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ABSTRACT 
The following thesis is concerned with what I have termed professional discourse. I 
have used the term to call attention to two elements. With professional, I have 
indicated a recent move in educational analysis and research on teachers and other 
practitioners which represents a shift to a concern with practical activities, a tacit or 
explicit resistance to theory, and an attempt to displace the cognitive paradigm of 
research and theorizing. With the notion of discourse, I have indicated that, in order 
that the as yet limited debate on professional activity be opened up, it has to be linked 
with the discourse on practice. By the latter, I mean the opposition between practice and 
theory at the analytical level, and its most recent unfoldings and manifestations. 
The thesis identifies a vocabulary of practice, implicating such concepts as reflection, 
repetition, judgment, skill, example, exemplar, and a series of oppositional terms, such 
as saying/showing, competence/performance, explicit/implicit knowledge. These serve 
as a link between the professional and the practical. The problematic of the 
theory/practice relation in its various formulations is, then, explicitly addressed in the 
work of Dreyfus, Habermas, Lyotard and Derrida. 
The thesis claims that (a) it is Dreyfus' thesis on exemplarity that makes the link 
possible between the professional and the practical, but (b) it is only with Habermas, 
Lyotard and Derrida that the professional/practical discourse can take its linguistic turn. 
Then the thesis addresses the implications of the linguistic turn. It argues that it is only 
through an examination of the metaphysical presuppositions of the linguistic turn that 
the claim of professional discourse to be free from the determinations of theory can be 
assessed; in particular, the research methodologies of professional discourse have not 
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"One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil" 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
This thesis raises the question of the relation between theory and practice, by tracing the 
debate on professionals' practical action, teachers' in particular, and by linking it to the 
discourse on practice. Three kinds of relation are presented. The first two are identified 
as the relation of opposition between theory and practice, and that of the reversed 
opposition (practice/theory) which respectively organize what is here called the 
'cognitivist', and the 'practical' paradigms of research. The third, by deconstructing 
some of the terms which define the opposition in its two modes, presents and argues for 
a displaced relation which multiplies the differences. 
That is to say, the third position starts with the understanding that there is an 
(hierarchical) opposition between theory and practice, itself defined by a series of 
opposed terms resting on the opposition between thinking, i.e., securing a rational 
foundation upon which one may establish the totality of what is knowable, and acting, 
i.e., conforming one's actions to the foundation so secured. The foundation grounds 
the theory of action - i.e., legitimates, furnishes criteria, and sets standards for action. 
This describes accurately, although in very general terms, the fundamental assumption 
of the cognitivist paradigm. 
Further, it embraces, as its working hypothesis, the Heideggerian hypothesis that 
metaphysical rationality produces its own closure. This means that the displacement of 
metaphysical conceptuality entails more than the abandonment of the foundational base. 
Theoretical moves, and specific empirical research projects which attempt to abandon 
the foundational base, tend to move to the practical. But this move reinscribes itself 
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into metaphysical determinations and/or falls into a crude empiricism in one way or 
another. The reviewing of relevant literature confirms the suspicion that, to state it 
strongly, the current debate on professional action, when and to the extent to which it 
moves to the practical, cannot but pay the price for the unthought determinants of its 
oppositional terms, with empiricism; i.e., recourse to cognitivist- psychological 
categories of analysis (e.g. perception, intuition), and the employment of a notion of 
subject which is the cognitive-psychological and/or practical-ethical - i.e., the active self 
who makes the law and obeys it; the latter, embedded in the dichotomy between 
constituted/constituting subject, is already anticipated in any critique of the philosophy 
of the subject. 
Hence, the thesis has chosen to be directed by the hypothesis that metaphysical closure 
necessitates deconstruction. The latter situates historically what appears to be a 
foundation; that is to say, the determinations - epochal constellations of presencing in 
the Heideggerian terminology- which have always already prescribed the terms in which 
the question of action can and must be raised (e.g., transcendental or linguistic as the 
most recent), the ground from which it is answered (e.g., cogito, discursive 
community), and the types of answers that must be adduced (hierarchy of imperatives, 
hierarchy of discursive interests -cognitive or emancipatory) [Schiirmann:1987:1-21]. 
At the same time, it situates itself historically: historically, it is the possibility of 
deconstruction of metaphysical oppositions; to be precise, it does not directly attack the 
opposition between theory and practice, which would allow one's position to be 
enclosed within it, rather it deconstructs the series of dichotomies within which and 
upon which the theory/practice relation currently rests. By uprooting action from rule-
coercion, it frees the space for analytical categories to be worked out. 
To facilitate the reviewing - in Part I of the thesis - of the empirical research on 
assessment of professional practices and of the more general field of the cognitive 
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sciences and cognitive procedures, the thesis has worked out the basic presuppositions 
of the cognitivist paradigm. These are: 
(i) a subject/object dichotomy, where a consciously or unconsciously knowing subject 
is directed to a world of objects, the latter governing the 'given' and the 'situation'; 
(ii) the subject acts as a consequence of, or is determined by, code/rules - inside the 
mind as mental/formal representations, or outside the mind as social rules- and by 
meanings either explicit or implicit; it is assumed that the latter can be analysed and 
made explicit; 
(iii) a concept of reflection on rules as a grounding for action, and as a grounding and 
unification of subjectivity, so that clarity about the rules clarifies and constitutes the 
mind of the subject and the quality of the action. Assessment turns on being clear about 
rules, principles, meaning (plan, programme). This either gives the sovereign subject, 
preconstituted prior to the social, or the enslaved subject, particularly in the marxist 
tradition, where the subject is the constituted subject within the social; e.g., Althusser's 
thesis on ideology and the mechanism of interpellation - a variant on reflection and re-
presentation which conceals the epistemological problematic of reflection, object re-
presentation and the transparency of the self; 
(iv) a certain conception of theory as an infinitely repeatable and demonstrable truth, and 
of the thesis as a position that stays the same within a system whose repeatability 
guarantees its place. This conception pressuposes the ideality of the 'object' of inquiry, 
that is to say, the notion of its being as presence so that the thesis can survive the 
present moment. This, in turn, is supposed to confirm the ideality of a 'subject' and its 
ability to transcend its temporality. 
The cognitivist paradigm of research and theorizing is propped up by the notion of 'rule 
following'; that is to say, the idea of language or any other signification system as a 
rule-governed system which presupposes that there is an unconditioned exterior - i.e., a 
rule - which regulates/governs/determines the conditioned - i.e., speech, the human 
subject, or the order of the activity. Three kinds of questions are then posed: What is a 
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rule? How does a rule regulate a discourse or a human subject? Where are the rules 
located? The last two questions tend to dominate the debate furnishing the following 
two answers. 
The first, put forward by advocates of the cognitive paradigm, argues that the order of 
the activity is determined either by the deep structure of the rule (Chomsky), or by our 
intending a rule (Husserl), where the rule is conceived, by virtue of its identity (i.e., its 
form), as intrinsically linked to the steps of the activity that it governs. This amounts to 
saying that rules located in the human mind or consciousness generate speech or 
performances. The deep structure of the rules is internalized within the human mind 
(level of competence) so that one can perform (level of performance). 
The second argues that the rules are located in social practices. Wittgenstein, in 
particular, in his critical stance towards cognitivism, rejects the idea of the rules 
underlying the diversity of uses, in favour of looking at these uses to see how they are 
in fact ordered. He finds no underlying essence but a "complicated network of 
similarities and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of 
detail" [1968:§66,§67]. This second answer postulates that 'following a rule' is a 
practice which one learns against a background or form of life. This important move 
to recognizing the significance of practice in the determination of action, brings with it 
an emphasis on illustration, demonstration, showing, and skilful attention of how old 
uses of, say, language, are connected with new ones, as well as a conception of 
community standards and agreement in language and/or rule-use. 
The last point, already an advance, because it repudiates and denies the causality of the 
rule or rule-intention, is theoretically crucial. However, most commentators offer a 
communitarian reading of Wittgenstein which, though accurate as far as it goes, is, 
nevertheless, open to the charge of conservatism - i.e., the criticism that it does not 
allow for change - and of anthropocentrism - i.e., the view that rule-following is 
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possible because people share certain judgments - and is ultimately communitarian in the 
sense that agreement is grounded in the notion of a community as substance, or even 
quite simply as an entity (a people, their language, a professional group, etc.). 
For the thesis, the problematic and the critique of 'rule following', presented in detail in 
chapter 3, indicates a general shift from the cognitivist paradigm to the practical. This 
shift becomes the main focus of the thesis. More specifically, two kinds of move to the 
practical are identified: 
(a) a general resistance to theory and an emphasis on practice and practical activity 
expressed in a practical vocabulary such as tacit knowledge, skill, judgment, 
context-specificity, practical considerations, know-how, reflection-in-action, etc. 
Disguised in this problematic, there remains intact the cognitivist paradigm by its 
emphasis and grounding on reflection, and its employment of the subject/object model. 
A representative piece of work, "The Reflective Practitioner" by Schon, is discussed in 
chapter 2; 
(b) a more direct and explicit questioning of, and opposition to, the cognitivist paradigm 
can be found in Dreyfus' work, discussed in chapter 4. This identifies the problematic 
of the theory/practice relation and confronts it at the analytical level. Drawing on the 
problematic of early Heidegger, as presented in chapter 1, Dreyfus exposes the 
presuppositions of cognitivism. He concentrates on the notion of rule, and presents a 
critique of the notion of reflection on rules. This leads him to a counter-proposal of 
types of action grounded on a non-cognitive base. Dreyfus indicates this base by using 
notions such as the Heideggerian 'background practices', Kuhn's 'exemplars' and 
Wittgenstein's 'forms of life'. The notions of rule and example/exemplar are used as 
indicative of two types of action-situation which are different in nature, opposed, and 
exclusive of its other. Moreover, it is argued that, as opposed to action determined by 
rules, reflection on acts or performances that are normalized and focused by exemplars, 
cannot furnish an account which would rationally (discursively) justify them. 
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You cannot have a theory of practical activity is the explicit position that Dreyfus takes 
as an implication of his analysis of the theory/practice relation. But the thesis implicit in 
Dreyfus' text is a model of exemplarity, the unseen metaphysical determinants of which 
request a response in the form of a question concerning the function of the notion of 
background practices in his framework. I will refrain from analysing here the 
difficulties and the specific problematic which led to the uncovering of this question; but 
what follows from that point onwards is a challenging of the assumption of self-
evidence, transparency and concreteness of the notion of practice that brings forth a 
series of other metaphysically employed terms such as perception, intuition, memory, 
image, representation, repetition, calculation and decision. These are all linked to the 
question of the subject, and of language. 
Chapter 5, then, links the problematic of the theory/practice relation to its linguistic turn 
via Habermas, since the latter claims to have made a break with the philosophy of 
consciousness through his notion of intersubjectivity in his theory of (linguistic) 
communicative action. The linguistic turn problematizes the structure of the 
theory/practice relation by linking practice to a (linguistic) performative act, a situation 
which poses the problem of how one moves from a language of identity to linguistic 
intersubjectivity through non-communication, dispersion and absolute difference. 
Implicated in this is 'speech act theory', and its examination links the work of 
Habermas to that of Derrida (chapter 6) and Lyotard (chapter 7) so that the metaphysical 
determinants of the theory/practice relation are examined with reference to the work of 
all three. In particular, because of the constative/performative distinction, the discourse 
on practice slips into a serious/play distinction which, quite simply, is the Platonic 
presupposition of logos/mythos and mimesis. 
With the following brief points, I would like now to situate, in this opening, the 
intention of my title: "Re-writing professional discourse". With this title, first, I 
subscribe to Dreyfus' statement that one cannot have a theory of practical activity, but 
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with the complicating remark that the oppositional logic on which it still rests, as I will 
explicate in this thesis, blocks a movement whose impossibility of description is the 
impossibility of concluding such a general theory. Hence the requirement to re-write a 
discourse which creates the possibility of movement. 
Secondly, I am aware that the thesis represents an attempt to challenge a teleocratic 
structure while writing in a teleocratic fashion. To re-write and displace logocentrism, 
which supports the oppositional structure on which exemplarity relies, is to intervene in 
a text and re-inscribe oneself into this text. It entails the stating of a thesis - i.e., a 
detachment - but one which is negotiated in a movement of detachment from/attachment 
to the specific texts. The result is presented as a series of theses in the final chapter, 
which amounts to arguing for the supplementary structure of exemplarity. It is 
supported by, and, at the same time, attempts to elaborate and explicate Derrida's 
statement which reads as follows: 
"What happens when acts or performances (discourse or writing, 
analysis or description, etc.) are part of the objects they designate? 
When they can be given as examples of precisely that of which they 
speak or write? Certainly, one does not gain an auto-reflective 
transparency, on the contrary. A reckoning is no longer possible, nor is 
an account, and the borders of the set are then neither closed nor open. 
Their trait is divided, and the interlacings can no longer be undone." 
[1987:391; emphasis added] 
Finally, the notion of an exemplar, a necessary feature of teaching and learning, almost 
subverts the very title of the thesis - its authority to designate a theme (e.g., 
professional) - by linking it to the pedagogical structure in general. Throughout the 
thesis, a pedagogical structure which repeats in different ways or forms, such as 
theory/practice, rule/example, judgment/decision, saying/showing, listening/hearing, 
etc., reveals its fundamental determination, viz., the metaphysics of presence. The 
latter governs the notion of theory (saying, but also phonocentrism) as pure seeing, and 
showing as pure handling of 'a thing'. As will become clear, the eye/hand and pure 
voice can never be eliminated but can be displaced, in particular, by a shift to voices and 
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listening and hearing, in order to weaken the full presence of phonocentrism and 
reinscribe the dichotomy of saying/showing [1]. The immediate steps in this process are 
indicated in the pragmatic conclusions. 
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PART ONE 
COGNITIVE RULES VS EXEMPLARS: DISPLACEMENT OR 
HIERARCHICAL REVERSAL 
"...In most 'crafts or branches of learning' what we call 'expertise' is 
the essence of the art. And for the domains of knowledge that we touch 
with our art, it is the 'rules of expertise' or the rules of 'good judgment' 
of the expert practitioners of the domain that we seek to transfer to our 
programs." 
" ...Experience has also taught us that much of this knowledge is 
private to the expert, not because he is unwilling to share publicly how 
he performs, but because he is unable. He knows more than he is aware 
of knowing. (Why else is the Ph.D or the Internship a guild-like 
apprenticeship to a presumed 'master of the craft'? What the masters 
really know is not written in the textbooks of the masters.)" 
[Feigenbaum:1977:1016-1017] 
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CHAPTER 1: THE COGNITIVE PARADIGM AND THE 
THEORY/PRACTICE OPPOSITION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Writers from various disciplines of the social sciences, including education studies, note 
- either as critics or as followers- the dominance of the cognitive paradigm. Its 
beginnings are often located in the late 1950's when the celebrated Chomsky - Skinner 
debate signalled a paradigm shift [Coulter:1983:1]. Though it is in psychology that a 
strong cognitive movement dominates over the classic behaviorist view, this is also and 
increasingly the case within theoretical linguistics, philosophy of mind and action, 
sociology, anthropology, and the exemplary field of cognitivism, namely, Artificial 
Intelligence (A.I). The latter, in fact, embodies and realizes the most basic principle of 
the cognitive view, viz., 
"...any form of information processing, whether natural or artificial, 
requires a device that has in some way or another, an internal model or 
representation of the environment in which it operates." 
[Mey:1982:xv] 
If the cognitive view has been widely discussed, elucidated and applied in the various 
disciplines and multi-disciplinary studies ('Cognitive Studies'), in the last two decades 
or so, its basic assumptions are not new. In fact, being as old as the Greek metaphysical 
understanding of everything as 'formed matter, the cognitive view, in its modern form, 
is formulated by Husserl's phenomenology, which is aimed at a purely ideal 
objectivity. For only an ideal objectivity is capable of being known or experienced as 
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identically the same for different subjects, who cannot share identically the same real 
sensory contents. 
I will not trace here the history of cognitivism, though I will have the opportunity to 
refer to this history at several points throughout the thesis. Instead, I would like to give 
a few examples, in order to show the extent to which the contemporary thinking and 
searching about knowledge and action is framed by the cognitive paradigm, the latter 
itself understood as a cognitive structure which shapes expectations and guides research 
activities [Mey:ibid: xvii]. 
Mey formulates his proposal for the extension of the cognitive viewpoint in the study of 
science with the following words: 
"Science is a socially organized process of knowledge acquisition. It 
might be impressive because of the hugeness of the organization it has 
acquired by now or because of the long list of achievements it has 
accumulated, but this does not imply that it yields knowledge which is 
basically different from the knowledge a cook has of spices, or a farmer 
of the weather, or a salesman of buyers. When the cognitive view is 
applied to science, it is not because science is a priori considered a 
superior and very special kind of knowledge, but it is because science is 
just another kind of knowledge and the cognitive view should hold as 
well for science as it does for more modest forms of knowledge." 
[ibid:xvi] 
In this view, the traditional dichotomy between common sense/theory, or 
practical/theoretical knowledge is bridged by the fact that, in both cases, knowledge is 
attributed to common cognitive processes in individuals or, at best, in individuals 
functioning within certain patterns of social organization. 
J. Lave, in her critical reviewing of the literature on cognitive theory, attempts to free 
the study of cognition from its tight cognitivist chains. She focuses on one particular 
form of cognitive activity, arithmetic problem solving, and uncovers the implicit logic of 
cognitive science, namely, the competence/performance distinction. This requires the 
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psychological mechanism of learning transfer to account for stability and continuity 
of cognitive activity across different situations. The exemplar for the forementioned 
distinction is provided by experimentation in cognitive psychology: 
"...psychological experimentation...looks for evidence of stable 
(mental) structures at a moment in time, and values the ability of 
experimental methods to keep history and past experience from 
'contaminating' the investigation of that structure..." 
[1988:191-192,n.3] 
It is quite obvious that such a conceptualization of the mind (the sovereign subject) 
parallels that of the conceptualization of the subject as constituted within the social (the 
enslaved subject), the mechanism of interpellation - a variant of representation - being 
the direct analogue of the psychological mechanism of learning transfer. 
A further assumption of cognitivism, namely a certain notion of rationality, is well 
exposed by a growing body of serious critiques that have come from a broad post-
structuralist perspective [for example, Walkerdine 1988; Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, 
Venn & Walkerdine:1984]. Hindess (1988), in his discussion of the example of the 
rational choice approach to human behavior - economic activity in particular - uncovers 
a number of questionable assumptions about actors and about their rationality 
presupposed by this approach. Actors are assumed to act rationally, and their actions 
are supposed to follow from their beliefs, desires and other states of mind to be got 
at by intentional analysis. Rational choice theories rely upon an explicit 
methodological individualism, which presents social life as if it were reducible to the 
actions of rational individuals and their often unintended consequences; though most of 
them, Hindess correcly argues, depend on an implicit assumption of structural 
determination in analysing the forms of thought employed by actors. In any case, as I 
will argue in chapter 5, when we move from the view of the individual with intentions, 
to the view of the linguistic subject, which is supposed to acquire and master a system 
of rules, a crucial debate between intention/ convention is glossed over with the 
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consequence that the rational, as the cognitive and representational element, prevails as 
that which determines action. This, however, is at the expense of an important area of 
inquiry, namely decision and judgment. 
In chapter 2 below, I present empirical research projects into professional activity, 
professional education and professional development, and I treat this area as an instance 
which will enable me to expose the model of action presupposed by the cognitive 
paradigm. The subject/object dichotomy, on which the model rests, is evident in all the 
studies reviewed there. The problem is often formulated in terms of a body of 
knowledge possessed by a practitioner, and an object domain on which the practitioner 
is to act upon. Moreover, the understanding of the 'knowledge domain' is caught in the 
dichotomy of explicit/implicit in such a way that 
"...if we are to develop rational educational practice...we must start 
from a consideration of current practice, the rules and principles it 
actually embodies and the knowledge, beliefs and principles that the 
practitioners employ in both characterising that practice and deciding 
what ought to be done... Getting at current practice and policy will 
necessarily involve articulating accurately the concepts and categories 
that practitioners use implicitly and explicitly..." 
[Hirst:1983:16] 
As a consequence, the question of research into professional activity is posed as the 
elicitation of tacit knowledge via an individual expert (Bliss & Ogbom:1987), which, 
further, requires the formation of hypotheses about the underlying knowledge-structure, 
to be tested against how well they predict expert performance. The notion of tacit 
knowledge conveys a basic assumption of cognitivism, namely, that actions are 
determined by rules which may no longer be available to attention (overleamed skills) 
or by schemes abstracted from the structures of action (internalisation). 
I will refrain from commenting on these assumptions at this point, as they will be dealt 
with in detail in chapter 3. Instead, I would like to propose that we look at the debate on 
professional activity, and read the currently dominant opposition between theory and 
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practice that characterizes it in terms of the dichotomies which support it and which I 
have just introduced here; namely, explicit/implicit - and the related distinction between 
verbal/non-verbal - knowledge, common sense/theoretical understanding, 
theoretical/practical reasoning, and competence/performance. Further, I would like to 
introduce, in the section which immediately follows, aspects of Heidegger's early work 
that challenge these dichotomies and render them problematic. To indicate the 
problematic, in his "Being and Time" (1962) Heidegger, in seeking to challenge the 
mentalistic framework of Husserl's phenomenology, focuses on a notion of practical 
activity, which is based on the observation that our directedness towards objects 
('intentionality') is practical rather than cognitive, and that the primary form of 
understanding is doing something for a purpose rather than being conscious of 
something. 
With such an alternative framework, I will, then, in chapter 2, look at empirical research 
projects into professional activity, with a view to demonstrating that the forementioned 
dichotomies of the cognitive paradigm are the domimant categories through which 
action and professional activity are currently being thought, understood and researched. 
Further, I will show that these dichotomies function, and direct research, even in cases 
where there is a stated intention to challenge cognitivism, by questioning, for example, 
the idea of rationality of action that the latter presupposes, and by shifting to the 
practical - i.e., away from theory and towards the view that knowledge and action 
cannot be understood outside their specific contexts. 
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1.2 HEIDEGGER ON THE RELATION BETWEEN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 
The early work of Heidegger promises at least two concrete gains regarding the 
dichotomy between theory/ practice: 
(i)a clarification of the concepts of practice and theory which might enable one to develop 
a vocabulary, subversive of any move towards dichotomization and hierarchization of 
theory/ practice. With regard to this, I will consider Heidegger's formulation of four 
kinds (levels) of activity, which reveal four different ways in which 'subjects' stand 
towards 'objects', and examine the kinds of hierarchies which are suggested; 
(ii)a subordination of theory/ practice dichotomy to 'Dasein' (being-there, human being); 
With regard to this, the notion of 'Dasein as a situation' will be considered. 
Further, the Heideggerian framework questions two basic assumptions implicated in the 
theory/practice dichotomy - namely, reflection and the philosophy of consciousness. 
With regard to the former, the dichotomy between implicit/ explicit knowledge, for 
example, which is presupposed in the current debate on professional practice, leads to 
the strategy that the implicit must become explicit as an object of representation which 
would then direct action. It is, therefore, presupposed that one acts better if s/he is clear 
about the beliefs, cognitive structures, rules, dispositions, etc., which are held to 
determine action. While the Heideggerian position would not want to deny that 
deliberation very often takes place, it would nevertheless question a move which posits 
that action depends on the reflective clarification of cognitive representations. 
With regard to the latter, a question, for example, often posed in terms of a dichotomy 
between verbal/non-verbal knowledge, addresses the issue of whether there is a 
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difference between saying that a person understands something or somebody and 
claiming that that person can display the knowledge-base of this understanding, 
especially when the latter privileges the linguistic form. Such a formulation of the 
problem, i.e, as an attempt to make explicit the structure of the intentional content of the 
mind which directs action, displays both a particular philosophical position, i.e, a 
philosophy of 'consciousness', and the adoption of a particular notion of understanding 
which is congruent with this position. That is to say, the 'scientific' mode of 
understanding, which is equated with being able to say how - describe procedures - and 
why - explaining -. However, it is possible to show, as Heidegger did, that this view of 
understanding is only a specific case and therefore it cannot be taken as foundational. 
The rupture that Heidegger brings to the traditional model of reflection and the 
philosophy of consciousness, can be captured by contrasting his starting point with that 
of Husserl. For Husserl, the common characteristic of all mental experiences is 
directedness towards or reference to a meant object. The essence of mental experience is 
intentionality. Husserl gives a transcendental argument concerning the necessary 
conditions for the possibility of intentionality. As Okrent [1988:6-10] explains,since 
Kant, all transcendental arguments have proceeded in two stages: first, one argues that 
some set of conditions is necessary for intentionality or some particular kind of 
intentional state (e.g. consciousness, experience); then, secondly, one argues that these 
conditions fix the conditions that an object or entity must satisfy if it is to be capable of 
being intended (thought of, experienced, meant). 
Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, which takes intentionality as its object of 
inquiry, proposes the following moves [Dreyfus & Haugeland:1978:228-229] [1]: 
(i) through eidetic reduction one determines the eidos of a kind of thing through 
"free imaginative variation"; that is to say, one imagines varying a thing in various ways 
and checking intuitively if it would still count as the kind of thing in question; 
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(ii) through transcendental reduction attention is transferred from what our 
thoughts are standardly about to the very senses or meanings of those acts of thinking 
themselves, i.e., to the noemata of those noetic acts. This moment becomes a radical 
bracketing of the entire natural attitude, to reveal how entities are intended by pure 
consciousness (transcendental consciousness) in their essential whatness, free from 
individuating characteristics. The noema is not an (actual) object but becomes the object 
for the phenomenological reduction (object as meant) which is directed not towards 
objects but towards the modes in which consciousness is aware of objects. 
Heidegger, too, gives a transcendental argument concerning the necessary conditions 
for the possibility of intentionality. But his transcendental argument is distinct in two 
ways [Okrent;op.cit.]: 
(i) he believes that the tradition has failed to address an important question regarding 
intentionality, thus making the mistake of moving directly from a transcendental 
discussion of it to the attempt to ground metaphysics. This means that the tradition 
thinks of the intentional agent as a substance to which a range of properties are 
attributed: mental properties, private mental states, consciousness and self-
consciousness, which cause that being to act. Heidegger's answer to the question of the 
nature of the intender is that to be an intentional agent is to be a certain kind of 
organized activity (temporality); 
(ii) the early Heidegger thought that it was possible to combat subjectivism, and he 
hoped to show that the proper answer to the question of the meaning of Dasein's being 
(Dasein as a being of the same ontological sort that we are), namely, a pragmatic, anti-
mentalistic, agency-centered answer to the question of 'what are the necessary 
conditions for being an intentional agent, would lead to the appropriate, anti-subjectivist 
answer to the question of the meaning of being; namely, a non-subject-centered account 
of the conditions under which an entity can appropriately be said to be [Olcrentibid:7] 
[2]. 
24 
More specifically, Heidegger, in "Being and Time", offers a phenomenological analysis 
of everyday masterful, practical know-how that dispenses altogether with the need for 
mental states such as desiring, believing, following a rule, etc. and thus with the notion 
of an 'intentional content'. Though he does not deny that there is a place for 
contemplation and consciously-directed action, he nonetheless reminds us that first and 
foremost we are coping beings already involved in the world. He calls this kind of 
everyday skilful coping 'primordial understanding', with the entities thus encountered 
'ready-to-hand' and thus locates the starting point of Husserl's phenomenology at the 
'unready-to-hand' level; that is to say, situations where 'transparent coping' is 
disturbed, a fact which raises the possibility of the reflecting and problem-solving 
subject. 
The contrast between Husserl and Heidegger, even in this summary form, calls 
attention to two kinds of issues which I will subsequently attempt to explore: first, the 
status of the claim that human beings are in a primary sense 'observing subjects' or 
'knowing beings', and the model of perception/seeing implied in this position; second, 
the primacy or not of practical activity over theorizing and its implications for the 
conceptualization of the relationship between theory and practice. 
With regard to the first issue, Heidegger avoids the Cartesian/ Husserlian problem 
which arises from starting with an isolated, individual self, by explaining things the 
other way round: he starts with the conforming public self and then tries to show how 
the autonomous individual crystalizes out of this rather amorphous 'public us'. Dasein 
points to the fact that human beings are always a shared, social, situated way of being 
and only sometimes are conscious subjects directed towards objects. 
With regard to the second issue, Heidegger wants to expose the principle of reflection -
i.e., that true knowledge of the world is to be gained by means of detached, 
disinterested reflection - as an error of traditional epistemology, and thus, to put 
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consciousness and knowledge into proper perspective, which is to show how the latter 
arises out of involved, everyday practical activity. Thus, he starts with involved acting 
in the world to claim that detached knowing is a deficient modification of everyday 
involvement. In this sense, passive perception is seen as an impoverished and derivative 
version of our natural tendency to manipulate things. But it is not just practical activity 
Heidegger wants to make primary; more importantly, he wants to show, first, that the 
practical activity cannot be analysed using Husserl's account of intentionality. 
Secondly, he wants to emphasise that there is a more basic way of being than either 
detachment or involvement [Dreyfus:1987a:59]. Thus, in Heidegger, there is no 
suggestion that intentionality is to be taken as a mark of the mental or a distinguishing 
characteristic of consciousness. His term 'comportment', equated here with 
directionality, just means behaviour or conduct, and has no mentalistic overtones. 
Heidegger accepts Husserl's overall formulation of intentionality, but rejects the notion 
that this concept is applicable primarily or exclusively to the mind. He wants to 
understand intentionality as characterizing not merely acts of consciousness, but 
activity in general. Thus, intentionality is attributed to Dasein rather than 
consciousness. He points out that it is part of the essentialism of the tradition to 
introduce some kind of intentional content to explain the directedness of the mind and 
bridge the gap between subject and object. 
To break out of this epistemological tradition, Heidegger begins with everyday involved 
phenomena and then sees where consciousness and its intentional content -'thematizing 
consciousness' - fits in. Thus, he starts with the following [Dreyfus: 1987a:63] : (i) we 
do not need to bring thematizing consciousness into our description of ongoing, 
everyday activity; where it comes in, it presupposes non-thematic consciousness; (ii) 
thematizing consciousness need not be reflective; indeed, most of the time people who 
have beliefs and desires do not reflect on them; (iii) if we start with intentional 
awareness, Heidegger argues, even with tacit or unthematic or pre-reflective mental 
states, we will distort the phenomenon of everyday coping and be led back into all the 
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old epistemological problems. The importance of this move becomes apparent if we 
pause here to think of the consequences of the move to take 'intentionality', 'mental 
states', 'reflection', 'thematic consciousness' as the main paradigm of thinking about 
human beings and their relationships to the 'world'. One might want to draw a parallel 
between this and the dominant approach which takes intelligence as sequential reasoning 
to be a paradigm of human reasoning in general. Taken together, these two moves may 
account for the 'cognitive' perspective, both in its psychological stream - how people 
process information - and the epistemological stream - how people know and how they 
know it - which is at the heart of research on A.I and 'Expert Systems' (see chapter 3). 
Heidegger's break with the epistemological tradition is conveyed in the notion of 
Being-in-the-world, the most important and original contribution of "Being and 
Time". Its understanding presupposes the clarification of the notion of 'world'. Dreyfus 
[1987a:65-70a] analyses the notion of 'world' by distinguishing the categorial 
(characterized by indifference) and existential (characterized by concern) ways in which 
the term is used. Further, he distinguishes an ontical sense (which relates to entities) 
from an ontological sense (which relates to the way of being of those entities). Thus, 
according to Dreyfus, Heidegger allows four uses of 'world': two uses where 'in' 
indicates an in-clusion Heidegger calls 'universe'; the other two where 'in' indicates an 
in-volvement he calls 'world'. More specifically, (a) the ontical-categorial sense of 
'universe' (no. 1) refers to the totality of objects of a certain kind; e.g. the physical 
universe as the set of all physical objects, or a universe of discourse, e.g., mathematics 
as the realm of all possible objects of mathematics; (b) the ontological-categorial sense 
(no. 2): a set of particulars can be specified in terms of the essential characteristics of the 
entities which fall in the set. Thus, 'physical world' could mean the essential 
characteristics of the set of all physical objects in the universe; (c) the ontical-existentiell 
sense (no. 3), which is better captured by examples, e.g., 'the child's world' and the 
'business world'. A contrast between, say, the 'physical world' as a set of objects (no. 
1) and 'the world of the physicist' as a constellation of practices and concerns (no. 3) 
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shows a difference in understanding; that is to say, in the latter case, first, our 
understanding of world is pre-ontological in that it is an understanding of what we are 
and a specification of what, in general, it means to be, which is in the practices, 
although it need not be noticed or spelled out. Secondly, there is no such thing as 'my 
world', if this is taken as some private sphere of experience and meaning, which is self-
sufficient and intelligible in itself, and so, more fundamental than the shared public 
world and its local modes. Heidegger thinks that it belongs to the very idea of a world 
that can, in principle, be shared, so 'the world' is always prior to 'my world'; (d) the 
ontological-existential sense (no. 4): this is the structure common to our most general 
system of practices and to any of its sub-regions. Though we can never abstract the 
world's essential structure so as to be able to describe it to a pure intelligence who does 
not in-habit our world, we can still point out to those who dwell in the world with us 
certain prominent structural aspects of this actual world. 
With this analysis, Heidegger seeks to show that the categorial sense of world, with its 
subjects and objects, can only be understood in terms of the existential sense of our 
shared world and not vice versa. He wants to 'concretely demonstrate' that there is an 
involved way of encountering entities, which reveals a way of being of these entities 
which is inaccessible to a detached knower or viewer.This involved way underlies both 
theory and practice, and cannot be explained in terms of cartesian subject/ object 
intentionality [Dreyfus:1987a:71]. 
Heidegger notes that we do not by and large encounter 'mere things', but rather we use 
things to get things done. He calls those entities which we encounter in concern 
'equipment'. For something to function as equipment in Heidegger's sense, there must 
be a whole context of other equipment in which this piece functions. This point is very 
important: an 'item' of equipment is what it is only insofar as it fits, in a certain way, 
into an 'equipment whole', a 'referential context'. In Heidegger's own words: 
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"Each particular equipmental thing has as such a specific reference to 
another particular equipmental thing...Every entity that we uncover as 
equipment has with it a specific functionality. The contexture of the 
what-for or in-order-to is a whole of functionality relations. This 
functionality which each entity carries with it within the whole 
functionality complex is not a property adhering to the thing, and it is 
also not a relation which the thing has only on account of the present-at-
hand of another entity." 
[Heidegger, quoted in Dreyfus:ibid:74] 
Heidegger calls the way of being of those entities which are defined by their use 
'readiness to hand' and notes that perception - subject sees object - cannot be the mode 
of access of anything ready-to-hand. In fact, when we are using the equipment, it has a 
tendency to 'disappear'. We are not aware of it as having any characteristics at all 
[Dreyfus:1987a:76]. 
Everyday skilled activity involves knowledge of what a piece of equipment is. 
However, this primordial understanding should be distinguished, first, from a positive 
understanding of equipment - i.e., mere familiarity with its normal cultural function. 
Secondly, primordial intentionality, while not deliberate action in the traditional 
intentionalistic sense - i.e., requiring beliefs, desires and goals - in no sense indicates an 
adherence to behaviourism [3]. The behaviour is directed but, in this case, it is not the 
mind which is directed but the person going about his/her business; this directedness 
reveals what it is directed towards under an aspect. To carry on directed activity one 
need not have the relevant goal in mind, nor need one have ever had the goal in mind. 
[Dreyfus:1987a:79-80]. Thus, the description of skilled activity enables Heidegger to 
introduce both a new kind of intentionality (transparent use) which is not that of a self-
contained subject, and a new sort of entity encountered (equipment) which is not a 
determinate, isolable object. Starting from primordial intentionality, Heidegger then 
sketches how thematic consciousness and its objects enter the picture: 
"Being-in-the-world...amounts to a non-thematic circumspective 
absorption in references or assignments constitutive for the readiness-
to-hand of a totality of equipment...the present-at-hand of entities is 
thrust to the fore by the possible breaks in that referential totality in 
which circumspection 'operates'." 
[Heidegger:1962:107] 
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Traditional intentionality is, therefore, introduced at the point where there is a 
disturbance or breakdown, when it rises to the level of deliberate attention. He describes 
three modes of disturbance that progressively bring to the fore both Dasein as a knower 
and the present-at-hand way of being of isolated, determinate substances, which 
'underlies' the ready-to-hand ways of being of equipment. Dreyfus's elaborate analysis 
at this point is worth paying attention to, as he is attaching more emphasis on these 
different modes of breakdown than the Heideggerian text warrants. Basically, 
Dreyfus's claim is that what he calls 'temporary breakdown' and 'total breakdown' 
reveal two new modes of encountering entities and two new ways of being of entities. 
A third kind of breakdown, 'malfunction', provides a preview of these two. Thus: 
(1) when equipment malfunctions, Heidegger says, we discover its unusability by the 
"circumspection of the dealings in which we use it", and the equipment thereby 
becomes 'conspicuous'. "Conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand equipment as in 
a certain un-readiness-to-hand" [Heidegger:1962:102-3]. Nevertheless, for most normal 
forms of malfunction, we have a ready way of coping so that we easily shift to the new 
way of coping and go on. "Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment 
but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of something with which one concerns 
oneself' [ibid:103]. Another response is to ask for help; coping with malfunction 
"may take some such form as [saying] 'The hammer is too heavy', or 
rather just 'Too heavy', 'hand me the other hammer'. Interpretation, is 
carried out primordially not in a theoretical statement but in an action of 
circumspective concern - laying aside the unsuitable tool, or exchanging 
it, 'without wasting words'." 
[ibid:200] 
In such cases, transparent circumspective behavior is so quickly and easily re-
established that no new stance on the part of Dasein is required. 
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(2) Further disturbance would lead to temporary breakdown which is the transition from 
involved coping to involved deliberation. Dreyfus describes this kind of disturbance as 
follows: 
"When there is a serious disturbance and even deliberate activity is blocked, 
Dasein is forced into a new stance.This attitude is called 'deliberation', and 
involves reflective planning. But even deliberation is not the sort of detached 
theoretical reflection described by the tradition." 
[1987a:85] 
This kind of deliberation is what is known as practical reflection, which can either be 
limited to a local situation or it can take account of what is not present. Heidegger calls 
this latter kind 'envisaging': "In envisaging, one's deliberation catches sight directly of 
that which is needed but which is un-ready-to-hand" [Heidegger:1962:410]. 
If one starts from the level of 'envisaging', as traditional epistemology actually does, 
then the next move is to see the subject as being related to an object by means of some 
mental content. Mental representations are assumed to be special meanings in the mind 
of the subject, which can be described in complete independence of the world, while the 
objects of such representations are context-free, independent referents. Heidegger 
specifically rejects this interpretation of our ability to relate to objects in terms of the 
contents of a subject - a mind containing 'internal representations'. More specifically, he 
argues: (i). in situations of involved deliberation, envisaging does not relate itself to 
'mere representations'; however, (ii)., it is not denied that when skilful coping reaches 
its limits and requires deliberate attention, there is a 'subject' conscious of objects. 
Heidegger, though, emphasises the need for this 'subject' to be described accurately 
and interpreted anew. Further, (iii)., even when people have beliefs, desires, plans, 
follow rules etc, such 'mental representations' make no sense except against a 
background of practices. 
Dreyfus illustrates the last point by looking at the role speech-act rules play on the un-
ready-to-hand level. When one is acting transparently, e.g., making a promise, s/he 
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does not need any rules at all. S/he has learned from examples how to do it. If 
something goes wrong, a rule is then invoked; this rule, though, is not a strict rule 
whose conditions of application are stated in the rule itself. It is a 'ceteris paribus' rule. 
'Ceteris paribus' rules generally work as a consequence of our shared background 
practices - i.e., everyday transparent ways of coping. They are not in the mind, but 
rather in the ways we have learned to behave. Dreyfus concludes on this point: 
"Thus even when rules, beliefs and desires play an explanatory role on 
the un-ready-to-hand level, they cannot be analysed as the self-
contained representations supposed by the tradition, nor do they simply 
depend on a network of other beliefs and desires, etc. Deliberative 
activity remains dependent upon Dasein's involvement in a transparent 
background of coping skills." 
[Dreyfus:1987a:89] 
Thus, in Dreyfus's reading [1987a:90:91,n.13], once it becomes clear that the 
subject/object relation arises only on the level of the unready-to-hand, there are two 
objections to cognitivism: (a) this relation only makes sense against a background which 
itself cannot be analysed in terms of further mental states; and (b) a mental state is not a 
relation to a representation but is in direct relation to its object. Moreover, this relation is 
a derivative form of intentionality which presupposes a mode of being which is not a 
relation at all, and, therefore, the relation between mind and things is not basic. 
Thus far temporary breakdown has been seen from the perspective of Dasein. Situations 
of disturbance of transparent coping should now be seen from the side of the entities. 
These situations reveal something like an 'object' which is not an isolable, self-
sufficient, substance assumed by the tradition, but an object contextually defined by its 
failure to be ready-to-hand. Two points are important here: (i) the un-ready-to-hand 
necessarily shows up in a practical context: 
"When something cannot be used - when, for instance, a tool definitely 
refuses to work - it can be conspicuous only in and for dealings in 
which something is manipulated. Even by the sharpest and most 
persevering 'perception' and 'representation' of things, one can never 
discover anything like the damaging of a tool." 
[Heidegger:1962:406] 
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(ii) When equipment temporarily breaks down, involved users no longer encounter 
equipment as transparent, but as having specific characteristics. Thus, a way of 
equipment is revealed which is more determinate than transparent functioning; yet it is 
not that of an isolated, present-at-hand thing with present-at-hand properties: 
"When we are using a tool circumspectively, we can say,for instance, 
that the hammer is too heavy or too light. Even the proposition that the 
hammer is heavy can give expression to a concernful deliberation, and 
signify that the hammer is not an easy one - in other words, that it takes 
force to handle it, or that it will be hard to manipulate." 
[ibid:412] 
Dreyfus calls those situational characteristics which are revealed in situations of 
breakdown, 'aspects: in order to distinguish them from the decontextualized features 
Heidegger calls 'properties'. He notes that although we spend most of our lives either 
transparently coping or dealing with things in terms of the aspects they reveal when 
there is a disturbance, the philosophical tradition has nothing to say about aspects. 
(3) In situations of total breakdown, there is a transition from involved deliberation and 
its 'objects' to theoretical reflection and its objects. 
"The more urgently we need what is missing, and the more 
authentically it is encountered in its un-readiness-to-hand, all the more 
obtrusive... does that which is ready-to-hand become - so much so, 
indeed, that it seems to lose its character of readiness-to-hand. It reveals 
itself as something just present-at hand and no more..." 
[ibid:103] 
(i) Once our work is permanently interrupted, we can either stare helplessly at the 
remaining objects, or we can try to fit the objects, which now have no practical context, 
into some new explanatory framework; (ii) only when ongoing activity stops, is there 
room for theoretical reflection. For Heidegger, the theoretical attitude presupposes a 
withholding of the practical attitude. This means that theoretical explanation is that kind 
of acting which starts with the present-at-hand. Further, the theoretical isolation of 
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properties (looking away from their context) needs to be independently motivated and 
requires its own kinds of skills [Dreyfus:1987a: 95-96]. 
It should be noted here that Heidegger's elaboration of the special character of the 
theoretical attitude, i.e, the conditions of the possibility of Dasein's existing in the way 
of scientific research, seems to point to a difference between a 'theoretical' and a 
'practical' statement. For example, in situations of temporal breakdown, 'heaviness', in 
the assertion 'the hammer is heavy', is encountered under an aspect. In contrast, in 
theoretical explanation, 'heaviness' is encountered as a property. In Heidegger's own 
words: 
"... this proposition can also mean that the entity before us, which we 
already know circumspectively as a hammer, has a weight - That is to 
say, it has the 'property' of heaviness...When this kind of talk is so 
understood, it is no longer spoken within the horizon of awaiting and 
retaining an equipmental totality and its involvement-relationships." 
[Heidegger:1962: 412] 
Once characteristics are no longer related to one another in a concrete, everyday, 
meaningful way as aspects of an object in a particular context, the isolated properties of 
the present-at-hand entities can be quantified and related by scientific covering laws. 
Dreyfus [1987a:97] formulates Heidegger's position on the 'theoretical attitude' in the 
. folot 
 wmg way: (i). it is necessary to get beyond our local practical concerns in order to 
be able to encounter 'mere' objects; (ii). the 'bare facts' related by scientific laws are 
isolated by a special activity of selective seeing rather than simply found; (iii). 
scientifically relevant 'facts' are not merely removed from their context by selective 
seeing; they are theory-laden, i.e., recontextualized in a new projection. 
4) Pure contemplation: This is pure staring at entities. Heidegger claims that this stance 
provides the basis for traditional ontology. 
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MODES OF BEING OF ENTITIES OTHER THAN DASEIN 
What occurs Dasein's stance 
(modes of concern) 
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properties, and objects as 
collections of properties. 
(Hammer weighs 500 
grams). 
Also features, attributes, 
etc. 
Recontextualised. 
The 	 universe 	 as law- 
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Just 	 looking 	 at 
something. 
(Curiosity.) 
What traditional ontology 
mistakenly 	 interprets 	 as 
pure present-at-hand: bare 
facts, 	 sense 	 data, 	 res 
extensa,nature, etc 
Table 1.2.1. 
Source: Dreyfus, 1987 (a):103a 
Table 1.2.1 (reproduced from Dreyfus:1987a:103a:Table 4) summarizes the four ways 
Dasein can relate to entities and the four ways of being of the entities thus revealed. 
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Dreyfus [1987a:101-103] concludes his reading of early Heidegger by postulating the 
priority of the everyday copying which he justifies in the following way: 
(1) for Heidegger, mental states in which subjects stand over against objects, are not 
necessary for Dasein's way of being. Dasein could stay on the level of ready-to-hand 
and just cope. Husserl, in contrast, would say that skills are just unconscious rule-
following. A modified position, for example, Searle's [4], although admitting that skills 
do not need to be caused by intentional states, would still argue that any sequence of 
skilled activity must be initiated by a fullfledged intentional state. This latter position, 
however, would make primordial intentionality and mental intentionality equiprimordial, 
since each would require the other, 
(2) transparent coping does not require intentional awareness, while intentional 
awareness does require transparent coping. The point is that while transparent coping is 
intentional, in Searle's sense, its details are not contained in, nor explained by, the 
intentional content of conscious intentions. In the execution of an action, one calls upon 
the flexible, adaptive, transparent, everyday coping, and it is in this sense that these 
basic skills are called 'primordial intentionality'. The latter is both necessary and 
sufficient for Dasein's everyday activity. Therefore, the everyday, ready-to-hand coping 
is more fundamental than the epistemological level of subjects directed towards objects; 
this is to be interpreted as saying that the whole activity of both thematic intentionality 
and non-thematic coping takes place against a background of transparent ready-to-hand 
coping. Moreover, this background is understood as a holistic web of practices, 
containing a unified style or understanding of being. 
In Mark Okrent's interpretation of Heidegger, the last, somewhat descriptive, point of 
Dreyfus becomes clearer in its significance, because the former emphasises and 
illuminates, to use the latter's words, the view of a unified style or 
understanding of being which grounds both practical and theoretical knowledge. 
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His line of argument is the following. Okrent sets out to understand the stand-point 
under which Heidegger can claim that "[understanding] is the condition of possibility 
for all kinds of comportment, not only practical but also cognitive" [Heidegger, quoted 
in Okrent:1988:23]. He recalls that, traditionally, a distinction is drawn between 
cognitive and practical understanding. Cognitive (theoretical) understanding is the 
subsumption under a concept, which results in a judgement of the form 'x is y'. 
Practical understanding is associated with some practical ability; to understand in this 
way is to know how to accomplish a number of tasks [ibid:14]. Okrent, then, claims 
that, in Heidegger, there is overwhelming textual evidence that the word 
'understanding' is used in the sense of practical coping, and that cognitive 
understanding is seen as a derivative of practical understanding [ibid:25]. On the other 
hand, he claims, Heidegger does hold the position which seems to derive from the 
cognitive sense of the term, that is to say, the claim that, perhaps as a function of the 
role of beliefs in all intentions, one cannot intend anything without having some beliefs 
in regard to that thing. Indeed, in the traditional cognitive sense, understanding amounts 
to taking something as something, or having a belief in regard to it. Heidegger would 
agree, but he would further suggest that it is possible to be aware of 'something' 
without having any beliefs in regard to it, or being aware of it as something with a 
definite character. Further, Okrent argues that Heidegger grants some sort of priority to 
self-understanding, and interprets the claim that "understanding is practical copying" as 
asserting one of the following: either that one can't intend oneself unless one 
understands oneself, and that one can't intend anything else unless one intends oneself; 
that is, the claim that there are no intentions without practical self-understanding. Or, the 
different claim, that there can be no intentions directed towards a thing unless we 
understand it; that is, unless we have practical understanding of the thing intended, 
which is, of course, wildly implausible [ibid:24]. Notice here that Heidegger is 
upsetting the traditional dichotomy of cognitive/practical understanding, with a 
corresponding radical transformation of the notion of belief, but this is only for the 
purpose of assisting in the radical shift of intentionality from consciousness to practical 
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self-understanding. Thus, it is argued that the conditions of the possibility of all 
intentionality is practical self-understanding or, in Okrent's words, "competence over 
being as existing" [ibid:25]. 
In his elaboration of this last claim [ibid:28], Okrent shows the full sense in which 
Heidegger argues for the priority of the practical over the theoretical. Following Kant, 
Heidegger still sees the subject as the source of the unity among our intentions of 
objects, albeit with a radical transformation of subject and object through his notion of 
Dasein. But he diverges from Kant in thinking of the primary unity of experience as a 
practical rather than a theoretical one. This means that Dasein always understands itself 
as action-oriented or, better still, as 'for-the-sake-of-which', which Okrent translates as 
'purposiveness' to denote the being of Dasein. 
Heidegger's claim, then, that Dasein understands itself and does so by understanding 
its own being, is the claim that understanding consists in Dasein's projecting a 'for-the-
sake-of-which' in terms of which these things other than Dasein have significance, and, 
furthermore, that one's understanding of oneself is a 'for-the-sake-of-which' to be 
accomplished [ibid:30]. This is actually what Heidegger means by saying that Dasein is 
'aware of something' without having any beliefs; Dasein is aware of possibilities, and 
to project possibilites is not to 'grasp thematically' that which is projected. As Okrent 
puts it, 
"...the purpose of my actions, which is my self understanding, is not 
identical with any thought I might have of myself as being in a certain 
way in the future or with any mental intention on my part." 
[ibid:36] 
For, in Heidegger's words, 
"[g]rasping [a possibility] in such a manner would take away from what 
is projected its very character as a possibility, and would reduce it to the 
given contents which we have in mind." 
[1962:185] 
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To conclude, Heidegger's claim that self-understanding as 'directedness' or 
'purposiveness' is the condition of possibility of all understanding, is to be understood 
as distinct from both our cognitive understanding of things as substances with 
properties, and our practical understanding of how to cope with and deal with things in 
a variety of situations. Moreover, with the notion of 'purposiveness', Okrent forges a 
link between Heidegger's analysis of self-understanding and his analysis of the practical 
understanding involved in understanding how to use tools, perform actions, and cope 
with situations. 
Connecting the conclusion above with the earlier discussion on the distinction between 
ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, I might say that, in this reading, the Heideggerian 
text warrants the general conclusion of the priority of the practical over the theoretical. 
Further, one might want to claim, as Dreyfus does, that the practical, everyday copying 
in situations of the ready to hand is, so to speak, of the same qualitative character as 
practical self-understanding. This position takes cognitive understanding as a specific 
case which is possible only when there are subjects directed towards objects. Moreover, 
it should be emphasised here that this notion of 'purposiveness' as "a holistic web of 
practices containing a unified style or understanding of being" is, for Dreyfus, an 
implicit understanding which radically departs from its traditional definition within 
the cognitive paradigm. While the latter defines practical knowledge as knowledge of 
how to apply cognitive knowledge (know-that), in specific situations (know-how), the 
former puts forward a strong view of practical understanding as a web of practices 
which cannot become explicit or formalized. 
I would like now to return to my earlier discussion on the differentiation between three 
ways of being, namely, ready-to-hand, unready-to-hand and present-at-hand, in order 
to discuss in what sense the first one is considered to be the primary mode of Dasein's 
being. Then, secondly, I want to link this discussion with Dreyfus's question of "how 
can I be a situation" and show what is meant by a 'situation'. Finally, I will try to 
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systematise a little here - there will be a fuller treatment in subsequent chapters -
arguments on language which are implicated in the two issues above. It is hoped that 
this discussion will facilitate the presentation, in chapter 4, of Dreyfus' basic claim, 
namely that the starting point of any investigation of practical/professional activity 
should be ready-to-hand coping and the background on which it rests - i.e., a holistic 
web of practices containing a unified style or understanding of being. 
Heidegger shows that all three ways of being (ready-, unready-, and present-at-hand) 
presuppose the phenomenon of world which cannot be made intelligible in terms of 
any of these ways of being. With the notion of 'world' (no.4, earlier), Heidegger 
moves from an analysis of what shows up to an analysis of the 'there' of the world. I 
mentioned earlier that equipment only functions when it fits in with other equipment. 
Heidegger calls this fitting in involvement: 
"...an involvement is itself discovered only on the basis of the prior 
discovery of a totality of involvements. So in any involvement that has 
been discovered (that is in anything ready-to-hand which we 
encounter), what we have called the 'worldly character' of the ready-to-
hand has been discovered before hand." 
[1962:118] 
Dreyfus [1987a:108-109] stresses the interrelatedness which is not analysable in terms 
of isolated elements. This holistic insight equates the context of involvements (the 
'wherein') with the phenomenon of 'world'. Worldhood is meant to be an illustration of 
what Heidegger will later generalize as Dasein's transcendence. This means that Dasein 
is always outside itself because it is being-in-the-world [ibid:110]. 
Moreover, the equipment we use make sense to us, has a point. The world-structure 
exhibits an in-order-to, towards-which, where-in and a for-the-sake-of-which, which is 
called significance: 
"In understanding significance, concernful Dasein submits itself 
circumspectively to what it encounters as ready-to-hand. Any 
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discovering of a totality of involvements goes back to a 'for-the-sake-
of-which'; and on the understanding of such a 'for-the-sake-of-which' 
is based in turn the understanding of significances as the disclosedness 
of the current world. In seeking shelter, sustenance, livelihood, we do 
so 'for-the-sake-of constant possibilities of Dasein which are very 
close to it; upon these the entity for which its own being is an issue has 
already projected itself." 
[Heidegger:1962:344] 
In other words, for early Heidegger, it is the ready-to-hand mode which provides 
Dasein's ontological structure. Dasein relates to 'worldhood', on the one hand, through 
'involvement' as the being of equipment, and, on the other hand, through self-
interpretation or significance. 
In fact, the above elaboration makes Dreyfus's question of "how can I be a situation" 
sound less strange. To use his example, 
"When I'm driving - if we consider that aspect of me which is coping, 
not my physical body - being-there [Dasein] is actively being taken up 
into the situation in which my directed activity is going on. My skills 
are completely geared into the situation." 
[1987:263] 
To be a situation is the basic structure of Dasein, and consists of the equipmental 
contexture ('context'), the relational totality of signifying ('activities'), and the self-
understanding cdirectedneA. To understand this structure, the following points should 
be kept in mind: (i) things understood in a practical way - e.g., equipment that we are 
capable of using in a certain manner - have a different kind of being from ordinary 
substances which are the objects of cognitive understanding; (ii) 'understanding how' 
gives priority to the verbal (e.g to hammer) rather than the nominal form - that is to say, 
an ability or, better still, an overt performance or activity; e.g., "the test of hammer is in 
the hammering" [Okrent:op.cit:32]; (iii) this allows for the question of what it is for an 
activity to be 'appropriately' timed or performed in the 'appropriate' way, to be handled 
in a different way from its traditional handling (e.g correct application of rules): 
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"One understands how to hammer if in a situation that 'calls for' 
hammering he successfully completes the operation of hammering and 
tends to be able to do so habitually" 
[Olcrentibid:33] 
Furthermore, the evaluation of success in a given situation would consider (a) the ability 
to respond differentially to a situation that 'calls for' a specific operation; and (b) the 
successful completion of the operation which is, in turn, fixed as a certain functionally 
defined resolution in the light of 'directedness'. Therefore, (iv) it can be said that Dasein 
has competence [ Okrent:44-45] when it has (a) self-understanding, accomplished by 
and through (b) an understanding of oneself as an 'end' to be accomplished, which is 
always embodied in (c) a practical understanding of tools and a practical capacity to 
realize a variety of 'ends' with those tools, when (d) these actions are socially regulated 
activities (use of socially standardized tools, in socially sanctioned ways, to attain 
socially recognized and useful 'ends'), which (e) requires a community of Daseins for 
whom equipment is used in a certain way. 
One might want to conclude, at this point, that, within this framework, the distinction 
between competence /performance can only make sense to the extent to which it is used 
to differentiate situations of the ready-to-hand mode from those of the unready-to-hand; 
that is to say, the former provides the criteria of correct use (competence) against which 
on-going activity is evaluated. This, again, departs from traditional cognitivist 
definitions of competence as the cognitive deep structure of knowledge and skills 
against which any particular performance is judged. 
The previous points help bring together various arguments on Heidegger's 
understanding of theory, namely: (a) theory stems from engagement with the 'world' 
in its ontical/ categorial sense (no. 1); its general structure is the structure of the 'world' 
(universe) in its ontological/ categorial sense (no. 2); (b) the theoretical attitude 
presupposes the withholding of the practical attitude, i.e., Dasein's stance as a subject 
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encountering objects; (c) when on-going activity stops, there is room for reflection 
which might lead to theoretical reflection and, further, an engagement with a specific 
activity, i.e., theoretical explanation; (d) theoretical understanding, i.e., the 
subsumption under a concept which results in a judgement (theoretical statement), 
whereby the isolated properties of the present-at-hand entities are quantified and related 
by scientific covering laws, is a specific kind of activity. Its status cannot be judged 
without reference to the purpose of the activity one is engaged in. This is to say that 
theory is perfectly capable of explaining the 'world' in its first or second sense; it only 
becomes a derivative and deficient instrument when attempts are made to use it for 
understanding the world in its ontical/ or ontological existential sense. 
I would like now to turn to the third issue mentioned earlier and make a brief note on the 
problematic of language implied in this framework. It seems that the definition of theory 
as cognitive theory warrants a sharp distinction between a 'theoretical' statement and a 
'practical' one, or a speech-act, for example, "the hammer is too heavy". Let me 
emphasize, first, that Heidegger does not start from the human being's experience of the 
object - e.g., the hammer as heavy - but from a public aspect - e.g., 'too heavy for this 
job' [Dreyfus:1987a:145]. This unready-to-hand level thematizes interpretation, but 
it is still local and context-specific ('practical deliberation'). For Heidegger, 
interpretation is not a deficient mode of understanding; rather it enriches our 
understanding by "working out of possibilities projected in understanding" 
[Heidegger:1962:189]. Furthermore, this unready-to-hand level can be privatively 
(selectively) thematized on the present-at-hand level by means of assertions which state 
propositions, which assign predicates to subjects such as 'the hammer is heavy' 
[Dreyfus:1987a:216-217J. From the point of view of a phenomenological description, 
assertion of proposition is a deficient mode which the traditional account 
misunderstands. For it believes that it is based on the context-free, passive registering 
of the way things present themselves to pure intuition and that it gets at the objective, 
explanatory basis of everything. 
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It is important to elaborate the notion of interpretation and the use of language in such 
situations of unready-to-hand. As Heidegger argues, in interpretation: 
"That which has been circumspectively taken apart with regard to its 
'in-order-to' - that which is explicitly understood - has the structure of 
something as something. The circumspective question as to what this 
particular thing that is ready-to-hand may be receives the 
circumspectively interpretative answer that it is for such and such a 
purpose." 
[1962:189] 
Thus, everyday interpretation, for Heidegger, is to lay out the as-structure in some 
local, practical context when there is some sort of problem. Relevant to this is 
Heidegger's use of 'assertion'. 'Assertion' presupposes that there has been some sort 
of disturbance and therefore that understanding has already been explicitly laid out: 
"That which is understood gets articulated when the entity to be 
understood is brought close interpretatively by taking as our clue the 
'something as something"; and this articulation lies before our making 
any thematic assertion about it. In such an assertion the 'as' does not 
turn up for the first time; it just gets expressed for the first time and this 
is possible only in that it lies before us as something expressible." 
[ibid: 190] 
To put it briefly, in situations of the 'unready-to-hand', the self-understanding exhibited 
in unreflective projective activity may be explicitly understood, thus: (a) when local 
activity is disturbed, it can be interpreted without using words at all. " ...laying aside 
the unsuitable tool...'without wasting words' [Heid:ibid: 200]; (b) in more difficult 
situations, words may be used along with tools: "Hand me the other hammer" [ibid]; (c) 
such 'assertions' set up the possibility of broadening the context. This sort of 
hermeneutic assertion, since it is still context dependent, must be sharply distinguished 
from the privative apophantic assertion (assigning a predicate to a subject); (d) the move 
from interpretation ('assertion') to apophantic assertion corresponds to the move from 
practical deliberation to theoretical reflection, i.e., from the unready-to-hand to the 
present-at-hand [Dreyfus:1987a: 229]. 
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Dreyfus emphasises that in 'assertion', language functions as equipment, doing its job 
in a context of practical activity, although this context can become more and more 
remote. Thus, in 'pointing out' - one of the three aspects of the unified structure of 
'assertion' - language is used to point out characteristics of the work in progress; what I 
let her/him see by pointing is the shared situation, not some representation or meaning I 
have in mind [Dreyfus:1987a:230]. In 'predication' - the second aspect of 'assertion'- I 
may take a step back from the immediate activity and attribute a 'predicate' - e.g., 'too 
heavy' - to the hammer as 'subject'. This singles out the hammer and selects the 
difficulty of the hammering, thus narrowing my /our attention to the specific 'aspect' of 
the total activity; 'predicate' here is used in its grammatical sense, but not yet as 
attributing an abstractable 'property' to the subject. 'Communication' - the third aspect 
of 'assertion' - can take place in the course of a shared activity, and, also, can be 
'shared' with those who are not directly involved in the activity in question. The latter 
can have a positive function of giving others the information they need to contribute to 
that job, but it also makes possible the privative passing of the word along, as in idle 
talk. 
This reading of Heidegger suggests a differentiation between unreflective projective 
activity, i.e, transparent coping in situations of the ready-to-hand mode, practical 
reflection, i.e., explicit understanding of the 'as' structure" of the current activity of the 
unready-to-hand mode, with the equipmental use of language ('assertions'), and the 
privative mode of the present-at-hand, where a subject discovers the 'properties' of an 
object and use language to re-present them (assertions). The point is that, as we move 
from primordial, to positive, to privative assertion, the as-structure of interpretation 
undergoes a modification. Cut off from significance and involvement, the practical 
context is covered up and a pure intuition of essences becomes the target. This analysis 
seems to open possibilities for investigation of practical/ professional activity, which, at 
least, upset the traditional dichotomy of verbal/non-verbal knowledge. 
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However, I would like to raise a note of caution regarding Dreyfus' reading at this 
point. The problematic of language rests upon the elaboration of the extent to which the 
`as-structure' - wherein 'assertions' enter the very act of interpretation - differs from the 
phenomenological 'as-structure' understood as the synthesis of the meant and the 
perceived. Since I will discuss the question of language in Part II (see esp. section 6.2) 
I wish to turn immediately to the related problematic of hermeneutic interpretation and 
make the claim that Dreyfus's failure to see the issue of language along the line I have 
just alluded to, might be seen as a consequence of his understanding of Heidegger's 
hermeneutic interpretation. 
Dreyfus [1987a:219-234] discusses the structure of hermeneutic interpretation as 
worked out by Heidegger, from the as-structure of interpretation and its intertwining 
with understanding. The hermeneutic interpretation has a threefold structure 
(forestructure) indicated by the three German words of `vorhabe', `vorsiche and 
`vorgriff . These are translated as "what we have in advance" - the totality of 
background practices- "what we see in advance" or foresight - under the guidance of a 
point of view - and "what we grasp in advance" or fore-conception - a definite way of 
conceiving [Heidegger:1962:190;191,n.2]. 
Dreyfus claims that, although all understanding has some sort of fore-structure, there is 
still a difference between the theoretical fore-structure, and the everyday and the fore-
structure of hermeneutic interpretation. In order to ground this claim, first, he draws a 
necessary distinction between theoretical and practical holism [Dreyfus:1980]. 
According to theoretical holism, there is no difference between the natural and the social 
science, for there is no possibility of finding neutral uninterpreted data. Data become 
data insofar as they have been interpreted according to a theoretical whole. Furthermore, 
competing wholes are incommensurable and only become commensurable through 
interpretation or radical translation. This becomes possible because the theoretical 
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wholes are composed of distinguishable parts which are related by explicit or in 
principle explicable rules [5]. 
In a second stage, Dreyfus argues that all understanding presupposes practical holism, 
i.e., a background of practices (vorhabe) which cannot be spelled out in a theory 
because (a) the background is so pervasive that it cannot become an object of analysis, 
and (b) the practices involve skills. He further argues that the first claim presupposes 
the second, for if it were only a question of pervasiveness of one's own background 
which made it inaccessible to theory, it could be made an object of theoretical analysis 
by another culture. Practical wholes, therefore, are distinct from theoretical wholes in 
that the relations among the elements are constituted by abilities and skills rather than 
rules and beliefs. 
In a third stage, Dreyfus argues that both natural sciences and social sciences 
presuppose a practical background of skills and techniques. But, in the case of the 
natural science, the aim of the practices is to decontextualize the entities studied so as to 
take them out of their practical context. In other words, the practices themselves are 
grounded on practical wholes and cannot be reduced to theoretical statements, but the 
results of those practices can. Moreover, this is the reason why science need not pay 
attention to its `vorhabe', and can still be highly successful. In contrast, 
"...such skills and the context of everyday practices they presuppose 
are internal to the human sciences...for if the human sciences claim to 
study human activities, then the human sciences, unlike the natural 
sciences, must take account of those human activities which make 
possible their own disciplines." 
[1980:17] 
Dreyfus's conclusion, therefore, is that what makes up the background is practices, 
and practices do not consist in a belief system, a system of rules, or in formalized 
procedures. It seems that the background does not consist in representations at all 
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and, therefore, cannot be treated as a theory. For Dreyfus, the actual problem is the 
relation of theory to human activity: 
"Inevitable difficulties arise not from the definition of man but from the 
fact that the current sciences of human beings imitate natural science in 
seeking a theory that predicts events in the everyday world using 
context-free features abstracted from that world." 
[1983:8] 
There is no need here to go into a full exposition of the debate [6] in the context of 
which Dreyfus asserts the necessary difference between natural and social sciences and 
puts forward, if not necessary reasons for what is an appropriate method in the 
respective fields, but, at least, the (much weaker) thesis that empirical social science 
needs to be supplemented by a hermeneutical social science. Instead, I want to make the 
following points which I consider relevant for present purposes. First, I would like to 
refer briefly to Okrent's different reading of early Heidegger, which challenges 
Dreyfus' reading of Heidegger's use of the hermeneutic circle. Secondly, I would like 
to present, in a summary form, and I will return to this in subsequent discussions, 
Dreyfus's understanding of, and opposition to, theory, which is claimed to be grounded 
in the Heideggerian framework I have been discussing in the present chapter. At the 
same time, I will indicate his conception of skill, as this seems to be the inevitable 
conclusion of his working from within such a framework. Finally, I will briefly 
consider some basic directions for research into practical activity which, according to 
Dreyfus, can be an alternative to current cognitivist projects. 
Regarding the first issue, Okrent [1988:157-170] argues that the Heideggerian 
hermeneutical circle departs from the classical understanding of it and cannot be 
understood as a variation of a common theme of the `verstehen' tradition, which would, 
then, be used as a premise to ground an argument about differences between scientific 
methods, on the one hand, and hermeneutic interpretation in the social sciences, on the 
other. More specifically, the claim is that the hermeneutic circle applies to all 
understanding regardless of the ontological character of the entity interpreted. The 
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primary circle is between the interpreter and the results of the interpretation. According 
to the classical assumption of the hermeneutical circle regarding the truth of the 
interpretation, a human action or a cultural production is itself what it is only within the 
context or horizon of a human understanding. Its meaning is established only within 
such a holistic human system, so that, it is claimed, to interpret the meaning of such an 
entity correctly must be to understand the entity as it is understood by the community 
that constituted it as it is; in other words, one must adopt the standpoint of the other. In 
contrast, for Heidegger, the meaning or truth of an interpretation rests on the success of 
that interpretation to 'uncover' the thing it is interpreting 'as it is'; not from the 
standpoint of the other, but in accordance with the interpreter's own understanding -
i.e., the pattern of purposeful activity in which he is engaged - as was clarified earlier. 
Thus, it is the practical context of acting, and not the purpose ascribed to the interpreted 
- even if this being is interpreted as having self-understanding - that 'grounds' and 
supplies the conditions that must be met if a being, i.e., an object of study is to be a 
definite sort of thing. 
Let me emphasise the point that is of interest in the present context. Okrent's point is 
that transcendental hermeneutics was part of the Heideggerian project of establishing a 
new metaphysics, and at this early stage of Heidegger's thinking, there is a structural 
analogy between transcendental phenomenology and transcendental hermeneutics. 
Heidegger interrupts this project of "Being and Time" as non-viable; this is not without 
consequences, as I will show later, for theoretical/ practical wholes, the question of 
methodology, and, more generally, the theory/practice relation. 
With this note of caution in mind, I would like now to refer briefly to the conclusions 
that Dreyfus draws from "Being and Time" regarding the theory/practice relation. For 
Dreyfus, the fundamental question regarding this relation comes down to the question 
of the nature of theory which he understands as follows [1983:8-10]: (a) knowledge is 
explicit, and it doesn't require interpretation. Making a theory is making explicit what is 
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implicit; (b) it is abstract, in the sense that it consists of context-free elements. It does 
not refer to particular situations, and has been abstracted from a local, specific context; 
(c) it is systematic, which means that the elements are combined in terms of their 
relations to rules and laws; finally, (d), it is able to predict. By theorizing with the 
elements, it attempts to specify the changes within those elements. In short, what theory 
does is to detach an element from the everyday life and to translate it into a theory. On 
the other hand, there are background practices which embody skills. A skill cannot 
be decontextualized and made a theoretical object of analysis. It is, therefore, in the 
nature of practical activity not to consist of representations, and not to be capable of 
being treated as a theory. The Heideggerian practical holism, it is claimed, while taking 
theory very seriously and granting that it works for the natural science, still maintains 
that there cannot be a theory of this sort for human beings. 
Though Dreyfus is aware of the fact that Heidegger interrupts the project of "Being and 
Time", and, also, that 
"there are hints scattered throughout Heidegger's later works that in 
opposing the subject/object ontology by an appeal to the primacy of 
equipment, Being and Time was itself a formulation of the penultimate 
stage of technology..." 
[1984:24] 
this in no way changes the importance of the framework of "Being and Time", 
especially in its analysis of 'what it means to be Dasein'. Moreover, for Dreyfus, while 
"Being and Time" offers the fundamental insight of the significance of background 
practices, it nonetheless offers no way of distinguishing the trivial from the important 
contents of the non-objectifiable aspects of those practices [1980:19]. This means that 
the conclusion of "Being and Time" is a practical nihilism, for it gives no answer to the 
question of why one interpretation of practices should be taken more seriously than 
another. For Dreyfus, the important lesson that vorhabe does not consist of 
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representations and cannot be treated as a theory is supplemented by Heidegger's later 
work which provides a way out of nihilism and a motive for action, for 
"[it] holds open the possibility that there still exists in our micro-
practices an undercurrent of a pretechnological understanding of the 
meaning of being...Now scattered in our inherited background practices 
this understanding involves nonobjectifying ways of relating to nature, 
material objects, and human beings." 
[ibid:22] 
Dreyfus' proposal for discerning the micro-practices that are dispersed by the 
objectifying practices, includes two concrete strategies. First, a concrete demonstration 
is required in order to show that human beings and the objects that they encounter are 
formed by practices that cannot be objectified; secondly, to attempt to find a paradigm 
(exemplar) that focuses the dominant practices, while at the same time assembling all 
evidence in our micro-practices that an alternative understanding of human beings is 
possible [7]. 
It is the subject/object ontology that grounds the theory/practice opposition, and any 
attempt to displace the opposition and think of practical activity and skill would have to 
challenge the former. This is the starting point of Dreyfus, based on his reading of 
Heidegger's "Being and Time", which, in his view, has questioned this ontology and, 
by implication, the theory/practice opposition. Dreyfus uses this framework to think of 
the practical, and I will examine his position in chapter 4. As I said in the introduction to 
this chapter, I have chosen Dreyfus' reading of Heidegger to approach the debate on 
professional practice, precisely because it addresses the fundamental question of the 
theory/practice opposition. This already implies that what currently constitutes the 
debate on professional activity, professional education and professional development, is 
limited in that it does not concern itself with this fundamental question. It is thus 
conducted in terms of hierarchical oppositions grounded on the opposition between 
theory and practice. I will now proceed to show this and identify the vocabulary of this 
debate. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
2.1 STUDIES ON THE MENTAL LIFE OF THE TEACHER 
A host of questions concerning how practitioners' decisions are made and how 
they ought to be made is posed on a day to day base by professional communities, 
the community of researchers and policy makers. The topics of judgment, problem-
solving, decision making, cognition and reasoning, and the related issues of the 
relationship between theory/practice, expressed in the problematic of both the place of 
theory in the learning of professional skills and the role of theory in professional 
practice, are not only active research areas which just happen to be fashionable but they 
are, in fact, the expressions of the cognitive paradigm at its highest stage of dominance. 
The two major approaches to the description of how practitioners make judgments 
and decisions - and, by implication, to the prescription of normative criteria of 
evaluation - concentrate alternatively on either the practitioners' actions and their 
observable effects, or their information-processing mechanisms as the 
practitioners attempt to solve problems [Elstein & Bordage:1988:109-129]. The former 
approach to the practitioners' behaviour seeks to capture and represent, in a formal 
mathematical equation, the relationship between inputs (cues) available to the 
practitioner and his/her outputs (judgment/decision), although it makes no claim to 
model what goes on inside the practitioner's head. Controversial issues, for example in 
medical practice, between 'clinical' and 'statistical' prediction, do not alter the basic 
direction of this approach, for they are posed in terms of efficiency criteria. Thus, the 
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question of 'case-uniqueness' vs rule-generated procedures is often decided in favour of 
the latter on the grounds that it 
"probably predicts graduate success better than does clinical 
judgment...it is fair and just in that it treats everyone alike...it supplies 
potential candidates with knowledge of how they are to be evaluated, it 
makes us publicly accountable for our decisions, and finally...it saves a 
great deal of time and effort." 
[Dawes, quoted in ibid:124] 
The problem-solving approach, on the other hand, studies the practitioners' reasoning 
from an information processing standpoint and attempts to capture 'what goes on inside 
the practitioner's head'. It is based on analysis of verbal reports, obtained from experts 
in a particular field as they solve problems or make decisions. Expertise is assumed to 
be dependent on a well-organized store of knowledge which contains rules for 
procedures - i.e., practical skills - as well as propositional knowledge - i.e., a rule 
structure that governs performance [Dowie & Elstein:1988:12-15]. Experts are viewed 
as knowledgeable, intelligible, flexible and adaptive to the task environment. The rule 
structure appears to be a highly compiled form of knowledge-in-action, often 
complex and case-specific which may account for an expert's quick recognition of a 
new problem as a variant of a familiar type. 
As opposed to the first approach, which attempts to capture in an abstract formalized 
rule a practitioner's judgment, the information-processing approach attempts to give 
informal verbal rules which are assumed to express an expert's intuitions of what has 
to be done in a given situation. These are knowledge-based or 'expert' computer 
systems which try to represent knowledge in a way that preserves both the purely 
abstract representations of mathematics and the meaning of concepts [Fox:1988:226- 
252]. 
A contemporary controversial issue within this approach surfaces in the form of the 
question of why novices, despite the fact that they can answer questions, experience 
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difficulties in practice. This at least makes clear that planning and procedural skills are 
not identical with retrospective identification of causal mechanisms, and that procedural 
knowledge and propositional knowledge are not identical [Dowie & Elstein:1988:13]. 
In practice and in actual research projects there is a considerable overlap between the 
two approaches, and in the remainder of this section I would like to give a few such 
examples of empirical research concerned with teachers' professional activity. Then, in 
section 2.2, I will focus, by way of presenting Schon's studies (1983,1987), on one of 
the controversial issues singled out above, namely, 'case-uniqueness' vs rule generated 
procedures and technical rationality. In fact, Schon's perspective cannot easily be 
identified with either of the two approaches mentioned, though its emphasis on a rich 
base of knowledge-in-action shares many assumptions of the problem-solving expert 
systems. Moreover, Schon's clear shift of emphasis from the normative curricula of the 
professional schools dominated by technical rationality, to practical knowledge and 
reflection-in-action, as well as the influence that his studies seem to exert on current 
thinking and empirical research on professional practice, compel a close look at his 
work. Finally, section 2.3 will take up the second controversial issue mentioned above 
and present Broadbent's et.al (1986) laboratory research, which challenges the view 
that human knowledge is exclusively rule-based. This study suggests that in non-well-
structured tasks, the ability to verbalize task knowledge is poorly or even negatively 
correlated with skill in actually doing the task. 
As early as 1974, the research community in North America was oriented towards 
research on human information-processing, presenting an image of the teacher as a 
professional who has more in common with physicians, lawyers, architects than with 
technicians who execute skilled performances according to prescriptions or algorithms 
defined by others [Clark & Peterson:1986:256]: 
"The panel was oriented toward the teacher as clinician, not only in the 






pathology and prescribing particular remedies, but more broadly as an 
individual responsible for (a) aggregating and making sense out of an 
incredible diversity of information sources about individual students 
and the class collectively; (b) bringing to bear a growing body of 
empirical and theoretical work constituting the research literature of 
education; somehow (c) combining all that information with the 
teacher's own expectations, attitudes, beliefs, purposes...and (d) 
having to respond, make judgments, render decisions, reflect, and 
regroup to begin again." [1] 
This marks a turning away from the behaviourist paradigm of research, which focuses 
on the observable teacher behaviour and the causal relationship between that behaviour 
and the students' behaviour and their achievement, to the cognitive paradigm which 
focuses on teacher cognition or her/his mental life [Shulman:1986:23] as the 
central topic of research into teaching. 
TEACHERS' THOUGHT PROCESSES 
CONSTRAINTS & OPPORTUNITIES 
Teacher Planning 





Source: Clark and Peterson: 1986: Fig. 9.1: 257 
In their review of the research literature on 'teachers' thought processes', Clark and 
Peterson [1986:255-296] differentiate the two paradigms by using the model presented 
in figure 2.1.1 above. The model depicts the domains of teachers' thought 
processes and teachers' actions and their observable effects as representing 
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the two paradigmatic approaches to research on teaching. This is in contrast to 
behaviourism, which focuses on the latter domain and seeks a linear causality between 
the variables of teacher behaviour, student behaviour and student achievement (the 
process-product approach to the study of teaching effectiveness). Clark and Peterson's 
model seeks to conceptualize a reciprocal relationship between the two domains with a 
circular rather than linear causality. 
The cognitive paradigm focuses mainly on the former domain, and the three categories 
depicted in the model - i.e., teacher planning (preactive and postactive thoughts), 
teachers' interactive thoughts and decisions, and teachers' theories and 
beliefs - reflect the researchers' current conceptualization of this domain. Empirical 
research literature indicates that the kind of thinking that teachers do during interactive 
teaching is qualitatively different from the kind of thinking they do when they are not 
interacting with students. The category of teachers' theories and beliefs is assumed to 
represent the rich store of knowledge that affects teachers' planning and their 
interactive thoughts and decisions. Empirical studies into a fourth category, teachers' 
judgements, is subsumed by the reviewers into the previous three categories since it 
is but one cognitive process that teachers use in their planning and interactive decision 
making [ibid:2581. 
The category 'teachers' interactive thoughts and decisions' is the point at which an 
attempt to incorporate the concerns of the behaviourist and the cognitive paradigms can 
be discerned. It also indicates the same kind of concern that research on 'expert' 
systems referred to earlier show, namely, to describe the thinking that teachers do while 
interacting with students in the classroom. More specifically, researchers have been 
concerned with the extent to which teachers make interactive decisions that lead them 
to change their plans or their behaviour in the classroom. 
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Because of methodological problems in 'probing the unconscious', empirical studies 
reported on teachers' interactive thoughts and decisions have restricted their 
definitions to conscious choices made by the teacher during classroom interaction. 
Marland's [cited by Clark & Peterson:1986:273-277] category of deliberate act 
specifies more the nature of an interactive decision that the researchers have in mind: a 
teacher's conscious choice between continuing to behave as before or behaving in a 
different way. According to the reviewers, the results of several studies are consistent in 
suggesting that "...on average, teachers make one interactive decision every 2 minutes" 
[ibid:274]. Criteria for an interactive decision include explicit reference to consideration 
of alternatives, evidence that the teacher made a selection and became committed to one 
of the alternatives, and evidence that the teacher followed through, in the classroom, 
the choice of alternatives. The scepticism regarding the theoretical and empirical 
fruitfulness of such an approach [Shulman:op.cit:24] surfaces in Peterson and Clark's 
own empirical research which reports on a teacher's answer to the question of whether 
he was thinking of any alternative actions or strategies during the lesson: 
"At this point? No. None at all. It was going along.The only time I 
think of alternative strategies is when something startling happens." 
[Peterson & Clark: 1978:561] 
In contrast to this type of empirical research which stresses individual conscious choice, 
Shavelson and Stern propose a model based on the assumption that teachers' interactive 
teaching may be characterized as carrying out well established routines. They see these 
routines as mental images which are routinized and played out in the same way as a 
computer subroutine. 
"These images or plans are routinized so that once begun, they typically 
are played out, much as a computer subroutine is. Routines minimize 
conscious decision making during interactive teaching and so 'activity 
flow' is maintained." 
[Shavelson & Stern :1981:482] 
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Moreover, decision making is portrayed as occurring when the teaching routine is 
interrupted. According to the same reviewers [ibid:279], the research question on 
teachers' interactive decision making is often connected with the question of teacher 
effectiveness. The research findings present the effective teacher as engaging actively in 
cognitive processing of information during teaching, in such a way that she/he 
simplifies and makes sense of the complex classroom environment. More effective 
teachers, it is argued, have successfully 
"...transformed the complexity of the environment into a conceptual 
system that enabled them to interpret discrete events and to anticipate the 
direction and flow of classroom activity" 
[Doyle:1977:54] 
In a similar fashion, and following basic assumptions of the cognitive paradigm, 
researchers on the interactive decision processes of beginning vs experienced teachers 
interpret their findings as indicating that the experienced teachers have better developed 
knowledge-structures or schemata for phenomena related to classroom learning 
and teaching than do novice teachers, and that the two groups differ considerably in 
their perceptions of classroom events as well as in their underlying schema for what 
constitutes an 'appropriate' flow of classroom events [Fogarty, Wang & Creek:1982; 
Housner & Griffey:1983; Calderhead:1983]. 
Another type of research referred to by the reviewers focuses on teachers' knowledge 
which is assumed to be represented as beliefs or theories. The common assumption 
of this kind of research is that a teacher's cognitive and other behaviour is guided by 
and makes sense in relation to a personally held system of beliefs, values and 
principles. According to Clark and Peterson [op.cit:287], this type of research 
purports to make explicit and visible the 'frames of reference' through which 
individual teachers perceive and process information. 
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Within the field of cognitive psychology, this claim has attracted considerable attention, 
and provoked experimental research, such as Nisbet and Wilson's (1977) and Reber's 
et.al (1980), which has given rise to contradictory claims. The former starts with the 
observation that "we sometimes tell more than we can know" and suggests that 
"...it may be quite misleading for social scientists to ask their subjects 
about the influences on their evaluations, choices, or behavior. The 
relevant research indicates that such reports, as well as predictions, may 
have little value except for whatever utility they may have in the study 
of verbal explanations per se." 
[1977:247] 
This experimental study advances a position against the view that there is direct access 
to mental contents through psychological reflection. The latter study explores the 
relationship between implicit and explicit modes in the learning of a complex system. 
Their perspective holds that complex systems, such as those that underly language, 
socialization, perception and sophisticated games, are acquired implicitly and 
unconsciously, and that such knowledge is memorially encoded in the form of 
abstract representation systems. Furthermore, it is claimed that the acquisition 
process itself contains, at its core, an induction process whereby relations among parts 
of the stimulus environment are mapped in an order that corresponds roughly with the 
ecological salience of these relations [1980:492-493]. The emphasis is on the 
complexity of the task, but also on the experience of the perceiver, on which the mode 
of cognition (implicit/explicit) depends. 
Within this broad perspective, the controversies notwithstanding, a small body of 
empirical studies, concerned with the dominant distinction, among the larger research 
community, between the knowledge of academics and the experience of teachers, and 
being sceptical about the search for a unique body of professional/technical knowledge 
as a knowledge-base, has sought to describe the practical knowledge of teachers. 
Their basic research strategy is the gathering of verbal data by using various forms of 
self-reports and methodological techniques such as thinking aloud, stimulated recall, 
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journal keeping and the repertory grid technique.They are especially concerned with 
finding ways of tackling what they see as the central methodological problem of how to 
elicit and interpret valid and reliable self-reports about cognitive processes. The data are, 
then, analysed either in terms of content - e.g, knowledge of the self, of the milieu of 
teaching, of subject matter, of curriculum development and of instruction [Elbaz, cited 
in Feiman-Nemser & Floden:1986:513-514] - or according to the ways practical 
knowledge is organized - e.g., according to rules of practice, practical 
principles, and images. The latter are assumed to mediate between thought and 
action, guiding teachers intuitively and inspiring rather than determining action [Elbaz in 
ibid]. 
Let me conclude this brief review by underlining the dominant categories and 
dichotomies of the cognitive paradigm which were identified as shaping the research 
questions on 'teacher cognition' and as providing the means through which teachers' 
professional activity is currently being thought, understood and discussed. It is obvious 
that the model of (professional) action is that of the cognitive paradigm and rests on a 
dichotomy between a preconstituted subject, directed by deliberate acts or unconscious 
choices, and a preconstituted or perceived professional task, as the latter is shaped by 
rules or meanings. The focus of research, furnished by the information-processing-
mechanism approach of cognitive psychology, is the mental life of the teacher, and aims 
to collect verbal reports from practitioners who possess experience; the latter are viewed 
as a well-organized store of knowledge, representing either theories and beliefs, or a 
personally held system of beliefs, values and principles, or practical knowledge. This 
makes the practitioner the subject of psychology with an explicit or implicit encoded 
abstract representation system or with an implicit system of practical rules, principles 
and mental images who is called, through psychological reflection, to make this store of 
knowledge explicit and visible as a precondition for his/her action. 
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2.2 THE SHIFT TO THE PRACTICAL 
2.2.1 THE DEBATE ON 'TEACHER APPRAISAL' IN THE U.K. 
Recently, the traditional way of understanding the relationship between theory and 
practice seems to have been reversed, a fact which has been reflected in the debate about 
the professional education of practitioners such as teachers, doctors, nurses, the police, 
etc. Thus a new discourse is prevailing, with a new vocabulary which includes terms 
such as 'reflective practitioner', 'professional skills', 'professional judgment', etc. This 
and the following sub-section will attempt to assess how far the debate has moved 
regarding the relationship between theory/practice. In assessing this shift, the 
Heideggerian framework for thinking about the relationship between theory and practice 
should be borne in mind, for this framework cautions against any opening to the 
practical that is not prepared to challenge the subject/object dichotomy, and the model of 
reflection. This sub-section will take a very brief, critical look at the prevailing practices 
in the U.K. and the current debate on 'teacher appraisal', focusing mainly on the 
theoretical view of J. Elliott (1983,1987) which seems to have exerted considerable 
influence over the shaping of the debate. The subsequent section will review Schon's 
recent work (1983,1987). I have already justified this choice (section 2.1) and, in 
addition, I should emphasise here that, as I just mentioned, my main concern is with 
the discerned attempt in current literature to reverse the dichotomy of theory/practice. 
The question, therefore, is the extent to which this dichotomy has been challenged. 
'Teacher Appraisal' is defined as the forming of qualitative judgements about teachers' 
professional practices [Wragg:1987], but the dilemma currently shaping the debate [2], 
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as expressed in the problematic of appraisal for managerial purposes (summative 
evaluation) or staff development (formative evaluation), certainly reflects the wider 
social, economic and political context in which the debate takes place. Generally, it is 
understood as a 'trade off between management, concerned with issues of 
effectiveness and productivity, and the teaching force, concerned with professional 
autonomy, and the possibility of positive developments in the profession. Although the 
move to institutionalize the discourse about what is effective in teaching, and the similar 
move to 'job descriptions', are indicative of an emphasis on practical procedures 
dominating the debate, there is, I believe, some space for raising theoretical and 
epistemological issues of great relevance. 
There is, first, the fundamental assumption of reflection behind 'Teacher Appraisal' 
which should be unveiled and questioned. The requirements of the Suffolk pilot scheme 
on 'Teacher Appraisal' [Suffolk Education Department (SED):1985, 1987] for self-
appraisal, work-review, professional interview and dialogue rest upon the 
philosophy of consciousness and the model of reflection which makes fundamental 
assumptions about the nature of knowledge and self-knowledge, as well as about the 
nature of the human subject. 
Secondly, to propose a scheme of 'Teacher Appraisal' for professional development is 
first and foremost to address the question of what is meant by professional skill, and 
how skills are atjuired and enhanced. This is to say that the question of appraisal as 
judgment or calculation should take precedence over whatever is being appraised. The 
current debate, dominated by questions such as, for example, the question of whether 
'classroom observation' should be an element of appraisal, ignores questions of the 
former kind, and presents concerns of the second kind as primary and fundamental 
[see, for example, SED, 1985; Wilcox, 1986; Nisbet, 1986; Nuttall, 1986]. 
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Thirdly, the Suffolk Education Department, by putting professional 'dialogue' at the 
centre of appraisal for professional development, claims to have been consistent with 
research findings which suggest that 
"Teachers in particular lack an effective set of descriptive terms for 
talking about what they do. As a result they must often fall back on 
clichés and outworn slogans when called upon to describe their work." 
[Jackson,1968, quoted in SED:1987:15] 
Indeed, there is a line of argument suggesting that the possibility of creative 
developments in a professional culture much depends on the adoption of reflective 
practice which would supplement or substitute for intuitive practice. This view has 
been forcefully put forward by J. Elliott (1983,1985,1987) and supports his proposal 
of a two-tier model of 'Teacher Appraisal', initially developed in his empirical research 
on police appraisal. The model purports to accommodate both appraisal for managerial 
purposes and staff development. Management is given indirect access to practice 
through the accounts of the practitioner and an observer, and this facilitates both the 
self-development of the individual, and the development of the organization [1987:31]. 
The basic theoretical perspective is that self - evaluation is a logically necessary means 
of professional development [1983:225]. Elliott distinguishes between unreflective 
self-evaluation which depends on the degree to which teachers have mastered a 
pedagogical tradition - i.e., tacit practical knowledge derived from their own and others' 
past experience - and deliberate self-evaluation which enables practitioners to 
develop their practice in ways that are appropriate to changing social conditions. For 
Elliott, the former defines competence, that is to say, "the skilful utilization of existing 
stocks of tacit professional knowledge" [ibid:229]; the latter is professional 
development beyond mastery, which, though grounded on unreflective self-
evaluation, presupposes deliberate self-evaluation as a necessary condition. Thus: 
"Whereas the professional development of teachers 'towards mastery' 
is dependent on the evaluations of those who have mastered traditional 
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educational practice, professional development 'beyond mastery' 
depends on teachers' capacities to engage in deliberative self-
evaluation.The former involves being developed while the latter 
involves a process of self-development." 
[1983:237] 
And furthermore, Elliott claims, 
"[w]hen autonomous professionals continuously improve their practical 
knowledge through deliberation and discussion with their peers, they 
not only develop themselves but also help to develop the professional 
tradition, the common stock of tacit mutual knowledge." 
[ibid:238] 
Many proposals for 'Teacher appraisal' and staff development take account of this 
perspective and indeed stress the need, voiced by practitioners themselves, for 
communication and discussion of common problems among peers: 
"There was considerable repetition of the desirability of discussion 
between collegues and others engaged in the same field of work, and 
facing similar problems...the desire to talk with someone about 
common problems is clear and doubtless reflects feelings of 
isolation..." 
[FEU : 1982:27] 
However, this way of approaching the issue of professional practice already poses 
fundamental questions which invite research at the analytical level. These are only 
enumerated below, since I will deal with them in subsequent chapters; following this, I 
will turn to the review of Schon's work. Here, then, are the problematic terms/issues: 
the issue of communication, the model of reflection and self-reflection, and the related 
problematic of a a solitary subject, as well as the claims to intersubjective 
communication; the issue of performance, the idea of performance beyond mastery and 
the notion of a substantive professional community; the question of calculation vs 
critical judgment and the ethical questions associated with it [cf. Elliott:1985]. 
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2.2.2 REFLECTION-IN-ACTION 
D. Schon's recent studies (1983, 1987) have aroused a great deal of interest among 
educationalists, particularly in the field of teacher education. His basic conception of a 
reflective practice, proposed as an alternative and necessary epistemology of 
practice [3], is contrasted with technical rationality, defined by Schiin as the 
understanding of knowledge in terms of a hierarchy with general principles at the 
highest level and concrete problem-solving at the lowest, and an order of application 
which is also an order of derivation and dependence [Schon:1983:24]. 
More specifically, Schott exposes three kinds of dichotomies on which the model of 
technical rationality rests [1983:165]: (i) given the separation of means from ends, 
instrumental problem-solving can be seen as a technical procedure to be measured by its 
effectiveness in achieving a pre-established objective; (ii) given the separation of 
research from practice, rigorous practice can be seen as the result of the application of 
research-based theories and techniques to instrumentally conceived problems; (iii) given 
the separation of knowing from doing, action is only an implementation and test of 
technical decision. 
Thus, on his argument, the model of technical rationality is incomplete in that it leaves 
out a kind of inquiry through which practitioners resolve conflicting role frames and, 
therefore, fails to account for practical competence in 'divergent' situations - i.e., 
situations of uncertainty, uniqueness and value conflict. The most important areas of 
professional practice, SchOn argues, lie beyond the conventional boundaries of 
professional competence. 
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Reflective practice and the related notion of reflection-in-action has been seen as 
providing an alternative theoretical framework for research into professional practice 
and professional knowledge, by supposedly providing a different notion of reflection. 
Grimmett [1988:11-13], for example, differentiates conceptions of reflection found in 
the literature according to the answer that they give to the question of how research-
derived knowledge is supposed to contribute to the education of a practitioner. Thus, it 
is argued, a first category of conceptions of reflection understands the purpose of 
reflection as being that of directing practitioners in their practice. It presupposes a 
technical conception of knowledge (educational theory and research findings) which 
directs and controls action. A second category of conceptions of reflection sees 
reflection as informing practice, that is, as providing a rich basis for selection as 
practitioners deliberate among competing alternatives for action. Contributions in this 
category are distinguished by the attention they pay to the context of educational events, 
and they entertain the view that, in reflecting upon particular events and situations, one 
deliberates among competing views of action and examines each in the light of the 
consequences that it entails. A third category of conceptions of reflection views 
research-derived knowledge as constituting one source of information whereby 
practitioners apprehend practice as they reconstruct their experience. Reflection is here 
understood as the reconstruction of experience, the end of which is the identification 
of a new possibility of action. More specifically, reflection is seen as the reconstruction 
of experience which leads to new understandings of action situations, a new 
understanding of self (as teacher, as doctor, etc.), and new understandings of taken-for-
granted assumptions. 
Schi5n's position is placed within this third category, where reflection is regarded as the 
reconstruction of experience for purposes of apprehending situations of "complexity, 
uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict" [Scholl: 1983:39; cf.ibid:42]. 
Schon himself describes the process as a reflective tranformation: 
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" They observed in this case, the action of others...They reflected on 
their observations and embodied them in a description - very likely a 
story, for story-telling is the mode of description best suited to 
transformation in new situations of action. They observed, reflected and 
described, treating their story not as a record of a 'method' to be 
mechanically replicated but as a metaphor for the construction of a new 
program." 
[1988:26] 
He goes on to suggest that we can encourage one another to tell stories "about 
experiences that hold elements of surprise", because stories are "products of reflection" 
and when we get into the habit of recording those stories, we will be able to attend "to 
meanings we have built into them", and to our "narrative descriptions" [ibid]. The 
purpose always is to identify 
"a story that is faithful to past experience, coherent in its own right, and 
evocative for future reflection-in-action." 
[ibid; emphasis added] 
Such a conception of reflection and reflective practice grounds Schon's argument for 
practitioner-based research which could generate professional knowledge: 
"...one person helps another learn to practice reflective teaching in the 
context of the doing. And one does so through a Hall of Mirrors: 
demostrating reflective teaching in the very process of trying to help the 
other learn to do it." 
[ Schon:1988:19] 
The kind of research Schon is thinking of underlies reflective teaching and reflective 
supervision. It is claimed to be research not about or for practice but in practice. It starts 
the inquiry with a careful examination of artistry, that is, the competence by which 
practitioners actually handle indeterminate zones of practice [1987:13]. However, 
unlike others who would close off inquiry by attributing outstanding performance to an 
artistry seen as something mysterious over and above professional knowledge that a 
practitioner might possess, Schon wants to open inquiry to this core of artistry which, 
for him, is at the heart of professional knowledge. 
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Such research, Scholl argues, has the following characteristics [1988:28-29]: (a) it 
builds on the research that reflective practitioners already do, and is meant to enhance 
such capability; (b) it is research aimed at producing understandings useful to 
practitioners; (c) the validity of the propositions (practical statements) produced as 
results, depend upon the extent to which practitioners who reflect-in-action in the light 
of them, are able to use them to design effective interventions; finally, (d) it combines 
reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action. While based on the former, the latter is the 
mode of research activity which results in descriptions of events and interventions that 
may become elements of a repertoire, either in the form of theories-in-use or concrete 
cases; both of them provide metaphors for reflection-in-action. 
This last assertion rests upon the view that, implicit in the artistic, is a form of knowing 
which is in the actions [1983:50]. This knowing-in-action is the characteristic of 
ordinary practical knowledge and has the following properties [ibid:54] : (i) there are 
actions, recognitions and judgements we know how to carry out spontaneously; (ii) we 
are often unaware of having learned to do these things; we simply find ourselves doing 
them; (iii) in some cases, we were once aware of the understandings which were 
subsequently internalized in our feeling for the stuff of action. In other cases, we may 
never have been aware of them. In both cases, however, we are usually unable to 
describe the knowing which our action reveals. On the other hand, he observes, both 
ordinary people and professional practitioners often think about what they are doing, 
sometimes even when they are doing it. Reflection-in-action (reflection on the material 
of the situation) and reflection on the knowing-in-action hinges on the experience of 
surprise [1983:56] caused by troublesome and divergent situations. Moreover, this 
reflection is not necessarily expressed in the medium of words, and it may take various 
forms: a practitioner may reflect on the tacit norms and appreciations which underlie his 
judgement; on the strategies and theories implicit in his pattern of behaviour; on a 
feeling for a situation which has led him to adopt a particular course of action; the way 
he has framed the problem, or the role he has constructed for himself [ibid:62]. 
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The view of the practitioner as a builder of a repertoire which consists of stories or 
examples that evoke surprise, rests upon a series of dichotomies between academic 
knowledge/reflection-in-action, determinate/indeterminate zones, teaching/coaching, 
technical rationality/artistry. The second term between each pair contributes to the 
building up of a vocabulary that has been praised in the literature as offering novel ways 
of talking about professional activity. Thus: 
"There is great importance in Schon's reminding us of the importance 
of tacit knowledge, of that which cannot be spoken, of that which 
cannot be articulated, lying close to the heart of many kinds of artistic 
expertise and even professional judgment." 
[Shulman:1988:32-33; emphasis added] 
Thus far, I have attempted to introduce what is considered to be a 'novel' vocabulary 
offered by Schon's studies. Let me, therefore, reiterate those categories, and emphasise 
from the outset that most, if not all of them, are the cause of the current confusion 
within the debate on professional education [4]. This urgently invites analytical work at 
the most basic level. First of all, it is the shift to the practical, whereby the concept of 
practice has been taken to be a self-evident concept, that brings with it all the 
presuppositions of the cognitive paradigm: the notion of reflection; the pre-constituted 
individual subject who is not only the carrier of experiences from one situation to 
another - trans-fer - but also the active transformer - trans-form - [5]; the notion of 
experience and the associated linear notion of time, and the notion of meanings 
conferred upon objects by the individual. I will be dealing with these concepts 
throughout the thesis. 
Secondly, there is a cognitivist assumption, carried along in the unexamined shift from 
technical rationality to reflective practice, which informs the latter concept. This holds 
that descriptions, through rational reconstruction - coherent, faithful to the past and 
evocative for future practice - as well as narrative descriptions, play a fundamental role 
in intervention for change. I want to claim that this position is in need of scrutiny and 
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analytical clarification, and I will do this, first, by taking a closer look at the notion -
rejected here - of technical rationality, by way of examining the cognitivist assumptions 
behind the much richer conception of calculative rationality (chapter 3); and by 
examining Habermas's more sophisticated conception of rational reconstruction 
which encompasses Schon's concept of narrative description. Moreover, the view 
that, through reflection, practitioner-based research can yield practical knowledge useful 
for intervention and change, can be easily recognized as a disguised form of the 
cognitivist argument which privileges cognitive understanding: 
"Like knowing-in-action, reflection-in-action is a process we can 
deliver without being able to say what we are doing....Clearly, it is one 
thing to be able to reflect-in-action and quite another to be able to reflect 
on our reflection-in-action so as to produce a good verbal description of 
it; and it is still another thing to be able to reflect on the resulting 
description." 
[Schon:1987:31) 
Indeed, Schiin sees these levels of reflection as important in the acquisition of artistry. 
One cannot help noticing the haunting subject of traditional epistemology, namely, a 
cognitively reflective practitioner. This becomes apparent in his description of the levels 
in the ladder of reflection through which students and coach, in a studio of design, try 
to understand each other: 
5. Reflection on reflection.... 
4. Reflection on reflection on description of designing. 
3. Reflection on description of designing. 
2. Description of designing. 
1. Designing. 
I have already examined the notion of cognitive understanding and the counter-
conception of practical understanding within the Heideggerian framework which, let's 
say for now, offers a much more well-thought conception of understanding and a 
different conception of research, namely the Heideggerian hermeneutic interpretation. 
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Thirdly, Schon's claim that technical rational performance requires situations which are 
capable of being reformulated unambiguously and which present themselves in stable 
forms, and that reflective practice as the artistry of the competent practitioner is the 
capacity to deal with unique, uncertain and conflicting cases that cannot be (adequately) 
resolved by technical rational knowledge, is nothing but the age-old problematic of 
determinant/reflective judgment best formulated by Kant, and re-thought in his "Critique 
of Judgment" and later writings. Moreover, the 'artistic' conceptions and vocabulary 
that Schon employs to talk about professional judgment, and, furthermore, his proposal 
that professional education should be modelled according to aesthetic exemplars derived 
from the design studio or the music school, is the unacknowledged shift to the Kantian 
model of aesthetics [6]. I will deal with these issues, first, by shifting to the problematic 
of language (chapter 6) which allows us to rethink the question of uniqueness of cases; 
and, secondly, I will discuss Lyotard's reading of Kant (chapter 7) which most 
forcefully poses the issue of judgment and reveals the complexity of the issues around 
the distinction between particular/singular (unique). In addition, it is sensitive to the 
contemporary problematic of language. 
This last point about language is in need of some clarification. I will come back to it 
with my fifth point. Before that, fourth, I would like to look a bit closer at Schon's 
argument that the performance of the practitioners includes a repertoire, i.e., elements of 
repetition understood by him as units or types of cases, each one consisting of 
family resembling cases. This apparently Wittgensteinian view is described by 
Schon as follows: 
"As long as his [the practitioner's] practice is stable, in the sense that it 
brings him the same types of cases, he becomes less and less subject to 
surprise. His knowing-in-practice tends to become increasingly tacit, 
spontaneous, and automatic, thereby conferring upon him and his 




"When a practitioner makes sense of a situation he perceives to be 
unique, he sees it as something already present in his repertoire. To see 
this site as that one is not to subsume the first under a familiar category 
or rule. It is, rather, to see the unfamiliar, unique situation as both 
similar to and different from the familiar one, without at first being able 
to say similar or different with respect to what. The familiar situation 
functions as a precedent, or a metaphor, or - in Thomas Kuhn's phrase 
- an exemplar for the unfamiliar one." 
[Schon:1983:138] 
This process of seeing-as and doing-as - that is to say, according to an as-structure 
that hinges upon the range and variety of the repertoire that a practitioner brings to 
unfamiliar situations, and which helps him judge a situation on the basis of similarity 
relations without the need to reduce it to an instance of standard categories - is a 
common way of reading Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblances. I will 
discuss this in chapter 3, and will return to it in chapter 4 in my discussion of H. 
Dreyfus; but let me underline here this interpretation, and note that it presupposes a 
notion of (unconscious or partially conscious) articulation resting upon an essentialist 
human subject. To be sure, there is one particular line of argument that attempts to 
reframe Schon's position, and, unintendedly [7], to save him from such a charge. I 
now turn to my fifth point to present this argument, but, first, I should give an account 
of Schon's own understanding of language. 
Sch6n explores examples of professional practice by looking at cases drawn from a 
range of professions: engineering, architecture, management, psychotherapy, town 
planning and music. The examples come from practical situations, or from records of 
professional education based on protocols of supervisory sessions, or on master classes 
in musical performance. Based on his distinction between reflection-in-action and 
reflection on action, he introduces a further distinction between a language-of, say, 
design, and a language to talk about design. At times, he is careful to pinpoint the 
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importance of the former, emphasising that 'drawing and talking' are parallel ways of 
designing. 
In his example of supervisory sessions of a master-designer with his students, Schein 
observes that the students, if anything, are more likely at the outset to be able to give 
verbal descriptions of design that they cannot produce [1987:87]. At first, students do 
not know what designing is and they cannot recognize it when they see it [ibid: 100]. 
The studio master cannot make things easier for them either. He cannot explain what 
'thinking architecturally' means [ibid: 97], first, because he, as a practitioner, has a 
limited ability to say what he knows, since essential features of designing escape clearly 
stated rules. In addition, much of what he can say is graspable by a student only as he 
begins to design. In a few years or even months, though, students and coaches begin to 
talk with each other in a language that, to an outsider, seems complex and obscure. 
They communicate easily, finishing each other's sentences or leaving sentences 
unfinished, confident that the listener has grasped their essential meaning. 
In analysing this example, Schein pays special attention to the ways in which 
convergence of meaning between a coach and his students occurs. In the design studio, 
the master-designer uses a special kind of language, what Scholl calls a 'drawing 
and talking' language. In the supervisory sessions, a distinctive dialogue develops with 
two aspects to it, namely, 'telling and listening' and 'demonstrating and imitating'. The 
coach's showing and telling are interwoven as are the student's listening and imitating. 
Through this combination, students learn what they cannot learn by imitation or 
following instructions alone [1987:111]. 
However, there is another view of language embedded in Sch6n's descriptions. Thus, 
"[i]n the earlier stages...one notices or feels that A and B are similar, 
without being able to say similar with respect to what. Later on, 
reflecting on what one perceives, one may come to be able to describe 
relations of elements present in a restructured perception of both A and 
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B which account for the preanalytic detection of similarity between A 
and B. Later still, one may construct a general model for which a 
redescribed A and a redescribed B can be identified as instances." 
[1983:186] 
Scholl understands this move from preanalytic grasping of similarities to descriptions of 
the exemplars, or what he calls generative metaphors, to a construction of a model, 
as both inevitable and necessary. As he points out, our descriptions are of different 
kinds depending upon our purposes and the language of description available to us 
[1987:25]. He further elaborates this view of language by saying that descriptions are 
always attempts to put into explicit, symbolic form, a kind of knowing that begins by 
being tacit and spontaneous, and states that "our descriptions are conjectures that need 
to be tested against observation of their originals" [ibid:25]. 
My point is that Schon oscillates between a view of language as a form of articulation, 
whatever that means, and a different view of language as representation in the sense of 
correspondence with an outside reality. This unclarity has been exploited particularly 
well by Hills & Gibson (1988) - to my knowledge, the only essay among the otherwise 
rather extensive literature to take up the issue of language in Schon's work. Hills and 
Gibson attempt to reframe Schon's observations in language-systematic terms, in order 
to clarify the relationship between the kind of knowing that provides the basis for 
technically rational performance, on the one hand, and the performances of Schon's 
competent practitioners on the other, and have gone some way towards unpacking that 
which is characterized as unique in his framework. They note: 
"The problem is not that there is a mismatch between the knowledge 
purveyed by professional schools, on the one hand, and the problems 
of professional practice on the other, not if by 'mismatch' one means 
that the former is irrelevant to the latter. Rather, the problem is the 
failure of professional school faculty to ask and answer the questions, 
`what can the underdeveloped linguistic-conceptual systems available to 
the field contribute to professional practice?' " 
[1988:171] 
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The problem, however, is that in their move to language, they are seeking linguistic 
conceptual systems. Their distinction between an analytic (linguistic) competence 
and its reflexive exercise is grounded on a conception of language and representation 
as correspondence, and a notion of communication determined by linguistic (syntactic 
and semantic) rules. Furthermore, it is claimed that the reflexive exercise of analytic 
competence can give the practitioner mastery over the various aspects of language 
(cognitive, expressive, evaluative, constitutive, in their own terms). Though interesting 
as a move, if one bears in mind the generally empirical and empiricist orientation in the 
reception of Schon's work, I will refrain from discussing it in any detail, for it is 
obvious that it easily falls into the universal/particular problematic, where a case 
becomes an instance of a (linguistic) concept, and/or a position of rational 
reconstruction. I, therefore, propose to come back to this problematic by way of 
assessing Habermas' notions of communicative competence and rational reconstruction 
(chapter 5). I underline here the problematic that Hills & Gibson are registering with 
their reframing of Schon. This I will state as the question of the relationship between the 
ideality of a language and its repetitions - that is to say, its empirical representations. 
I would like to make a final point emphasising, at the same time, that, although he 
attempts to reverse the dichotomy between theory and practice with his move to the 
practical, Schon cannot challenge it. The series of dichotomies that support the cognitive 
paradigm, and which privilege cognitive understanding, are the organizing categories of 
his framework. The move to the practical brings forth a further dichotomy between 
saying/showing and this, as I will have the opportunity to uncover in subsequent 
chapters, has to do with the way practice has been traditionally understood. In the 
analysis of his examples, Schen points out that there is a multimedia language of 
demonstration and description. 'Telling and demonstrating', 'listening and imitating', 
he argues, characterize the coach's performance and the student's learning respectively. 
His proposal for a practicum, i.e., a setting designed for the task of learning a practice, 
is a consequence of his view that, 
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"...learning all forms of professional artistry depends, at least in part, 
on conditions similar to those created in the studios and conservatories: 
freedom to learn by doing in a setting relatively low in risk, with access 
to coaches who initiate students into the 'traditions of the calling' and 
help them, by 'the right kind of telling' to see on their own behalf and 
in their own way what they need most to see. We ought, then, to study 
the experience of learning by doing and the artistry of good coaching." 
[Schorr 1987:17; emphasis added] 
The practicum proposed here is, first, distinguished from apprenticeship, in that the 
latter offers direct exposure to real conditions of practice and patterns of work, but most 
work places are not set up for the demanding tasks of imitation and education 
[ibid:37]. It is also distinguished from a practicum as a form of technical training 
wherein an instructor's role would be to communicate and demonstrate the application 
of rules and operations to the facts of practice: 
"A reflective practicum must establish its own traditions...Its traditions 
must include its characteristic language, its repertoire of precedents and 
exemplars, and its distinctive appreciative system." 
[Scholl: 1987:311] 
I would like to conclude this section by indicating a far-reaching and deep-rooted 
conception of practice in need of thorough examination. The starting points, which will 
be explored at various points in subsequent chapters (chapter 8, in particular), have 
been offered here in the form of the dichotomy between saying/showing, and in notions 
such as learning and imitating, the 'calling of a tradition' and the authority of the 
exemplars - notions which pose the question of the model of mimesis under which we 
can think about language and reality, tradition and community, exemplars and authority, 
and thought and action. 
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2.3 REVIEW OF LABORATORY RESEARCH 
In the preceding section, I mentioned the dichotomy between saying and showing 
which, as we will see later on, shapes some of the thinking and research into 
professional practice. In this section, I will only look at what I consider to be its 
immediate cognitivist antecedents - namely, the dichotomy between doing or performing 
an action and the verbal reporting of it. Experimental studies in cognitive psychology 
have been trying for some time now to establish the relationship that is assumed to exist 
between the ability of a person to carry out efficient action in a situation, and that of the 
same person to answer questions about the situation. I have already introduced this 
problematic (Section 1.1) which often is formulated in terms of the distinction between 
implicit and explicit knowledge. Laboratory studies in cognitive psychology (for 
example, Reber et.al., 1980) have addressed the issue of the relationship between 
implicit/explicit modes of learning and performance, and have looked at the 
circumstances under which tacit knowledge is Aluired, as well as the nature of its 
interaction with explicit knowledge (e.g. verbal instruction). 
In what follows, I will review Broadbent's et.al. (1986) laboratory studies which are of 
some interest because, while they are firmly located within the cognitive paradigm, they 
attempt to challenge a widely held theory on which experimental studies on 
discrepancies between performance and verbal accounts of it rest, namely, the view of a 
common data-base (knowledge-base). This view supposes that 
"people act by consulting an internal model of the world, a database of 
knowledge common to all output processes, and manipulating it to 
decide on the best action. To handle the discrepancies between verbal 
report and action, this view also supposes a distinction between the 
general database of knowledge, and other relatively specific processes 
that act upon this database. Some such processes will result in verbal 
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outputs, some in actions, and knowledge that is accessible through one 
process may fail to be revealed through another defective process." 
[Broadbent et.al.:1986:33] 
The well-known objections to laboratory research notwithstanding [8], I will proceed to 
review these studies for two reasons. First, Broadbent's et.al. line of inquiry casts 
doubts on certain attempts at computer modelling of professional expertise, and 
researchers in decision technology have themselves read Broadbent et.al. as 
challenging one of the basic assumptions of the field, namely, the view that human 
knowledge is exclusively rule-based. Thus they acknowledge: 
"Recent work has suggested that in tasks with a non-obvious structure, 
skill at verbalizing task knowledge is poorly or even negatively 
correlated with skill at actually doing the task..." 
[Fox:1988:237; emphasis added] 
Secondly, views originating either in Broadbent et.al. or in the theory that they seek to 
challenge, have being spreading through the debate on professional practice, motivating 
research or supporting theoretical positions which still rely on either of the two sets of 
dichotomies mentioned earlier. In addition, as the quote immediately above indicates, 
the questioning of the rule-based character of knowledge in Broadbent et.al.- as in H. 
Dreyfus & S. Dreyfus's position that I will present later - typically goes with the 
argument about practice as doing or performing which is associated with skill and is 
opposed to explicit or formal knowledge. The dichotomy implied in the argument 
between theory as explicit, formal knowledge and practice as doing or performing 
which requires and results in skill, is worth exposing and underlining, for it relies upon 
a widely held assumption about experience as immediate, concrete, intuitive and 
direct. Let me, therefore, review Broadbent's et.al studies in some detail. 
In a research report entitled "Implicit and Explicit knowledge in the control of complex 
systems" (1986) Broadbent et.al. report experiments which deal whith the relation 
between the ability of a person to carry out efficient action in a situation, and that of the 
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same person to answer questions about the situation. As they point out, their research 
was a response to, mainly, two sorts of gaps in the existing literature: first, although 
there is research to suggest that performance changes without a change in verbal 
knowledge, the opposite is more rare, that is to say, to show changes in verbal 
knowledge without change in performance. Second, there is a major gap in the literature 
concerning the investigation of the kinds of task in which discrepancies may be 
expected to occur. In addition, in their considerations, they also took into account the 
results of a minority of existing studies in the fields of concept and language learning 
and in the field of control of dynamic systems; that is to say, systems in which each 
action creates a fresh situation requiring further action. These studies do not simply 
show a discrepancy between action and verbal report but go even deeper. They try to 
show that the probability of correct action changes with practice, understood as 
'repetition', while that of a verbal account does not. These results, they argue, cannot 
be explained by partial but incomplete access by the verbal system to a database 
improved by practice. The effects of practice must be entirely on the processes leading 
to action, not on a database shared with verbal outputs [ibid:34]. 
They, then, argue that although such results allow conclusions stronger than a mere 
demonstration of inequality between verbal accounts and action, several problems are 
left unsettled. First, it remains obscure why these tasks, rather than others, should 
show the discrepancy. Broadbent et.al call attention to the increased information load 
that makes certain tasks show the dissociation of verbal report and action. If so, then the 
same general task might show a lower degree of dissociation when presented in a form 
that reduces the number of possibilites to be kept in mind [ibid:35]. Further, they 
observe that the existing data are usually asymmetric; they show verbal response 
tending to be less affected by practice than action is, but not the reverse. In fact, the 
reverse kind of discrepancy - improving verbal knowle dge without a change in the 
quality of decision - seems to be less common. For example, one can hardly imagine 
that a person who can define a concept would nevertheless be unable to pick out 
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instances of it, although it is perfectly possible to encounter the form of discrepancy in 
which detailed action is correct but verbal definition is not [ibid:36]. 
On the other hand, they say, it is quite plausible to observe high verbal knowledge and 
low action when dealing with complex systems, for example, managing transport 
systems or models of the economy. One of the characteristics of these systems is that 
knowledge of a certain relationship between two variables is consistent with a large 
number of possible decisions being correct. Thus it is very plausible that a person might 
possess verbal knowledge about economics and yet be unable to take correct decisions, 
just as s/he may be able to take correct decisions and yet be unable to answer verbal 
questions [ibid]. 
With such starting points, Broadbent et. al. set out two questions for empirical 
investigation: first, to find cases in which there are changes in the ability of the 
individual to answer questions about the task, without corresponding change in 
performance, and, second, to investigate the relationship between verbal reports and 
action when the amount of information varied; that is, when the number of variables to 
be controlled changed or when the salience of the crucial information varied. The 
experiments were carried out by using the dynamic system tasks of Broadbent (1977) 
and Broadbent & Aston (1978) and the systems chosen were the transportation system 
and the economy. 
The aims of the transportation studies were: 
(i) to confirm that practice did indeed increase the correctness of decision without 
improving the answers to questions about the system being controlled; (ii) to see 
whether improving the answers to questions - for example, providing verbal instruction 
in the system rather than simply giving uninstructed practice - would have any effect on 
the efficiency of decisions; (iii) to tackle the question of the amount of information being 
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handled during learning. This was done by giving each person a period to practice on 
the effects of each one of the variables before exposure to the main task. 
They report the analysis of the results as follows: 
(i) experience with the total task did not improve the ability to answer questions about it, 
but experience of the isolated relationship did; (ii) the people who tried out the task with 
each relationship alone learned as much as other people learned from their practice with 
the complete task, and they learned it in a way that let them answer verbal questions; 
(iii) verbal instruction improved verbal knowledge, but it did not increase the ability to 
perform the task. On the other hand, experience of the situation and practice on the task 
caused a loss of verbal knowledge. In any case, there is no evidence in the findings that 
greater ability to answer questions is associated with any advantage in actual 
performance. 
In short, from the transportation studies, they conclude that there is some connection 
between the amount of information presented and occurence of a dissociation between 
verbal report and action; and that practice on a dynamic system can increase the 
probability of correct decision, without a corresponding increase in the number of 
correct answers to verbal questions about the system. Furthermore, the results raise the 
possibility that experience of the situation is actually reducing the ability for verbal 
reports rather than increasing it. 
On reflection upon the system used in these studies, Broadbent et. al. realized its 
limitations. First, to check the possibility of practice reducing verbal knowledge 
requires the use of a system about which there is considerable verbal knowledge in 
advance of practice, and in this sense the transportation system wasn't very suitable. 
Secondly, their experiments with the transportation system were limited in that an 
externally determined goal was given to the persons involved, and, therefore, it might 
have been the case that the subjects were learning only aspects of the system directed 
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narrowly to achieving that goal. Third, in the transportation studies, the system to be 
controlled was left constant and they varied only the methods of training. Characteristics 
of the system itself may alter the ease or difficulty with which relevant information can 
be detected. Finally, the degree of instability of a dynamic system creates the possibility 
of improving verbal knowledge while positively harming action. For example, when 
decisions produce near-catastrophic consequences, the cause-effect relationship is more 
likely to be noted than it is when effects are sufficiently small to be lost in the general 
random changes that are happening in the system. For all these reasons, a simple 
economic model was chosen as more suitable. To give an example, verbal knowledge 
of economics is relatively widespread in the community and thus available in advance of 
any practice; or, in the economic field, an action may not have an effect until 
considerably later. The degree of instability in the field of economics is also greater. 
To carry out the economic studies, four groups of people were chosen. The techniques 
of data collection varied, according to the specific aims of the experiments in each case, 
from questionnaires - to discover the subjects' personal preferences and their initial 
beliefs on economics, as well as to test the ability for verbal reports after the completion 
of the task - to written information on performance - an example sequence of 8 
decisions and their consequences - and trial experiences. The aims of each experiment 
with its results are summarised below. 
The experiment with the first group aimed at detecting changes in verbal reports 
without changes in accuracy of decision, and improvement in decision with practice 
without a corresponding change in verbal knowledge. The researchers report the 
following results: (i) experience with the task caused this sample of subjects to change 
their intentions. More specifically, it showed improvement in performance without 
gains in verbal knowledge as a result of familiarity with the system. Also, shown was 
an improvement of decision-making accuracy with practice, with no improvement in 
verbal knowledge, despite the use of a system about which people have opinions from 
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everyday life and the use of a free situation without specified goals. Finally, it showed 
some changes in verbal knowledge in the opposite direction to the changes in decision 
accuracy. The second group, tested identically to the first group, confirmed the 
findings, especially the finding that the effect of practice is to change the intentions of 
the subjects, and, in fact, showed a downward change in verbal question answering at 
the same time as there was an upward change in decision performance. 
In the case of the third group, the main factor to be tested was the number of 
relationships needed to be kept in mind. The task was verbal and/ or actual performance 
in a situation, in which each decision can affect outcomes only after the next decision, 
rather than immediately, a fact which requires that the subjects keep track of twice as 
many relationships. The findings confirmed that lagged effects are simply harder 
because they involve a larger number of possible relationships. Experiments with the 
fourth group started from this premise, viz., given the suggestion that quantity of 
information is important in determining effects on verbal knowldge, factors making a 
relationship more salient might cause verbal knowledge to improve. One such factor is 
the size of the change produced by a decision. The experiment achieved this by 
removing a feature of the previous experiments which would self-correct the 
consequences of mistaken decisions. Thus, if a mistaken decision was made, its effects 
would persist and become dramatic. The expectations were that this group would show 
better results in verbal reporting and less good results in decision making. This would 
be a dissociation confirming that the effects of practice are indeed on specific 
processes and not on a common database, and also tending to confirm that loss 
of verbal knowledge is associated with the presence of large quantities of information, 
and can be combatted by salience of the desired information. The rationale behind it was 
that if there is a common database, but verbal knowledge is sometimes inadequate 
through loss of access to a common database by specific verbal processes, then the 
predictions would be different: either salience would produce a parallel improvement for 
both verbal and performance measures, or the difficulty of the task would cause both to 
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suffer. They report the following results: (i) the overall ability to answer questions had 
been increased; (ii) the increased salience of effects had failed to produce a 
corresponding increase in the benefits of practice. In general, the reduction in stability 
prevented the beneficial effect of practice on the control of the system, but produced a 
beneficial effect on question answering. 
Broadbent et. al. started with two questions: first, they wanted to explain why we 
expect action and verbal reports to be associated in many everyday tasks but not in 
laboratory tasks - nor, perhaps, in certain other real life tasks. The existing theory 
which is used to explain the discrepancy suggests that if one knows the rules verbally, 
s/he can decide on the basis of those alone. If the rules are not known, one decides on 
the basis of similarity between the present situation and others met in the past. Thus, 
action based on matching the current situation to one from the past will give better than 
chance performance, although it is incapable of supporting question anwering. The 
theory thus explains how people can make the right decisions although they do not 
know the rules, but it expects them to do better if they do know the rules. In contrast, 
Broadbent's et. al. experimental studies try to explain how people who answer 
questions well may nevertheless perform badly. Their results suggest that the 
situation-matching strategy, rather than being merely a weaker approximation to the 
model manipulation one, possesses an advantage of its own. 
In fact, this position is in accord with one particular line of argument in computer 
literature. Michie (1980) describes two different machine mentalities: (a). the tabular 
representation - or 'look-up' table - which stores the correct action to be taken in each of 
an array of situations. It is fast, but too shallow for helpful interaction, for "the device 
could say nothing about how it knew what it knew" [ibid:17]; (b) The compact 
algorithmic representation - or 'look-ahead' table - which proceeds by calculating the 
future consequences of each possible action, using its observation of the current 
situation and its knowledge of the structure of the world. It is slow but "...when asked 
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how it selected its move, look-ahead is able to make an exceptionally profound 
response by disgorging the complete analysis tree" [ibid:18]. It is not only a complete 
strategy but, at the same time, a complete justification of the strategy. 
As Broadbent et. al. remark [op.cit.:49], Michie's argument changes the broader 
interpretation of the difference between the two strategies. That is to say, the 'look-up 
table' can sometimes be the best choice, depending on the problem one is tackling. The 
'look-ahead table' might be inefficient in controlling highly unstable systems. This 
means that if it is the case that performance based on verbalizable knowledge, and 
that which selects action by matching the situation to those met in earlier 
experience, are alternative modes of function, each with its own advantages, then 
the problem becomes one of specifying the conditions that make one or the other 
appropriate. 
The previous point clarifies the notions of implicit and explicit knowledge that are 
implied in this account. Implicit knowledge is the result of the 'situation-matching' 
strategy, and success here is related to selective attention and the mapping of situations 
onto actions. Further, it is implied that such knowledge cannot be elicited in the form of 
rules or propositional knowledge and it is acquired through practice. It is expected that 
practice with exemplary situations would enhance this kind of knowledge and, 
therefore, improve performance. Explicit knowledge, on the other hand, is seen as 
knowledge acquired through the 'model manipulation' strategy. It is perfectly 
representational and can be elicited in the form of rules. In this mode, performance is 
expected to improve with verbal instructions and knowledge of theory. 
I started this review by pointing out a basic dichotomy of cognitivism. On the one hand 
verbal knowledge, understood as explicit, perfect representations (rules) of an 
objective world (situation/task), capable of determining and justifying action by putting 
to work the psychological information processing mechanism of inferential reasoning. 
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There is no place for experience in this mode, for all that is required is abstract, formal 
knowledge, distanced from experience and therefore objective, and capable of being 
repeated as the same (e.g., the same procedures). On the other hand doing, 
which yields implicit, non-representational knowledge, acquired through performing. 
This knowledge puts to work the quite different mechanism of situation-matching on the 
basis of similarity relations. Experience in the form of repetition of what is the same 
in the similar action (e.g., of a type) is the prerequisite of this mode. Moving within 
this binary opposition, it is not surprising that Broadbent's et.al. shift to practice 
imports from the cognitive paradigm all the presuppositions about practice, 
performance, experience and repetition. 
At the most basic level, these presuppositions of cognitivism, which also characterize all 
the moves to the practical reviewed in this chapter, rest upon a common view about 
language, viz., that there is a level of action and practice which is separate from 
language. This view, I believe, should be made problematic by inquiring into the 
presuppositions of performance, and the notion of the performative. This I do in chapter 
5, and Part II. 
Secondly, it is important to emphasise here a new element introduced in the debate with 
Broadbent's et.al. studies, and their shift to practice. That is to say, contrary to studies 
and positions reviewed earlier, they introduce the view that performance based on 
verbalized knowledge and that which selects action by matching the situation are two 
alternative modes of function. Within the discourse on professional practice, and 
more generally the discourse on action, this can be or has been exploited in at least three 
ways. First, it can further problematize the debate on practical reasoning, a weaker view 
of rationality and action justification, and typically opposed to inferential reasoning. I 
will look at this debate in chapter 3 below. Secondly, it has been used by H. Dreyfus & 
S. Dreyfus to support their own model of skill acquisition, and their proposal of types 
of action-situations, and I will discuss this model in chapter 4. Finally, as with other 
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studies/positions reviewed, it emphasises notions that require a systematic analysis, 
such as, for example, 'similarity relations' and 'direct, intuitive, concrete, immediate 
experience' which comes before or is beyond language. 
In chapter 1 (section 1.1) I introduced the basic dichotomies of the cognitive paradigm 
which construct and support the opposition between theory and practice, and I 
discussed an alternative framework which, at least, complicates the picture of 
cognitive/practical understanding. The present chapter gave examples of research in the 
field of cognitive science and of theoretical positions/empirical studies on professional 
practice of teachers and other practitioners, with a view to identifying the vocabulary 
used in the move to the practical/professional, and to illustrating my thesis that current 
inquiry is still supported by a strong cognitivist base. I have already indicated the ways 
in which the issues raised are going to be followed up in subsequent chapters, and I 
would, therefore, conclude this review by emphasising two issues only. 
First, there is evidently a shift to practice and a questioning of the notion of action as 
determined by technical rationality, abstract rules or calculation, which very often is 
accompanied by a rejection of theory and theoretical knowledge. What has not been 
questioned, however, is the notion of theory itself. In the chapter which follows, I 
would like, therefore, to look a bit closer at the notion of (cognitive) theory, and refer to 
certain positions which attempt to uncover some deep-rooted presuppositions of 
cognitivism related to this notion. In addition, I would like to look at the more general 
debate on rule-following for, on the one hand, the rule-following model is intrinsic 
to cognitive theory, and on the other, it poses questions about the nature of rules. 
Secondly, it appears that the shift to the practical opens up two seemingly different 
problematics regarding practical/professional activity. One revolves around the notion of 
skill and skilled practice (Elliott, Broadbent) and perhaps provokes us to push the 
inquiry further towards raising the issue of performance; the other around the notion of 
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artistic practice (Schon), and perhaps creates the possibility of openings to the issue of 
professional judgment. One might suspect that there is some common ground to these 
seemingly divergent ways of thinking of the practical, which must be identified as the 
presupposition on which they rest. For now, let me stress what has already surfaced: 
the active indeterminacy of the notion of skill and judgment, and the need for their 
systematic analysis. I should hope that this thesis will go some way towards unpacking 
both notions. 
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CHAPTER 3: CALCULATIVE RATIONALITY: RULES AND 
EXEMPLARS 
"We might think of the idea that practices are made up of formulable 
rules as the equivalent, from the practical point of view, of the idea 
which, from a theoretical point of view, sees the world as made up of 
picturable facts. It construes our practices as essentially formulable 
by rules in a way analogous to that in which representationalist 
epistemology construes the world as being essentially picturable 
by propositions. Furthermore, it construes rules as types of 
generalizations in the imperative form, generalizations which practically 
determine particular actions in a way analogously to the way theoretical 




As was mentioned in the general introduction, one of the fundamental presuppositions 
of the cognitive paradigm is theory: an infinitely repeatable truth which presupposes 
the ideality of the 'object' which, in turn, confirms the ideality of the 'subject'. The 
notion of theory is intrinsic to the rule-following model. The latter currently defines 
reason in general, its exemplary instance being computer-like reasoning. 
This chapter discusses three approaches to the critique of the rule-following model. 
Section 3.2 focuses on Dreyfus's critique of cognitive sciences and cognitive 
procedures in the field of Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive simulation. It pays 
particular attention to his critique of the notion of theory through a questioning of the 
presuppositions of the competence/performance distinction which underpins the 
theory/practice hierarchical opposition. Section 3.3 follows Wittgenstein in his critique 
of the linguistic cognitive paradigm, the conception of language as a system governed 
by rules, and the notion of a rule as that which both governs behaviour and provides an 
external standard of correctness. In particular, it explores various readings of 
Wittgenstein's critique of representation and his move to language use, and indicates 
their implications for the theory/practice relation. It is the idea of representation, the 
notion of truth as correspondence, and the idea of rationality which are at stake in 
Kuhn's critique of natural science as the paradigm of knowledge. Section 3.4 discusses 
different readings of Kuhn and traces their implications, especially with reference to his 
attempt to weaken the notion of rationality as representation, through his notion of an 
exemplar. 
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To critique the metaphysical principle of reason is to show the limits of modern reason. 
This effort is, certainly, present in Dreyfus, Wittgenstein and Kuhn. The challenge is in 
their attempt to think through the subject/object ontology, that is to say, the assumption 
that the subject is separate from the world of objects so that their relation is one of 
manipulation. Their critique of theory - i.e., of the metaphysical drive to reduce the real 
to what is visible - through a weakening of the model of determination by rule, opens 
the inquiry into the field of the practical. But this, as is pointed out in the concluding 
remarks, inevitably raises the question of the subject; that is to say, the requirement that 
the metaphysical presuppositions which operate with the weakening of the cognitive 
subject are explored and displaced. 
3.2 A CRITIQUE OF CALCULATIVE RATIONALITY: COGNITIVE 
SIMULATION AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AS A 
PARADIGM OF THEORY AS CALCULATION 
H. Dreyfus (1972), having as his particular objective the critique of the use of the digital 
computer in cognitive simulation (C.S.) and artificial intelligence (A.I.), undertook to 
question the whole philosophical tradition which underlies them. For Dreyfus, 
following Heidegger, this tradition should be traced back to the beginning of western 
metaphysics visualized by Plato. Modern technology, it is argued [1972:xv-xx], is the 
fulfilment and application of the Platonic project which is summed up in: (a) the idea 
that all reasoning could be reduced to some kind of calculation; (b) a searching for an 
'effective procedure'; (c) an epistemological demand for certainty; (d) a reduction of 
'know-how' to 'know that', that is to say, explicit, precise instructions. Plato suggested 
that it was possible to find a whole system of theoretical, objective principles which 
could be defended in rational argument and used to explain nature and justify action. 
Dreyfus holds that these assumptions support two kinds of dichotomies which, by 
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implication, define our traditional understanding of the notion of skill. First, the 
dichotomy between theoretical/practical knowledge. Theory is referring to an abstract 
conceptual scheme; it is systematic, explicit and can be generalized in the form of law or 
rules; in short, it is non-practical. It is thus contrasted with practical knowledge, manual 
dexterity, or skill understood as the successful application of knowledge based upon 
training. Secondly, the dichotomy between rational rules, that is, formal, global, 
universal knowledge, and practical, common sense knowledge which is specific, 
unformalizable and situated. Caught between these dichotomies, the notion of practical 
skill has been defined by exclusion as a kind of know-how. In one of its turns, viz., 
with Leibniz, the project attempts to salvage even those skills Plato traditionally 
rejected, by turning them into know-that, "...since it is at bottom just another theory 
more complex and particular" [Dreyfus & Dreyfus:1986:3]. 
Dreyfus (1972) defines his own project as the attempt to uncover the biological, 
psychological, epistemological and ontological assumptions underpinning the 
experiments with digital computers, thus posing questions concerning human as 
opposed to artificial reasoning. His main thesis is that these a priori assumptions must 
be seen as hypotheses rather than as a priori truth. More specifically, for Dreyfus, the 
failure of digital computers to fulfil the expectations of the workers in the field is 
evidence against the holding of such assumptions, and suggests that all difficulties in 
C.S. and A.I., rather than reflecting technological limitations - i.e., our technological 
capabilities at the present stage - may reveal the limitations of technology 
[ibid:130,139]. 
At another level, the failure of digital computers to simulate human practical 
understanding disconfirms the thesis that an exhaustible analysis of human reason into 
rule-governed operations on discrete, determinate, context-free elements is possible. 
To put it differently, H. Dreyfus sees the digital computer as the paradigmatic 
application of the view that thinking is calculating. It consists of abstract symbols 
92 
which stand for anything, and logical operations which can relate anything to anything. 
These two characteristics - discrete elements (bits of data) and their manipulation by a 
series of instructions (systematic rules) - are the essence of a digital computer. There is 
no appeal to human intuition and judgement. On the contrary, there is a conversion of 
any set of intelligent activity into a set of instructions by rule. For Dreyfus, this raises 
the question of whether human everyday, situated, skilled behaviour can be simulated 
by those machines, and amounts to the question of whether there can be a theory of 
practical activity. 
In what follows, H. Dreyfus's account of the four assumptions mentioned above will 
be reviewed in some detail and will be used as a background for the subsequent 
discussion on the competence/performance distinction. The latter has been already 
introduced in section 1.1 as one of the basic underpinnings of the theory/practice 
opposition, and the debate around this distinction should serve to expose and clarify the 
notion of (cognitive) theory and the by and large unexamined assumptions on which our 
understanding and definition of it rest. 
The assumption that man functions like a general-purpose, symbol-manipulating device 
amounts to : 
(i) a biological assumption about how the human brain works. That is to say, the view 
that at some level of operation - usually supposed to be that of the neurons- the brain 
processes information in discrete operations by way of some biological equivalent of 
on/off switches [ibid:68]. Dreyfus holds that no argument can be drawn from current 
empirical evidence concerning the brain. In fact, the difference between the 'strongly 
interactive' nature of brain organization and the non-interactive character of machine 
organization suggests that insofar as arguments from biology are relevant, the evidence 
is against the possibility of using digital computers to produce intelligence. In any case, 
the question of whether the brain operates like a digital computer is an empirical one to 
be settled by neurophysiology. 
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(ii) A psychological assumption which suggests that the mind functions like a digital 
computer. This is the view that the mind is a device operating on bits of information 
according to formal rules. Intelligent behaviour is produced because of the ability of the 
mind to use computer processes: comparing, classifying, searching lists of data. The 
human being, when behaving intelligently, is supposed to follow heuristic rules similar 
to those which would be necessary to enable a digital computer to produce the same 
behaviour [ibid:76]. In this view, thinking is 'data processing', a third person process, 
in which the involvement of the 'processor' plays no essential role [ibid: 68]. What is 
involved here is an unexamined move from the fact that the brain, in some sense, 
transforms its inputs, to the conclusion that the brain or mind performs some sequence 
of discrete operations. For Dreyfus, 
"...we need not conclude from the fact that all continuous 
physicochemical processes involved in human 'information 
processing' can in principle be formalized and calculated out discretely, 
that any discrete processes are actually taking place ." 
[ibid:80] 
Dreyfus questions the model of C.S. as a representation of how the mind actually 
'works' - viz., the view that mental processes must be the product of a rule-governed 
sequence of discrete operations. In contrast to the computer-influenced assumption that 
experience can be analysed into isolable, atomic, alternative choices, he shares the 
Gestalt psychologists' view that thinking and perception involve global processes 
which cannot be understood in terms of a sequence or even a parallel set of discrete 
operations [ibid:78]. Dreyfus [ibid:15-31] describes three basic characteristics of this 
'global information processing', namely: (a) in human perception, information, rather 
than explicitly considered, remains on the fringes of consciousness and is implicitly 
taken into account; (b) human beings possess the ability to use global context to reduce 
ambiguity sufficiently without having to formalize and eliminate ambiguity altogether 
(ambiguity tolerance); (c) human beings have the ability to distinguish the 
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essential/inessential in a specific task - viz., to see the core of the problem immediately -
which points to the fact that there are no essential/inessential elements in themselves. 
This kind of perception, Dreyfus claims, presupposes an altogether different conception 
of the notion of insight ('know-how'). It presupposes a recognition of the typical 
which depends on similarity, and a perspicuous grouping which cannot be 
thematized. It is claimed, therefore, that a context-dependent recognition in terms of 
proximity to a paradigm case and an insightful ordering around a paradigm is a common 
form of human recogition [ibid:40]. This family resemblance recognition is in 
contrast to the machine recognition where one has to move from an implicit 
perceptual grouping to an explicit conceptual classification. The question which is posed 
here is whether something fundamental is lost in this move from a perceptual 
consciousness - family resemblance - to a conceptual one - class membership defined in 
terms of specific traits; that is, whether one can analyse all experience, even perception, 
in terms of rules, and whether one can be justified in holding that all knowledge 
involves a set of explicit instructions. Dreyfus' analysis of research in C.S. and A.I. 
would suggest that, although man is surely a physical object processing physical inputs 
according to the laws of physics and chemistry, man's behaviour may not be explicable 
in terms of an information-processing mechanism receiving and processing a set of 
discrete inputs [ibid: 99-100]. 
(iii). An epistemological assumption that all knowledge can be formalized. This is the 
view that whatever can be understood can be expressed in terms of logical relations, that 
is, that a logical calculus governs the way the bits are related according to rules 
[ibid:68]. More specifically, although the epistemological assumption does not actually 
contain the view that human performance can be explained by supposing that people are 
following heuristic rules in a sequence of unconscious operations, it, nevertheless, 
claims that intelligent behaviour may still be formalizable in terms of such rules, and can 
be reproduced by machine. Thus the epistemological assumption involves two claims: 
(a) that all non-arbitrary behaviour can be formalized; and (b) that the formalism can be 
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used to reproduce the behaviour in question. Dreyfus criticizes the first claim by 
showing that it is an unjustified generalization from physical sciences, and the second 
claim by arguing that a theory of competence cannot be a theory of performance. A 
timeless, contextless theory of competence cannot be used to reproduce the moment to 
moment involved behaviour required for human performance, and, indeed, there cannot 
be a theory of human performance [ibid:102-103]. 
It appears that two crucial distinctions are blurred in arguments of either of the two sets 
of assumptions. It is often argued that the distinction between 
competence/performance marks the difference between the psychological and the 
epistemological assumption. Thus, while both assume the Platonic understanding as 
formalism, those who make the psychological assumption (C.S.) see the rules used in 
the formalization of behaviour as the very same rules which produce the behaviour. 
In contrast, those who make the epistemological assumption (Ad.) only affirm that all 
non-arbitrary behaviour can be formalized according to some rules. Secondly, the 
distinction between the production of intelligent behaviour/reproduction of the essential 
features of the same behaviour is blurred in the epistemological assumption that the 
formalism in question, whatever that is, can be used by a computer to reproduce the 
behaviour. As Dreyfus puts it, 
"..their formalism, as a theory of competence, need not be a theory of 
human performance, but they have not freed themselves sufficiently 
from Plato to see that a theory of competence may not be adequate as a 
theory of machine performance either." 
[ibid :102] 
Dreyfus sees the refutation of the epistemological assumption in the failure of the so-
called 'expert systems' to perform at a level higher than that of an advanced beginner, 
which presumably raises the question of what an expert human being does that a 
machine cannot reproduce; in other words, what is involved in skilful human 
behaviour. As he points out, the formalists seem to have been caught between an 
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impossibility of always having rules for the application of rules (cf. the Wittgensteinian 
argument, section 3.3, below), and an impossibility of finding ultimate, unambiguous 
data for applying these rules. In fact, the latter is the necessary precondition of A.I. 
Digital computers "ultimately contain a model of the world represented as a structured 
set of facts or propositions which are either true or false" [ibid:124]. 
(iv). This leads Dreyfus to a questioning of the basic ontological assumption underlying 
the use of the digital computer, the claim, that is, that everything essential to intelligent 
behaviour must in principle be understandable in terms of a set of determinate, 
independent, situation-free elements. To this ontological assumption that the world can 
be analysed as a set of facts and bits of information, Dreyfus counterposes 
Wittgenstein's notion of a form of life and Heidegger's notion of being-in-the-
world which contains the question of what we know when we have "knowledge of the 
world and its ways" [ibid:120]. Put differently, Dreyfus' counterproposal is based on a 
view of the human situation as providing the context in which human beings encounter 
specific facts. The attempt to make explicit this practical context, he argues, would 
require a disregarding of the difference between fact and situation. Further, Dreyfus 
remarks, even in the case where the importance of situated facts is recognized, the 
computer has first to recognize the context and then use this fixed context to determine 
the meaning of the elements. A hierarchy of contexts is thus being accepted which, in 
the last analysis, supports the claim that some features are intrinsically relevant and have 
a fixed meaning regardless of context. This leads the A.I. workers to an antinomy: on 
the one hand, they hold the thesis that there must be always a broader context; on the 
other hand, it is required that there must be an ultimate context, otherwise there will be 
an infinite regress of contexts and the formalization can never begin [ibid:134]. 
Dreyfus, following Heidegger, claims that his counterproposal of 'being-in-the-world' 
does not have to face such antinomies, for (a) it is our sense of the situation which 
enables us to select from the potential infinity of facts the immediately relevant ones, as 
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well as to estimate their significance (essential /inessential ) [ibid:130]; (b) it is the 
situation which provides the background against which behaviour can be orderly 
without being rule-like [ibid:130]; (c) it is the human ability to engage in practical 
activity which helps organize the situation in terms of human purposes and needs, so 
that objects are recognized as relevant/accessible [ibid: 148]. In short, it is a 'knowing-
how' instead of 'knowing -that' which is acquired through human beings' concern and 
engagement with the world. 
Drawing his arguments from the Heideggerian framework presented in chapter 1, and 
from Wittgenstein's notion of a form of life (section 3.3), Dreyfus claims that 'know-
how' cannot be made explicit. From the same sources, he formulates the suggestion that 
analysis of contexts in terms of facts and rules is rigid and restricting because, (a) one 
cannot have a satisfactory model of background understanding [Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus:1986:136]; (b) the fact that one cannot always put what s/he has learned into 
words suggests that 'know-how' cannot always be reduced to 'know-that' since it is 
not accessible to humans in the form of facts and rules [ibid:16]; (c) intuition, 
synonymous with 'know-how', refers to an understanding that effortlessly occurs upon 
seeing similarities with previous experiences [ibid:28]; (d) practice is required for 
maintaining 'know-how' which can be lost through inactivity. 'Knowing-how ' 
requires an experience with real situations [ibid:20]. 
Dreyfus uncovers the biological, psychological, epistemological and ontological 
assumptions underlying the attempts at A.I. and C.S. on the grounds that (a) this 
uncovering also constitutes a powerful critique of the notion of rationality as developed 
and refined in the western tradition by two thousand years of Metaphysics; (b) the 
critique of C.S. and A.I. shows something about the character of human intelligence, 
and, thus, opens the way and prepares the ground for an understanding of the notion of 
practical skill as situated, orderly, but not rule-governed human behaviour. 
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Let me clarify a little further Dreyfus' position. Much concerned with showing the limits 
of mechanized reason, he draws attention to human skilled activity and human 
expertise. In chapter 4 below I will present the Dreyfus & Dreyfus model of skill 
acqisition in detail, but it is important to emphasise here the distinction that H. Dreyfus 
draws between computer-like reasoning or calculative rationality - which is based 
on the view that computers, as logic machines and people alike are rule-following, 
symbol-manipulating, rational beings - and human skills which are based on intuition. 
The latter, Dreyfus and Dreyfus hold, is acquired in unstructured problem areas - that 
is, areas in which the goal, what information is relevant, and the effects of one's 
decisions are unclear. The interpretation of the situation, whether conscious or 
unconscious and based upon perceived similarities - depending on the level of skill -
determines what is seen as important in a situation. Dreyfus and Dreyfus call this 
interpretive ability, judgment. Thus, 
"...according to our description of skill acqisition the novice and 
advanced beginner exercise no judgment, the competent performer 
judges by means of conscious deliberation, and those who are 
proficient or expert make judgments based upon their prior concrere 
experiences in a manner that defies explanation." 
[1986:36] 
The distinction between calculative rationality and judgment based on concrete 
experience is further elaborated by their differentiating between justification by 
calculative rationality - i.e., inferences drawn from isolated, objective facts describing 
the problematic situation - and consensus-based, intuitive, shared uderstanding which 
defies precise verbalization [ibid:194]. The importance of the latter, in their argument, 
lies in the fact that it does not oppose deliberation to intuition. For deliberative 
rationality, as an intermediate type of rationality, does not seek to analyse the situation 
into context-free elements as the analytical reasoning characteristic of calculative 
rationality does. It rather rests on the intuitive, experience-based understanding of a 
practical whole, and, therefore, it might even sharpen intuition. 
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I have already discussed Dreyfus' interpretation of Heidegger's practical understanding, 
and the importance he attaches to the Heideggerian notion of vorhabe (background 
practices) and being-in-the-world; here the way in which Dreyfus & Dreyfus utilize 
this framework becomes apparent: background practices embody skills, and skills 
cannot be decontextualized and made a theoretical object of analysis because they don't 
consist of representations at all. While the human/machine distinction, which turns 
on this notion of representation, points to a need that this view be further scrutinized as 
to its humanist and essentialist grounding, here I will only emphasise their own claim 
and I will return to it later. To commonly held views, which posit that intuition is 
common sense and inferior knowledge, they juxtapose the view of intuitive, holistic 
understanding, which points to differences between a current situation and a similar, 
previous one, and produces a further intuitive grasping of the situation along with its 
associated decision based upon past experience. 
I have already mentioned one of the basic questions that Dreyfus raises with his 
critique, namely, whether there can be a theory of practical activity, which, for him, is 
the question of whether human behaviour can be formalized. I would like to pursue this 
issue further by looking at the distinction which is often drawn between 
competence/performance. But, first, I should reiterate that, according to H. Dreyfus, the 
basic difference between the psychologist and the epistemologist is that the former 
assumes that human behaviour can be given in the form of rules and these same rules 
are also the explanation of the behaviour, while the epistemologist only assumes that all 
non-arbitrary behaviour can be formalized according to some rules, and that these rules 
can be used by a computer to reproduce the behaviour. Arguments on the 
competence/performance distinction will facilitate a better understanding of the two 
seemingly different claims. 
In H. Dreyfus' analysis [1972:238-241,n.17] of Chomsky's position, the latter seems 
to put forward quite contradictory claims regarding the competence/performance 
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distinction. He sometimes defines competence and performance in such a way as to 
preserve the separation between the two, and to make the question of the relationship 
between a theory of competence and a theory of performance an empirical one. 
"...a generative grammar is not a model for a speaker or a hearer. It 
attempts to characterize in the most neutral possible terms the 
knowledge of the language that provides the basis for actual use of a 
language by a speaker-hearer." 
[Chomsky quoted in Dreyfus:ibid:238,n.17] 
With this distinction, the relationship between competence - i.e., what one knows when 
one knows a language - and performance - i.e., whether one follows these rules when 
one speaks - is defined as an empirical question. In other cases, Chomsky seems to 
hold that competence necessarily plays a role in performance and builds it into the 
definition of competence/performance and their relationship. 
"By a generative grammar I mean a description of the tacit competence 
of the speaker-hearer that underlies his actual performance in production 
and perception (understanding) of speach...it thus constitutes a 
hypothesis as to how the speaker-hearer interprets utterances, 
abstracting away from many factors that interweave with tacit 
competence to determine actual performance." 
[Chomsky quoted in Dreyfus:ibid] 
Chomsky further holds that linguistic competence that underlies behaviour is not 
realized in any direct or simple way in behaviour. A similar view, very often employed 
in research into professional activity and expert systems [for example, Ogborn & 
Bliss:1987], is expressed by Polanyi's notion of tacit knowledge. 
"[F]rom my interrogations of physicists, engineers and bicycle 
manufacturers, I have come to the conclusion that the principle by 
which the cyclist keeps his balance is not generally known.The rule 
observed by the cyclist is this. When he starts falling to the right he 
turns the handle-bars to the right, so that the course of the bicycle is 
deflected along a curve towards the right. This results in a centrifugal 
force pushing the cyclist to the left and offsets the gravitational force 
dragging him down to the right. This manoeuvre presently throws the 
cyclist out of balance to the left, which he counteracts by turning the 
handlebars to the left; and so he continues to keep himself in balance by 
winding along a series of appropriate curvatures. A simple analysis 
shows that for a given angle of unbalance the curvature of each winding 
101 
is inversely proportional to the square of the speed at which the cyclist 
is proceeding. 
But does this tell us exactly how to ride a bicycle? No. You obviously 
cannot adjust the curvature of bicycle's path in proportion to the ratio of 
your unbalance over the square of your speed; and if you could you 
would fall off the machine, for there are a number of other factors to be 
taken account in practice which are left out of in the formulation of this 
rule." 
[Polanyi:1969: 49-50 ] 
Although one can read this passage in at least two different ways, one of which would 
support the view that the formalism cannot account for the performance, his subsequent 
reference to 'hidden rules' [ibid:53; cf.Dreyfus:1972:236-37,n.2; ibid:238,n.17] shows 
that Polanyi fails to distinguish between performance/competence, and assumes that the 
rule he suggests for describing bicycle-riding competence is involved in bicycle-riding 
performance; consequently, the formalism expressing the competence is no longer 
neutral. 
As Dreyfus remarks, commenting upon the same passage, if the 
competence/performance distinction is to separate a formal theory from a psychological 
theory (theory of language use, theory of practical activity), as the epistemologist 
claims, the relation of a theory of competence to a theory of performance cannot be built 
by definition. 
But if it belongs to the definition of competence to underlie performance, as the 
psychologist believes, then competence cannot simply mean a formal theory. It would 
have to mean an idealized psychological theory of how language is produced, and 
the competence/performance distinction would call attention to the fact that other factors 
had been disregarded. This may be, for example, what Polanyi, in the passage quoted 
above, points to when he says that "there are a number of other factors to be taken 
account in practice, which are left out of in the formulation of this rule". In the same 
vein, and evoking contextual or biological constraints, Chomsky proposes that we 
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"disassociate a variety of factors that interact with underlying 
competence to determine actual performance..." 
[quoted in Dreyfus:1972:239,n.17] 
In making these points, Dreyfus correctly wants to uncover and question the 
assumption that "a person who has acquired knowledge of a language has internalized a 
system of rules" [Chomsky, quoted in Dreyfus:240:n.17], which underlies current 
theories of performance. Among theoretical linguists, this is a common view of 
language acquisition which assumes that a person who acquires knowledge of a 
language has internalized a system of rules and that these rules function as a 
mechanism for generating sentences. Baker and Hacker (1984), in a similar manner to 
that of Dreyfus, expose both the psychological myth of language acquisition, and the 
claims of the minimalist philosophers of language that their theories of meaning are not, 
or not directly, of any psychological moment. 
As far as the former is concerned, Baker and Hacker argue that it is a distortion of 
familiar truths. The tendency, for example, to attribute to a child tacit knowledge of a 
complex theory of meaning, distorts the character of his/her experience, suggesting that 
it consists in being fed information rather than in playing games, being encouraged, 
trained to imitate, to use words, etc. In other words, the computer analogy has a 
homogenizing effect on the characterization of what a child is exposed to [1984:290]. 
The minimalist, on the other hand, claims that a theory of meaning has the function of 
presenting an analysis of the complex skill which constitutes mastery of a language. To 
borrow the example that Baker and Hacker use from Dummett [1984:340,n.46], if a 
Martian could learn to speak a human language or a robot be devised to behave in just 
the ways that are essential to a language-speaker, an implicit knowledge of the correct 
theory of meaning for the language could be attributed to the Martian or the robot with 
as much right as to a human speaker, even though their internal mechanisms were 
entirely different. For Baker and Hacker, as for Dreyfus, this raises the inevitable 
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question of why it is that implicit knowledge of the theory of meaning which constitutes 
the theoretical representation of the practical ability, is attributed to the speaker, if the 
minimalist task is merely to give a proper analysis of the speakers ability to display what 
it is that he can do; and the inter-related question of the criteria according to which such 
implicit knowledge is distinguished from total ignorance [ibid:341]. 
In the section that follows, I will present Wittgenstein's position on 'rule following' and 
the debate around it. But before I conclude this section, I would like to return to 
Dreyfus's critique of the assumptions underlying C.S. and A.I. in order to make three 
critical points which I will take up in the subsequent section and/or in chapter 4, when I 
will present Dreyfus & Dreyfus' model of skill acquisition. 
First, Dreyfus emphasises that the formalist claim is based on a concrete understanding 
of the nature of scientific explanation. According to this, 
" to the extent that we have not specified our behavior in terms of 
unique and precisely defined reactions to precisely defined objects in 
universally defined situations, we have not understood that behavior in 
the only sense of 'understanding' appropriate to science. " 
[1972:114-115] 
He, therefore, attempts to show that this theoretical claim is untenable in its own terms, 
for the rules cannot be completely formalized. In the course of establishing this 
claim, Dreyfus, among other things, points to Polanyi's own objection to C.S., referred 
to earlier, which Dreyfus presents as an "interesting intermediate position" 
[1972:237,n.17]. Though he criticizes Polanyi [1] for his assumption that human 
beings follow 'hidden rules', he nevertheless cites approvingly the latter's assertion that 
"in an important sense" we do know the rules, but 
"one cannot deal with this as if it were unconscious knowledge, for the 
point is that it is a (more or less unconscious) knowledge with a bearing 
on an end. It is this quality of the subsidiary awareness, its functionally 
performing quality, that the machine cannot dublicate, because the 
machine operates throughout on one single level of awareness." 
[Polanyi, quoted in Dreyfus:1972:237,n.17] 
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The point is that Polanyi shares with Dreyfus the Gestalt psychologists' view that 
perception involves global processes, a 'family resemblance' recognition, which is 
contrasted to machine recognition. Dreyfus puts forward this view with the conviction 
that it relies upon a rich conception of perception, intuition and know-how which 
cannot be made explicit. I suggest that this view be submitted to further scrutiny. 
Secondly, and related to this, for Dreyfus, this know-how or kind of implicit 
knowledge suggests that analysis of contexts in terms of facts and rules is rigid and 
restricting. I have already presented this claim earlier on, so I would like here to make 
only one additional remark. Evoking Wittgenstein's notion of rule-following, Dreyfus 
argues that 
"[b]oth Wittgenstein and the computer theorists must agree that there is 
some level at which the rules are simply applied and one no longer 
needs rules to guide their application. Wittgenstein and the A.I. 
theorists differ fundamentally, however, on how to describe this 
stopping point. For Wittgenstein there is no absolute stopping point; we 
just fill in as many rules as are necessary for the practical demands of 
the situation. At some level....the interpretation of the rule is simply 
evident and the regress stops. For the computer people the regress also 
stops with an interpretation which is self-evident, but this interpretation 
has nothing to do with the demands of the situation. It cannot, for the 
computer is not in a situation." 
[1972:116; emphasis added] 
This interesting position drawn from Wittgenstein, but also in accord with Dreyfus' 
employment of a Heideggerian framework, will be discussed in the following section. 
But it is worth underlining that, in Dreyfus, it is the human as opposed to the machine 
which is able to act according to the practical demands of the situation. My specific 
concern, therefore, is to attempt to trace that which grounds such a claim. 
Thirdly, from the discussion I presented earlier on the competence/performance 
distinction, it appears as if Dreyfus is concerned with clarifying this distinction in order 
to argue that there cannot be a theory of performance of practical activity. His 
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commentary on the theoretical linguist, Chomsky, but also my own arguments from 
Baker & Hacker, may give the impression that, by and large, the discussion concerns 
practical activity in general, and it only draws upon the domain of linguistics/philosophy 
of language - a similar though distinct domain - in order to support the claim that human 
beings are not rule-following, computer-like machines. I would like to point to two 
kinds of misunderstandings which usually pass unnoticed in such an approach. First, it 
is assumed that a rule is a strange, extra-linguistic entity, and this calls for a serious 
reconsideration of the question of what a rule is. Secondly, it appears to still hold on to 
a distinction between action and linguistic action. To be more exact, claims around 
the use of language, and arguments against the possibility of a theory of meaning 
present language as a practical activity. However, very often, in Dreyfus in 
particular, linguistic activity is presented as if it were a different kind of activity which 
just happens to share the same kind of characteristics with other kinds of practical 
activity, such as, for example, bicycle-riding. Language thus appears to be different and 
separate from action in general. 
With Wittgenstein, in the following section, this point will become clearer, for it will be 
shown that interpretations of his position have not fully grasped the importance of the 
linguistic turn taken by late Wittgenstein, and have underestimated the implications of 
this shift for the action/linguistic action separation. 
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3.3 WHAT IS TO FOLLOW A RULE: A CRITIQUE OF THE 
LINGUISTIC-COGNITIVE PARADIGM 
The concept of rule following, far from being an answer to the question of how we 
know how to use a word, as often suggested by commentators of Wittgenstein, is the 
central problem [Staten:1985; Edwards:1982,1990; Cave11:1976; Baker:1981] of the 
"Philosophical Investigations" (1968). The myth of language as a calculus of meaning 
is undermined by a careful scrutiny of what rules are and what it is to calculate and to 
follow a rule. The goal is to render transparently ridiculous the idea of a hidden or 
unconscious following of a rule. To be sure, the critique of rule following is first and 
foremost Wittgenstein's own self-critique. Edwards [1990:147-153], among others, 
plots the course of Wittgenstein's self-criticism [2] by attending to the central themes of 
his earlier work, the "Tractatus: Logico-Philosophicus" (1972). This latter work makes 
the claim that the essence of language is its capacity to represent a world of facts 
existing independently of it. Further, it develops an atomistic ontology and theory of 
inference that make the elementary propositions of language truth-functionally 
independent of one another. 
The representationalist account of language, formulated in early Wittgenstein as the 
'picture theory of the proposition', known as the 'correspondence theory of meaning', 
makes elementary propositions the fundamental units of language. Propositions are 
logical pictures of facts. This means that, for early Wittgenstein, the basis of 
representation is logical rather than psychological. In a subsequent typescript, known as 
the "Philosophical Remarks" Wittgenstein attempts to cut the "Tractatus Logco-
Philosophicus" loose from the doctrine of the inferential atomism of the elementary 
propositions, i.e., from the idea of inferentially discrete propositions, while attempting 
to save the 'picture theory', by detaching it from the individual proposition. He thus 
presents us with a view of language that connects to reality not in the form of single 
107 
proposition to single fact, but by means of systems of propositions 
[Edwards:ibid:150]. It is easy to see how this idea of language-as-representation leads 
directly to the discussion in the "Philosophical Investigations" of rules and rule 
following. For Wittgenstein, at this stage, a system is a system because it is governed 
by clear and definite rules. To learn the system, say, of colour words, is not just to 
learn the 'internal' rules governing the relationships among the colour words, it is also 
to learn 'external' rules for their application to reality. In fact, 
"[t]he system of rules determining a calculus thereby determines the 
`meaning' of its signs too. Put more strictly: the form and the rules of 
syntax are equivalent. So if I change the rules - seemingly supplement 
them, say - I change the form, the 'meaning'." 
[Wittgenstein quoted in Edwards:ibid:153; emphasis added] 
This position of early Wittgenstein which attempts to establish that the meaning of a 
word is the rule of its application or, put differently, that syntactic rules account for 
semantic connections, postulates, more generally, that language in its essence is a 
rule-governed system. Having arrived at this position, the later Wittgenstein realizes 
that, as Baker [1981:44-45] puts it, he has replaced one form of mythology with 
another: myths about objects become myths about rules. 
Wittgenstein's inquiry into and critique of the conception of language as a rule-governed 
system has, at least, three aspects: (i) it asks the question of what a rule is; (ii) it 
purports to uncover the traditional presuppositions behind the view that a rule regulates 
a discourse or a human subject; that is to say, the idea that there is an unconditioned 
exterior, the rules, which regulate/determine/govern the conditioned, the speech or the 
human subject. He thus traces the traditional answers to the question of the relationship 
between the unconditioned and the conditioned by exploring the question of 'what is to 
follow a rule'; (iii) it attempts to uncover the presuppositions related to the question of 
the rules-location and to reframe the problematic, so as to break with its metaphysical 
determinations: viz., either that the rules are exterior to the discourse and are located 
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in the human mind or the unconscious so that they generate speech or performances, or 
that they are located in social practices. Though the latter is often identified as the 
later Wittgenstein's position, there are tensions in the "Philosophical Investigations", as 
will be demonstrated, which give rise to different readings. By following those 
readings, I hope to be able to clarify the conception of language with which 
Wittgenstein attempts to replace his former conception of it as a rule-governed system. 
Drawing attention to the empirical conditions of learning a language (for example, 
1968:§143) Wittgenstein exposes the mentalistic picture of rule-learning, which makes 
us think of a rule as itself something essentially mental, as a sort of mental 
representation of the process to be carried out in accordance with it. The various 
'language-games' that he presents indicate that a formula or rule is what it is only in 
terms of some consistent practice of application, and the vocabulary or grammar of the 
mental, assumed to be self-contained and separate from the grammar of the physical, is, 
in fact, dependent on some physical circumstances. It is the application that determines 
that the formula has been grasped. 
This point is exemplified in §§ 185-192 of the "Philosophical Investigations" with the 
discussion of the '+2' rule. Wittgenstein shows that, first, the correct application of 
'+2' is not contained in the formula itself, even when this formula has been carefully 
taught and explained. It rather seems that the formula '+2' must be meant by us to be 
taken in a particular way. But, Wittgenstein says, this might also mislead us into 
identifying that meaning of the formula with a particular mental act. If this cannot be 
sustained, then one might want to argue that the steps are underdetermined by the 
rule or formula. This, however, would also be misleading for, 
"We use the expression: 'The steps are determined by the formula...'. 
How is it used? - We may perhaps refer to the fact that people are 
brought by their education (training) so to use the formula y=x2, that 
they all work out the same value for y when they substitute the same 
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number for x. Or we may say: 'These people are so trained that they all 
take the same step at the same point when they receive the order' 
`add 3". We might express this by saying: for these people the order 
`add 3' completely determines every step from one number to the next. 
(In contrast with other people who do not know what they are to do on 
receiving this order, or who react to it with perfect certainty, but each 
one in a different way.)" 
[Wittgenstein:1968: §189] 
Edwards [1990:165] emphasises the central role of training. Our ability to learn the '+2' 
rule in whatever way it is meant, depends on our being able to respond appropriately to 
a certain course of training which leads to a uniformity of the practical application of the 
rule. The important point to notice here is, first, that Wittgenstein makes grammatical 
remarks, not metaphysical claims; that is to say, remarks about the way certain of our 
concepts are connected to one another and to the world, such as, for example, the 
physical and the mental vocabularies in the grammar of understanding. Secondly, the 
remarks in the passage above do not refer to the empirical psychology of human rule 
learning; rather, they are remarks about what it means to say that a rule has been 
learned [Edwards:ibid]. 
In a similar way, Baker (1981) systematizes Wittgenstein's remarks in his attempt to 
evaluate the dominant philosophical position that understanding consists in operating a 
calculus according to definite rules. To operate a calculus is supposed to mean: (a) one 
follows a rule in calculating a result; being guided seems to belong to the essence of rule 
following; (b) the calculus already contains all particular results and hence it is the 
impersonal arbiter of whether one has succeeded in following the rule. These two 
features (objective, subjective) generate a tension. Neither something that failed to guide 
behaviour nor something that failed to provide an external standard of correctness 
would count as a rule [3]. Baker suggests that there are three sources of error regarding 
the 'subjective' aspects of rule following: (i) the search for an underlying essence, the 
failure of which leads to a search for a psychological process which will bring to light 
the underlying mental process; (ii) following a rule, unlike acting in conformity with 
one, is seen as an intentional act; (iii) the search for some special connecting 
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experience or mental mechanism that will serve to distinguish coincidental conformity 
with a calculation-rule from genuine calculation. Illusions about the 'objective' aspects 
of rule following cluster around instances of calculation, hence the mistakes: (i) a 
calculus contains all of its correct applications; (ii) a temptation to redraw the boundaries 
between the logical and the phychological, and to conclude that if something conforms 
to a rule, it is a logical question, in contrast to the psychological question of how one 
determines if it so conforms; real objectivity becomes an unattainable ideal, correctness 
becomes a transcendent concept; (iii) the notion that a rule determines its application 
exploits an analogy between rules and mathematical functions. Consistency appears to 
be a necessary condition for overall correctness of application; (iv) a calculus, or even a 
game, is a system of rules. Behind this conception is the idea that any consequence of a 
set of rules must itself be a rule already contained in that set. As Baker characteristically 
puts it, 
"we conceive of a system of rules as a huge machine in motion, which 
turns out applications and derived rules; all of this as independent of our 
will as the motion of the stars." 
[ibid:54] 
Thus Wittgenstein rejects the idea of a system of rules underlying the diversity of uses, 
in favour of looking carefully at those uses to see how they are in fact ordered. In this 
way, he shows that a rule or a formula is not some sort of 'mental representation' which 
intrinsically contains all its correct applications. The actual course of its application is 
the criterion for what it 'intrinsically' means in the first place. A rule determines its own 
readings no more and no less than a signpost determines how we react to its direction. 
The view that what matters is what we do in response, say, to the signpost, presents the 
rule as empty and as lacking of any real force. What matters is what sort of 
interpretation we attach to it. But the recognition of the necessity of rule 
interpretation has the paradoxical effect of destroying the notion of a rule altogether 
[Edwards :op.cit: 167] . 
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However, Wittgenstein's investigations do not stop here. He points to several related 
confusions regarding interpretation, which, in effect, demonstrate that there is nothing 
in the nature of the interpretation per se that makes its meaning any clearer than the rule 
it is supposed to interpret. Thinking of interpretation as another mental representation 
gets one no further in answering how rules actually do their work; in fact, "we have 
only replaced the mystery of the meaningful rule with the enigma of the meaningful rule 
interpretation..." [Edwards :ibid:168] . 
"Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to 
do so; we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person 
reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? 
Which one is right?... The common behaviour of mankind is the system 
of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language." 
[Wittgenstein:1968:§206] 
We do on occasion follow a rule or obey an order as a matter of training, without going 
through some intervening interpretation of it: "there is a way of grasping a rule which is 
not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 
'going against it' in actual cases" [ibid:§201]. 
Questioning the idea of interpretation as something that takes place in our individual 
heads as misleading, Wittgenstein, in Edwards' [op.cit.: 168-69] reading, 
demonstrates, with the use of examples, that the power of interpretation to guide 
appropriately one's behavour, resides not in the interpretive formula but in the particular 
circumstances in which the formula is learned and taught. In Staten's [1986:72; 
Wittgenstein:1968:§35] reading, too, pointing and naming and understanding gestures 
become meaningful because the scene of naming is dependent upon the 
circumstances - i.e., what happens before and after the pointing. 'Ostensive 
definitions' seen as rules, had been conceived as a uniquely privileged form of 
explanation immune from the possibility of being misinterpreted or misunderstood. For 
Baker [1981:38], Wittgenstein's aim is not to show that 'ostensive definitions' are 
peculiarly defective forms of explanation, but the rather different task of showing that 
112 
they take place against the background of other linguistic skills that have already been 
mastered. 
The subtle differences in the commentaries above on the 'scene of pointing' are worth 
noting, and I will return to this. More generally, for many commentators, Wittgenstein, 
in challenging the notion that understanding is something mental, points towards 
practices in their social context, the form of life. The meaning of the word, the 
argument goes, depends on its usage in a certain context, and the context is given by a 
set of actions which are interwoven with words, and thus establish the only possible 
meaning of the word. This argument asserts, first, that Wittgenstein displaces the 
dichotomy between language and activities or action, and, secondly, that context defines 
or determines action. In particular, the notions of form of life, language game, 
and family resemblances are often used to assert that action - and often linguistic 
action as separate from action - is context dependent. Fogelin, for example, commenting 
on 'ostensive definition', writes: 
"Actually the form of the problem gives us its answer. Since an 
ostensive definition will not, by itself, determine the use of an 
expression, we will need some other form of training that does 
determine the use. Nothing could be better than a direct training in the 
use itself." 
[1976:106] 
For Wittgenstein, "...the speaking of language is part of an activity or of a form of life", 
and the notion of language game - i.e., "...the whole, consisting of language and the 
actions into which it is woven..." [1968:§7] - is meant to bring this view into 
prominence. He explains the notion of 'language game' by inventing examples of how 
children are taught their native language, or of imaginative primitive combinations of 
speech and action. Language games include our many verbal activities, the things we 
actually do by or with the use of language [ibid:§§2,23]. 
Take the case of a child or a person who hasn't yet come to master a foreign language. 
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"But if a person has not yet got the concepts, I shall teach him to use the 
words by means of examples and by practice - And when I do this I do 
not communicate less to him than I know myself.... 
I do it, he does it after me;... 
The expressions 'and so on', 'and so on ad infinitum' are also 
explained in this teaching... 
We should distinguish between the 'and so on' which is, and the 'and 
so on' which is not, an abbreviated notation. 'And so on ad inf.' is not 
such an abbreviation. The fact that we cannot write down all the digits 
of iris not a human shortcoming, as mathematicians sometimes think. 
Teaching which is not meant to apply to anything but the examples 
given is different from that which 'points beyond them." 
[ibid:§208] 
Imitation, repetition and teaching by example which 'points beyond' it give rise to 
different interpretations. For Pitkin [1972:44-45] they indicate that, say, a child learns 
not by explanation but by training. Training, in her view, differs from explanation in 
that it is relatively non-verbal, aiming at producing certain actions from the learner quite 
apart from what is going on in his head. The child is not trained to the grasping of 
definitions, essences or universals behind the particulars, and in any case this grasping 
does not explain what needs to be explained. It is not training to repetition which is 
meant to apply only to the examples given. 
"[T]he examples were not descriptions of an outside letting us guess at 
an inside which for some reason or other could not be shown in its 
nakedness. We are tempted to think that our examples are indirect 
means for producing a certain image or idea in a person's mind - that 
they hint at something which they cannot show...Our method is purely 
descriptive; the descriptions we give are not hints of explanations. " 
[Wittgenstein:1969:125] 
Thus, giving examples is not an indirect means of explaining in default of a better. The 
child is to do certain things and not other things on the basis of the example. There is no 
further knowledge that the teacher has at which her examples only hint. Pitkin puts it 
thus: 
"The place where explanation fails and training is called for is where the 
pupil lacks the knowledge of how to use the word. And that kind of 
knowledge is completely contained in the examples." 
[op.cit:48] 
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The kind of training which is necessary to the acquisition of a natural language requires 
inducing the child to go on, in the same way, in new and different cases. This 
teaching points beyond the examples given [ibid:45]. 
In this reading of Wittgenstein, therefore, words are used to do things, and we must 
master how they are used. It is futile to seek for a well-worked-out theory of use [cf. 
Bogen:1972:214-218; Pears:1971:34-41]. This kind of learning is necessarily a matter 
of training by means of the appropriate example whose projection into new cases is 
grounded on a form of life: 
"We learn and teach words in certain context, and then we are expected, 
and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts. 
Nothing insures that this projection will take place...just as nothing 
insures that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That 
on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and 
feeling,...all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls 'forms of life '." 
[Cavell:1976:52] 
Thus Wittgenstein rejects a theory of use underlying a diversity of uses, in favour of 
looking carefully at those uses to see how they are in fact ordered. When he examines 
examples of games he finds not a shared essence, but 
"a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: 
sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail." 
[1968:§66] 
The concept of 'family resemblance' is meant to indicate a series of different, though 
related, uses. It is not a formal or formalizable concept and it is not to be taken as a new 
master concept but one in a series of helpful illustrations, as one among his great 
analogies. The different uses of the 'same' concept are related to each other like the 
fibres of a thread whereas "...the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that 
some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres." 
[ibid:§67; cf. Staten:1985:82-83]. 
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The analogy with games that Wittgenstein uses exploits the fact that the metaphysical 
tradition understands them as activities which are said to proceed according to definite 
rules. Wittgenstein introduces the idea of use and meaning which includes the point of a 
practice: "I mean that this piece is called the 'king', not the particular bit of wood I am 
pointing to" [Wittgenstein:1968:§35]. 
Pitkin [1972:65] argues that Wittgenstein's analogy between 'family resemblance' and 
games, as well as his other great analogy between words and tools, has been somehow 
misunderstood. It, first, suggests a physical objectivity to the relevant features that does 
not in fact exist in language, where it is not clear which features actually count, and a 
concept must always be projectible into new situations; secondly, the analogies allow a 
label-and-object interpretation; that is, they allow us to think that, for example, if all 
games do not share a single common feature, at least groups of games share partly 
overlapping clusters of features. But, for Pitkin, the real point is not features of games 
at all, but features of the situations in which we talk about games. 
The point that Pitkin makes is that, if there are no essences, no unity to the meaning of a 
word, all we can do is to adduce instances of its use and describe the grammar of that 
word. For Pitkin, the grammar describes all regularities in language and includes the 
element of meaning or sense that stays fixed regardless of context. She elaborates this 
last point with three main theses [ibid:71-84]: words are not, or not merely, labels, but 
often signals; the language is learned from instances of use, and meaning is 
compounded out of those instances; meaning is context dependent, meaning and sense 
need to be completed by context. 
What causes our confusion is our 'craving for generality' [Wittgenstein:1969:17]. We 
tend to contemplate a concept abstractly and we are convinced that the generalization is 
correct because we know that the example is correct. But there might be other equally 
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correct and valid examples of usage inconsistent with the first. It follows from that that 
the rules that can be abstracted from our ordinary use of an expression are, in fact, often 
mutually inconsistent or contradictory. The temptation is to seek for the unchanging 
element and thus miss the shifts and variations. If language, therefore, does not have 
one function, that is to picture the external world, and instead performs a multiplicity of 
functions, which can be enumerated but cannot be reduced to a general conception about 
its nature, then language in general is an invalid abstaction. Hence Wittgenstein's motto: 
"Let the use of words teach you their meaning " [1968:220], which invites for a 
technique that replaces explanation in terms of category and essence, and demands a 
skilful attention to the way in which old uses are connected with new ones. The old 
uses may be strikingly different from the old ones, but the real task is to find the 
intermediate links [ibid:§122]. This last point relates to Wittgenstein's mistrust 
towards the traditional explanatory schemes, and it is coupled with a suggestion for a 
perspicuous representation as exemplified by his own powerful example of 
"Philosophical Investigations": a collection of fragments or a pedagogical textbook of 
examples where the reader, searching for its unity, has to think the way through those 
examples in the hope that they will shed light or illuminate one another by their 
juxtapositions. I will return to these important notions of 'intermediate links' and 
'perspicious representation'. But before that, let me summarize the lines of arguments 
presented thus far which stem from a certain reading of Wittgenstein, and draw some of 
their implications. 
It seems that there is a general agreement as to the scope of the "Philosophical 
Investigations". It puts forward an anti-theory philosophical position or, better, exposes 
the limits of theory, theories of language in particular, on the grounds that they are 
unwarranted abstractions from human practices and experiences. It constitutes an attack 
on essentialism, and up until now I have attempted to show that its treatment of 
language undermines two classical theses of how language is ordered: first, the theory 
of linguistic reference, or representational theory of language, which posits the view 
117 
that words get their meanings by their reference to external objects, so that it is the 
external objects which anchor language; and secondly, words have their meanings 
because language is a rule governed system - viz., that the identity of the meaning of 
words is preserved through rule-dependency. The privately held or publicly shared 
rules become the superstandards independently of human agreement. Now, it is 
this last point which requires careful handling, for it is on the issue of agreement that the 
diversity in the readings of Wittgenstein is most apparent. In fact, this connects with a 
third classical thesis of how language is ordered, viz., the view that meaning is founded 
on the human subject which is external to language. If Wittgenstein has been shown to 
have undermined this view in its crude form - that is to say, that it is our mental 
activities which give words their meaning - there are subtler variations of this same view 
which remain essentialist and humanist. In what follows, I would like to explore this 
thesis a little. 
First, it has been noted earlier that context and aspects of the situation are evoked to 
explain how meaning is preserved through the diversity of usages of the 'same' word. 
This argument presupposes that one can draw a distinction between the word and its 
context, and that the latter is that which remains pure (complete) and closed so that it can 
fix meaning. This argument, however, does no more than reverse the argument of the 
purity of the rule and its capacity to determine meaning and action, while it still remains 
dependent on the category of a conscious subject to decide which context is relevant. 
Secondly, from the thesis that there are no essences, it does not follow that there is mere 
arbitrariness: "It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the 
language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life" [ibid:§241]. 
This passage has often been connected with the conception of community standards and 
agreement in language use, and has been related to the conceptions of 'language games' 
as closed and incommensurable systems (cf. Taylor:1981), and 'family resemblances' 
as distinct entities divided from one another. These views are either straightforwardly or 
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ultimately 'communitarian' interpretations of Wittgenstein [cmp. ICripke:1981:289-294; 
Baker:1981:31-71] which, as Staten [1985:164-165,n.20] remarks, take as given and 
fundamental the contingent fact of community agreement, emphasise the social 
intersubjective character of meaning, the correctness of custom and practice, and deny 
the causality of the rule or rule-intention. The communitarian view tends to imply that 
Wittgenstein is committed to the status quo, in that he celebrates an existing 'form of 
life' and does not allow for change. It is also a totalitarian view in that it accepts the rule 
of the majority [cf.Holtzman & Leich:1981:23], and, finally, institutes the community 
as the subject that replaces the human subject, this way establishing a new ground of 
security. 
It was mentioned earlier that Wittgenstein's emphasis on the power of examples to 
'point beyond themselves' points, at the same time, to the open-ended character of 
language and its peculiar regularity. Edwards' (1990) reading of Wittgenstein on this is 
worth rehearsing. For, having shown that §§142-207 of the "Philosophical 
Investigations" have undermined, in various ways and from various directions, our 
confidence in the rules, and have directed us to the public circumstances of 
language acquisition and employment, this reading, which seems to be faithful to 
Wittgenstein, takes us back from a position of transcendental behaviourism [cf. 
Wittgenstein:1968:§§208-210] to a deeper and 'creative' level of regularity of language, 
relating it to the enlightenment issue of rationality, freedom and autonomy, and the 
rational self. 
In §207, Wittgenstein seems to pose the need for the very notion of rule he was 
supposed to have jetissoned. The difficulty and the bind in which he places himself, -
viz., neither behaviourism nor the efficacy of the rule - occurs in the context of 
explanation. The crucial linguistic phenomenon is clear enough. The use of a word is 
learned on the basis of a limited number of examples, yet we are usually able to move 
from those cases to grasp the use of the word 'as a whole'. This means that we are able 
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to 'apply' the word appropriately, 'regularly' in contexts unrehearsed and unforseen in 
the process of learning it. Having jetissoned intention and intuition for the grasping 
of the example, we want an explanation of language and hence of rationality that is itself 
rational. We want to be able to believe that there is some reason behind our typical 
agreement in extending the use of a word in a new context. This is what the mysterious 
rule, either as a formula or as interpretation, intuition or intention, is supposed to be: a 
reason for doing what we are doing and a reason for our general agreement. It is just 
that, Edwards writes, that Wittgenstein attacks: 
"How can he know how he is to continue a pattern by himself -
whatever instruction you give him? - Well, how do I know? - If that 
means " Have I reasons?" the answer is: my reasons will soon give out. 
And then I shall act, without reasons." 
[Wittgenstein:1968: §211] 
It is the metaphysical illusion that at a deeper level there is the rational authority of 
language, that there are reasons, some explanation of what we are doing, and that, in 
fact, we are going on 'in the same way'. Rational practices must ultimately rest on self-
sufficient grounding reasons. What is at issue is the metaphysical rational self, 
potentially autonomous and self-determined through self-knowledge which can become 
the point of our conscious scrutiny and choice. If the reasons are rules, and if one can 
become fully aware of what those rules are, thereby 'grasping' the actions that they 
'contain', then one can fully experience moral freedom in respect of these actions. Full 
self-determination requires complete self-transparency furnished by this conception of 
rules as reasons. It, ultimately, supports both aspects of the enlightenment conception 
of the self, viz., rational self-transparency and moral autonomy [Edwards:op.cit:190]. 
Thus, a rule is in a crucial sense a reason that directs and determines one's behaviour if 
one follows it, a reason which relates to moral freedom and responsibility. Once 
articulated, a rule can be rejected or followed, obeyed or disobeyed. Wittgenstein, in 
uncovering this metaphysical illusion, uncovers that which is really at issue. The 
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metaphysical drive is to want to locate not the cause of our agreement but a justification 
of it. Thus: 
" If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my 
spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do'." 
[Wittgenstein:op.cit: §217] 
Edwards reads the above quoted passage as asserting that: 
"at the foundation of our lives together is a community of sensibility 
and reaction, not an identity of potentially rational apperception 
conjoined with radically free choice. And that grounding sensibility is 
not itself representable as yet more rules to be made conscious; that gets 
us no farther. At some point in such representation we hit bedrock, 
impervious to further penetration with the tools at hand." 
[op.cit:180; first emphasis added] 
Edwards is not giving here a communitarian interpretation of Wittgenstein. He is not 
saying that Wittgenstein poses the 'form of life' as the irreducible ontological base, 
which would be to reinstate the entire metaphysical discourse at the heart of 
Wittgenstein's writing. Rather, he is reading the above quoted passage as 
Wittgenstein's attempt to uncover the metaphysical picture of the self as a rational and 
free being. Still, there is the question of whether there isn't here a new and sophisticated 
form of (re)grounding on which the reversed hierarchical opposition between use and 
rules is based, and which asserts that "explanations come to an end somewhere" 
[Wittgenstein:op.cit:§1], and that "I have reached bedrock" when the justifications are 
exhausted. Edwards seems to accept this grounding on "extremely general facts of 
nature" [Edwards:op.cit:183; cf. Wittgenstein:op.cit:n.56]: 
"It is a particular context of training that gives the rule...its power to 
govern us. At the root of that training is an obedient imitation that does 
not itself depend on our prior understanding of what is demanded of us. 
It is that capacity for obedience - that sensibility to command as such, 
along with the ability to respond to it appropriately - that is finally 'the 
scene' for any of our language-games. The grammar of 'rule' is closely 
connected to that of 'training' and 'reaction'." 
[Edwards:op.cit:183-84; the two emphases before the last added] 
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For Edwards, it is the authority of language and nature to command, as well as the 
human obedient imitation and reaction to general facts of nature which is the 
ground. One is tempted to explore more the model of imitation implied in Wittgenstein, 
but since I will explore this issue in chapters 7 and 8 below, I would like to emphasise 
now that these general facts of nature which seem to be outside and beyond language 
itself, is something which indicates that a sophisticated reversal of oppositions and 
regrounding on the authority of nature and life [4] is taking place. 
That this is the reading that Edwards makes of Wittgenstein is further supported by the 
fact that he, sometimes, wants to hold on to a distinction between language and practical 
activity: 
"The point here is a general one...language is only one case - perhaps 
the clearest and most important case to be sure - of a human practice 
claimed by philosophers to be so representable. The fundamental 
philosophical issue here is about that sort of representation." 
[Edwards:ibid: 190] 
For Edwards, the argument that Wittgenstein makes is not a transcendental one. The 
centrepiece of his attempt to undermine the rule-constituted conception of language is 
his endeavour to call into question the ideal of rationality as representation. This 
weakens, though it does not completely discharge, the claim put forward above of a 
sophisticated regrounding in "the brute animal capacities, the earthly and bodily 
facts...on which [the rule constituted conception of language] utterly depends" 
[ibid:193; emphasis added]. 
Edwards explores further Wittgenstein's inquiry into rationality as representation by 
reading the §§ 243-428 of the "Philosophical Investigations" (usually discussed as 'the 
private language argument') as a continuation of the discussion of rule-following that 
concludes in §§240-242, and as Wittgenstein's attempt to give a perspicuous 
presentation - that is, surveyable rearrangement - of the grammar of self-hood. His 
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claim is that the deepest common thread between the 'rule-following' argument and the 
'private language' argument is Wittgenstein's attempt to mitigate the charms of a 
particular metaphysical picture of the self which sustains itself only by appeal to its own 
will that appears in various disguises, such as intention, limitless rationality and 
infallible memory. Edwards successfully argues the last case by presenting 
Wittgenstein's discussion of one of the deepest metaphysical assumptions. He directs 
our attention to the 'diary case' of §258. The 'diary case' assumes that the 'contents' of 
self-consciousness (e.g. sensations) are independent of their natural expression in, say, 
characteristic bodily movements, the latter being mere accidents inessential both to the 
existence and to the particular identity of the sensations themselves. This is to picture 
the self as if it were a being capable of knowing itself as such, immediately and in 
complete independence from everything else. 
"I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To 
this end I associate it with the sign 'S' and write this sign in a calendar 
for every day on which I have the sensation... I speak, or write the sign 
down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation -
and so, as it were, point to it inwardly..." 
[Wittgenstein:op.cit: §258] 
As Edwards [op.cit:196] remarks, in order to raise the question of coherence of that 
picture, Wittgenstein is calling attention to the scene of language where a seemingly 
essentially disembodied 'I' attaches meaning to the sign through the wilful direction of 
her self-consciousness which links the 'S' sign with the object in the memory. Self-
identity requires consciousness of one's identity through time. To establish such 
identity, that is such self-continuity, requires a continuity of individual memory about 
what was happening 'here' in the past and then to be able to connect that in memory, by 
way of sameness or of difference, with what is happening 'here' now. Only the 
connection with memory could provide the temporal self-continuity that minimal self-
identity demands; because, the recognition of certain, say, sensations as the same as 
the sensations felt 'here' earlier, is necessary to one's recognition of oneself as a self. 
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Likewise, unless memory is supposed a priori to be infallible, the difference between 
correct and incorrect uses of the sign 'S' collapses. 
In this reading, Wittgenstein is concerned to undermine the mental grounding and the 
representational picture of the self, and so he returns us to the 'natural connection' 
which allows for checking and connecting memories against something outside pure 
self-consciousness; in the end "[n]o language game...not even those that involve the 
most intimate forms of self-awareness, float free of those 'extremely general facts of 
nature" [Edwards:op.cit:199; Wittgenstein:op.cit:n.56], viz., one's embodiment, the 
immediate, unlearned presence of the 'natural expressions' of sensations and naturally 
manifested feelings. 
To repeat, Edwards emphasises that this is not a transcendental argument. All 
Wittgenstein tries to do is to show that to suppose that one's memory is infallible is 
misleading and nonsensical. But Wittgenstein would go so far as to question even the 
division between sense and non-sense: 
"To say 'This combination of words makes no sense' excludes it from 
the sphere of language and thereby bounds the domain of language." 
[Wittgenstein:op.cit: §499] 
This is an important passage, I believe, of the "Philosophical Investigations". Edwards 
[op.cit:200] reads it as saying that the limits of sense are set by a grammar, and the 
grammar reflects a way of life. Further, it is the task of the philosopher to show, 
through a perspicuous presentation of that grammar, the form of life that is exalted. 
However, there could be another reading of it which would require that we trace the 
way Wittgenstein tries to work his way out of metaphysically bounded oppositions such 
as sense/non-sense, and which connects directly to his conception of language. In what 
follows, I will pursue the two issues together in order to argue that Wittgenstein is led 
to a position of what I will call concrete empiricism. 
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In an earlier study of Wittgenstein, Edwards (1982) argues that Wittgenstein surrenders 
completely the metaphysical impulse and that his critique of the metaphysical tradition is 
made from a position totally outside it; his entire endeavour being the undermining of 
the notion of rationality as representation, by showing that representation is just an 
image rather than the picture of thought. In the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", 
according to Edwards, there is a distinction between thought identified with 
representation, and sense of the world connected with the will. The sense of life is 
found outside the realm of thought in the world-limiting willing self. The early 
Wittgenstein thus separates ethics from thought, and poses as a metaphysical necessity 
that, before the sense of life comes clear, one must see the world as a limited whole -
that is to say, recognize the intrinsic limit of one's power of representation. This 
Kantian theme of the "Critique of Practical Reason", where the recognition of the 
limitation of the intellect's power is a necessary condition of the willing self s (moral) 
freedom - viz., of the opening to the practical realm, which yields a kind of practical 
knowledge - is accommondated in Wittgenstein through the metaphysical doctrine of 
showing. In the "Philosophical Investigations", Edwards argues, 'showing' remains, 
though its significance changes, and it is there not a metaphysical doctrine but, rather, a 
defence against doctrine. The later Wittgenstein is, again, concerned to show the limits 
of thought but, as opposed to "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", where thought is 
identified with representation and the limitation is understood as inherent in the nature of 
thought (e.g. human consciousness), the "Philosophical Investigations" deliteralize 
the notion of representation itself. 
Perspicuous presentation is the method that Wittgenstein uses to deliteralize certain 
metaphysical pictures, and thus to free the imagination from its domination by certain 
exemplary scenes of language use which tend to force their impress upon language and 
perception, and transform them into repetitions of these ideal scenes [cf. 
Staten:1985:67-68]. It consists in finding or inventing connections 
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[Wittgenstein:op.cit:§122] - that is, transitional and intermediate cases - that will 
illuminate the network of a grammar and will bridge the gap between old and new uses 
[ibid:§§161-164]; a surveyable representation which is connected with seeing and 
noticing an aspect [Baker & Hacker:1980:295], and mastering a technique 
[Fogelin:1976:185-87]. 
As Edwards [1982:210-211] argues, the deliteralization of a particular picture, by 
putting it into contact with other and incompatible images also found in its grammar, is 
not the method of an epistemological sceptic who merely challenges our powers of 
representation, but it is Wittgenstein's method of challenging the ideal of representation 
itself, i.e, the literalization of images into metaphysical pictures. Thus Edwards writes: 
"This gives us a key for thinking about what it is to break with the 
philosophical notion of literal representation: it is to give all images their 
due as images; it is to allow mind to play freely among a multitude of 
images, using those that are appropriate at a given time, literalizing none 
of them into pictures." 
[ibid:211; emphasis added] 
Once an intermediate case has been found or invented, one's view of a particular 
phenomenon may be substantially altered. As with Kant's aesthetic judgments, 
intermediate cases become objects of comparison that alter one's perception of a given 
grammatical picture. 
I would like to argue here that this reading of Wittgenstein is dependent on a notion of 
articulation of one's situation, that is still founded upon some notion of the human 
subject. In Edwards' earlier reading, this is the notion of perception which alters 
one's sensibility. A certain reading of the Kantian aesthetic model is thus employed to 
argue that intermediate cases (as with Kant's 'passages') can change "one's way of 
looking" at things [Edwards:1982:140], and a distinction is drawn between rationality 
as representation and perspicuous (re)presentation [5]. In his more recent study, 
Edwards makes a reading of Wittgenstein which is supposed to undermine the picture 
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of the metaphysical self altogether; however, a close reading of this interpretation 
reveals the problems inherent in it. I have already emphasised one such point where the 
problem surfaces, namely, his resorting to brute facts of nature, training and imitation, 
although he insists that this is not another ground outside and beyond language. One is 
tempted to ask a series of related questions such as, for example, the function of 
showing, in later Wittgenstein. In communitarian accounts, pointing, example, 
training, are all manifestations, as opposed to saying, which are supposed to show 
the limits of theory. More careful not to pose such an opposition between showing and 
saying, Edwards does not, however, explain, for example, how representation is 
supposed to be limited in Wittgenstein's later work. Thus it seems that nature is posed 
as the absolute other, a position which, in his earlier work, is most apparent in his 
employment of the notion of world: 
"Confronted by the stark there-ness of all there is, we in the West have 
most often reacted with curiosity, not astonishment. We have thought 
we could understand what is there, and thereby control it." 
[1982:235] 
Curiosity, will to power, a scientific technocratic form of life, in short, rationality as 
representation, is juxtaposed with Wittgenstein's tendency to treat the world as holy, as 
a miracle and a mystery that requires, not control but sheer acknowledgement: 
"... the world - not the riddle-world of science but the world whose very 
existence is a miracle - is the holy other." 
[ibid:236; my emphasis] 
I will pursue this issue with Lyotard's reading of Kant; for, on the one hand, 
Wittgenstein, in this reading, can be subsumed under the Kant of the "Critique of 
Judgment", and, on the other hand, in both Wittgenstein and Lyotard there is a model of 
imitation at work which is in need of more systematic exposition, because, to anticipate, 
it operates a Platonic reversal. Reversals, however, do not, by themselves, take the 
thought out of metaphysical determinations, and a hint of this problem was given earlier 
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on when , in breaking with literal representation, the question of what is 'proper' comes 
up, requiring some kind of subject to decide what is proper/improper. Moreover, as 
also mentioned earlier on, Wittgenstein attempts to problematize the distinction between 
sense/non-sense, and the crucial question becomes how one can get out of metaphysical 
oppositions. 
I want to do no more here than hint at the lurking danger of empiricism, which I raise 
in Appendix A and discuss in section 6.4 with reference to Derrida's radical 
empiricism. I mentioned earlier on that Wittgenstein's discourse has the form of 
concrete empiricism. The "Philosophical Investigations" is offered as an example 
similar to and at the same level with that which it contains, i.e, a collection of fragments 
and a series of examples which focus on the surface of language, revealing its playful 
nature which proliferates differences. It might be said that Wittgenstein's discourse 
does what it is talking about. But, 
"What we have here is not that conclusion, readily drawn these days, 
using a logic of truth as presentation substituted for a logic of truth as 
representative equivalence, according to which new logic the narrative 
is the very event that it recounts, the thing presenting itself and the text 
presenting itself - presenting itself - by producing what it says. If there 
is performance here, it must be dissociated from the notion of presence 
that people always attach to the performative." 
[Derrida:1979:145-146] 
As Derrida is suggesting here, the question of doing or performing is itself embedded 
in a metaphysical vocabulary such as the notion of presence. For now, I will not 
pursue this issue except to point to the inherent difficulties in the conception of 
surveyable (re)presentation. Wittgenstein's discourse, which is also meant as a 
perspicuous presentation of the status of language as implying performance, has a 
necessary incompleteness and falsifiability built into it which parallels the 
incompleteness of language. But, as Hobson's (1982) analysis of Derrida's 
'empiricism' suggests, this brings with it the risk of empiricism. In fact, as we will see 
later, Derrida's discourse is an attempt to avoid the totalization (system)/empiricism 
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metaphysical opposition, and the problem is not to substitute one for the other but to be 
able to alter it and move the discourse on, while ensuring freedom from contradiction. 
Totalization limits what is taken into account, by operating a closure, thus ensuring 
consistency. Empiricism, on the other hand, rejects totalization, asserting that it is 
impossible because of the limits both of the individual mind and of discourse in the face 
of the richness of the natural world, a richness which is constitutive of the 
empirical attitude. The latter necessitates an empirical stance, in that any system is 
defined immediately as provisional and tentative [Hobson:1982:291]. By declaring the 
world as infinite, the world (or nature) is declared as the absolute other which closes 
off what is non-other and thus limits it. Totalization is prevented by opposing to it 
something equally monolithic because irreducible. In the linguistic version of 
empiricism, a text's meaning is declared infinite, polysemic and never ending. The text, 
however, is closed because limited by this infinity (absolute other). There is truth 
beyond the logos, and empiricism transgresses to language what in other contexts 
might be the mind's boundaries [ibid:295]. The text becomes interpretative, 
hermeneutic, and if there is a movement in the interpretation, this is between bounded 
hierarchical opposition (sense/non-sense, limited/infinite). I just want to register the 
problem here and point to the analogy between this kind of problematic and the move 
from the theoretical (cognitive) to the practical that this thesis is concerned with. 
I tried to show earlier on that different readings of Wittgenstein move from a position of 
articulation grounded on the human subject to articulation by language itself. I have 
already presented Edwards' version of the latter position, which is a well informed, 
consistent and, as far as it goes, an accurate account of Wittgenstein. I would like now 
to conclude this section by making a very brief reference to Staten's version of the 
position of articulation through language. I would like, in particular, to draw attention to 
two aspects of his reading of Wittgenstein in order to prepare the ground for a rather 
different conception of language to be presented in chapter 6. 
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Staten presents the Wittgensteinian text as a deconstruction of western metaphysics. 
Earlier on, when commenting upon the scene of 'pointing and naming', I made a brief 
reference to his reading of this scene. Staten argues that the word 'this' is the hinge on 
which Wittgenstein's deconstruction turns. For, on the one hand, 'this' is the word that 
accompanies the pointing gesture in the presence of the object, i.e., 'ostensive 
definition', which is the conception of language against which Wittgenstein is working; 
on the other hand, 'this' is the word that the latter uses in his writings as a way of 
pointing towards, citing in quotation marks, samples of language. It turns out, Staten 
writes, that the boundary between object and word cannot be drawn, that the act of 
pointing is inscribed in a syntax, and that a word can function as a thing [1985:68]. For 
Staten, Wittgenstein here draws attention to the fact that all experience is structured like 
a sign sequence. 
"Language is a scenic writing, a syntax which means only from the 
sequence of its moments; and the subject is displaced into the moments 
of this writings, his meaning exiled from himself into the before and 
after of the Umstande [circumstances]." 
[ibid:72; emphasis added] 
In this account, Wittgenstein presents us with a conception of language as a "play of 
surfaces" which lies in the "subtle articulation of appearance" [ibid:78], and emphasises 
the differences that are concealed under the illusion of 'essence' and 'sameness'. 
Furthermore, Staten argues, this conception of language bears analogies with Darwin's 
conceptual breakthrough [ibid:96-97]: there is no essential difference between 'species' 
and 'varieties', a discovery which Darwin explains by invoking the principle of 
'intermediate gradations'. The minute change that occurs from one gradation to the next 
contains an increment of essential or specific change and the transition to a new category 
has already begun in the slightest individual variation. Staten thus concludes: 
"Wittgenstein's preferred mode of clarification is by means of 
arrangement of instances in such a way that they pass over into each 
other in a 'continuous series of transitional cases'...This form of 
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account replaces explanation in terms of category and essence, for 
instead of discrete classes with a boundary of identity between them, 
we now have a spread of particulars varying from each other in 
accidental ways along a continuum until at last there has been 'essential' 
change without a boundary of essence ever having been crossed." 
[1985:96; emphasis added] 
Here are the two points I would like to underline ; I offer them instead of a conclusion. 
First, the conception of language that Staten claims Wittgenstein is promoting is still 
caught in a dichotomy between syntactic/semantic, difference/sameness. Language is 
but a spread of particulars, and the subject is displaced in language. I would like to 
argue that there is a strong convergence between this view of language and Lyotard's, 
which I will analyse in detail in chapter 7. Secondly, Staten's claim that Wittgenstein 
deconstructs metaphysics is a misunderstanding of the operation of deconstruction 
itself. First, because the account of language as analogous to evolutionary development, 
excludes the crucial notions of rupture and mutation in language [cf. Derrida:1984:112- 
113]. Secondly, Wittgenstein's account does not move the discourse on, beyond the 
'spread of particulars', as deconstruction in its rigorous sense - as we will see below, in 
chapter 6 - is doing. Suffice it to say that the latter is an interventionist force which 
operates on, and does not just dissolve, the metaphysical oppositions, such as 
totalization (e.g. language as a rule-governed system)/uses, theory/practice, 
metaphysical determination/ empiricism, altering them and moving the discourse on. 
3.4 AUTHORITATIVE NORMALITY AND RATIONALITY 
In this section I would like to discuss T. Kuhn's notion of rationality which, for many, 
utilizes Wittgenstein and employs a notion of practice as activity which cannot become 
an object of representation, and is determined by a form of life (see section 3.3 above, 
and Appendix A, table A.4). For others, it marks a shift from a model of rationality that 
searches for determinate rules which can serve as necessary and sufficient conditions, to 
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a model of practical reasoning as 'phronesis' that emphasises the role of 
exemplars and judgmental interpretation [Bernstein:1983:57]. For Rorty [1979:332-
333], T. Kuhn's notion of rationality shows that the traditional distinction between 
natural and social sciences, based on the notion of 'correspondence to reality' is 
unsustainable. For J. Caputo [1987:214-215] Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions" (1970) is, in important respects, like - and helps explain- the undeveloped 
notion of rationality in Heidegger's "Being and Time". This (deconstructive) reading 
locates the contribution of this work in the fact that it sets the terms for a post-
metaphysical notion of rationality. Notwithstanding the large controversies generated by 
his work within the natural sciences, regarding the status of scientific knowledge and 
the image of science that this work portrayed (see, for example, Lakatos & 
Musgrave:1970), "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" has certainly shaken the 
view of natural science as a paradigm of knowledge to which the rest of culture had to 
measure up. For it has effectively questioned the view that an algorithm for choice 
among scientific theories can be constructed, and has advanced from the level of logical 
analysis to the level of rhetorical analysis wherein, at some point, some ways of 
reasoning have more weight than others. Furthermore, by raising the question of the 
extent to which 'rationality' is anything more than the prevailing mode of thinking, 
Kuhn's work points to the political and institutional conditions under which 'reason' 
and 'science' reign. That is to say, his notion of a paradigm emphasises that science is 
not only an activity organized around a certain model or exemplary exercises in 
problem solving, but it is also a system of authority: the imposition of a paradigm is a 
hegemonic - i.e., violent - operation which not only displaces some ideas and brings to 
the centre some different ideas and different models, but also transforms the relations of 
power within the scientific community. 
What unites the scientific community of practitioners, Kuhn writes, is a paradigm, a 
term which in "The structure of Scientific Revolutions" is used interchangeably to 
indicate both a disciplinary matrix and a concrete shared example [6]. Moreover, 
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membership to the community is allowed after a process of initiation - a rigorous and 
rigid process of socialization - which is the responsibility of the community itself and 
which provides the resources appropriate to the practice of research. 
Kuhn defines the notion of 'disciplinary matrix' as the ordered elements of various sorts. 
These are the common possession of the practitioners of a professional discipline and 
which, in large measures, account for the relative fullness of communication within the 
group and for the relative unanimity of the group's judgements in professional matters 
[Kuhn:1970:182;1977:296-297]. The four main components of a 'disciplinary matrix' 
are: (a) symbolic generalizations, that is, formal or readily formalizable elements which 
serve two inseparable functions, viz., legislative and definitional; (b) shared 
commitments derived from beliefs in particular models which, among other things, 
supply the group with "preferred or permissible analogies and metaphors"; (c) values 
which, though they function at all times, are particularly important when the members 
of a community must identify crises or choose between incompatible ways of practicing 
their discipline. As Kuhn explains, 
"...the resort to shared values rather than to shared rules governing 
individual choice may be the community's way of distributing risk and 
assuring the long-term success of its enterprise." 
[ibid:186] 
Finally, (d) 'exemplars', that is, concrete problem solutions, accepted by the group as 
paradigmatic, which scientists study with care and upon which they model their own 
work. 
It is important that the notion of symbolic generalizations and of an 'exemplar' be 
further specified. In the sciences, particularly in physics, symbolic generalizations are 
found either in symbolic form (F=m.a), or they are expressed in words, such as "action 
equals reaction". As Kuhn emphasises, 
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"[a] shared commitment to a set of generalizations justifies logical and 
mathematical manipulation and induces commitment to the result. It 
need not, however, imply agreement about the manner in which the 
symbols, individually and collectively, are to be correlated with the 
results of experiment and observation..." 
[1977:299] 
That is, unlike mathematical formalization, generalizations in the sciences are more like 
generalization sketches - schematic forms whose detailed symbolic expression varies 
from one application to the next. Indeed, Kuhn says, if F=m.a were to be taken as an 
abbreviation of a conjunction of particular symbolic forms, it wouldn't exhaust what the 
members of a scientific community can properly be said to know about how to apply 
symbolic generalizations [ibid:301]. This means that designing a special formalism, a 
new version of the formalization, is something which can be taught, which, indeed, is 
being taught through the exemplars. 
The problematic that Kuhn responds to is based on the notion of 'truth as 
correspondence', i.e., the view that scientists attach symbolic expressions to nature 
according to rules which can be discovered and rationally reconstructed. 
Correspondence rules are supposed to connect one part of the system of scientific 
knowledge, theoretical concepts, to the other part, the language of observation [7]. He 
notes: 
"It is, I think, remarkable how little attention philosophers of science 
have paid to the language-nature link...a failure to notice how much has 
been lost, from an epistemological standpoint, in the transition from a 
sense-datum language to a basic vocabulary." 
[ibid: 1977 :303,n.13] 
What Kuhn emphasises here are some aspects of scientific training and behaviour 
connected with the fourth main cognitive component of a 'disciplinary matrix', i.e, 
exemplars. He points to the problems students of science encounter in laboratories or in 
science texts, and - contrary to the dominant view that students cannot solve problems 
unless they have first learned the theory and some rules for applying it - claims that a 
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scientist never learns concepts, laws and theories in the abstract and by themselves. The 
process of learning a theory depends upon the study of application, including practice, 
problem solving, i.e., a process of learning by doing. 
"After the student has done many problems, he may gain only added 
facility by solving more. But at the start and for some time after, doing 
problems is learning consequential things about nature. In the absence 
of such exemplars, the laws and theories he has previously learned 
would have little empirical content." 
[1970:188] 
The main characteristics of this learning process can be described as follows: 
the student learns similarity relations; that is to say, s/he acquires the ability to 'see' a 
variety of situations as being like each other. S/he discovers a way to see his/her 
problem as being like a problem that has been already encountered. At the end of the 
training, s/he has assimilated a "time-tested and group-licensed way of seeing" 
[ibid:189]. The pedagogic vehicle for the perpetuation of normal science is the textbook. 
During the educational initiation, the textbook becomes a source of authority. And if it is 
true that textbooks cause a distortion in the scientist's perception of the discipline's past, 
and, also, that the image of science they create "is no more likely to fit the enterprise that 
produced them than an image of a national culture drawn from a tourist brochure or a 
language text" [ibid:1], they, nonetheless, supply the students with everything they 
need to know in a brief, precise and systematic way. The textbook, Kuhn argues, 
explains in part the absence of overt disagreement over fundamentals within the 
scientific community [ibid:11]. 
Students of physics, he explains, regularly report that they have read through a chapter 
of their text, understood it perfectly but, nonetheless, had difficulties in solving the 
problems set for their practice at the end of the chapter. Their difficulty is in setting up 
the appropriate equations, in relating the words and examples given in the text to the 
particular problems they are asked to solve. These difficulties dissolve in the same way 
as soon as the students discover a way to see their problem as similar to a problem they 
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have already encountered. What the textbook does, therefore, is to show to the 
students, by example, how to do their job. The science students accept theories on the 
authority of teacher and text, not because of evidence. The applications given in texts 
are not there as evidence. Learning them is part of learning the paradigm as the base of 
current practice [ibid:80]. This is an important aspect of the role of the textbook, what 
could be called the transformation of the vision of the student. The textbook, as a source 
of authority, plays the role of communicating the vocabulary and syntax of a 
contemporary scientific language and thus significantly differentiates the developmental 
pattern of mature science from that of other fields [ibid:137]. 
Thus Kuhn's claim is that the students learn to see similarity relations by doing 
problems. The scientists engage in the activity of normal science, viz., puzzle-solving, 
by modelling them on previous puzzle solutions, and by developing similarity relations 
to cover new cases. Kuhn emphasises the important role that an expert puzzle-solver 
plays, for her/his results add to the scope and precision with which the paradigm must 
be applied [ibid:23-42]. 
Kuhn draws on Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblances in order to make the point 
that what normalizes the activities of the scientists is an acquired perception of 
analogy. That is to say, he suggests that one of the fundamental techniques by which 
the members of a group learn to see the same things, when confronted with the same 
stimuli, is by being exposed to examples of situations that their predecessors in the 
group have already learned to see as being like each other, and as different from other 
sorts of situations. The emphasis is on a manner of knowing which is misconstrued if 
reconstructed in terms of rules that are first abstracted from examples and thereafter 
function in their stead. This manner of knowing would be sacrificed if one were to seek 
an answer to the question of 'similar with respect to what', which is a request for a rule; 
that is to say, for the criteria by which particular situations are grouped into similarity 
sets. The point is that one has no direct access to what it is that one knows, and no 
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rules or generalizations with which to express the kind of knowledge which is 
embedded in the stimulus-to-sensation route. 
It is obvious that Kuhn here borrows from the 'Gestalt' school of psychology in order 
to claim that an initiate, by doing exemplary problems, acquires the ability to view the 
situations that confront her/him in the same 'gestalt' as other members of the scientific 
community. Moreover, a change of paradigm is often compared to 'gestalt' switches 
[ibid:135,148,189,204]. 
Up until now, I have emphasised aspects of Kuhn's work, in particular, his view of 
normal science, which make a widely acceptable reading - a reading which is borne out 
in his own text. According to this reading, then: (a) the notion of 'disciplinary matrix' 
separates out two sorts of elements: on the one hand, beliefs, values, symbolic 
generalizations - i.e., the cognitive elements (rules, in a broad sense); on the other 
hand, the exemplar which can replace explicit rules and guide research in the absence 
of them. The latter is a concrete problem-solving, through which the initiates learn the 
language of a theory and acquire the knowledge of nature embedded in that language. 
Exposure to concrete problem solutions shape the students' perceptions and transform 
the vision of what they see; (b) the practice of natural science and the practice of 
research depend on the ability acquired through the exemplars, to group objects and 
situations into similarity sets. Furthermore, it is claimed that there are no criteria for 
doing so, for if there were, these would be criteria of identity, and could, therefore, 
be turned into a theory. Thus, (c) exemplars are non-cognitive, in the sense that they 
cannot be made an object of representation. In particular, (i) there aren't any explicit 
criteria to be followed in a judgment of similarity; (ii) learning the exemplars means 
doing concrete problems - that is to say, a practice which includes skills that cannot be 
turned into elements of a theory; (iii) it is claimed that the theory of meaning employed 
is a non-essentialist theory - that is to say, the symbolic generalization F=m.a, comes 
with the exemplar of how it can be applied and used; (d) any attempt to reconstruct this 
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kind of tacit knowledge by substituting rules for exemplars would entail a weakening 
of the community's cognition, and a change in the nature of the community's future 
responses to some experimental stimuli. 
This reading, I think, reasserts the traditional dichotomy between object/subject, 
stimulus/perception, and replaces explicit identity criteria (rules) with tacit identity 
criteria (exemplars), saying with showing, judgment as calculation with judgments of 
similarity, and, finally, reinstates the essentialism of a substantive community. It asserts 
that practical knowledge grounds theory through the exemplar, viz., tacit 
identity criteria for recognition of similarity relations. The exemplar systematizes the 
object and organizes the vision of a perceiving subject. It is a tacit metaphysics of 
presence which is still based on a calculable though non-representational judgment. That 
is to say, the reversal of the practice/theory dichotomy does not surpass the cognitivist 
paradigm grounded on the subject/object dichotomy and the rationality of the calculable 
- in this case, in the form of the demonstrable. But as Heidegger forcefully puts it: 
"The technological scientific rationalization ruling the present age 
justifies itself every day more surprisingly by its immense results. But 
this says nothing about what first grants the possibility of the rational 
and the irrational. The effect proves the correctness of technological 
scientific rationalization. But is the manifest character of what is 
exhausted by what is demonstrable? Doesn't the insistence on what is 
demonstrable block the way to what is? " 
[Heidegger:1978:391] 
Let me here underline the main claim of this dominant - and which, I repeat, is not 
without textual support - reading: natural science presupposes a background or 
disciplinary matrix which has an effect of normalizing the activities of the scientific 
community. A shared exemplar is what focuses and unifies the scientific practices and 
the scientific discourse into one enterprise. 
It is only when we turn to his distinction between normal and 'revolutionary' science 
that we might begin to read Kuhn's text differently, i.e., to construct a line of argument 
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that might make a non-essentialist reading. Above all, we might, then, begin to 
disengage it from its dependence on human perception. Within the frame which has 
been presented above, the incommensurability thesis [8] reads as saying that competing 
paradigms are incommensurable, for their proponents "see different things", change is 
external to the currently dominant paradigm, and it is the outcome of rhetorical 
persuasion and conversion. Rorty (1979) draws attention to a subtle but important 
difference in Kuhn's argument that there is no neutral observation language, in which 
proponents of theories from different paradigms can offer their evidence. According to 
Rorty, Kuhn wanted to question the traditional view that 
"What changes with a paradigm is only the scientist's interpretation of 
observations that themselves are fixed once and for all by the nature of 
the environment and of the perceptual apparatus." 
[Kuhn, cited in Rorty:ibid:324] 
The question is whether Kuhn simply claims that what changes with a paradigm shift is 
just the interpretations of data that are themselves fixed once and for all, or whether he 
challenges the notion of data and interpretation altogether. As Rorty remarks, the 
former suggests that if we could get at the 'real' data, unpolluted by our choice of 
language, we would be able to ground our rational choice between competing theories. 
In contrast, to challenge the idea of 'data and interpretation' is to founder the 
epistemological project altogether. 
According to this second line of argument, the claim is that: (a) it is not the perceptions 
of the scientists that change with a paradigm change, but the nature of the real, i.e., 
what counts as real. Consequently, (b) there is no algorithm available for choice 
between theories belonging to different paradigms. Taking these two postulates as his 
guide, Rorty reads Kuhn as saying that each paradigm is self-justifying. That is to say, 
each disciplinary matrix has its own theory, models, criteria and governing standards. 
The Kuhnian argument that the criteria of choice between competing paradigms function 
not as rules but as values that influence it is seen by Rorty as a way of posing the 
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question of whether there can be a range of scientific values which would affect such a 
choice. In other words, the crucial consideration is how to draw a line between what is 
scientific and what is not in periods of crises, during which the values themselves are 
created along with the paradigm shift, and when: 
"...the lines between disciplines, subject matters, parts of culture, are 
themselves endangered by novel substantive suggestions." 
[Rorty:ibid:329] 
In Caputo's words: 
"...everything that Kuhn wants to say turns on the distinction between 
'normal' science and 'revolutionary' science or to give it a 
deconstructive twist, between normalization and transgression, between 
a settled disciplinary frame and the violation of that frame, between 
normalized authority (authoritative normality) and its disruption." 
[1987:215] 
For both Rorty and Caputo, it is just at this point that the scientist has to confess the 
play of reason. For it is then that the unavailability of criteria displaces the question 
of what is rational, because what counts as rational is a 'won argument'; that is to say, 
its moves are reconstructed after the fact [Caputo:ibid:310,n.10; Rorty:op.cit:331]. 
Moreover, this is not a weakness in reasoning, but the strength of reason which is put 
to its best test when it must make its way without the guidance of a rule or exemplar. 
The moment of reason comes when there is 
"...a certain free play of scientific rationality, a free repetition of 
possibilities which the old system harbored, a creative transformation of 
old signs..." 
[Caputo:op.cit:219] 
To accept this line of argument is to blend later Heidegger's critique of the metaphysical 
principle of reason, which shows the limit of reason, with its Derridian radicalization, 
which asserts the contamination of reason. I will only briefly indicate the problematic 
that will become clearer in Part II of the thesis. In this way, I will complete the task of 
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the present chapter which has been the critique of rationality as representation, with its 
concomitant notion of (cognitive) theory, and its grounding on an essentialist human 
subject. 
Heidegger defines Metaphysics as a reflection "on the nature of the existent and on the 
nature of truth" [1977:1]. And this gives a ground, a foundation to an age such as the 
modern age, the world of the Greeks or the middle ages. Looking at the nature of truth, 
and what is, as a foundation which dominates all phenomena is, for Heidegger, a way 
of periodization of the history of thought in the west. By showing that the metaphysical 
foundation within each historical age changes, so that the nature of truth and what is, 
the existent, changes, Heidegger undercuts any notion of an ahistorical eternal truth. 
Two consequences follow from this: (a) one cannot make a foundation in the solitary 
human subject, i.e., the notion of the human subject is a consequence of the modern 
age; (b) one cannot argue for a very straightforward, linear progress within western 
thought. On the contrary, there have been radical discontinuities between the three 
historical ages. It is, therefore, senseless to contrast modern science with the science of 
the Greek world or the Middle Ages on the grounds that modern science is more exact. 
For modern science presupposes in its methodology of exact measurement a certain 
notion of objects which the Greeks and the Middle Ages do not have. 
The essence of modern science is theory in the sense of viewing, observation of the 
real [1977a:166]. Observation is the key word here. Theory as observation is the 
entrapping, manipulating and refining of the real. 
"The real is what presences as self-exhibiting. But what presences 
shows itself in the modern age in such a way as to bring its presencing 
to a stand in objectness." 
[ibid:167] 
The objectivity of the modern science goes along with a notion of a mastering and 
dominating human subject. That is to say, in the modern age, the essence of man as 
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such changes in that man becomes a subject [1977:9]. Thus Metaphysics is described as 
an ontology, which in the modern age, defines both human beings as subjects and 
'things' as objects. For Heidegger, 
"[m]an is never first and foremost man on the hither side of the world, 
as a 'subject', whether this is taken as 'I' or 'we'. Nor is he ever 
simply a mere subject which always simultaneously is related to 
objects, so that his essence lies in the subject-object relation. Rather, 
before all this, man in his essence is eksistent into the openness of 
Being, into the open region that lights the 'between' within which a 
'relation' of subject to object can `be'." 
[1978a:229] 
Thus Heidegger subjects 'ontology' to criticism not because, 
"...it thinks the Being of beings and thereby reduces Being to a 
concept, but because it does not think the truth of Being and so fails to 
recognize that there is a thinking more rigorous than the conceptual." 
[ibid:235] 
His critique of metaphysics is the critique of modern reason which reduces the world to 
something which can be rationally systematized. To show the limits of reason 
is to refuse to surrender to its claim to make reality fully visible and intelligible by 
invoking explicit or implicit identity criteria which reduce the real to what is 
demonstrable - viz., a concept or an exemplar. To show the limits of reason is, 
also, to uncover the metaphysics of 'subjectism' [9], i.e., the view that the subject is 
separate from the objective world so that its relation to that world is one of 
manipulation. To expose the limits of reason is to show the logic of the age of 
modernity. In previous forms of civilization, the idea of the endless transformation of 
the world was excluded. As every existing thing can have an order within an eternal 
hierarchy, the idea of the ceaseless modification of existent relations between man/man 
and man/nature was simply unthinkable. With modernity, it is not only the division 
between the external reality and the free subjectivity, but also a new type of logic 
according to which this free subjectivity acts upon the objective world so as to 
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transform it by technical means. This presupposes the reduction of external things to 
concepts and exemplars. 
The essence of modern science , Heidegger claims, is research [1977:3]. The pursuit of 
facts in the historical method is akin to the scientific research in the measurement of 
facts. Heidegger shifts the debate away from scientific method by arguing that scientific 
method presupposes a projection of natural processes. For the method to work 
presupposes a ground plan which is an opening for scientific events to become 
visible, i.e., a turning of things into measurable objects which can be captured by 
scientific method. The 'ground plan' permits us to see nature-things as measurable and 
calculable units and thus to proceed with scientific measurement. Science becomes 
research through the projection of this 'ground plan' which allows for verification or 
falsification of the data according to one's presuppositions. Having obtained a certain 
presupposition about the existent, science can bring things to a 'standstill', to see the 
facts as never changing. Through the 'ground plan' - i.e., the presupposition behind the 
cognitive procedures of modern science - nature becomes objectified, that is, turned into 
isolated units in space and time; and this creates the possibility of methodology and 
measurement, and gives the security which stems from the ability to control one's 
calculations in advance [ibid:9]: 
"Where the world becomes a view, the existent as a whole is posited as that 
with respect to which a man orients himself, which therefore he wishes to 
bring and have before himself and thus in a decisive sense re-present to 
himself." 
[ibid:10] 
There is a necessary interplay between subjectivism and objectivism found in the notion 
of re-presentation. The objectification of 'what is' takes place in a re-presentation which 
ends at presenting 'what is' in such a way that the calculated presence can be 
secured and certain of 'what is'. The projection is the 'ground plan', the ontology, 
which turns the existent into an object of re-presentation, and the human being into a 
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subject who can calculate, and through that calculation is certain of the existent. In the 
re-presentation, what is present can be placed and positioned before a subject, while the 
subject is in the 'picture': it re-presents the world and establishes it. 
Heidegger's notion of metaphysical ontology points to a double happening. On the one 
hand, an 'opening' is being made which makes re-presentation possible. On the other 
hand, in this 'opening' something is being hidden, withdrawn from representation; 
behind the calculable, lies the incalculable, for 
"...what a thing is in its Being is not exhausted by its being an 
object..." 
[1978a:228] 
This is Heidegger's critique of all forms of cognitivism. It shows the limitation of both 
reason and scientific progress, the limitation being the consequence of the 
mathematical character of thinking [1978b:267-271]. The critique takes the form of 
"thinking that is neither theoretical nor practical. It comes before this distinction" 
[1978a:236]. It thinks the truth of Being that is a recollection of Being. Heidegger 
clarifies this position by elaborating on the relation between the thinking of Being on the 
one hand, and theoretical and practical behaviour, on the other. Thus, 
"[Thinking] exceeds all contemplation because it cares for the light in 
which a seeing, as theoria, can first live and move." 
And, 
"...thinking is a deed. But a deed that also surpasses all praxis." 
[1978a:239] 
The uncovering of the limits and the groundlessness of reason might still suggest that 
incommensurability occurs only at the interstices between scientific epochs and that 
there actually is a time when 'normal' science is peacefully settled. It is only after the 
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Derridian radicalization (deconstruction) of both Kuhn and Heidegger that it can be 
asserted that normalcy and revolution are not successive moments but components in 
the ongoing history of science (cf. Feyerabend:1970), that subversiveness is 
structurally necessary to normalcy, and that reason has been always already 
contaminated by its other. 
The critique of rationality as representation and the related critique of the notion of 
theory as being grounded on the subject/object ontology, and, in particular, the Kuhnian 
rule/exemplar distinction bring forth a basic problematic regarding the question of the 
subject. In the displacement of the rule-following model and the weakening of the 
notion of the subject that follows rules, one can discern a move from a passive subject 
to a subject which imitates. Thus, despite the critique of the dominant reading of 
Kuhn, the importance of Kuhn, I believe, lies in the move to identification through a 
mimetic model (see chapter 8), so that his position falls within the problematic of 
mythos/logos. 
At this point, I would like to summarise the main concerns of this chapter and conclude 
by connecting them to the point just mentioned which, I believe, opens up a significant 
line of inquiry that I am going to explore in Part II. Section 3.2 above presented a 
critique of the notion of calculative rationality by following, mainly, H. Dreyfus' line of 
argument which draws on his inquiry into cognitive science and cognitive procedures 
and uncovers that a paradigmatic instance - i.e., a rule-following, symbol manipulating 
being - becomes a metaphysical picture of what a rational being in general is. Dreyfus 
juxtaposes analytical reasoning to skilled activity which leads him to the thesis that one 
cannot have a theory of practical activity; for human activity cannot be formalized, and 
skill cannot be decontextualized and made a theoretical object of representation. 
Section 3.3 elaborated this argument further by looking at Wittgenstein's critique of the 
linguistic cognitive paradigm. Although there is the danger that, rather than shedding 
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light, the different readings of Wittgenstein presented there complicate the problematic 
of rationality, it seems that there is a general agreement that Wittgenstein's critique of 
language as a rule-governed system is an anti-theory position, and shows the limits of 
theory - theories of language in particular. The emphasis that Edwards' reading places 
on Wittgenstein's endeavour to undermine metaphysics is also worth keeping in mind. 
From an earlier position which identifies thought with representation and shows the 
limits of it, the limitation understood as inherent in the nature of thought, Wittgenstein 
moves to a position which deliteralizes the notion of representation itself. It does this by 
uncovering the metaphysical pictures that are responsible for our fixing of our notion of 
rationality as representation, and by attempting to mitigate the charms of a particular 
metaphysical picture of the self which sustains itself only by appeal to its own will. His 
focusing on the surface of language, accentuated by his strategy of presenting or 
inventing examples - each one of which has the effect of cancelling out the implications 
of the preceding - has the effect, on the one hand, of proliferating differences, and, on 
the other, of presenting us with a playful conception of language, and a conception of 
self as displaced in the moments of language. 
Supported by Wittgenstein's critique of representation, Kuhn's analysis of the practices 
of science, discussed in section 3.4, is a concrete attempt to undermine the notion of 
rationality as rule-following, thus challenging the view of the primacy of cognitive 
theory. But the emphasis on the significance of Kuhn's inquiry for our understanding 
of the institutional and the political conditions under which reason reigns, though 
correct, can still support a dominant reading of Kuhn which distinguishes between 
cognitive and non-cognitive elements, reversing the opposition and replacing the rule 
with the exemplar. The danger underlying this position is that tacit identity criteria and 
calculation, in the form of the demonstrable, substitute for explicit rules and discursive 
reason. However, the Kuhnian view, captured in the statement that practical knowledge 
governs theory through exemplars, can support a different line of inquiry: starting from 
a critique of rationality as a critique of metaphysics, it would think through the analytical 
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problem raised by the move from theory to the practical - namely, the question of the 
subject. As I will argue in Part II, this is a fundamental question, one which, moreover, 
connects Wittgenstein, Kuhn and Dreyfus in their critique of cognitivism. For, as with 
Kuhn, the issue that Wittgenstein's critique of rules raises is, I believe, fundamentally 
the same. That is to say, as opposed to dominant interpretations - for example, 
Lyotard's (see chapter 7) - which read Wittgenstein as posing a subject player who is 
outside of language and uses language as tools - a thesis could be put forward that, in 
Wittgenstein, the subject is an effect of language, and this raises the question of its 
status. More specifically, first, because of Wittgenstein's critique of the notion of rule 
following, his move from the abstract to the concrete makes the subject an effect of 
reading the concrete. Secondly, his 'literary' style, which makes his writing 
problematic, keeps upsetting the boundaries between philosophy and literature. 
Thirdly, because of his notion of perspicuous presentation, the decision is made by the 
reader so that there is a reader effect. I raise this problem here because the-research 
problematic into practical/professional activity is carried out from the perspective of 
either a structure or an agent (outside of language). The move from the cognitive to the 
practical, however, through Kuhn, Wittgenstein and Dreyfus, offers the possibility -
against Dreyfus himself, as the chapter which follows will argue - of addressing, at the 
analytical level, the sociological question par excellence - namely, the question of the 
active/passive subject; the closest sociology has come to dealing with this issue has been 
in the sociological question implied in the move from the 'judgmental dope' to a 
practical subject [10]. 
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CHAPTER 4: EXEMPLARITY 
As I have indicated at several points, H. Dreyfus' framework for thinking of practical 
and professional activity can accommodate the research studies presented in chapter 2, 
and represents a move to the practical and away from theory via a critique of the notion 
of rationality, as discussed in chapter 3. In chapter 1, I presented the basic source of 
Dreyfus' work, namely his reading of early Heidegger, and it is important that what 
follows should be read against this background. In particular, H. Dreyfus and S. 
Dreyfus' model of skill acquisition, which will be discussed shortly is a direct 
development of table 1.2.1 (p.35) on "modes of being of entities other than Dasein" 
based on H. Dreyfus' reading of "Being and Time". One of the basic notions in early 
Heidegger underscored by Dreyfus' reading should be also recalled. This is the notion 
of background practices on which both theoretical and practical activity rests. 
Background practices, as a practical whole, moreover, requires a holistic 
understanding which is different from cognitive understanding. While the latter is 
defined as that which can be captured by a theoretical statement and be formalised, the 
former does not consist of representations at all, and encapsulates skills which cannot 
be decontextualized and turned into a theoretical object of analysis. 
In chapter 3, I presented H. Dreyfus' specific claims about the impossibility of 
constructing a theory of practical activity, the inadequacy of the model of calculative 
rationality to capture the knowledge and skill involved in practical activity, and the 
temptation of seeing know-how as just another theory which can be turned into a 
know-that. It should be remembered that these claims have been formulated against 
the background of his critique and opposition to mechanized reason. To the assumption 
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of the 'expert systems' that experience can be analysed into isolable, atomic facts 
which can be manipulated by rules, he juxtaposes human expertise and the question 
of what an expert human being does that a machine cannot reproduce. Borrowing from 
Gestalt psychology, global information processing - i.e., the view that thinking 
and perception involve global, holistic processes which cannot be understood in terms 
of a sequence of operations - is opposed to data processing. The latter contains a model 
of the world represented as a structured set of facts or propositions which are either true 
or false. In short, Dreyfus' counterproposal is based on a view of the human 
situation as providing the context in which human beings encounter specific facts. To 
be able to formalize the practical context and the practical understanding involved in 
orderly everyday behaviour, the 'expert system' would have to build in an ultimate 
context, otherwise there would be an infinite regress of context. To say that the human 
situation provides the context is, for Dreyfus, to say that humans have a sense of the 
situation and this is informed by the practical background against which behaviour can 
be orderly without being rule-governed. 
The distinctions between the modes of being of the ready-to-hand, unready-to-
hand and present-at-hand guide Dreyfus' 'classification of intelligent activities' 
according to the kind of 'information processing' that intelligent behaviour in each one 
area presupposes. As table 4.1 below shows, the non-formalization of area IV is a 
consequence of its qualitative difference vis-a-vis the three other areas. In Heideggerian 
terms, it corresponds to the mode of being of the 'ready-to-hand' which is more 
primitive, and evolutionarily, ontogenetically and phenomenologically prior to the other 
areas. 
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CLASSIFICATION OF INTELLIGENT ACTIV11 
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Source: Dreyfus: 1972: 204: table 1. 
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It was just mentioned that Dreyfus' classification of intelligent activities is based on the 
kind of 'information processing' required in each one area. Earlier on, in section 3.2 
above, I made a brief reference to those mechanisms which define Dreyfus' notion of 
skill. Let me, therefore, repeat and elaborate, for, his whole argument rests upon a 
notion of human skill characterized by 'information processing' which cannot be 
modelled by a computer language which is, by definition, a formal system based on 
'data processing' [Dreyfus:1979:345,n.21]. Dreyfus [1972:15-41] describes the 
following four human forms of 'information processing'. 
i. Fringe consciousness (vs heuristically guided search): refers to marginal 
awareness, although no positive use of the information resting on the fringe is made. 
Strategies used involve (a) zeroing in by means of an organization of the perceptual field 
on an area formerly on the fringes of consciousness, and which other areas still on the 
fringes of consciousness make interesting; then, (b) counting out explicit alternatives. 
ii. Ambiguity tolerance ( vs context-free 'information processing'): that is to say, 
the ability to deal with situations that are ambiguous without having to transform them 
by substituting a precise description. This human ability to use a global context to 
reduce ambiguity sufficiently wihout having to formalize - that is, to eliminate ambiguity 
altogether - reveals a second fundamental form of 'information processing' which 
presupposes the first. It requires fringe consciousness which takes account of cues in 
the context and probably some possible parsings and meanings, none of which can be 
made explicit. Ambiguity tolerance, then, refers to the ability to narrow down the 
spectrum of possible meanings as much as the situation demands. 
iii. Essential/inessential discrimination (vs trial and error search): involves a grasp 
of the essential structure of the problem which requires 'insight' into what counts as 
data. In computer literature, it is often described as the problem of large data-base, the 
infinite amount of data, and the problem of their representation in a model of the world. 
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The problem stems from the fact, Dreyfus argues, that essential operations do not exist 
independently of the pragmatic context, i.e., the human purposes and needs which 
implicitly organize and direct human activity. Human beings do not require a 
representation of the world, for their model is the world itself, and facts are made 
explicit insofar as they are relevant. 
iv. Perspicuous grouping (vs characteristics of objects) : This is based on the three 
types of skill mentioned previously, i.e., insight, fringe consciousness, ambiguity 
reduction, and, in addition, recognition of similarity through family resemblances. The 
latter requires recognition of the typical through a paradigm case rather than 
recognition in terms of traits of objects. As Dreyfus remarks, recognition of family 
resemblances or of networks of crisscrossing similarities is a sophisticated but still 
common form of recognition which employs a special combination of the three forms of 
'information processing' already mentioned. 
It becomes apparent that Dreyfus defines skills in non-mechanistic terms, and in 
opposition to the view of internalization of rules. Human expertise provides him with a 
model of skill as an open-ended ability. He grounds his analysis on Heidegger's notion 
of 'being-involved-in-the-world' (section 1.2), Wittgenstein's notions of family 
resemblance, form of life and learning by perspicuous examples (section 3.3), and 
Kuhn's notion of exemplars for recognition of the typical (section 3.4); and supports 
his argument on the two different types of information processing (data-
processing/global information processing) with the conclusions of Broadbent's et.al. 
studies discussed earlier on (section 2.3). Thus Dreyfus supports and effectively utilizes 
Broadbent's et.al. distinction between situation matching vs model manipulation 
strategy in order to argue for two different types of reasoning, namely, artificial 
reasoning vs expert-like, situated, orderly but not rule-like behaviour, whose models 
are the computer machine and the human expert respectively. The calculable is 
juxtaposed to the incalculable, the man to the computer, in order to argue that there are 
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areas of activity which formal systems cannot tackle and should either be replaced or 
supplemented by human-like global information processing. For it seems that 
"[m]an and computer is capable of accomplishing things that neither of 
them can do alone." 
[Rosenblith quoted in Dreyfus:1979:301] 
The classification of intelligent activities in table 4.1 is based on the machine-
like/human-like information processing required in each one of the areas appearing in 
the table. It is clear that Dreyfus sees the two first types as amenable to the digital 
computer, the third as partially programmable and the fourth one as totally intractable. 
The first area, the so-called associationistic, includes all forms of elementary 
behaviour where meaning and context are irrelevant to the activity concerned. The 
second area, the simple formal, encompasses the conceptual rather than the 
perceptual world. Problems are completely formalized and completely calculable. The 
third area contains complex-formal systems; it is thus in principle reproducible but in 
fact intractable. It includes those systems which in practice cannot be dealt with by 
exhaustive enumeration algorithms and require heuristic programs. The fourth area, 
informal behavior, includes all those everyday activities in the human world which are 
regular but not rule-governed. The problems on this level are open-structured, requiring 
a determination of what is relevant and insight into which operations are essential 
before a problem can be dealt with. Pattern recognition in this domain is based on 
recognition of the typical, by means of a paradigm case, and techniques are usually 
taught by generalizing from examples and are followed intuitively without 
appeal to rules. As a sense of the global situation is necessary in order to avoid storing 
an infinity of facts, it is impossible in principle to use discrete techniques to reproduce 
directly this kind of behaviour. 
Even this classification of intelligent activities, Dreyfus [1972:206] notes, is 
'misleadingly encouraging'. For, when the difference in degree between simple formal 
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and complex formal turns out in practice to be a difference in kind, the computer 
programmer attempts to solve the problems in area III by introducing procedures 
borrowed from the observation of how human beings perform the activities in area IV. 
That is to say, they assume that area IV differs from area III, simply by introducing a 
further level of complexity, whereas area IV - Dreyfus argues following Heidegger - is 
of an entirely different order: far from being more complex, it is in fact more primitive, 
being evolutionarily, ontogenetically and phenomenologically prior to areas II and III. 
Dreyfus, therefore, reveals a basic assumption in the attempt to program human 
activities, namely, the tendency to conceive of thinking as a continuum, and all 
intelligent behaviour as of the same general type. It is assumed that decision procedures, 
such as heuristics discovered in one field of intelligent activity, must tell us things about 
the 'information processing' in another area. This way, certain simple forms of 
information-processing applicable to areas I and II are imposed on area IV, while the 
unique form of 'information processing' in this area, namely that 'data' are not 
being 'processed' at all, is overlooked. 
H. Dreyfus and S. Dreyfus (1986) argue that most practical/professional activities, 
such as the tasks of a doctor, a nurse or a teacher, belong to the area IV of the non-
formal. They are open-structured problems requiring skills, i.e., the non-formalizable 
types of information-processing referred to above. Certainly, it is possible to approach 
the problems in this area in an objectified way, as, for example, when objectification 
becomes the conscious or non-conscious orientation of a society. In this latter case, the 
professional 'world' is understood in its categorial sense, in terms of isolated elements 
constituting the situation, and it is approached with 'indifference'. Competence is 
defined as cognitive rule following, the analysis of the task is done in terms of 
means/ends, and the ability to apply the rules in such an objectified domain characterizes 
the technical expert. This competence, however, Dreyfus and Dreyfus argue, will 
not raise performance above the level of mastery of the rules. In contrast, human 
expertise is the final stage of a developmental process and the quality of 
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performance in a task depends on the level of skill brought to the task. True expertise, 
they argue, challenges the fundamental assumption of cognitivism, viz., rationality as 
representation. For it is the interpretive ability, based upon prior concrete experience, 
and which defies explanation, that constitutes the judgment of an expert. That is to say, 
while cognitivism describes the situation or task in terms of objective features and then 
understands the action as triggered by an exact match between the current situation and a 
stored description, Dreyfus and Dreyfus argue that the situation is stored as an 
unanalysable whole and the action triggered by an overall similarity. Thus, 
"True expertise is characterized by a discontinuous move to letting the 
issues in a situation elicit a fluent and flexible response." 
[Dreyfus & Dreyfus:1986:209-210,n.11] 
FIVE STAGES OF SKILL ACQUISITION 
SKILL LEVEL COMPONENTS PERSPECTIVE DECISION COMMITMENT 





None Analytical Detached 
3. Competent Context-free 
and 
situational 





4. Proficient Context-free 
and 
situational 




5. Expert Context-free 
and 
situational 
Experienced Intuitive Involved 
Table 4.2 
Source: Dreyfus & Dreyfus: 1986:50:Table: 1-1 
Table 4.2 is the five-stage model of skill aquisition that Dreyfus and Dreyfus propose. 
The characterizations 'components' and 'decision' refer to the way the whole is 
treated, i.e., as context-free elements or in terms of situational aspects, and to the way 
the decision is made, i.e., analysis or intuition respectively. The characterizations 
'perspective' and 'commitment' refer to the way the 'whole' is approached, for 
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example, in terms of a plan or a point of view which will, in turn, determine the 
'involvement' dimension. Each one stage is characterized as follows [Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus:1986:17-51; Dreyfus & Dreyfus:1986a]: 
Stage I, of the novice, requires no experience. The instruction process starts with 
context-free features of the task environment and rules which determine actions. 
Novices recognize learned components and apply learned rules and procedures. 
Stage II, of the advanced beginner, comes with the trainee's gaining some 
experience in coping with real situations. Instructions refer both to objectively defined, 
non-situational elements and situational features on the basis of perspicuous examples 
of meaningful components. At this stage, the trainee seeks both features and aspects of 
the situation. Action is determined by rule application, and the performance is judged in 
terms of whether the rule has been followed. There is no judgment involved and, 
therefore, no responsibility for the outcome. 
Practitioners at stage III, competence, choose a plan for which there is no objective 
procedure. The choice is detached, but, as a consequence of the choice, the actor feels 
responsibility and finds himself/herself emotionally involved in what occurs. This is an 
important stage in any training process, and is qualitatively different from the two 
previous ones. The difference is located in the fact that the trainee starts acquiring 
holistic memories, that is to say, s/he stores whole situations that are associated with 
success or failure. In contrast to remembering aspects of the situation, remembering 
whole situations involves a process in which certain elements stand out as salient with 
respect to the plan. Competent performance, however, still shows the pattern of 
detached planning, conscious assessment of elements which are salient with respect to 
the plan, and analytical rule-guided choice of action, followed by an emotionally 
involved experience of the outcome. 
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Considerable experience at the level of competence results in skill enhancement. At 
stage IV, proficiency, practitioners choose a perspective not by decomposing the 
situation into component features but by intuition based on holistic similarity 
recognition, which is the product of deep situational involvement. Still, the decision as 
to what has to be done is made analytically. Elements that stand out as important are 
assessed and combined by rule to produce decisions about the best way of manipulating 
the environment. What differentiates this stage, therefore, is that the practitioner has 
already developed a sense of the situation, i.e., s/he sees the current situation as similar 
to a previous one and so spontaneously conceives the appropriate plan. Understanding 
the sense of a position is, then, followed by deliberative rationality, viz., 
calculation of the move that best achieves the goal. 
The activity of the practitioner at stage V, expertise, is best described by saying: "what 
transparently must be done is done" [Dreyfus & Dreyfus:1986a:71]. That is to say, the 
expert performer understands, acts, and learns from results without any conscious 
awareness of the process. This is the result of skill acquired at the level of proficiency; 
viz., experience-based similarity recognition that produces a deep situational 
understanding; as well as further experience with a variety of situations all seen from the 
same perspective or with the same goal in mind, but requiring different tactical 
decisions. As a result, sub-situations, their goals or perspective, and their associated 
action, decision or tactic, are accumulated. Dreyfus and Dreyfus's claim is that 
"Nile doubtless store far more typical situations in our memories than 
words in our vocabularies. Consequently, these reference situations, 
unlike the situational elements learned by the advanced beginner, bear 
no names and, in fact, defy complete verbal description." 
[ibid:72] 
The assumption is that an expert performer (a) has developed a sense of the situations 
s/he is regularly engaged with; (b) his/her actions depend almost entirely on deep 
understanding of the situation (intuition) and hardly at all on analysis and comparison of 
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alternatives; and (c) the expert does not follow rules, s/he simply recognizes special 
cases. In effect, 
"... no amount of rules and facts can capture the knowledge an expert 
has when he has stored his experience of the outcomes of tens of 
thousands of actual situations." 
[Dreyfus:1984:35] 
For Dreyfus and Dreyfus it is, therefore, understandable why an expert, when asked by 
the 'expert-systems' programmer to give the rules which explain his expertise, 
regresses to the level of a beginner and gives the rules he still remembers but no longer 
uses. Dreyfus believes that 
"Euthyphro, the expert on piety, who kept giving Socrates examples 
instead of rules, turns out to have been a true prophet after all." 
[ibid] 
Let me now attempt a preliminary characterization of Dreyfus & Dreyfus' developmental 
model of skill acqisition by pointing to and emphasising the basic assumptions which 
inform its conception. 
(i) Though there is no conclusive evidence about what is going on in the human brain or 
mind, they argue that there seems to be no reason to believe that expertise necessarily 
involves inference. On the contrary, performance above the level of competence 
seems to involve skills which are combinations of holistic kinds of information 
processing, such as ambiguity tolerance, insight, perspicuous grouping, etc. These 
skills cannot be represented in the form of rules and, consequently, such an activity 
cannot be justified by invoking the putative rule of its production. 
(ii) In contrast to the cognitivist understanding of the notion of experience, viz., that it 
produces rules of thumb that can be extracted from concrete cases, formalized and 
programmed, they claim that experience is the outcome of situational 
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understanding and presupposes involvement. It produces reference or exemplary 
situations - i.e., situations repeatedly occurring and with solutions attached to them. 
(iii) Even if there is a tacit theory underlying expertise, it is counterproductive to base an 
educational program on such an idea, because the rules to which an expert has access 
are not the 'rules' that generate his/her expertise. Therefore, learning and acting on the 
rules the expert can formulate will not improve performance. In fact, the search for rules 
stands in the way of learning, and practice requiring nothing more than the 
memorization of facts, rules and procedures will not raise performance above the level 
of trained competence. Educated expertise, in contrast, measured by the practitioner's 
ability to act appropriately without analytical reflection indicates that an example 
might equal a thousand inferences. 
This means that to the traditional notion of intuition embedded in the dichotomy 
analytic thinking (reason)/intuition, Dreyfus and Dreyfus counterpose the intuition of an 
expert - the outcome of involvement in practical activities and skill acquisition. 
However, analytical thinking is not excluded by this model. Analytical thinking is 
always necessary for beginners learning a new skill. This is a basic thesis of Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus, and goes against the cognitivist view that beginners start with specific 
cases, and as they become more proficient, they abstract and interiorize more and more 
sophisticated rules. For the former, such acquisition moves in just the opposite 
direction, from abstact rules to particular cases. This, somehow, differentiates their 
position from Kuhn's. The latter, in describing the process of learning by exemplars, 
very often parallels it to a child's process of understanding from specific cases. 
Wittgenstein, too, frequently draws on children's learning from examples. Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus, in contrast, emphasise that their model refers to an adult's process of 
understanding and skill acquisition which moves from rules to specific cases. Although 
this may be only a difference of detail, and what is important, perhaps, is the 
commonality of views regarding the essential role of exemplary situations for 
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performance, it is still interesting for another reason. That is to say, the insistence of 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus on the move from rule to example is a direct consequence of H. 
Dreyfus' reading and utilization of the Heideggerian analysis of being of entities, and 
his distinction between 'presence-at-hand' and 'readiness-to-hand'. This becomes 
apparent with their intermediate case of detached deliberation which corresponds to 
the 'unreadiness-to-hand'. This latter case is not a regression to analytical thinking, i.e., 
analysis of the situation in terms of features and facts, for, in their argument, 
deliberation depends upon situational (holistic) understanding which is prior to aspect 
specification. Hence the thesis that detached deliberation and intuition need not be 
viewed as opposed alternatives but as productive team-mates. In short, this position 
differentiates between detached calculative rationality and deliberation on the 
intuitive, experience-based, holistic understanding; and between the latter and 
judgment, i.e., the interpretive, non-conscious ability based upon perceived 
similarities. Thus, according to this differentiation and their description of skill 
acquisition, 
"...the novice and advanced beginner exercise no judgment, the 
competent performer judges by means of conscious deliberation, and 
those who are proficient or expert make judgments based upon their 
prior concrete experiences in a manner that defies explanation." 
[Dreyfus & Dreyfus:1986:36] 
In order to get a better insight into just what it is that constitutes judgment according to 
this model, the presupposed notion of intuition must be made clearer. For it seems 
that it is this notion of intuition which differentiates Dreyfus and Dreyfus' thesis on 
judgment as an interpretive ability or movement (a discontinuity between the 
cognitive and the non-cognitive) from a cognitivist understanding of judgment as 
movement in a cognitive continuum. A very brief reference to Hamm's (1988) 
discussion of Hammond's cognitive continuum theory, and the comparison he makes 
between this theory and the Dreyfus & Dreyfus model would facilitate the clarification 
of the latter. 
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Hamm's main argument is that the two approaches differ in the way they understand the 
notion of context. While in Hammond's theory, context is defined by the characteristics 
of the task, in Dreyfus and Dreyfus, the context is provided by the practitioner's 
expertise. Hamm, then, examines these different notions of context in terms of the 
distinction between intuition/analysis. Hammond's theory locates analysis and intuition 
at the poles of a continuum. The former organizes information according to an 
analytical principle while the latter combines information by averaging. Likewise, 
tasks are considered to occupy a position on a task continuum ranging from analysis-
inducing to intuition-inducing, depending on task-features such as the complexity of the 
task, the ambiguity of the content, the form of task presentation, etc. In this way, the 
theory explains differences in a practitioner's thinking from one situation to the next. 
Finally, the theory uses the term practice to refer to both the characteristics of the task, 
and the mode of cognition the expert uses on a particular task, thus defining modes of 
practice which range from intuitive judgment to scientific experiment. 
The argument is that an expert practitioner can manipulate the task features and the mode 
of cognition that s/he uses so as to achieve a more accurate position on the continuum 
of the possible modes of practice. Thus the more structured the task, the more analytical 
the mode of cognition, the greater the possibility of variable manipulation by the judge, 
and the greater the visibility of the process. Furthermore, experience is relevant only 
indirectly, e.g., to the extent that an organizing principle is known, and unfamiliarity 
with the task is likely to induce intuition, and the reverse. 
In contrast, Hamm writes, the Dreyfus & Dreyfus model defines context as the 
practitioner's expertise, and describes several levels of thinking involved in a task. 
Different modes of cognition, depending on experience, can be used at each level. The 
model views intuition as different in kind from analysis. Analysis and intuition in the 
model are two pure types of cognition; the former is carried out by symbolic and the 
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latter by non-symbolic processes that are best represented by the activity of the novice 
and expert respectively. 
It is obvious that the cognitive continuum theory makes all the assumptions of 
cognitivism (e.g., subject/object dichotomy, object analysis in terms of analytical 
principles, etc.), and, as Broadbent et.al. (see section 2.3) put it with reference to 
cognitivism, in general, this theory is based on the belief that intuition does well in 
certain cases, but one would do better if an analytical principle were known. The more 
interesting question, however, is if Hamm's is a fair evaluation of the Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus model. For it presents it as if it had done no more than reverse the dichotomy, 
and privilege intuition. It also presents it as if it had replaced the 'objectivism' of the 
task with the 'subjectivism' of the expert. 
As I will argue below, Dreyfus and Dreyfus' basic framework for the analysis of skill 
inevitably leads them to a form of subjectivism. But this framework is not as simple as 
Hamm presents it. They do not just put forward an argument about context specificity, 
and they do not just say that context is context as perceived. This would be much like 
the often used argument which reads Wittgenstein as saying that the meaning of a word 
is determined by context (see section 3.3). It would also be similar to that reading of 
Kuhn where Kuhn is said to argue that practitioners of competing paradigms see or 
perceive different things. But as I argued in section 3.4 by following Rorty's line, it is 
what counts as 'real' that changes with a paradigm change, and Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
would support this view. In addition, the model itself is the outcome of H. Dreyfus' 
reading of Heidegger, and it is clear from the dicussion in chapter 1 that Heidegger's 
framework is an attempt to overcome the subject/object dichotomy of western 
metaphysics. 
While Hamm believes that the Dreyfus & Dreyfus model complements Hammond's 
theory, it is obvious that the two theories talk about different things when they use the 
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term intuition. What is important here, though, is his claim that there is a distinction 
common to the two approaches between 'cognition-by-symbol-manipulation' and 
intuitive cognition characterized by non-symbolic processes. This distinction facilitates 
the raising of the question of representation, the clarification of which is necessary in 
order to be able to appreciate more fully the position of Dreyfus and Dreyfus. 
It is, indeed, the case that Dreyfus and Dreyfus often describe intuition as a non-
symbolic process when they talk about, not a different kind of thinking, but, rather, a 
different mode of activity. This mode is differentiated from rule-following, symbol-
manipulation techniques not so much, or not primarily, because an expert is using a 
different mode of cognition, but, first and foremost, because interpretation is 
involved which is based on similarity relations and relies upon the essential role 
played by an exemplar/example. The attribution of an essential role to the latter, 
ignored by Hamm [1], complicates the distinction between task/expertise 
(objective/subjective) and puts an emphasis on the act of interpretation. Thus it is 
the clarification of these terms and the assumptions on which they rest that need further 
scrutiny. 
In the second edition of "What computers can't do", H. Dreyfus [1979:34- 
35;310,n.82;339,n.10) corrected his earlier position regarding the role of the 'noema' in 
the determination of meaning in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. Dreyfus 
had thought earlier that, for Husserl, cognition is context-determined and goal-directed 
and that the 'noema' serves to provide a context of expectations (inner horizon). He 
understood Husserl as saying that the 'noema', though abstract, has a kind of 
indeterminacy which cannot be expressed in a formal symbol structure. The 
argument was directed against the attempt of 'Artificial Intelligence' research to model 
intelligence as the passive receiving of context-free facts. Dreyfus eventually realized 
that the 'noema' was meant to be a formal symbolic description of stereotypical objects, 
and that Husserl's task turned out to be an 'infinite task'. 
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Drawing on early Heidegger, Dreyfus explains that it is the outer horizon - i.e., the 
background practices - that determines the relevant facts and the structure of the inner 
horizon. A distinction is drawn here between the explicit structure and the implicit 
horizon, and a potentially infinite play between the two is set up. Dreyfus [ibid:60-61] 
gives two explanations of how, in the case of human beings, the infinite task might 
become a finite one. Either this 'background' is acquired gradually through training, 
and what one 'knows' about this, which enables one to act and recognize specific 
situations, cannot be made explicit (for such an attempt would lead to an infinite 
regress); or, alternatively, one can allow for representations, though these wouldn't 
be formal ones, but, rather, would be more like images or concrete representations. 
Such memories are not in the form of formal representations because one does not 
have to make explicit the strict rules that abstract symbol-representations would require. 
With these latter distinctions between the formally representable/ non-formally 
representable, the abstract system/the concrete image, Dreyfus explains the judgement 
characterizing expertise, which, he argues, is a discontinuous move from the 
cognitive to the non-cognitive. 
The latter, for Dreyfus, is what characterizes skill. One can think of all aspects of 
human thought, such as moods, sensory motor skills, concrete images, and long-range 
self-interpretations. Not only knowledge is involved, but also self-understanding. 
Dreyfus' and Okrent's interpetation of Heidegger around this point, is worth recalling 
(section 1.2). The evaluation of success in a given situation, they argue, would consider 
the ability to respond differently to a situation which 'calls for' a specific operation, and 
to complete it successfully. This, in turn, is fixed as a certain functionally defined 
resolution in the light of directedness. The latter is accomplished through an 
understading of oneself as an 'end' to be accomplished and this is embedded in a 
practical understanding of tools, that, in turn, are socially regulated activities. These 
finally, require a community of 'Daseins'. It is, therefore, through the distinction 
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between a holistic understanding of a situation, and of 'what one is', and a cognitive 
understanding, that skilled activity is differentiated from a machine's calculations. 
The Heideggerian referential totality of equipment and its involvement relations 
characterizing the practical whole, might be interpreted as supporting a position of 
context-specificity in the determination of action. Against research that tries to 
determine such a context and reproduce it in a computer, Dreyfus argues that, in order 
to be able to recognize the specific context, one must have already selected from the 
indefinite number of possibly discriminable features the possibly relevant ones. The 
potentially infinite task of determining relevance in the case of humans is not an issue, 
because, he claims, in contrast to a machine, human beings are always-already-in-a-
situation. 
This means that the success of a practitioner in a given situation is assumed to be 
measured by his/her ability to act appropriately in situations which might have once 
been problems but are no longer problems, and, therefore, do not require reflection. 
This non-reflective activity, Dreyfus writes, is based on the practitioner's developed 
ability to perceive the now present situation as similar to a past-example. Thus it is 
the experience with the past that in-forms the present. This experience is stored in the 
form of an example, because a concept cannot manage a large quantity of information 
[Dreyfus & Dreyfus:1986:155-156; cf. Broadbendt et.al., section 2.3, above]. It is, 
therefore, the inadequacy of the concept that necessitates the example. The latter 
provides the general sense in order for the practitioner to decide the present case. As 
Dreyfus argues, 
"[o]nly our general sense of what is typical can decide here, and that 
background understanding by definition cannot be 'situation specific'." 
[1979:60] 
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Dreyfus uses indiscriminately the Heideggerian term of background practices, the 
Kuhnian exemplar, and Wittgenstein's notion of perspicuous presentation of 
concrete examples to argue that practitioners do not need to classify objects by 
representing them as instances of concepts but, rather, they group them together as 
more or less distant from paradigm cases. Similarity and proximity to a prototypical 
case [Dreyfus & Dreyfus:1986:149] that is stored in memory, rather than formalized 
concepts, accounts for expertise. 
One might get the impression that, in Dreyfus's framework, the 'background practices', 
the 'exemplar' and the 'example' replace the concept, and that theory is disassociated 
and replaced by practice. This, indeed, happens, but only at the surface level. At 
another level, Dreyfus attempts to say something more than this, and the resulting 
unclarity is responsible for the ambiguity in Dreyfus regarding the analytical distinction 
between example/exemplar, and the lack of a distinction between unformalized/ 
unformalizable. This other line of argument becomes apparent as soon as we follow the 
pairs of oppositions that his framework sets up, and realize that the analytical concepts 
that he uses to overcome cognitivism move between bounded limits. It, then, becomes 
clear that his notion of exemplarity is determined by the series of reversed oppositions 
that have already been introduced. 
In chapter 2, I illustrated the thesis that studies into practical/professional activity have a 
strong cognitivist base, by presenting such studies, and, also, by discussing recent 
attempts to shift to the practical paradigm. I concluded there that the design of the latter 
studies bear on the basic presuppositions of cognitivism which they cannot challenge. 
H. Dreyfus and the Dreyfus & Dreyfus model of skill acquisition aim at showing the 
limits of cognitivism, and the inadequacy of the cognitive paradigm to understand and 
reproduce the practical activity or skill involved in unstructured problem-areas in which 
the goal, what information is relevant and the effects of decisions are unclear [Dreyfus 
& Dreyfus:1986:35-36]. Their shift to the practical is characterized, in the first place, by 
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a reversal of the series of hierarchical oppositions, and consequently, a reversal of the 
theory/practice totality, as table 4.3 indicates. In the second place, to prevent the infinite 
play of substitutions between the implicit and the explicit, etc., and between the 
univocity and exactitude of the scientific, and the interpretations of the polysemic 
meanings of the practical world - including the world of the scientist - the model poses 
as an absolute stopping point the background practices, the exemplar or the 
practical whole. This stopping point serves as the ground of both theory and 
practice. It gathers together, focuses, unifies and normalizes both theoretical and 
practical activity. Moreover, it is clear from the preceding discussion that this stopping 
point is described as the typical. The type, as I discuss in chapter 8, is an onto-
typology of the figure/image - Darstellung - which falls into a dichotomy of an 
active/passive subject. Crudely, I can indicate here the novice in relation to the expert, 
and the question of identity. Nothing is to prevent, because of the specular image, the 
speculative solution: either the novice totally dominates the other (expert) or vice versa. 
Radical alterity disappears. 
BOUNDED OPPOSITIONS SUPPORTING THE PRACTICE / THEORY 
























A first assumption on which such a framework of exemplarity rests is the view that 
the practical whole is not affected by language, and is independent of its linguistic 
inscription. The rule, which by definition is formalized or formalizable, abstracted, and 
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detached from its concrete context, is not formed and deformed by language. Likewise, 
the past-example in its repetitions remains uncontaminated by language, and does not 
fail to guide, immediately and unreflectively, the present. Secondly, an assumption 
is made that language is polysemic (see section 6.3.3). The multiplicity of meaning is 
regulated by the exemplar but it requires an expert subject with intuition, memory and 
perception - in short, a cognitive subject. The critique of rationality and mental 
representation leads to a position of mental articulation of images or experience, 
whereas the human subject, by harnessing the skill, acquires a total control of the 
situation. This is an intensified notion of mastery and technical control which replaces 
control by rules, and what Dreyfus and Dreyfus are arguing against. This, at the surface 
active subject, however, implies a weak notion of decision and judgment. 
The Heideggerian example of hammering and of the craftsman utilized by Dreyfus 
speaks of a kind of action wherein the subject has been socialized into the background 
of a community. It stands for the non-rule-bound, intelligent activity of the expert, 
whose judgement is based on tacit identity criteria - similarity with a paradigm case 
- and is not a judgment between incommensurables. Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
overemphasise the Kuhnian position of authoritative rationality (see section 3.4), and so 
fail to support their argument that judgment is a movement of discontinuity and 
interruption of the cognitive. The model of the craftsman points to a well 
institutionalized example of practice, and presupposes the existence of a stable 
substantive community [2]. Calculative rationality is replaced by a non-representable but 
still calculable decision. For, it relies upon the demonstrable which is the logos of 
the type, as I will argue in detail in chapter 8, and which is still under the 
determinations of the theoretical (see below). 
In this framework, the normalization assumed to be effected by the exemplar and the 
mechanism of similarity relations are the sources of certainty of the expert's judgment, 
and any change occured is external to the currently dominant paradigm (cf. section 3.4). 
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When this framework is put in a socio-historical context, the exemplar is technology 
which focuses and explains the objectifying character of our attitudes and practices. 
Showing such an exemplar is the cognitive endeavour of the enlightened researcher, and 
so is the discerning of those 'elements' in our micro-practices which are still 
uncontaminated by the technological (see section 1.2). Finally, in this framework, the 
movement between the bounded limits of the calculable and the incalculable is stopped 
with Dreyfus and Dreyfus' theoretical decision to pose the practical whole as the 
foundation, and this returns the cognitive totality of theory/practice reversed but intact. 
I would like to conclude by arguing that the notion of practical activity and skill, located 
in the vocabulary of a representational model, is highly problematic. A working 
hypothesis is that it borrows either from Plato's notion of imitation as reproduction, 
or from Aristotle's notion of mimesis as the perfection of the incompleteness of nature 
by techne, or, perhaps, from both. Both models of mimesis are based on the 
opposition of nature (physis)/techne, and both lead to either an active or a passive 
subject, and a weak sense of decision. Of course, as with any concept, the notion of 
skill is a socio-historical 'fact'. Lacking an essential definition, it takes its force from the 
conceptual system in which it is used. Though, in the absence of a socio-historical 
analysis, it is difficult to specify its current position in the epistemological map in a way 
which would be something more than a generality, it is still possible to indicate that, for 
example, in Aristotle, the notion of phronesis related to skill takes its meaning through 
its association with episteme, the latter thereby being weakened. In the 18th century, 
the notion of judgment (and of skilled and artistic practice) takes its meaning through the 
separation of spheres into the cognitive, the moral and the aesthetic. At present, 
rationalization entails a diminution of phronesis or skill, as it is defined as merely the 
clarification of rules and their application. However, Dreyfus and Dreyfus' attempt to 
redefine skill, by inscribing not some differences between human/machine, but an 
absolute oppositional limit, falls back into and repeats the Aristotelian opposition 
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between physis and techne. This is why the human skill is called for to complete the 
machine, which is understood as the analogue of nature that is a rule-governed system. 
The developmental model of skill that Dreyfus and Dreyfus' model of exemplarity 
presents rests upon a notion of mimesis as identification with a model - the 
exemplar, example, the product or the expert herself - which mysteriously dictates 
"imitate me in order to be what you are". It is this model of mimesis that requires the 
psychological mechanism of intuition. Only the latter saves the human subject from 
losing itself in the model, but this only at the expense of a regression to the model of 
subjectivity, and the conscious/unconscious distinction. 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus have recourse to simple forms of signification such as similarity 
and proximity, and come up with a notion of unreflective activity that fails to challenge 
the reversed opposition between content/form and raise the question of the force of the 
example. Similarly, 'similarity relations' entrap the model and make it into a 
hierarchical, developmental, evolutionary process which assumes the unity of 
experience, and which requires the invocation of a conscious/unconscious subject. 
The unidimentionality implied in such a notion of experience, where the past 
provides the model and in-forms the present, has been shown, in the case, for 
example, of transcendental phenomenology (see section 6.2), to be inadequate to do 
justice to the complex structure of experience, and to guarantee, as transcendental 
phenomenology claimed, the continuity and identity of the subject. In the Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus model, in particular, the expert reproduces the past in an identical repetition 
and, therefore, is a performer without future (see chapters 6 & 8). Moreover, Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus think that it is possible to eradicate cognitivism by shifting to the practical 
paradigm and exemplarity. But this move reinscribes itself into the metaphysical 
conceptuality as long as we continue to think of practice in such a way as to privilege 
doing. 
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In the rest of this thesis, I will try to show that it is only with the shift to language, 
accompanied by a thorough examination of the fundamental assumption of the 
representational model, according to which language is habitually understood, that the 
foundational argument that rests upon either the human subject or the real can be 
removed. It is only when language becomes the focus and the field of operation, and 
only when the problematic of representation and the temporality of experience 
associated with language is rethought [cf. Wood:1989:343-344], that we can avoid 
psychologism. It is only when practice is understood as linguistic/grammatological 
performance that the possibility presents itself for the displacement of cognitivism. 
For to think of practice as performance is to think of, at once, the possibility and the 
limits of mastery. This, I will argue later on, is not without consequence for the notion 
of rule, and rule application (of theory), for the notion of practice and doing, and for the 
notion of exemplarity itself. A space is, then, created in which to re-think the notions of 
temporality and experience, as well as to transform the concept of the subject. This is 
the precondition, also, for a different notion of judgment which would avoid both 
calculative rationality and a weak notion of decision based on tacit identity criteria. 
Following my earlier allusion, I would like to claim that further analysis of the Dreyfus 
& Dreyfus model would have to pursue in greater detail the dominance and the 
determinations of the eye and the hand in the theory/practice relationship. In conclusion, 
I will indicate the lines of the argument. Dreyfus and Dreyfus, as I have argued, rely on 
the intuition of a non-phonocentric subject. Intuition reveals the inner eye of the 
practitioner/expert. But this inner eye is also articulated with the master figure of the 
expert as a craftsman [3]. The craftsman is in the mode of the ready-to-hand. So the 
craftsman is a handyman. This poses the question of the role of the hand and the eye in 
the whole Heideggerian conceptuality, notably, in the determination of presence. 
More specifically, it poses the question of whether there isn't an implicit hierarchization 
which substitutes one 'hand experience', while Heidegger is endeavouring to expose 
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the Greeks for leaving the ready-to-hand in obscurity in favour of the present-at-hand 
[Heidegger:1962:96-97]. In "Geschlecht II: Heidegger's Hand" (1987c) Derrida 
addresses this problematic, and argues that Heidegger's privileging of the 'hand' is his 
privileging of handwriting, which deflects away from language and writing. 
Manuscripture is that which shows and inscribes the word for the gaze. The hand of 
the craftsman and the eye of imitation carry us to the eye of theory and the specular. In 
other words, as I indicated earlier, there is a typology of being, defined in terms of the 
figures of eye and hand - in short, an onto-typology. 
There are several indications in the preceding discussion to support the claim that the 
Dreyfus & Dreyfus model is determined by an onto-type, which does not displace the 
logic of the theoretical. We have seen, for example, the emphasis on sight, the concrete 
image, and the idea of the recognition of the typical which is linked to a kind of 
knowing associated with vision ('the optical'). Similarly, it is the structure of sight, 
i.e., seeing and doing (eye and hand), that governs the eliciting of the response in the 
performance of the expert. Their argument that "what transparently must be done is 
done", which privileges transparent seeing, can be taken as saying that what is done is 
what transparently must be done. 
I have posed here the problematic of the exemplar and the onto-type. But I must 
interrupt, make a detour. It might be a long one, but it is inevitable that I will return to 
this. I think I have already said enough to support my claim that the displacement of 
theory in the theory/practice opposition cannot afford to deflect the problematic of 
language. Habermas's theory of communicative action has made a shift to language and 
communication that claims to have offered a solution to the problem of subject/object 
dichotomy through his notion of intersubjectivity. In the chapter that follows, I will 
proceed to examine the model of communication implied in his theory and make explicit 
the presuppositions on which it rests. 
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CHAPTER 5 : HABERMAS' COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: 
PERFORMATIVES WITHOUT FORCE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The critique of instrumental reason developed within the confines of a philosophy of 
consciousness is unable to free itself from the very instrumentalism implicit in the 
subject/object formulation. This is the starting point of Habermas' theory of 
communicative action. Habermas makes a paradigm shift from labour to interaction and, 
with the theory of communicative action, he shifts from the philosophy of 
consciousness to the philosophy of language, thereby to communicative rationality, 
linguistic communication/dialogue and intersubjectivity. These concepts, basic to the 
discourse on practice, will be addressed here vis-a-vis the theory/practice opposition. 
In particular, Habermas' theory of communicative action comprehends society both as a 
system and as lifeworld. The latter is introduced as the correlate of the concept of 
communicative action, and as a means of explicating the ways in which the linguistically 
mediated communicative action can carry out its functions of social integration, cultural 
reproduction and socialization. Communicative action and life world clarify the concept 
of communicative rationality, and distinguish it from instrumental (subject-centred) 
reason associated with system and the strategic action type. In section 5.2, I would like 
to show how the theory/practice dichotomy works itself into the strategic action-system/ 
communicative action-lifeworld dichotomy. 
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In section 5.3, I will focus on Habermas's claim that a reformulated speech act theory 
grounds the distinction between communicative and strategic action types. I will 
question the presuppositions of this claim, and assess the extent to which 
intersubjectivity and the notion of a practical subject with procedural criteria breaks with 
instrumentalism associated with the philosophy of consciousnes and implied in the 
subject/object formulation. 
5.2 THE CONCEPTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AND 
LIFEWORLD 
In "The Theory of Communicative Action" [1] it is the differential use of knowledge, 
whether it is non-communicative or communicative, that determines the basic direction 
or objective of reason; that is, by concentrating on the non-communicative use of 
propositional knowledge in purposive action, an a priori choice is made in favour of 
cognitive-instrumental rationality. By starting from the communicative use of 
propositional knowledge in speech acts, a broader meaning of rationality is at issue, 
viz., communicative rationality. In the former case, the intrinsic telos of rationality is 
instrumental control, in the latter, communicative consensus or agreement. 
Furthermore, communication and communicative rationality are not limited to 
propositional knowledge. Habermas extends the range of rational speech from factual 
assertions to intersubjective norms and modes of self-reflection and self-expression, 
i.e., to the dimensions of the 'social' and the 'subjective' world. 
According to Habermas, communicative action aims at the attainment, preservation, and 
renewal of consensus, more specifically of a consensus resting on the intersubjective 
recognition of arguable validity claims. The rationality inherent in this praxis, manifests 
itself in the fact that a communicatively reached consensus must ultimately be grounded 
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on differentiated reason. To the rational-discursive aspect of communication, Habermas 
adds the 'active' or practical dimension. In the section "Relations to the World and 
Aspects of Rationality in Four Sociological Concepts of Action" [1984:75-101] 
Habermas differentiates communicative action from three competing action types, 
prominent in recent sociological literature, in terms of their progressive differentiation 
regarding the actor-world relations. Thus in Habermas' presentation (1984:ibid): 
(i)acting teleologically, an actor seeks to implement his objective or 'telos' by choosing 
the means appropriate to his aim, that is by selecting a given course of action among 
available alternatives. Individual teleological choice is transformed into 'strategic action' 
whenever the decision of one actor is influenced by, or is a response to, decisions by 
another agent (or agents). As Habermas points out, teleological action necessarily 
involves a relation between an actor and the external or 'objective' world, where 
'objective world' means the totality of states of affairs which either exist or can be made 
to exist through purposive intervention. While, in principle, such a relation can support 
a purely cognitive or contemplative stance, action becomes teleological (or strategic) 
through the accent on intervention and efficiency. 
(ii)Norm regulated action refers to consensual activity among members of a social group. 
Regarding its rationality potential, this type is said to involve a 'two-world' orientation, 
namely, orientation both to the 'objective' and the 'social world'; the latter is taken to 
mean a given 'normative context' specifying the totality of legitimate interpersonal 
interactions. 
(iii) With dramaturgical action, a new dimension of behaviour or 'world' comes into 
view, namely, the agent's 'subjective world' defined as the "totality of subjective 
experiences to which the actor has, in relation to others, a privileged access" [ibid:91]. 
Habermas finds dramaturgical action still restricted to a 'two-world' outlook: the 
correlation of inner and outer, subjective and objective worlds. 
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(iv) Communicative action is distinguished from the above mentioned action types, first, 
by its ability to encompass the 'three worlds' simultaneously; secondly, by its 
rootedness in language. To be sure, the teleological, norm-regulated and dramaturgical 
models of action are also mediated by language, but the latter is conceived one-sidedly; 
that is to say, only one function of language is thematized, viz., the release of 
perlocutionary effects, the establishment of interpersonal relations, and the expression 
of subjective experiences respectively [ibid:94-95]. By contrast, the communicative 
model, relying upon Mead's symbolic interactionism, Wittgenstein's notion of language 
games, Austin's theory of speech acts, and Gadamer's hermeneutics, takes all the 
functions of language into consideration [ibid:95]. Language becomes a 'reflective 
medium of interaction'. Communication refers to the interactive 'negotiation of 
definitions' of situations amenable to consensus. The communicative model of action 
presupposes language as a medium of unrestricted consensual interaction in which 
speakers and hearers make simultaneous reference to aspects of the objective, social and 
subjective worlds, against the backdrop of their pre-interpreted lifeworid. 
Thus from the rational-discursive standpoint, communicative rationality refers, on the 
one hand, to different forms of the discursive redemption of validity claims; and on the 
other hand, it points to different 'world' relations into which communicative agents 
enter by raising validity claims for their utterances; from the standpoint of its 'active' 
connotations, and through the medium of language in its pragmatic dimension - i.e., 
speakers by uttering statements in a communicative fashion, enter into distinct world 
relations and that they do so in a reflexive manner - communication functions 'as a 
mechanism of coordination' in the sense that participants reach agreement on the 
claimed validity of their utterances, and thus grant intersubjective recognition to 
reciprocally raised validity claims. 
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Habermas elaborates the formal or 'universal-pragmatic' underpinnings of 
communicative exchange in the"Intermediate Reflections"[ibid:273-337]. Dealing with 
action theory and communication, he introduces a broad distinction between 'success-
oriented' and 'consensus oriented' actions. To support this distinction, he transplants 
Austin's speech-act theory, i.e., his differentiation between 'locutionary', 
'illocutionary', and 'perlocutionary' components of speech acts, onto the plane of action 
theory. He thus associates the 'consensus-oriented' communicative action with 
locutionary and illocutionary utterances, and the success-oriented teleological (and 
strategic) action with perlocution. In communicative interaction, understanding a 
statement typically implies knowing the conditions which would validate, justify or 
argumentatively corroborate it. Communicative interaction includes only such speech 
acts in which the speaker advances validity claims amenable to critical scrutiny. Three 
types of validity claims are thus distinguished, namely, the truth of propositions, the 
rightness of normative obligations, and the truthfulness or self-disclosure, according to 
the adopted attitude - objectivating, norm-conformative, and expressive- toward the 
elements of the three worlds (objective, social, subjective). Moreover, attitudes are 
linguistically mediated through three types of speech acts: propositional (constative), 
regulative, and expressive. 
"The Theory of Communicative Action" introduces the concept of the life-world (a) as 
the correlate of the concept of communicative action, and (b) as a means of explicating 
the ways in which the linguistically mediated communicative action can carry out its 
three functions of social integration, cultural reproduction, and socialization. These are 
based on the three aspects of communicative action, i.e., understanding, coordination, 
sociation. The concluding paragraphs of the 'Intermediate Reflections' define the 
concept of the 'life-world' [2] as the 
"background of implicit knowledge which enters a tergo into 
cooperative processes of interpretation. Communicative action takes 
place within a lifeworld that remains at the backs of participants in 
communication. It is present to them only in the reflective form of 
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taken-for-granted background assumptions and naively mastered 
skills." 
[ibid:335] 
In the same context, the concept is described as having remarkable features: 
" It is an implicit knowledge that cannot be represented in a finite 
number of propositions; it is a holistically structured knowledge, the 
basic elements of which intrinsically define one another; and it is a 
knowledge that does not stand at our disposition, inasmuch as we 
cannot make it conscious and place it in doubt as we please." 
[ibid:336] 
In the section devoted to the differentiation between primitive-mythical and modern-
rational 'world-views' [ibid: 43-74] Habermas distinguishes the notion of 'lifeworld' 
from that of 'world-views', according to their potential for rationalization. In primitive-
mythical world-views, he argues, members assume a non-reflective attitude towards 
their cultural tradition. Modernization or rationalization from this point of view signifies 
the progressive differentiation between dimensions of the taken-for-granted life-praxis, 
and particularly the segregation of reviewable 'worlds', i.e., 'formal worlds', from the 
matrix of the traditional 'lifeworld'. In other words, members of a modern 
communicative group thematize - i.e., assume a reflective attitude towards - particular 
ingredients of the cultural tradition. 
The most elaborate treatment of the concept of the 'life-world' occurs in the second 
'Intermediate Reflections' of the study [1987:113-197]. There, the communication-
theoretic concept of the lifeworld is made precise by comparing it to the 
phenomenological concept. As Habermas argues, both Husserl, and Schutz and 
Luckmann base their concept of lifeworld on the model of the philosophy of 
consciousness [ibid:124,129]. In seeking to correct the subjectivist limitations of the 
concept through recourse to hermeneutics and ordinary language theory, Habermas 
starts from Schutz's distinction between 'situation' and 'horizon' (context). According 
to Schutz, situations are always embedded in broader horizons which, in turn, are 
178 
grounded in the lifeworld. For participants, the concrete situation is always the centre of 
their lifeworld, and it has a movable horizon because it points to the complexity of the 
life world; the latter is constantly present but only as a background to actual events 
[ibid:123-124]. Habermas abandons the framework of phenomenology and the 
psychology of perception and, instead, thinks of the lifeworld "as represented by a 
culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of interpretive patterns" 
[ibid:124]. This means that 
"[r]elevance structures can be conceived...as interconnections of 
meaning holding between a given communicative utterance, the 
immediate context, and its connotative horizon of meanings. Contexts 
of relevance are based on grammatically regulated relations among the 
elements of a linguistically organized stock of knowledge." 
[ibid] 
Further, Habermas claims, the category of lifeworld must be distinguished from both 
the formal frames - i.e., the worlds to which participants assign elements of situations 
in communicative action contexts - and the concept of world in the usual sense - i.e., the 
objective, social and subjective world. The life world is "the transcendental site where 
speaker and hearer meet" [ibid:126]. 
More precisely, Habermas' turning to a communication-theoretic concept of the life-
world is meant to: (i) avoid Husserl's transcendental subjectivity posited as the 
condition and transcendental frame of possible everyday experience, thus inhibiting the 
solution to the intersubjectivity problem; and (ii) correct Schutz's and Luckmann's 
action-theoretic twist to the model of generative subjectivity. In particular, Habermas 
[ibid:129-130] argues that (a) this action-theoretic model, developed with awareness of 
the basic epistemological questions, gains a certain depth of focus through being 
connected with the phenomenological analysis of lifeworld and action situations; it 
already goes beyond the familiar psychological and sociological models of an isolated 
actor in a situation, affected by stimuli or acting according to plans; (b) the action-
theoretic model, in fact, permits two sorts of theoretical solution. It either leads to a 
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phenomenologically informed systems theory, whereby the subject/object dichotomy is 
replaced by system/environment, and the intersubjectivity problem disappears in favour 
of interpretation; or - Schutz's direction - the tension between phenomenological 
lifeworld analysis and social action is resolved by putting aside the constitution of the 
lifeworld and starting off directly from the intersubjectively constituted lifeworld; this, 
however, is at the expense of getting at the lifeworld only through "the mirror of the 
isolated actor's subjective experience". Habermas' own solution, then, is to get at the 
structures of lifeworld by grasping the structures of linguistically generated 
intersubjectivity. This is possible for Habermas if the notion of 'lifeworld' is treated as 
a complementary concept to 'communicative action'. 
To accomplish this, Habermas goes through the following steps: first, he accepts a 
'strong' version of the notion of the lifeworld. The unproblematic character of the 
lifeworld for the actor, i.e., the latter's naive familiarity with an unproblematically given 
background ( Schutz and Luckmann) is put into a strong position by claimimg that this 
has to be understood in its radical sense: "qua lifeworld it cannot become problematic, it 
can at most fall apart" [ibid:130]. This is to say that the elements of the lifeworld with 
which actors are familiar do not have the status of facts, norms and experiences, i.e., 
they are not cognitively accessible. As Habermas emphasises, "the lifeworld 
always remains in the background" [ibid]; its commonality is prior to any possible 
agreement and cannot become controversial in the way that intersubjectively shared 
knowledge can. 
Secondly, he puts forward the thesis that: 
"The lifeworld loses its prejudgmental power over everyday 
communicative practice to the degree that actors owe their mutual 
understanding to their own interpretative performances." 
[ibid:133] 
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To be sure, still borrowing from phenomenological studies, he argues that, on the one 
hand, the actors keep their lifeworld at their back as a resource for action that is oriented 
to mutual understanding, as well as as a background of skill, intuitive knowledge of 
how one deals with situations, and socially customary practices (prereflective 
knowledge); on the other hand, the action situation is pursued and dealt with within the 
framework of the three formal world-concepts. 
As a third step, Habermas recognizes that this communication-theoretic concept still 
remains at the same analytical level as the transcendental lifeworld concept of 
phenomenology. In this sense, it can be obtained by reconstructing the pretheoretical 
knowledge of competent speakers. To make it fruitful for social inquiry, he turns it into 
an everyday concept of the lifeworld. In so doing, he focuses on narration as 
"a specialized form of constative speech that serves to describe sociocultural events and 
objects" [ibid:136]. This narrative practice, Habermas claims, has a function in 
objectivating the actors' belonging to their lifeworld. In other words, it is constitutive 
for social integration (group solidarity) and personal identity. For Habermas, this is the 
jumping off point for social theory, that is: 
"[i]n adopting the narrative form, we are choosing a perspective that 
'grammatically' forces us to base our descriptions on an everyday 
concept of the lifeworld as a cognitive reference system." 
[ibid:136] 
The everyday concept of lifeworld enables Habermas to move from the 
phenomenological position of the participants' perspective, with its focus on the 
horizon-forming context of an action situation, to the perspective of the narrator which 
utilizes the lifeworld for cognitive purposes. 
The last step completes this theoretical shift by identifying three functions of language-
use, i.e., understanding, coordination and sociation.These, it is argued, fulfill the three 
functions of communicative action, i.e., mutual understanding, coordination of action, 
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and socialization. These, in turn, are capable of reproducing the lifeworld itself by 
reproducing its three structural components [ibid:138]; viz.: culture, as the stock of 
interpretive patterns from which participants in communication draw their interpretations 
regarding something about the world; society, as the legitimate orders through which 
participants regulate their membership in social groups; and personality, as the 
competencies that make a subject capable of speaking and acting. This way, Habermas 
claims, communicative action corrects the one-sided focus on one component of the life-
world of Schutz (culture), Durkheim (society) and Mead (socialization). 
The concepts of 'communicative action' and 'lifeworld' enable Habermas to view 
modernization as the gradual replacement of implicit by explicit meaning patterns, a 
change involving the progressive 'differentiation' of life-world components and the 
move from everyday exchanges to rational communication, thematizing reviewable 
validity' claims. Thus, on the one hand, modernization signals the progressive 
differentiation of communicative structures of the 'life-world'; on the other hand, long-
range social development involves the growing segregation of symbolic communicative 
patterns (communicative rationality) from reproductive endeavours governed by 
standards of technical efficiency (instrumental rationality), a process which he describes 
as the 'uncoupling' of the 'system' and the 'life-world'. Seen jointly, societies emerge 
as entities which, in the course of evolution, are increasingly differentiated both as 
systems and as life-worlds: they are "systemically stabilized complexes of action of 
socially integrated groups" [ibid:152]. Systemic evolution is measured by the growth of 
a society's steering capacity, while the segregation of culture, society and personality 
indicates the evolutionary stage of the 'life-world'. The economy and the state are 
dedicated to the enhancement of 'steering capacity'; they are transformed into 
'subsystems' ruled by efficiency criteria, that bypass modes of linguistic 
communication. Once instrumental subsystems are not only 'uncoupled' from life-
world [ibid:179-185], but also begin to invade and subdue the latter, the uncoupling of 
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the system and life-world is converted into a direct 'colonization of the life world' 
[ibid:196;356-373] that is subjugated to standards of technical control. 
I hope that this admittedly summary form of reviewing of Habermas' two-volume study 
will be sufficient to facilitate a critical discussion of his theory. In the remaining part of 
this section, I will focus on the two basic concepts presented above - namely 
communicative action and life world - which are used in Habermas as critical concepts 
to distinguish his position from the instrumentalization of theory and an 
instrumentalized practice (praxis). In particular, in view of the charge that there is a 
strong 'cognitivist' and rationalist core underpinning Habermas's concept of action (for 
example, Benhabib:1986:241), I would like to characterize 'communicative action' as 
an action-type, and examine whether it actually frees itself from instrumentalism, that is, 
whether it, ultimately, displaces the subject/object dichotomy. 
Distinguishing between a 'weak' and a 'strong' version of the lifeworld concept, 
associated with Schutzian and Husserlian phenomenology, and Gadamer and 
Heidegger's analysis respectively, Dallmayr [1987:169] argues that, in the attempt to 
combine the two approaches and incorporate advantages intrinsic to both, Habermas' 
study loses its coherence. His argument is that, while in its strong version the lifeworld 
stresses pre-conscious and pre-subjective background conditions, which supposedly 
break with the subject/object and the ego-alter polarities, in its weak version it is 
presented as a network of subjects. Examples of the latter are abundant in the study. 
Very often the "life-world of a social group" is identified with society as "construed 
from the participant perspective of acting subjects"; situations are portrayed as 
experiential patterns concentrically ordered around individual agents; and the lifeworld 
is associated with a 'subject-writ-large', when it is argued, for example, that members 
of a collectivity typically rely on it "in the first person plural". 
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In my discussion of language in Habermas, I will argue that the employment of a weak 
notion of lifeworld goes with a weak notion of performative. The implication of this 
is that the concept of communicative action requires the category of a subject. But here 
I would like to show that, because of the ambiguity of the concept, the lifeworld in itself 
becomes an object of sociological inquiry. 
In a critique similar to Dallmayr's, Joas [1988:45-48] argues that, in introducing the 
concept of lifeworld, Habermas does not begin with theories of the constitution of 
cognition in contexts of everyday certainties of action and of social intercourse. Rather, 
in the attempt to correct the phenomenologists' use of the model of individual 
perceptions based on the philosophy of consciousness, lifeworld is progressively 
objectivated. That is to say - as a quotation from the study cited earlier demonstrates -
while from the participants' perspective, lifeworld appears as a reservoir of matters that 
are to be taken for granted, from the communication-theoretical perspective, elements of 
the lifeworld are turned into cognitive reference systems. The objectivation of the 
lifeworld is further accentuated when, from everyday narrations, which refer to the 
totality of socio-cultural facts without necessarily originating from the point of view of a 
participant in the narrated action, a theoretical account is developed for descriptions and 
explanations which pertain to the lifeworld in its entirety; that is to say, this account 
supposedly explains the reproduction of the lifeworld itself. 
Thus, having been appropriated and re-interpreted, the concept of the 'lifeworld' can 
then be 'objectivated' : (a) by a storyteller or interpretive reconstructor who tells of the 
knowledge and the action of other actors, and objectivates this knowledge and action 
insofar as he places it within a context that results from his understanding of the frames 
of reference within which he interpretes the action of others. This narrator could become 
the object of narration for a second narrator and so on, and the process would produce 
ever new 'stories; these new stories would perhaps be ever more 'objective', relative to 
the limited perspective of the original actors. However, Habermas' position implies 
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that, in this process, no level would be reached that is essentially different from that of 
the reconstruction of the meaning of others' action against the background of a life-
world; (b) by an epistemologist who can make the mode of constitution of cognition 
itself, as performed by actors or narrators or historians, the object of his reflection. 
With regard to this objectivation, it is a matter of a self-reflective confirmation of the 
preconditions of cognition and action. This confirmation can only assume the character 
of a formal definition of such preconditions, because otherwise it would become a 
particular theory which necessarily arises from a determinate life-worldly foundation 
that, as such, is essentially non-cognizable. It is therefore no accident, Joas concludes, 
that Habermas discovers as the structural components of the lifeworld, precisely those 
dimensions which Parsons identified as the levels at which the concept of system is to 
be applied in the social sciences. 
The discussion of Joas points to the fact that the performative force of language, that the 
communicative action implies, is already losing its force. Here we have the 
metaphysical determination of the subordination to science of narration, which is the 
Platonic logos/mythos dichotomy; I will indicate this problematic later with reference to 
Habermas' appropriation of Austin's performative. But it is obvious here that the 
concept of the lifeworld, weak and objectivated by the narrator and the sociologist alike, 
cannot easily support Habermas' claim that communicative action breaks with 
instrumental rationality. For, among other things, as Dallmayr [op.cit:163-164;164n2] 
points out, the status of communicative action as a type of action is unclear. It oscillates 
precariously between a mode of action predicated on a prior, pre-subjective consensus, 
and another view which treats consensus as the outcome of divergent individual design. 
To stay with Dallmayr, this problem of oscillation can be restated as the question of 
whether or not communication signifies a matrix underlying social interaction, or if it 
implies that human subjects use language instrumentally to secure co-ordination and 
consensus. In view of the study's pervasive stress on rationality and rationalization, 
Dallmayr argues, it seems fair to construe consensual interaction more as an 
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achievement than a premise. This view is supported by Habermas's own distinction 
between 'communicative' - i.e., a particularly reflexive or rational-discursive form of 
interaction - and 'norm-regulated' action - i.e., behaviour according to conventional 
rules. More importantly, communicative action leaves open the question of whether 
achieved consensus yields a common or joint action plan or only the pursuit of 
divergent goals, on the basis of a reciprocal acknowledgement of differences. 
Dallmayr's conclusion, perceptive though it is, opens up further questions; that is, 
whether an achieved consensus - i.e., consensus made substantive - is not in itself 
problematic, even if it is qualified so that it is freed from 'a joint action plan'. For, 
above all, it leaves in place the fiction of active constituted subjects. 
The question which arises, of course, is whether the overtly subordinated term, namely 
instrumental rationality, does not in fact win out over communicative action. One can 
furnish more arguments in support of this, but since there is already an extensive 
literature on the issue, I will only indicate the various aspects of this line of argument, 
which comes down to casting serious doubt on the pertinence of the claim that 
communicative rationality, introduced with communicative as opposed to strategic 
action, breaks with instrumentalism and cognitivism. I will conclude this section by 
drawing one important implication of this for Habermas' claim that communicative 
action has shifted from the philosophy of consciousness to intersubjectivity. First, a 
very brief account of the literature. 
There is a general argument that, given the emphasis on rationalization processes, 
communicative action is bound to be progressively purged of its active components or 
concrete action contexts. Habermas seeks to circumvent this conclusion by associating 
rational communication or consensus not only with a purely semantic understanding of 
utterances, but also with the pragmatic acceptance of validity claims and the practical 
implementation of the consequences of speech. The imbalance of the merger, i.e., the 
relative accentuation of cognitive understanding over practical implementation, is 
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emphasised by Benhabib [op.cit:242] when she writes: "Habermas is too quick in 
translating the rationality intrinsic to argumentation procedures into the rationality of 
action and life conduct". Joas, too, blames Habermas for not attempting to do justice to 
the diversity of kinds of action. For example, Habermas has not taken into account non-
teleological forms of dealing with objects in non-social situations. He, therefore, "has 
delivered only communication as such as the jam-packed residual category of non-
instrumental action" [op.cit:38]. 
There is, further, the problem of Habermas' appropriation of systems theory, which 
McCarthy (1985) describes as a 'pack of sorts'. Various commentators of Habermas' 
work [for example, Misgeld:1983;1985) argue that the principal aim of this move is to 
draw the normative point for his critical theory, namely, to make the criterion of 
increasing systems complexity problematic as an exclusive criterion of societal 
rationalization. To do this, he needs to establish a two-level concept of society which 
integrates the lifeworld and systems paradigms, in order to trace the sociopathologies of 
modern life to the progressive subordination of the life world to systemic imperatives of 
material reproduction ('colonization thesis'). It is worth noting that, in order to support 
his theoretical construct of system/lifeworld/colonization of life world, he has to bring 
in an evolutionary theory about the gradual uncoupling of the system from the 
lifeworld. It is with such a reconstruction that he can make the diagnosis that 
modernization presents us with (a) an increase in the efficiency of goal-oriented action 
(instrumental rationality); and (b) a societal emancipation (communicative rationality) as 
a process of freeing communication from both the unreflective reliance on tradition, and 
from being overpowered by the irrational growth of instrumental rationalization. 
In short, behind the distinction between the rationalization of the system, on the one 
hand, and of lifeworld, on the other, there lies Habermas' concern to show that the 
project of modernity entails a moral and political potential which cannot be exhausted by 
the achievements of technological reason [3]. In developing a theory of communicative 
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action and communicative rationality, Habermas wants to correct and complete Weber's 
analysis of modernity as a rationalization process. As Benhabib [op.cit:260-263] points 
out, Habermas believes that, in his analysis of modernity, Weber has overlooked 
developments in the scientific-cognitive, and the aesthetic-practical spheres. Habermas 
replaces Weber's dualist ontology of a sphere of values and a sphere of facts with a 
differentiation of three realms: world, society, and self. In addition, these are not seen 
as ontological but only as referential categories. This, as I said earlier, allows the 
knowing and acting subject to adopt different attitudes toward the same world 
(objectifying, norm conformative and expressive). Secondly, while Weber restricts his 
analysis to clarifying the relationship between the ethical orientations resulting from the 
rationalization of world religions and complexes of purposive-rational action embodied 
in the economic sphere, Habermas claims that a broader conception of societal 
rationality would have to examine the institutionalization of cognitive, normative and 
aesthetic ideas in cultural action systems. Through such institutionalization, modes of 
appropriating cognitive, social and subjective values become reflexive, i.e, 
"increasingly subject to discourse validation and argumentation" [ibid:261]. Moreover, 
the rationality of such processes is assessed more in terms of its procedural 
characteristics rather than the substantive content. The last claim makes the assertion that 
factually there has been an increase in rationality as a cumulative learning process in the 
three spheres. 
This takes the argument directly to what interests me here, namely, Habermas' claim to 
have shifted away from the philosophy of consciousness and subject-centered reason. 
From the discussion above, it becomes obvious that he wants to establish that the 
reflexive differentiation of value spheres is constitutive of communicative rationality. 
Such an account of modernization as rationalization, relies, on the one hand, upon the 
notion of an intentional subject which can differentiate between formal worlds and, on 
the other, upon the notion of reconstructive science. In earlier studies, he had already 
distinguished between reconstruction and self-reflection, thus: 
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"Self-reflection brings to consciousness those determinants of a self-
formative process of cultivation and spiritual formation [Bildung] which 
ideologically determine a contemporary praxis of action and the 
conception of the world...Rational reconstructions, in contrast, deal 
with anonymous rule systems, which any subjects whatsoever can 
comply with, insofar as they have acquired the corresponding 
competence with respect to these rules...In the philosophical tradition 
these two legitimate forms of self-knowledge have generally remained 
undifferentiated and have both been included under the term of 
reflection. However, a reliable criterion of distinction is available. Self-
reflection leads to insight due to the fact that what has previously been 
unconscious is made conscious in a manner rich in practical 
consequences...A successful reconstruction also raises an 
'unconsciously' functioning rule system to consciousness in a certain 
manner; it renders explicit the intuitive knowledge that is given with 
competence with respect to the rules in the form of 'know-how'." 
[Habennas:1974:22-23; emphasis added] 
Habermas moves from the paradigm of human consciousness and reflection to the 
rational reconstruction of an anonymous rule system, with which any subject 
whatsoever can comply insofar as they have acquired the corresponding competence 
with respect to these rules. He argues that a successful reconstruction raises an 
unconsciously functioning rule system to consciousness, and renders explicit the 
intuitive knowledge that is given with competence with respect to the rules so that self-
reflection on the explicit rules leads to insight. We may note here that what is between 
human subjects, in intersubjectivity, is an anonymous rule system. We may also recall 
that this is precisely the position Dreyfus is critiquing, namely, that know-how can be 
turned into anonymous rules. 
Habermas shifts the debate on the theory/practice opposition by making a linguistic 
turn. His fundamental distinction between communicative and strategic action types 
points to a different kind of rationality which avoids the instrumentalism of theory. The 
linguistically-generated intersubjective recognition of reviewable validity claims - i.e., 
of a reconstructed system of linguistic rules - guarantees, in his argument, the break 
with subject-centred reason oriented to success which grounds an instrumentalized 
practice. I will now proceed to question the claim that this framework, in particular 
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intersubjectivity, represents an advance vis-a-vis the subject/object relation, and assess 
what that would mean for the discourse on practice. 
5.3 FROM SUBJECT-CENTRED REASON TO 
INTERSUBJECTIVITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICAL 
DISCOURSE 
In my exposition of Habermas' theory of communicative action, in the preceding 
section, I have argued that he distinguishes between two concepts of reason, namely, 
subject-centred reason and intersubjective communicative rationality. In defence of this 
position, Habermas often mounts a charge against those who, like him, have attempted 
to go beyond the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness, but who, unlike him, in 
their critique of the metaphysics of consciousness, have not made the move to 
intersubjective linguistic communication (Heidegger, Derrida and Lyotard, in 
particular). They thus remain within an aesthetic model so that their political criteria are 
aesthetic. 
In contrast, Habermas' solution of communicative rationality, on the one hand, claims 
to have extended the normative power claimed by subject-centred reason - which 
conceived of the subject as having knowledge and truth - to intersubjectivity. The latter 
separates itself from marxism in that it represents a paradigm shift from the 'labour' 
model of human activity to language and interaction [4]. In this way, Habermas argues, 
it avoids interpersonal relations from being instrumentalized and technicised, and 
recaptures the emancipatory dimension of reason, denied by the marxist emphasis on 
purposive rational action [5]. On the other hand, it follows Hegel's reading of 
modernity, and his 'political solution' to the need for a totality against fragmentation, 
though it attempts to overcome aestheticism via intersubjectivity. His notions of 
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communicative action and intersubjectivity, therefore, pose the need for justification so 
that judgment is freed from aesthetic taste. The aesthetic becomes one of the three forms 
of differentiated rationality which is kept under the watchful eye of a more 
comprehensive form of reason. He has moved art from being the foundation for 
community and solidarity to one value sphere, subordinated to language as 
communicative rationality. 
Moreover, it is the shift to language that arguably allows Habermas to critique Derrida, 
in particular, for equating the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness with 
rationality. He understands Derrida's critique of logocentrism as equating reason with 
subject-centred reason, and argues that there is a different, step-by-step, testable critique 
on the western emphasis on logos, namely his own. More specifically, Habermas 
starts from an attack on the abstractions surrounding logos, traditionally conceived as 
free of language, as universalist, and as disembodied. Reason, for him, has remained 
confined ontologically, epistemologically or in terms of linguistic analysis, to only one 
of its dimensions, i.e., the cognitive. But the ontological framework of the philosophy 
of consciousness, which sanctions only theoretical, propositional, representational 
knowledge, proves to be too narrow. Logocentrism is a distortion - heightened by the 
philosophy of consciousness - of "a potential always already operative in the 
communicative practice of everyday life, but only selectively exploited" [1987a:311]. 
Intersubjective communication is inscribed in ordinary language and must be preserved. 
His move from the metaphysics of the subject to the communicative use of language is, 
therefore, meant to overcome "the fixation on the fact-mirroring function of language" 
[ibid:312], and to lead from logocentrism to communicative rationality and 
intersubjectivity. Hence the employment of Austin's speech act theory which, for 
Habermas, on the one hand, fulfils the demand for an internal connection of meaning 
and validity, and, on the other, expands this demand to the entire spectrum of linguistic 
meanings. This means that 
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"not only constative but also regulative and expressive speech acts can 
be connected with validity claims and accepted as valid or rejected as 
invalid..." 
[ibid:313] 
We can now draw the implications of Habermas' move for the discourse on practice. 
Habermas denies categorically that theory can give you substantive criteria for action. 
He moves away from the position of 'practice follows theory', that is, from the classical 
normative position. He states: 
"my...view levels down the old philosophical claims to normative 
theory, be it in politics or in ethics. For it means that you put the 
responsibility for decisions on the shoulders of those who anyhow will 
suffer their consequences, and that at the same time you stimulate the 
participants who have to make up their minds in practical discourse to 
look around for information and ideas that can shed light on their 
situation - which can clarify their understanding of themselves. The 
problem, by contrast, with classical normative theories is that they give 
people the illusion that they simply need to find the theory and then act 
on it...The normative part of the theory should be only procedural, 
while everything else that matters for practical purposes should be learnt 
from science, from social theory and not from moral philosophy. What 
I have in mind is a certain division of labour where the limited role of 
moral philosophy leaves a larger space for social theory." 
[Habermas:1986:207; emphasis added] 
As the quotation above makes clear, Habermas would not be content with a position 
which leaves practical subjects without criteria to judge only on the base of experience. 
Criteria, he argues, are procedural, not substantive. They give the practical subject the 
linguistic rational procedures for deciding what would constitute valid or invalid social, 
political, educational, etc. practices. He is, therefore, attempting to shift the debate to a 
practical subject with procedural criteria of judging for decision making. He moves 
away from the theoretical (cognitive) subject that is given substantive criteria for 
decision making, and opens up the space for a practical subject which, in dialogue with 
others, raises validity claims. And this enables Habermas to go into the 
political/practical subjects and communities with procedural criteria. 
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In what follows, I would like to make a few remarks on Habermas' use of speech act 
theory to show, in fact, that his move to communicative rationality reinstates subject-
centred reason. As Culler (1985) also points out, his use of speech act theory turns on a 
fundamental distinction between 'original' and 'parasitic', that is to say, an 
undemonstrated assumption that 
"the use of language with an orientation to reaching understanding is the 
original mode of language use, upon which indirect understanding, 
giving something to understand or letting something be uderstood, and 
the instrumental use of language in general, are parasitic. In my view, 
Austin's distinction between illocutions and perlocutions accomplishes 
just that." 
[Habermas:1984:288] 
As is well known, Austin has appropriated and developed Wittgenstein's pragmatic 
approach to language and 'language games'. As we have seen, the latter's was an 
attempt to move away from the philosophy of consciousness, i.e., the idea that private 
intention is the foundation of meaning, and the idea of a scientific method for the 
analysis of language. Austin moves from descriptions of language games to a more 
systematic idea of speech acts theory. He emphasises the performative character of 
speech acts and proposes to analyse the 'total speech act' in the 'total speech situation' 
[1975:148] as including the performance of three analytically distinguishable acts: the 
locutionary act - i.e., to say something (the speaker expresses states of affairs) 
[ibid:94]; the illocutionary act - i.e., to act in saying something (the speaker performs 
an action in saying something) [ibid:99]; and the perlocutionary act - i.e., to bring about 
something through acting in saying something (a speaker produces an effect upon the 
hearer) [ibid:109]. 
Austin analyses speech acts in contexts of interaction. The whole point of his approach 
is to work out the performative character of linguistic utterances in connection with 
institutionally bound speech acts, in which the obligations issuing from the performance 
of the speech act are unambiguously regulated by a shared conventional practice. Thus, 
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for Austin, illocutionary results stand in a conventionally regulated or internal 
connection with speech acts, whereas the posible perlocutionary effects of a speech act 
depend on fortuitous contexts and are not fixed by conventions. 
Subsequent interpretations of Austin moved away from Austin's 'conventionalism', and 
focused their analysis on the 'intentional' aspects of language, thus generating a crucial 
debate within speech act theory. Located within this context, Habermas' shift to 
language is marked by an attempt to overcome the critical problems of speech act 
theory. He accepts Wittgenstein's pragmatic approach to language, with the basic 
criticism that the latter's refusal to produce a universal theory leaves him only with the 
interactive mode of communication. By ignoring the cognitive mode of language, 
Habermas argues, Wittgenstein's approach cannot arrive at a general understanding of 
the social that would account for the production of meaning and the social distortion in 
communication. Habermas, therefore, wants to construct a general theory of speech 
acts, a 'formal pragmatics' [6], by reinterpreting Austin's speech acts theory. From the 
latter, he takes the notion of 'illocutionary force' (capturing the interactive moment) 
which enables him to study language (or speech) in its double structure, namely, as a 
propositional content and as an illocutionary force. Moreover, as M.Steuerman (1985) 
demonstrates, in attempting to go beyond the conventionalist/intentionalist debate, and 
motivated by the project of grounding reason as emancipation, he reinterprets the 
illocutionary force so that it is neither conventional nor intentional but rational. 
(p.1c1 4) 
The quotation cited earlier states precisely Habermas' point of intervention in the debate. 
He wants to show that the use of language with an orientation to reaching understanding 
is the original mode of language use, and that the instrumental use or any misuse of 
language is parasitic and secondary. To show the derivative character of the strategic 
use of speech, he turns Austin's analytical distinction of illocutionary/perlocutionary 
into two different types of action. He writes: 
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"...Austin confuses the picture by not treating these interactions, in 
connection with which he analyses the illocutionary binding effect of 
speech acts, as different in type from those interactions in which 
perlocutionary effects occur." 
[1984:294] 
For Habermas, the locution/illocution is the communicative mode of language and is 
sharply distinguished from perlocution associated with the strategic use of language. 
The move to (communicative) rationality is, then, completed when he argues that the 
illocutionary component of the speech act determines the aspect of validity under which 
the speaker wants his utterance to be understood. Thus he claims: 
"...we do not set illocutionary role over against propositional content as 
an irrational force, but conceive of it as the component that specifies 
which validity claim a speaker is raising with his utterance, how he is 
raising it, and for what." 
[1984:278] 
In the pure cases of speech acts - i.e., constative, expressive, regulative - the speaker 
adopts an objectivating, expressive or norm-conformative basic attitude, raising a 
validity to truth, truthfulness and rightness respectively. Moreover, to each of the 
fundamental attitudes, there corresponds a concept of 'world'. The three worlds of 
objective, subjective and social reality as frameworks of reference, become the 
pragmatic presuppositions of speech acts. The illocutionary aims of speech acts are 
achieved through intersubjective recognition of validity claims. 
I would like to argue that the distinction between communicative/strategic, basic to 
Habermas' claim to have shifted away from the instrumentalism of subject/object to 
intersubjectivity, requires an absolute and unambiguous distinction between 
illocution/perlocution which can only be anchored in an intentional subject. It is this 
requirement of an absolute separation which, in fact, forces Habermas to turn Austin's 
distinction into two diferent types of action. Moreover, it presupposes and relies upon a 
weak notion of performative, which subordinates force to form (or performative to 
constative). But, 
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(a) the illocution/perlocution distinction is not and cannot be a distinction between 
communicative/strategic. For many illocutionary acts seem primarily designed to 
produce certain effects rather than to bring about understanding. This, certainly, poses 
the question of whether speech act theory can be tailored to Habennas' reconstruction 
directed by the project of modernity (cf. Rasmussen, 1990). 
(b) Habermas [1984:293] claims that "the use of language with an orientation to 
consequences" is not an original use of language, but the subsumption of speech acts 
that serve illocutionary aims under conditions of action oriented to success. Suffice it 
here to mention Culler's [1985:137] remark that this is one of the weaker versions of 
classical attempts to separate pure from corrupt. 
(c) It is clear, however, that without this priority and this separation, Habermas would 
be left with two separate uses of language. It would, therefore, be a question of 
choosing values that are simply preferred rather than relying on values inevitably 
implied by linguistic communication [7]. To anticipate and apply to Habermas one 
major point of Derrida's critique of Austin (see chapter 6), it is the narrative of 
reconstruction, directed by the telos of emancipation, that forces such an ethical-
theoretical decision upon Habermas. 
(d) A series of exclusions result and bear witness to repressions that such a decision 
inevitably presuposes. Culler (op.cit), for example, has posed the question of why 
Habermas excludes the literary discourse (literature) from the communicative use of 
language. But at stake is not just literature in its usual sense: with the 'literary', Derrida, 
in particular, does not mean poetry and belles-lettres, but he attempts to advance a 
notion of judgment based on a rereading of Kant, whose law is the absence of given 
criteria. To this, as I mentioned earlier, Habermas reacts with the critique that Derrida 
collapses the genre distinction between philosophy and literature, with the implication 
that he is left with a notion of critical judgment as aesthetic preferences. 
196 
In his most recent study "The philosophical Discourse of Modernity" it is by such a 
distinction of genres, and through certain exclusions that Habermas is able to 
reconstruct the discourse on modernity. However, it is of no little significance that he 
admits that 
"[t]he philosophical discourse of modernity touches upon and overlaps 
with the aesthetic discourse in manifold ways. Nevertheless, I have had 
to limit the theme..." 
[1987a:xix] 
As Rajchman (1988) also remarks, this raises a number of questions, not least of all the 
question of criteria - if we are to accept his rational argumentation thesis - for such a 
separation between the 'philosophical' and the 'aesthetic' or 'literary' discourse on 
modernity. I cannot review the study here, although I will deal with the problematic of 
aesthetics in the final chapter, but I would like to emphasise that Habermas correctly 
identifies the problem; that is to say, that the necessity for a discourse on modernity 
originates as an aesthetic discourse, in that the relation of modernity to the ancients is 
conceived on an aesthetic model. But he reads modernity through Hegel and accepts 
Hegel's solution of a modernity without models (aesthetics), when he approvingly 
writes: 
"[t]he anxiety caused by the fact that a modernity without models had to 
stabilize itself on the basis of the very diremptions [or devisions...] it 
had wrought is seen by Hegel as 'the source of the need for 
philosophy." 
[op.cit:16] 
The difficult question is whether one can deal with modernity if one excludes the 
aesthetic discourse on modernity. One could pose the same problem by saying that the 
notion of totality (for example, systern/lifeworld), also inherited from modernity, 
represses the anxiety of 'a modernity without models'; but it cannot hide the fear of 
mythos and mimesis (see chapter 8). Habermas attempts to replace the aesthetic model 
that we have inherited from modernity with linguistic, intersubjective rationality. But 
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this is based on logos as speech, and is opposed to mythos, the narrative and the 
aesthetic. He has equated reason and rationality with a system of linguistic rules which 
gives the distinction between rational and irrational validity procedures. Therefore, it is 
always with reference to reconstructive rules that one can judge between valid/invalid. 
However, (i) logos is always in need of a myth for its actual grounding. That is to say, 
the idea of totality might itself be a sort of myth. For, as Rajchman [op.cit:184] 
remarks, it is possible to reverse the argument and say that the need for totality may be 
not the origin but the consequence of the philosophical 'discourse on modernity'. 
Therefore, we need to examine critically the discourse on totality and on modernity. 
This is, in fact, what Heidegger, Den-ida, Lyotard, Lacoue-Labarthe, Nancy, etc. -
against whom Habermas argues - are doing. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, in particular, 
find a way of looking at the subject-centred reason which confronts the question of 
aesthetics. I will have the opportunity to indicate later its implications for a different 
understanding of the notion of community and intersubjectivity. 
(ii) As with Austin and Searle (see chapter 6), Habermas resolves the question of the 
logos/mythos in favour of logos or serious discourse, to which he opposes 
'rhetoric' as play. In concluding, I will indicate the consequences, hoping that the final 
chapter will elaborate, in a better way, my position. One fundamental consequence 
concerns Habermas' notion of intersubjectivity, which has not, in fact, detached 
itself from the philosophy of consciousness. The 'I' is an ego-centric subject, based on 
the intentional attitude of a speaking subject. It is not surprising, then, that 
intersubjectivity is not about a relation to the other as the passage below nicely 
reveals. 
"One only gets hold of the relation-to-self that has traditionally been 
thematized -and distorted - as self-consciousness if one extends the 
semantic line of inquiry in a pragmatic direction. Thus it is the analysis 
of the meaning of the performative -and not of the referential - use of 
the expression 'I' within the system of personal pronouns that offers a 
promising approach to the problematic of self-consciousness." 
[Habermas:1984:397;emphasis added] 
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In chapter 6, it will become clear why a Searlian understanding of Austin cannot take 
Habermas out of the philosophy of consciousness. 
There is, secondly, the question of the nature of dialogue, which is the question of the 
nature of reason itself. Habermas argues for the 'force of the better argument', which is 
rational - i.e., grounded - argumentation. But this requires an absolute distinction 
between the form of 'rational' and the 'force' of 'illegitimate' argumentation and 
'rhetoric'; it requires a distinction between literary and metaphoric. The force of the 
better argument is the form of rationality itself. The one voice in argument is that of 
reason. In the dialogue, you are rationally appealing to the rule for your validity claim. 
You've got to listen to the voice of reason. This voice of reason cannot, in Habermas' 
terms, be a participatory voice in the dialogue, because it then runs the risk of being 
subjected to contradiction and being overriden. The dialogue must listen always to that 
voice to make the practical decision between valid/invalid. The rational voice has to 
carry the argument by its proper voice (form), but, in this case, there can be no actual 
conversation. In Habermas' terms, you cannot question reason [8]. 
Thirdly, I would like to argue that language, in Habermas, becomes an 'it'. It has been 
'reconstructed' in terms of formal pragmatics, and can be therefore calculated and 
reduced to an essence. Nothing resists the reconstructive move. But, as I will argue 
later on with Derrida's understanding of language, it is that which remains, that enables 
language not to be reduced. We have got to listen, not to one voice of universal (formal) 
reason, but to that remnant of language, and that, I would argue, gives the other, 
radical alterity. In Habermas, a distinction is presupposed between the essential and 
reconstructed rules of language and language going astray (the accidents of language). 
But, in order to make an absolute distinction between the essential, proper use and the 
accidental, one has to reduce language. If, however, language in order to communicate 
must miscommunicate, radical alterity has a possibility, as we will see with reference to 
Derrida. 
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I will conclude by suggesting that, instead of Habermas' solution of a practical subject 
with procedural criteria, thus always in control of language, we re-think, through a 
rereading of the tradition, the 'dia-' and the 'inter-' of dialogue and intersubjectivity 
respectively. We should also question the absolute ruling out of myths by Habermas' 
(and others') refusal to address the logos/mythos relation in the logocentric tradition, 
and by his retreat from the performative to the constative language. When language 
becomes an 'it', the linguistic subject, not posited as a subject in language, returns us 
back to the logocentric subject. As I will attempt to argue, though, 
"Only the space of [the] conversation can establish what is addressed, 
can gather it into a 'you' around the naming and speaking 'I'. But this 
'you', come about by dint of being named and addressed, brings its 
otherness into the present." 
[Celan:1986:50] 
It is worth repeating here that Habermas starts with a critique of metaphysics. As I 
mentioned earlier, he accepts Wittgenstein's pragmatic view of language and the latter's 
critique of representationalism and foundationalism, which contribute to the general 
delegitimation of the metaphysical assumptions of modern philosophy: metaphysics 
loses its authority to provide a rational base and grounding to all domains of action. The 
implication is a positivistic cultural orientation: science legitimizes itself and 
delegitimates all the other domains, a fact which results in the late-modern crisis of 
legitimation. But, for Habermas, the collapse of transcendentalism still leaves space for 
reconstructive sciences. His response to the crisis is to reinterpret the nature of the 
autonomous spheres from a communicative perspective. By widening Weber's notion 
of instrumental rationality, i.e., supplementing it with communicative rationality as 
formal argumentative practice, he claims to have taken rationalization beyond the 
positivist confines of Weber - i.e., beyond the latter's acceptance of the positivism of 
science and the de-cognitivization of the other value spheres. 
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Lyotard, in contrast, who argues against Habermas' notion of rationality and questions 
the notion of interlocution as a circulation of speech in the first person (singular or 
plural), pushes the issue further to such an extent that he arrives at a position of 
generalized positivism. For Lyotard, the issue of legitimation in the modern era -
previously provided by the traditional narratives - took the form of a narrative in a set of 
stories about the growth of knowledge and culture. The collapse of the metanarratives 
(of emancipation and speculation associated with metaphysics) marks the end of the 
modern era. The world of the post-modern can be represented as a proliferation of 
language-games; and it is the function of the scientific language game to demand and 
challenge legitimacy [Lyotard:1984:23-27], a demand which is posed as much with 
reference to other narratives as it is with science itself. This is the recognition of the 
pragmatic thesis of the heterogeneity of the various language games, and of the 
impossibility of applying common criteria for judging their validity (incommensurability 
thesis). This is, also, the advocacy of a notion of perpetual conceptual revolution, a 
continuous renewal and invention of new rules generating new vocabularies, but which 
make no claim to capture the essence of that which they describe. Thus, for Lyotard, the 
decomposition of the great narratives creates the mimetic space where what remains 
and proliferates is the free play of the practices of language, and the obligation to 
respond and to prescribe. Where this generalized notion of mimesis leaves the discourse 
on practice, and more specifically the questions which were raised in points (i) and (ii) 
above, will be explored in chapter 7. 
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PART TWO 
THE SUPPLEMENTARY STRUCTURE OF EXEMPLARITY 
"One shouldn't complicate things for the pleasure of complicating, but 
one should also never simplify or pretend to be sure of such simplicity 
where there is none...Those who wish to simplify at all costs and who 
raise a hue and cry about obscurity because they do not recognize the 
unclarity of their good old Aufklarung are in my eyes dangerous 
dogmatists and tedious obscurantists. No less dangerous...are those 
who wish to purify at all costs." 
[Derrida, 1988:119] 
"Not: 'don't think in terms of objects,' but 'don't do it yer, there's quite 
a lot to meditate upon before we turn our attention away from 
language.' Afterwards, many things are possible." 
[Staten:1985:xvi] 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 
Part II attempts to sketch the 'theoretical' (analytical) move that is necessary in order 
to displace the cognitive/non-cognitive opposition underlying the project on professional 
activity, and, more generally, the discourse on practice. This move, it is argued, is 
inseparable from questions and 'developments' regarding the following fundamental 
issues: (1) the logocentric paradigm which currently provides the model for our 
understanding of language; (2) the issue of critical judgment caught in the opposition 
between calculable/non-calculable decisions; and (3) the problematic of the 'subject' 
which is caught in the opposition between an active preconstituted, and a passive 
subject that is determined by a system. It seems that - and the task becomes one of 
demonstrating it now - although all these issues are at stake, it is fundamentally the 
rethinking and challenging of the logocentric model of language which will allow for a 
pathway between (or perhaps beyond) Habermas's communicative action, and 
Dreyfus' solution. 
I take this as a working hypothesis for the following reasons. It can be argued that if the 
latter's move serves to make the link between the professional and the analytical 
question of the theory/practice opposition, the former enables the thesis to address the 
opposition in its linguistic turn. Furthermore, these two positions were presented and 
discussed in Part I of the thesis as two important attempts to overcome the model of 
philosophy of consciousness. But, if my critique is correct, namely, that Habermas' 
intersubjectivity reinstates the assurance of an ego-logical subject, and Dreyfus' 
exemplar regresses and requires the psychological mechanism of intuition, then it may 
be possible to support the claim of this thesis that the way forward is a re-examination 
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of the presuppositions of the linguistic turn in which the theory/practice opposition is 
implicated. But I would like to acknowledge here that, for reasons that will become 
obvious later on (chapter 8), the thought that it is necessary to trace the pathway 
between Habermas' cognitivism and Dreyfus' practical paradigm, owes more to the 
latter. For it enables the thesis to address the question of the limit and of decision in 
research. 
There is no clear criterion for judging the success of the operation. The response -
i.e., what comes in part II - has been imposed on this writing by the thought of the 
limit. The latter is, itself, a consequence of tracing the thread of the theory/practice 
opposition, and the distribution of its terms: from the cognitive view of theory as 
prescribing the principle, and specifying the course of action (theoretical practitioner), to 
the practical paradigm and exemplarity which reverses the relation, such that practice 
grounds itself ('practical' practitioner), to the limit: the exemplar. To deconstruct its 
metaphysical determinants, three main detours - corresponding to the three chapters 
below - have been followed. The first, dealing with the problematic of language, 
captures the move from form to force and from typology to pragrammatology. 
The second, exploring the issue of judgment, begins to rethink the distinction between 
universal/particular and comes up against an essential mimetology. The thought 
of the experience of the undecidable, in the final chapter, inevitably 'returns' a certain 
notion of the 'subject' which is inseparable from decision and responsibility. It is 
inscribed in the movement from the analytical category of the exemplar (exemplarity) 
to supplementarity, and from the example which renders the rule intuitable to the 
performative, which is intrinsic to the structure of the example. 
204 
CHAPTER 6 : REFLECTION REPETITION AND ITERABILITY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Part I of the thesis has been a preliminary exploration and characterization of practical 
activity with special reference to professional conduct. The focus of the critical 
reviewing of the theoretical and empirical literature was furnished by some basic 
common presuppositions of the material itself: the cognitivist paradigm of 
research, and recent attempts to move away from such theorizing by shifting to the 
'practical' paradigm. To recap, the common presuppositions characterizing the 
cognitivist paradigm were shown to turn on the subject/ object dichotomy, where the 
object covers the given and/or the situation; a view of the subject as acting as a 
consequence of, or determined by, code/rules (inside or outside the mind) and meanings 
either implicit or explicit; further, and as a consequence, a theoretical decision about 
the grounding of action and unification of subjectivity (e.g. experience), in particular, 
reflection on rules. The recent attempts to question cognitivism are inscribed in a 
vocabulary of 'practice', which the thesis has identified as the vocabulary of the 
professional, 'practical' practitioner. It implicates such concepts as reflection, 
repetition, judgment, skill, example, as well as a series of oppositional terms such as 
saying/doing, competence/performance, explicit/implicit knowledge, etc. 
Through an attempt to displace - and not eradicate - the cognitivist paradigm, the first 
part of the thesis, to a certain extent, relied upon Dreyfus and his appropriation of 
Heidegger to provide the thesis with a critical standpoint. Tracking down the 
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oppositions at work in the shift from cognitivism to the practical, I was hoping to be 
able to demonstrate that there is a better way of thinking about practical activity than that 
suggested by cognitivism or by projects such as, for example, Schon's, which, 
although have shifted to the practical, have not questioned the basic presuppositions of 
cognitivism; that is to say, they have not addressed the analytical question of the 
theory/practice opposition. 
The initial assessment of Dreyfus' project had left me with a strong impression that his 
notion of exemplarity advances considerably the debate on professional activity, and his 
move to the practical has important implications for the discourse on practice. That is to 
say, I had assessed that Dreyfus' framework would, perhaps, allow one to distinguish 
between different types of situations and thus be able to analyse the relationship 
between recognition of a situation and action, e.g., when it is indirect - i.e., when the 
recognition of what needs to be done is linked to a reflective decision of how to do it -
and when it is direct - i.e., when and where what is to be done is done without 
reflection. The latter has been exemplified by the situation of expertise - i.e., a 
mode of action which is said to be rational though non-cognitive, that is to say, non-
representational, non-formalizable, knowledge based on a background of practices, and 
focused by exemplars. Moreover, three concrete gains were promised as a result of this 
move: (a) it would, supposedly, be able to bypass the location of cognitive 
representations in the mental, when the mental or consciousness is the theoretical theatre 
of action between the public world and the physical brain; (b) the public domain, where 
cognitive representations and background practices are socially shared activities in their 
acquisition, transmission and transformation, would become the area of inquiry for the 
location and specification of the understanding embodied in the practices as the bond 
between subject/object. Concerning immediate results, (c) it would indicate a kind of 
research activity which would be able to work out types of activity, and assist in the 
specification of the strategies for improvement of action, i.e., for the conversion of one 
type of recognition of an action-situation into another of the 'same' situation by 
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differentiating and balancing between formal rules, 'conspicious presentations', and 
expert authority according to the level of skill of the practitioner. 
This initial assessment was based on an appreciation of the framework from which 
Dreyfus was working. That is to say, (a) the Heideggerian attempt to overcome the 
subject/object ontology and the instrumentalism implied in this dichotomy; (b) an 
explicit critique of theory, of cognitivism and of its model of action, namely that of rule 
following; and (c) a 'strong' notion of 'lifeworld', indicated by terms such as 'Being-
in-the-world', Dasein ('being-there'), being-with, 'background practices', that is to 
say, indications of Heidegger's attempt to get out of the model of consciousness and the 
model of reflection. The 'ready-to-hand' mode, which is given priority over and against 
theoretical activity (the 'present-at-hand') in "Being and Time", seemed to be a fertile 
field for thinking about practical activity, the relation between theory-practice, 
discourse, communication and community, and human capacities and skill acquisition. 
As I argued in chapter 4, Dreyfus' neglect of the linguistic turn presents his 'practical' 
practitioner with such problems that, in the end, the psychological mechanism of 
intuition has to be employed in order to save the human subject from losing itself into 
the anonymity of either the 'they' or the 'task'; this, certainly, at the expense of a 
regression to the model of subjectivity and consciousness. To be able to locate this 
weakness, chapter 5 turns to Habermas who claims that intersubjectivity breaks with the 
subject/object ontology. But, as we have seen, if the linguistic turn, on which the notion 
of communicative action relies, is a major advance of the discourse on practice, the 
theory/practice relation works itself into another dichotomy, namely 
communicative/strategic action, and the practical subject, with linguistic rational 
procedures for judging, is always in control of language. These problems, certainly, 
raise the question of whether a shift to linguistic communication is in itself capable of 
breaking with metaphysics and logocentrism; and more specifically, of the metaphysical 
determinants of distinctions such as original/parasitic modes of language. 
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The inquiry into Habermas' theory made it clear that at stake is the thinking of the 
metaphysical presuppositions and determinations that enter (in) and inform, i.e., 
become operational in early Heidegger and/or Dreyfus' account regarding the reading 
[1] of the move to the practical - determinations which replace the schematism [2] of 
the cognitivist paradigm. This, above all, concerns the schema which the present thesis 
is concerned with, that is to say, the schema constructed out of the structure of the 
hierarchical oppositions between cognitive understanding/action, knowledge/skill, 
rule/context, implicit/explicit knowledge, example/context, rule/judgment, verbal/non-
verbal knowledge, competence/performance, as well as, a series of traditionally, i.e., 
metaphysically, employed terms such as language, and modes of language, meaning, 
intention, intuition, mimesis, time, representation. 
To state the issue this way is certainly to bypass (a) the question of Dreyfus' 
understanding of Heidegger, including the question of why Dreyfus ignores the post 
"Being and Time" developments, and (b) the demand which surfaces here that the 
question at least be stated as to whether Heidegger's work itself, at the time of "Being 
and Time", was developed sufficiently enough to give a perspective for such a project, 
and, in particular, whether it provides a non-subjectivist starting point. Suffice it here 
to make two remarks: (i) to take the existential analytic of Dasein as the starting and 
ending point of a non-subjectivist position, is to disregard the whole subsequent work 
developed in Heidegger's mid- and late writings. It becomes obvious in the writings 
after "Being and Time" that Dasein, thought of neither as the human being nor as the 
subject/consciousness of the self (whether conscious or unconscious) - i.e. 
determinations that are derived from and occur after the Dasein- but as the thought of 
ontological difference, opens the road leading to the question of Being [cf. 
Derrida:1988b:179]. Viewing "Being and Time" in the light of the two subsequent 
Heideggerian moments (Schiirmann:1987), - i.e., from the ontological difference 
arrived at from Dasein's transcendence, to the transcendentalism of the historical 
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and epochal unfolding of being as the ontological difference, to the topology 
which articulates the temporal difference [3] - radically displaces the subjectivism 
on which the former work still rests. However, (ii) it is important to mention that the 
'subjectivism' of "Being and Time" is not uncontroversial. As Sheehan [1985:201-218] 
argues, the hermeneutical 'as' in "Being and Time" already effectively displaces both 
the subject, and the entity as 'already-out-there-now-real'. With reference to the former, 
since 'things' are already interpreted through the network of the 'in terms of, the 
subject already lives in a movement of the as-factor. In a second sense, the subject lives 
already in the side of entities by living with their boundness as schemata of possibility 
and purpose. Regarding the latter, there is no referral of entities to presence but always 
a referral of entities as traces-of-no-presence, which is an on-going movement with no 
telos. In reducing the entity to the trace, interpretation refers to the differentiating 
process itself, to the ever-splitting-and-mediating movement that is logos: the referring 
that refers to no-presence. This post-metaphysical topic, Sheehan argues, unites beyond 
all difference, Heidegger and Derrida. I believe that to emphasise this point is of 
considerable importance, for it seems that it is the development by Derrida of this line of 
thought, already present in "Being and Time" - although it might have required what 
Schiirmann calls a backward reading of Heidegger - that takes Derrida 'beyond' 
Heidegger and enables him to deconstruct the logocentric paradigm of language and 
communication. The Heideggerian claim that the essence of technique is not 
technological, and his endeavours to think of the technique as such and as an 
essence is, for Derrida [1987a:172-173], a certain privileging of the essence, and 
marks the attempt to shelter the thought and language of essence from contamination. 
This, as it will become clear later on in this chapter, is not without consequence for 
language itself, and for the issues posed in the introduction to part II. 
To go back to the main discussion, i.e., the task of tracing the schema at work 
regarding the fundamental hierarchical opposition between the cognitive and the non-
cognitive, and the privileging of the latter - and no more than a preliminary to this - the 
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following fundamental questions will have to be explored: first comes the question of 
Heidegger's overcoming of the model of reflection and, in particular, the assessment of 
the view that his philosophy has distanced itself from the Metaphysics of presence. 
The critique that, in fact, it has not, precisely in matters where language is concerned, 
comes from Derrida's readings of Heidegger. Although it is impossible here to do 
justice to this debate - which, for some thinkers, for instance J. Caputo [1987:154-
155], would necessitate a reading of Heidegger through Derrida, supplemented by a 
reading of Derrida through Heidegger- it is sufficient to show schematically this 
problematic by tracing briefly the long history of the paradigm of reflection. Secondly, 
and related to this, is the question of the concept of repetition implicit in Heidegger's 
account, which needs to be clarified and distinguished from an assumption of the 
cognitivist paradigm, relying on, mainly, Husserl. This, in turn, will provide the 
necessary background knowledge for the understanding of Derrida's advance regarding 
the possibility of language and experience in general, which can be summed up in his 
notion of iterability. 
These two fundamental and basically analytical issues might be able to provide us with, 
to state it provisionally, the following thesis: if a model of exemplarity - i.e., 
exemplarity as the axis supporting the schematism in the early Heidegger-Dreyfus 
account - is that which furnishes the critique of essentialism and subjectivism - and, 
consequently, objectivism as the other pole in the dichotomy - of the cognitivist 
paradigm of research, a Derridian critique of exemplarity, cast in terms of the 'structure' 
of iterability, would provide the thesis with the means to overcome the difficulties 
identified in chapter 4. The most immediate gain, then, would be the beginning of a 
clarification of a third issue which must be raised at this stage; i.e., the distinction 
between explicit or thematized and tacit background practices, which is the kernel of 
Dreyfus' - fashioned after early Heidegger - model of exemplarity (see section 6.3.3 & 
chapter 8). 
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The two basic methodological issues, i.e., reflection and repetition, both understood as 
functions of Derrida's debate with phenomenology in general, are firmly linked with the 
question of meaning defined as a semantic category. The impossibility of identical self-
reflection, of repetition with identical meaning, and of totalizing the meaning of a text 
(the latter understood in its most broad sense) "already impies a thesis about the 
inescapability of the world of signs" while presupposing a conception of the subject as 
itself an 'effect' of meaning [Frank:1989:386]. Thus, put in a nutshell, Derrida's work 
demonstrates, in a systematic way, the impossibility of a sign to reiterate itself without a 
change in meaning, an impossibility which also ruptures the subject, and which 
deprives it of its 'presence-to-itself. To indicate the move, in classical transcendental 
philosophy the 'givenness of consciousness' is held to be fundamental; analytic 
philosophy takes it to be secondary over and against the more fundamental 'givenness' 
of meaning, whereas meaning is defined, in turn, as a linguistic category that, in 
addition, connects the mechanism of language to the compliance with intersubjectively 
inviolable rules and conventions. For the post-structuralist critique of meaning, the 
classical philosophy of consciousness is, also, reformulated and grounded in terms of a 
theory of signs. Further, post-structuralism submits to a systematic questioning the 
thesis of analytic philosophy. This thesis states that one can say something in a 
language, and language attributes meaning to its signs, words, and sentences, which 
stay typically identical in different applicational situations, i.e., pragmatic contexts; the 
latter are, themselves, defined as conventional types (for example, speech acts). For 
Denida, in particular, the 'order' implied in this thesis of analytic philosophy can no 
longer be guaranteed - it becomes undecidable and uncontrollable. Located within this 
context, a presentation of the critical confronation of Derrida with speech act theory -
the latter signalling the pragmatic turn of language philosophy- becomes a necessity for 
the purposes of this thesis. For Derrida attempts to establish that meaning is 
nonidentical to itself; and if a "nonidentical meaning could...never be conceived as the 
result of compliance with a rule", the "distance that separates the identity of the sign 
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from itself also undermines the rule that underlies its creation and deprives it of its 
pertinence" [ibid:387]. 
My claim here is that the elaboration of the 'structure' of iterability, which is, at the 
same time, the clarification of the Heidegger/Dreyfus position regarding the two 
fundamental questions in the problematic of the thesis at this stage - reflection and 
repetition - would open a space for or level of research into practical activity and 
professional conduct which, pace Derrida, could be called pragrammatological. The 
term can be used to point to what is missing in Dreyfus' model of action, to the extent 
that this model does not make the move to pragmatics and language. 
Pragrammatology has been defined by Derrida [1988:159:n16] as the space of an 
indispensable analysis which articulates the discourse of pragmatics - i.e., the 
deconstruction of speech act theory and, consequently, the deconstruction of the notion 
of communication - and the discourse of grammatology. The latter, as the critique of the 
sign (presence-structure), pushes Derrida into transforming the subordination of 
writing to speech. 
It has already been indicated that the notion of iterability will be the central notion of 
the present chapter, the elaboration of which will provide the thesis with the means for 
showing, subsequently, the limitations of the model of exemplarity which organizes 
Dreyfus' framework of action. Section 6.2 gives a brief account of the history of the 
concepts of reflection and repetition, and locates the Derridian notion of iterability 
within this context. Section 6.3 reviews the main points of the debate between Derrida 
and the 'speech-act' theorists, which sums up Derrida's stance vis-a-vis the logocentric 
tradition. The section continues with a note on the notion of context, and concludes by 
returning to the problem of the unchallenged dichotomy between the implicit and the 
explicit in Dreyfus, the analysis of which is facilitated by the discussion which precedes 
it. The final Section (6.4) systematizes Derrida's arguments on the notion of iterability, 
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presents his alternative model of language and communication, and attempts a 
preliminary assessment of its implications for theory and research. 
6.2.1 THE PARADIGM OF REFLECTION 
The subject/object ontology is inseparable from the model of reflection, and the 
understanding of the history of the concept is essential to the displacement of the 
cognitive paradigm. With the move to the practical, the notion of reflection becomes an 
element in the practical vocabulary so that its dominance in educational research in 
general, and in research into professional activity in particular, and moreover, its 
influence upon the way educationists think, remain basically unchallenged. This is the 
case, for example, with Schon's 'reflective practitioner', and J. Elliott's position of 
self-evaluation which I discussed in chapter 2. I emphasised there that their claim that 
self-evaluation through reflection is a logically necessary condition for professional 
development, calls for analytical work concerning the concept of reflection and all the 
other terms associated with it. On the other hand, as we have seen, Habermas' move 
from the paradigm of human consciousness and reflection to communicative rationality, 
relies upon rational reconstruction of an anonymous rule system. This means that, for 
Habermas, self-reflection upon those rules leads to insight regarding the intuitive 
knowledge that is given with competence. But it is exactly the view that know-how can 
be turned into anonymous rules that Dreyfus attempts to challenge by arguing that this 
view presupposes the modern form of the philosophy of reflection, namely the 
Cartesian model. 
This model includes a conception of the world as consisting of minds and matter, a 
picture of truth as correct representation, and a belief that intelligibility is to be rooted in 
rationality [Guignon:1983:13-14]. The modern man is formed as a 'subject of 
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experience', a mind or consciousness. A clear distinction is drawn between what is 
given in the mind, in mental acts, and what exists in the external world and is 
represented by such mental acts. The subject becomes the centre around which all other 
entities revolve as 'objects' of experience [ibid:17]. Moreover, the ground of 
understanding is the self-certainty of the knowing subject. Its condition is pure 
contemplation, i.e., the disengagement from our active involvement in the world in 
order to achieve the vantage point of the unprejudiced spectator [ibid:24]. Thus, starting 
from a list of types of beliefs held in everyday life, and based on evidence of the senses, 
the Cartesian inquiry assesses the grounds of those beliefs, and rationally rebuilds them 
in terms of a knowing subject equipped with certain types of data. The entire Cartesian 
inquiry, therefore, is based on methods of rationally evaluating beliefs [ ibid:24-27]. 
According to Gasche [1986:17] [4] the one single characteristic of all forms in this 
paradigm of reflection is an ambiguity regarding the nature of its founding reflexive act, 
i.e., whether this act is sensible or intelligible. In Locke, for example, this source of 
cognition, by which the mind becomes aware of its own doings, is a sensible, empirical 
operation of internal perception. As an empirical reflection, therefore, directed upon 
thought as an internal reality, it belongs by right to psychology. In contrast, in Leibniz, 
reflection is a logical reflection - i.e., an intellectual actualization of innate ideas 
[ibid: 18] . 
Kant, on the other hand, is critical of both logical and empirical reflection. His 
transcendental reflection is considered to be a total innovation within the Cartesian 
paradigm of reflection. As transcendenal reflection, reflection examines and 
distinguishes the faculties of cognition with which conceptions of objects originate, and 
which determine whether a given conception belongs to pure understanding or sensuous 
intuition; i.e., an inquiry into the ground of possibility of sensible intuition in general, 
and of objective comparison of representations [ibid]. Thus, unlike empirical and logical 
reflection, "transcendental reflection anticipates the deeply concealed transcendental 
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unity... of these two types of reflection" [ibid:18; italics in the text]. What is decisive 
for the history of the concept is that Kant achieved a first, however hypothetical, 
unification of the different moments that constitute the minimal definition of reflection as 
self-reflection [ibid:19]. This is achieved in the concept of the object-as-unity, which 
serves as the rule representing the identity of the function by which consciousness binds 
together the flow of representations across time. A rule is a form of moments in a 
temporal sequence. This move by Kant into the problematic of time, signals the 
beginning of that which Heidegger identified as the key to overcoming the paradigm of 
reflection - i.e., the deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence. For Kant's solution 
leaves us with a notion of subject as an empty form that accompanies the 
representations. Transcendental imagination - i.e., the function of unity and synthesis -
constructs the object which is grasped within the limits of a priori intuition. The 
cognition that results is a cognition within the limits of possible a priori experience, but 
such cognition is incapable of restoring anything like a subject. This weakness of the 
subject is accompanied by, as Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy [1988:31;30-37] put it, a 
compensatory 'promotion' of the moral subject; a move repeated in practical discourse, 
particularly in those positions which attempt to ground themselves on an essentialist 
moral subject. 
To reiterate and distinguish: empirical reflection as the turning in upon what takes place 
within us, is the source of all psychological knowledge; logical reflection as the turning 
backward of thought, away from its relation to objects (including itself as an empirical 
reality) to the examination of the relations among objects, and the relations among the 
concepts of these objects, secures conceptual knowledge; finally, the Kantian 
transcendental reflection sets as its task the determining and securing of the conditions 
of possibility of valid cognition. 
In Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, reflection has a "universal methodological 
function"; it is "consciousness' own method for the knowledge of consciousness 
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generally" [Gasche:op.cit:20]. The fundamental methodological importance of reflection 
for phenomenology is based on its investigation of the reflexive acts of consciousness -
of all the modes of immanent apprehension of the essence and of all modes of immanent 
experience. Yet, whereas Kant's transcendental reflection is concerned with the validity 
of reflections or thoughts, Husserl's transcendental reflection is an analysis of the 
production and constitution of the 'meant objects of thought' or 'noemata' [ibid:20; 
Dreyfus and Haugeland:1978:228-29]. 
More specifically, the starting point of Husserl's phenomenology is 'eidetic reduction' 
whereby one determines the eidos of a kind of thing through "free imaginative 
variation". That is to say, one imagines varying a thing in various ways and checking 
intuitively whether it would still count as the kind of thing in question [Dreyfus & 
Haugeland:ibid]. Basic to eidetic reduction is that the common characteristic of all 
mental experiences is directedness toward or reference to a meant object, i.e. 
intentionality. By bracketing intentionality in the natural attitude, Husserl's 
transcendental reduction consists in the interpreter's re-seeing how intentional acts 
constitute modes of presence. The phenomenological reflection thus entails looking 
away from the thematically intended object - i.e., 'looking back' to pure consciousness 
- in order to see the modes in which consciousness is aware of objects (mode of 
presence) [Sheehan:1983:290-297; Staten:1985:36-38]. 
With Hegel, the philosophy of reflexivity reaches its climax. At the same time, Hegel's 
is the first critique of the paradigm of reflection [5]. His absolute reflexion represents 
the most complete type of reflection: "the concept of reflection itself - reflecting the 
totality of its formal movements" [Gasche:op.cit:20]. What is important in Hegel's very 
complex notion of absolute reflexion is that it fulfils the universal requirement for unity 
which was only hypothesised by Kant. Reflection as self-reflexion, in Hegel, coincides 
with the motif of subjectivity in modern metaphysics. Subjectivity is the source of 
unification of the reflexive process's separate elements [ibid:20]. Put laconically: 
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reflection in its minimal definition is the process and the structure of the mirroring of an 
object by a polished surface and, at the same time, a mirroring of the mirror itself. 
Hegel adds a third element to the two moments that this minimal definition outlines, 
thus triggering the unifying dialectic between the mirror and its object, as well as 
between the mirror and itself [ibid:20-21]. For Hegel, this unity, this conceptual totality 
leaves absolutely no remainder outside. But, as Derrida remarks - accepting 
Heidegger's claim that the Western metaphysical tradition culminates in Hegel's 
speculative philosophy - 
"...Hegel's text is necessarily fissured...it is something more and other 
than the circular closure of its representation...it necessarily produces a 
powerful writing operation,...whose strange relationship to the 
philosophical content of Hegel's text must be reexamined, that is, the 
movement by means of which his text exceeds its meaning, permits 
itself to be turned away from, to return to, and to repeat iself outside its 
self-identity." 
[Derrida:1981:77-78] 
In seeking to move beyond the philosophy of reflection to a speculative idealism that 
rests upon the structural foundation of self-reflexivity, Hegel's text inscribes itself 
between the extremes of philosophy that emphasise difference at the expense of identity, 
and a philosophy that reinstates identity by the hypostatization of difference as absolute 
[Cornell:1987:1000-1001]. This makes Hegel's text, at once, the locus of Hegel's own 
move beyond Kant, by thinking what the philosophy of reflection leaves unthought, 
and Derrida's move beyond Hegel, by thinking of what the philosophy of reflexion 
leaves unthought [Taylor:1988:54-65]. 
This background information of the history of the paradigm of reflection, and its 
culmination in Hegel's self-reflexivity, is important for understanding the critique of 
reflexivity which is undertaken with Husserl, Heidegger and Derrida. In what follows, 
I will make a brief reference to the basic terms with which the critique has been 
conducted. Gasche makes this story short by tracing the conceptual filiation of Derrida's 
deconstruction to the concept of Abbau (dismantling) in the later work of Husserl, 
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and Destruktion (destruction) in the early philosophy of Heidegger. The notion of 
'Abbau' is discussed by Husserl in the context of his exploration of the conditions of 
the validity of judgement [6]. The latter would require a "necessary retrogression to the 
most original self-evidence of experience", that is to say, a stratum of experience that is 
never thematized by either logic or psychology [Gasche:op.cit:109-110]. Thus, while 
still a form of phenomenological reduction, 'Abbau' seems to stand for a nonreflexive 
way of reaching the roots of the pre-given world, its idealization, and the sense-
constituting structures of transcendental subjectivity [ibid:111]. On th other hand, 
'Abbau' is not an unmediated approach, since the predicative evidence with which it 
attempts to make contact cannot be held in an intuiting act; being a nonreflexive but not 
unmediated operation, 'Abbau' repudiates both transcendental and psychological 
reflection. It is a nonreflective turning back. [ibid:111]. 
Retrogression as 'destruktion' - no longer toward the sense-constituting structures of a 
transcendental ego or the prepredicatory experience of evidence in the original life-world 
- becomes, for Heidegger, a means of regaining the original metaphysical experience of 
Being [ibid:112]. The Heideggerian phenomenological method is distinguished by three 
related moments: Reduction or retrogression from what is, to Being; construction of 
Being, and destruction or the dismantling of tradition - i.e., the history of ontology as 
the metaphysics of presence [ibid:113]. In Heidegger's fundamental ontology, there is a 
necessary correlation between destruction and reductive construction. Destruction is the 
necessary reverse of the construction of the question of Being in philosophy. This, 
however, needs to be distinguished from Husserl's correlation between reduction and 
transcendental reflection. While the latter provides a foundationalist level which no 
longer needs to be dissolved - i.e., the Husserlian essences and forms - the former 
constructs a radically original ground. That is to say, a fundamental shift from a 
subjective transcendental perspective toward the question of Being as the transcendental 
question par excellence [ibid:114]. And this is a decisive turning away from the 
question of reflexivity. 
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The later work of Heidegger supports the nonreflexive conception of destruction. As 
Gasche [ibid:115] emphasises, at this point the guiding preoccupation of Heidegger's 
thought becomes the discovery of those methodological devices which would allow for 
the dismantling of the ontological tradition without recourse to reflection, since the 
latter, as part of that tradition, would only set limits and a goal to the movement of 
destruction. In contrast, the universal, or ground that Heidegger is after does not 
assume a definite end point of the turning back - i.e., it is not given in the mode of the 
present [ibid:115]. What is constructed in the step back from metaphysics is "that 
locality ( the oblivion of Being), from out of which metaphysics obtained and retains its 
origin" [Heidegger, quoted in ibid:116] [7]. That is to say, the step back lets that 
locality - i.e., the ontico-ontological difference, or the question of Being - appear. In 
this movement back, thought meets its opposite face to face "instead of objectifying it 
through subject presentation" [8]. Thus the movement of retrogression beyond the 
traditional ontology is, at the same time, the construction and the letting be of the 
hidden ground of that tradition. This is not a reflective return to something that, as the 
origin of that tradition, would be of the same order - i.e., an essence, a past-present or a 
pre-given; in fact, as one reaches out reflectively, it withdraws [Gaschedbid:118]. 
Taking into account that the question of the relation between Heidegger and Derrida is 
one of the most complex issues in current debates [9], Gasche cautiously points to 
similarities and differences between the concepts of dismantling and destruction on the 
one hand, and the Derridian deconstruction on the other. As he emphasises, all three 
concepts are, in essence, positive movements, and all three attempt to construct, in a 
systematic way, grounds of greater generality for what is to be accounted for [ibid:118]. 
The three concepts share in the fact that they are nonreflective methodological 
devices: the operation of dismantling because it searches for an original life-
world and thus for a world, and for structures of which there is no experience within 
that tradition; the Heideggerian destruction because it retrogresses to something 
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which is not present in any way whatsoever, but which constructs itself in the 
very process of stepping back. Deconstruction is, in an even more radical manner, 
nonreflective. That is to say, it takes reflexivity to be always incomplete and thus 
never perfectly reflexive. In fact, deconstruction displaces self-reflexion by interrupting 
the circuit of exchange between self and other. The presence that is achieved in auto-
reflection is a supplement for a lack of self-presence (see chapter 8). This is an 
implication of Derrida's critique of both Husserl and Heidegger. Basically, it turns on 
Derrida's questioning of the phenomenological inquiry and, particularly, its 
Heideggerian interpretation as the method of inquiring into the meaning of Being. His 
fundamental objections to Heidegger's destruction of the traditional ontology - including 
Heidegger's replacing of a prereflexive understanding for reflexivity - is that it "still 
remains within the grammar and lexicon of metaphysics". That is to say, Derrida 
argues, the conceptual resources that Heidegger uses for the destruction of metaphysics' 
naive concept of time in "Being and Time" themselves belong to metaphysical 
conceptuality. Phenomenology, in general, is by definition a systematic transition 
towards essences [Gasche:ibid:120]. Deconstruction, therefore, is the attempt to, 
precisely, avoid that. And as Derrida himself puts it in "Of Grammatology", 
"[t]he 'rationality' - but perhaps that word should be abandoned...-
which governs a writing thus enlarged and radicalized, no longer issues 
from a logos. Further, it inaugurates the destruction, not the demolition 
but the de-sedimentation, the de-construction, of all the significations 
that have their source in that of the logos. Particularly the signification 
of truth." 
[1976:10] 
The Derridian deconstruction, whose very target is the paradigm of reflection, and the 
displacement of the philosophy of consciousness, is not without its critics. Frank 
(1989), for example, from the perspective of analytic philosophy, argues that, while 
Den-ida rejects this model (as a rejection of the present-to-itself), he knows of no other, 
thus remaining negatively connected to it. The criticism focuses, precisely, on the 
question of the subject, but I leave this criticism aside, since I will return to 
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deconstruction and the subject in the final chapter. For the moment, I would like to 
make a brief reference to a highly representative study of analytic philosophy, namely 
E. Tugendhat's (1986), which, according to Gasche [op.cit:76-77] does not altogether 
sacrifice the philosophically fundamental aspects of reflection. 
The target of Tugendhat's critical appraisal are three models that inform traditional 
theories of reflection: (a) the ontological model of a substance and its modifications, a 
model deeply rooted in the subject-predicate structure (assertion) of ordinary language; 
(b) the subject-object relation which characterizes consciousness as a representational 
structure, with the result that self-reflection is understood as a relation in which the 
subject turns upon itself as upon an object; and (c) the assumption that all immediate 
knowledge is rooted in perception, and that self-reflection must therefore be understood 
as inner self-perception. For Tugendhat, the interplay of these three models - required 
by the idea of self-consciousness, self-reflection, and absolute reflection as an identity 
of the knower and what is known, of the subject and itself as object - is a priori 
impossible. In addition, if the three models cannot produce self-consciousness, and if 
identity cannot be taken as knowledge, it is because, for Tugendhat and the analytic 
tradition, knowledge and truth can only be propositional, and as such they are 
incommensurable with any form of self-identification. Nevertheless, instead of 
relinquishing self-consciousness, Tugendhat attempts to give an analytic account of 
what he calls `self-less consciousness of self', grounded on the phenomenon of 
`acquaintance with oneself'. Despite objections to his approach (e.g. Gasche, 
op.cit,77), Tugendhat's conception of the practical self-relation and of self-
determination is of considerable interest because it seeks to find a middle ground on the 
question of autonomy between Kantian rationalism and early Heidegger's 
'decisionism'. Nevertheless, it diverges dramatically from Heidegger in its assessment 
of the role of reason. On his lectures on "Heidegger on the relation of oneself to 
oneself' [1986:144-218] Tugendhat presents a language-analytical interpretation of the 
conception of the relation of oneself to oneself as developed by Heidegger in "Being 
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and Time". The Heideggerian 'Dasein' is here rationalized by its insertion into the 
structure of language, interpreted in the sense of analytic philosophy 
[cf.Schwab:1989:xix-xxi]. This model of rationality differs from traditional philosophy 
in that it is based on semantics rather than on ontology or subjectivity and, therefore , 
claims to be beyond metaphysics. The real confrontation, therefore, between 
Tugendhat's rationalism and Derridian deconstruction would take place on the question 
of the views on language held by each side [10]. I will not enter into this debate here, 
but I hope to show that the Derridian critique of the sign (section 6.2.2 & 6.3) means, 
also, that language cannot secure the unity and identifiability of the self. 
To return to the main point which was interrupted by the parenthesis - and thus 
conclude this subsection - deconstruction, as the project of displacing the philosophy of 
reflection - i.e., the paradigm of 'individual domination' [Cornell:1987] - seems to be 
the necessary operation for the "desedimentation...of all the significations that have their 
source in that of the logos". Deconstruction accomplishes this by pursuing the fissure in 
the system, that is to say, by, mainly, concentrating on a critique of form which, in its 
various versions, dominated Western metaphysics. From form as eidos or substance, to 
form as a rule for a sequence of representations in time, to the critique of 'presence', 
deconstruction arrives at a picture of meaning as temporally extended syntax: the trace, 
which is the general structure of experience as lived time [Staten:1985:1-27]. 
6.2.2 REPETITION 
Repetition is the second concept whose clarification will facilitate the elaboration of the 
function of iterability. The latter comes to the fore as a result of the Derridean move to 
deconstruct the notions of repetition implicit in Husserl's and Heidegger's works. 
Thus, with regard to Husserl, Derrida attempts to show that 
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"...presence is the 'effect' of a process of repetition, that representation 
precedes and makes possible the very presence it is supposed to 
reproduce, that repetition is 'older than what it repeats..." 
[Caputo:1987:4] 
Similarly, although Heidegger was the first to question the notion of Being as presence, 
it is Derrida who presses the issue even harder and drives it to its limit, by situating 
himself within the opening created by this critique - and especially, by the later work of 
Heidegger. It is, therefore, important to trace these moves from Husserl to early 
Heidegger, and from there to late Heidegger and Derrida, in order to be able to 
understand what Derrida is aiming at with the notion of iterability (see sections 6.3 & 
6.4). 
In the case of Husserl, there is a philosophy of repetition, as the creative production of 
unity by means of an interpretive or constitutive activity of consciousness, which aims 
at a purely ideal objectivity. That is to say, the accurate descriptions of perceptual 
consciousness is an identity not of sensations but of meaning or sense (sinn) which is 
guaranteed by understanding the 'object-as-perceived' through an ideally constituted 
identity. Put another way, only an ideal objectivity is capable of being experienced as 
identically the same for different subjects who cannot share intentionally the same real 
sensory contents. As Staten [1985:37] remarks, the crucial notion in Husserl is the 
"irreality of the noema". That is to say, the 'noema' is not a new something that comes 
between mind and world; its ideality is its repeatability as the same of an objective 
identity or sense - i.e., the fact that it is capable of being re-experienced in any number 
of intentional acts, and by any number of intentional subjects. "Idealities in general", are 
defined by Husserl, "as identities that present the standing possibility of repetition by a 
rational subject in general" [ibid:49]. 
Ideal senses are repeatable as the same. These ideal forms were 'initially' intended 
by particular acts of consciousness, yet remain essentially independent of any such acts. 
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The clarification of their grounding can be attained only by returning to the subjectivity 
that originally constitutes ideal objectivities. This constituting subjectivity is no longer 
an empirical subjectivity (psychologism) but transcendental subjectivity. More 
specifically, consciousness depends upon the 'primal' impression that an object makes 
on consciousness in an absolute 'Now'. With the realization that the latter can only be 
an idealization or limit-concept, Husserl puts forward "a complete concept of the now" 
which is made up of the primal 'Now' and, in addition, 'retention' of a just past now; 
it, also, contains 'protentions', i.e., anticipations of the future. However, the 
primordiality of the Now of perception is not compromised: "What is seen in it is 
immediately perceived rather than represented" [ibid:50-51]. The emphasis is on the 
noematic idealities (objects-as-known) and the transcendental subjectivity in which these 
idealities are constituted. 
The Husserlian phenomenological explication aims at making explicit what is implicit in 
transcendental constitution. Further, Husserl maintains, the discovery of intentional 
predelineation is ontologically neutral and, therefore, phenomenology should be 
purely descriptive. In Heidegger's critique of the Husserlian project, the commitment 
to ontological neutrality harbours, within itself, a concealed ontology of the Being of 
consciousness. This is the Cartesian ontology which supposes that reflective 
consciousness can be separated from concrete first-order experience embedded in 
language, historical tradition and culture. For Heidegger, the very project of 
neutralization proceeds from an ontology of consciousness as self-neutralizing, i.e., the 
acceptance of the possibility of pure reflection: of a consciousness which, in the process 
of repetition, returns to itself in so perfect a manner that nothing requires interpretation. 
But there are two gestures in Husserl. First, there is a historical (and linguistic) 
constitution in an originary repetition, which, in later Husserl, is necessarily an 
intersubjective, historical and linguistic work, the labour of generations, a work of 
historical repetition (theory of repetition). If this constitutive work goes forward, the 
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phenomenological reflection, secondly, goes in reverse, retracing the steps of the 
tradition back to the founding acts (theory of recollection). Intentional explication 
unfolds the implicit and mute factors which enter into the constitution of the world. This 
tension is resolved by Husserl's metaphysical gesture of repetition as recollection of a 
presence/present which subordinates creative production, and the repetition which 
repeats yet transforms. 
In Caputo's [op.cit:168ff] metaphor of a postal system, Husserl's phenomenology is an 
archeo-teleological post-office: an ideal repeatable message, fully constituted in its 
ideality, is sent out accross the epochs. Inscribed in the founding act, it is passed on and 
perfected as it is transmitted in carefully univocally packaged form. But receiving the 
message demands a response (a reading), the responsibility of sending the letter-in-
return, by which a tradition keeps in touch with the original author of the letter. 
In the work of Heidegger, the thread of the two different notions of repetition 
(recollection and repetition as transformation) are pulled together. The latter shares with 
Husserl the idea of 'horizonal' structure (the fore-structures of understanding in 
Heidegger). However, this important similarity - what Derrida [1982:126] calls the 
phenomenological opposition of implicit/explicit - has been laid out upon an ontological 
ground by Heidegger. In "Being and Time", the projective structure of the 
understanding derives from the Being of Dasein as repetition. The latter, Caputo claims, 
is the Kierkegaardian principle of repetition as a forward movement, although, in 
Kierkegaard, it is a linear one, which constitutes the 'self'. For Heidegger, the 
movement is circular, in as much as the movement forward is at the same time a 
movement back to one's inherited possibilities [op.cit:91]. 
In the project of 'Being and Time', to understand is to project, and to project is to set 
forth the fore-structure under which understanding occurs. Heidegger instists that the 
projection is at once and the same time a movement back to a preunderstanding. That is 
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to say, the projection must be a retrieval. This is an opening up of a "conflict as to 
the interpretation of Being". "Being and Time" does not attempt to resolve the conflict, 
as in its last pages it leaves open the question of time and presence. However, it sets it 
in motion so that so it lets the question of Being as presence tremble [ibid:81]. More 
specifically, on the basis of a provisional analysis of Dasein, Heidegger has determined 
the Being of Dasein as care. He, then, determines that the meaning of care is 
temporality. This points out an important distinction between the Being of a being and 
the meaning of that Being which turns on an implicit distinction between primary and 
secondary phases of the work of projection. For Heidegger, meaning is not the object 
of understanding - i.e, what is understood by the understanding - but, more exactly, 
the organizing component in what is understood. Therefore, there is a distinction 
between understandability and the organizing centre of the understandability. 
"To lay bare the 'upon which' of a projection, amounts to disclosing 
that which makes possible what has been projected." 
[ Heidegger:1962: 371 ] 
And, also, 
"The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, 
then becomes the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come 
down to us. Repeating is handing down explicitly - that is to say, going 
back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there" 
[ibid:437] 
Heidegger is engaged in a destruction of ontology, an overcoming of the metaphysics of 
Being as presence and Husserlian reflection. He seeks to determine and to delimit 
Being as presence, to think that which, itself beyond Being, lets Being come to pass; in 
Derrida's formulation, that which 'produces' Being as its effect [1982a:67]. Moreover, 
the later Heidegger crosses out the word 'Being' in favour of 'open' or 'Ereignis', or 
even more radically, he speaks of the distinction between present/presence/ and that 
which gives presence. 
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It is important to emphasise, at this point, Heidegger's realization - evidenced in the 
interruption of "Being and Time", and the erasure of the theme of time - that temporality 
remains within the grammar and the lexicon of metaphysics. Indeed, as Derrida 
[1982a:29-67] intends to establish, it is the opposition between 'primordial' and 
'derivative' time that structures Heidegger's concept of temporality. One of its 
consequence is that it brings the Heidegger of "Being and Time" close to Husserl on 
what can be called the "danger of degeneration" of meaning through language. This is 
the reason why the more radical notion of temporality, worked out by Heidegger after 
"Being and Time", and associated with his research into the 'being-for' (or towards) 
death, gives possibilities for thinking of both the 'I' of the 'I am' (subject), and the 
'being-with' (Mitsein), and a genuine idea of community. In the final pages of the 
thesis, I will return (if only to touch upon) the difficult Heideggerian issue of life/death 
through the work of Derrida and his collaborators (see Nancy, 1990; Ingram, 
1988a:107). 
However, both Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenology of "Being and Time" move 
within the orbit of the originary experience and the derivativeness of the language 
which, in passing the originary experience along, at the same time, degenerates it 
[Caputo:op.cit:73-76]. As has already been shown (section 1.2), 'Assertion', in 
Heidegger, enters the very act of interpretation as long as it exhibits the threefold 
hermeneutic fore-structure (fore-having, fore-sight, fore-grasping). 'Assertion' as 
ready-to-hand is an entity within-the-world. But this also carries the threat of 
degeneration when interpretation passes over into the 'assertion': predication runs the 
risk of allowing the more primordial experience to degenerate even if, in the first 
assertion, it was seized upon authentically. The constitution of communicable 
assertion creates both the possibility of extending understanding but also the 
possibility of degeneration. This logic of primordial/derivative informs Heidegger's 
critique of presence in "Being and Time". For Heidegger, the 'epistemological' problem 
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arises only on the basis of the deteriorated Being of the assertion. Truth, then, is 
misunderstood in its Being and is taken to be a relationship of objective presence. 
Derrida [1976:22; cf.1987a] presents the Heideggerian situation, and not only that of 
"Being and Time", as 'ambiguous' with respect to the metaphysics of presence and 
logocentrism. In the attempt to 'critique' the metaphysical tradition as a whole, Derrida 
seems to think that the criticism applies, at least in part, to Heidegger as well. In order 
to understand the force of Derrida's argument, we should recall and emphasise the 
difference: Husserl demonstrates that the essence of mental experience is intentionality, 
that is to say, movement that reveals, renders present. Heidegger thinks the unity of 
movement and revelation in terms of presence and absence. As Sheehan [1983:290-
304] argues, Heidegger, through the study of Husserl and Aristotle, transforms the 
traditional question of Being, putting it on a phenomenological - intentional disclosure 
(Husserl) - and a kinetic (Aristotle) base. Nevertheless, Derrida still claims that the 
constitutive core of traditional metaphysics, i.e., noetic identity and its supplement in 
logocentric teleology is not only present in Husserl, but permeates Heidegger's text. 
That is to say, the model of logos underlies Heidegger's own position on the structure 
of Dasein and being. What Sheehan [1985:201-218] claims, however, is that what 
informs the Dasein analysis in "Being and Time" is not the phenomenological principle 
of presence but rather the deconstruction of the Aristotelian notion of logos. Thus, in 
Heidegger, the repetition is not the repetition of a form or essence. While in Husserl 
being-as is a synthesis of the meant and the perceived, the hermeneutical-as has a 
kinetic structure. Yet it seems that Derrida's argument cuts deeper than Sheehan 
realises. In order to show this, I should first turn to Derrida's critique of the Husserlian 
phenomenological project, and then attempt to make one or two points regarding his 
critique of Heidegger. It must be said, though, at the outset, that the Derridian notion of 
repetition appears as a radicalization, or rather a deconstruction, of motifs which are 
found in both. 
228 
To indicate the nature of the move, if Husserl is laying a foundation for the horizonal 
structures - and, by implication, for phenomenology - in a self-present subjectivity, 
Derrida urges phenomenology further toward a grammatological reduction which 
sees even the self-presence of consciousness as an effect. In fact, in Derrida's 
grammatological reduction, both the subject and the object are the effects of a 
systematic iterability. Phenomenology is conducted on the terms which metaphysics 
sets: presence, evidence, perception, intuition, subjectivity. The Derridian 
grammatological reduction reverses the roles of presence and re-presentation. In 
"Speech and Phenomena" (1973) Derrida [11] shows the dominant Husserlian 
principle: the higher the level of empirical repeatability, the more perfect the ideal unity 
of the object, and the more diverse its empirical repetitions. Deconstruction, then, 
reveals another motif in the Husserlian text: the greater the power of repetition, the 
higher the level of ideality which is achieved. Repeatability is displaced by repetition 
and ideality is made a function of repetition. In the reversal, the question of whether 
presence precedes representation or whether, instead, representation produces the 
presence, is shown to depend on language. 
More specifically, Husserl has always kept language at a distance. He distinguishes 
between a founding level of prelinguistic (intentional) meaning (sinn) and the 
superstratum of 'logos' which simply gives expression to meaning (Bedeutung). 
Although he refuses to grant logos any productive role, he does concede that 
signification clarifies meaning by simplifying it. The expression is always a partial 
reproduction of the original meaning, and this partiality is not a failure but rather the key 
to the power and the economy of language: language through its general terms, gives 
the founding intentionality a sharper, more focused, and more articulate sense. 
The possibility of a tradition, precisely, depends on this 'depositing', in language, of 
expressions of an original meaning. The economy of language is to give the means of 
repetition so that the self-same ideal structure may be indefinitely repeated. But this, 
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also, entails a danger of degeneration; hence the 'task' of a historical 'reduction' to keep 
these bonds alive, by retracing the track from the primal experiences to the expressions 
which bear them through the historical process. This relation between 
objectivity/repeatability is recognized to such an extent that, finally, it is held to depend 
on language and writing. 
"...the 'protogeometer' must produce the pure ideality of the pure 
geometrical object in thought by a passage to the limit, assuring its 
transmissibility by speech, and must finally commit it to writing. By 
means of this written inscription, one can always repeat the original 
sense, that is, the act of pure thought which created the ideality of 
sense. With the possibility of progress...there goes the ever growing 
risk of 'forgetting' and loss of sense...The moment of crisis is always 
the moment of signs." 
[Derrida:1973:81] 
On the one hand, it is the necessity of 'original' reactivation of an ideal intentional 
meaning; on the other, the necessity and the worldliness of writing (sign) and its 
dangers. Writing is language in which neither the speaker nor the one spoken to needs 
to be present. What Derrida unravels ('deconstructs') is that the dead letter, the most 
distant stratum in the meaning/expression stratification is here assigned a central role in 
transcendental constitution. 
For Husserl, language/writing is useful in that it communicates ideality. For Derrida, 
it is not only that ideality cannot be communicated without language - thus remaining 
dependent on language - but its intersubjective constitution is dependent upon 
language, and, also, its constitution in general depends on signs. Derrida 
demonstrates it by deconstructing the Husserlian text, and by showing that, in fact, this 
is what the text itself says. 
Derrida focuses on Husserl's distinction between two kinds of signs. Expressive 
signs are inherently meaningful. They give the meaning and ensure the repeatability of 
ideality, of originary meaning. Indicative signs, on the other hand, are empirical 
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pointers that ensure the persistent existence of these ideal structures. They refer from the 
sign to the signified without bearing an intrinsic meaning to themselves (stand for, re-
present). It is a purely empirical connection, so that, upon the experience of the 
indicator, the reader is motivated to pass to the indicated. Expressive signs simply give 
expression to a meaning within solitary life, and this meaning, then,. by means of 
indicative signs is passed on and becomes intersubjective, thus ensuring the existence of 
the ideal meaning. 
Derrida is led by the text to an investigation of the reasons behind Husserl's wish to cut 
off expression from indication. For Husserl, meaning occurs essentially in solitude, 
when one thinks to oneself. In contrast, in communication, a piece of the empirical 
world is joined to meaning in the service of indicating meaning. In communication, 
meaning is borne into the world, is given a material body; a supplement is added 
which does not belong to the essence of the linguistic expression. 
For Derrida, the metaphysical anxiety is evident here. First, Husserl has us believe that 
the indicative signs are not making their way into the interior monologue, which, for 
him, is not really a communication. The impurity of the material body does not 
contaminate the essential meaning and its ideality. And the self-presence to the self is 
secured from the death, absence of intention, absence of founding validity, i.e, writing 
(indicative sign) that remains, while the life-giving presence - always there in the voice -
disappears. 
The 'real' communication, for Husserl, takes place in the intersubjective sphere, and all 
there is to the monologue of passing from sinn to Bedeutung is an imaginary and 
fictitious dialogue of the soul with itself. This is a 'pretended' dialogue, and the signs 
are useless, for they re-present nothing that is not present. The 'real' communication is 
a work of signs and mediation, which re-present, and, hence, are exposed to 
misunderstandings. For Derrida, the distinction between real and effective, and 
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'imaginary' communication - and hence between expression and indication - is 
unsustainable. If the indication is connected with absence, i.e., is the unwished for and 
uncontrolled meaning, nobody can guarantee that the communication will be effective. It 
may be as ineffective, and as fictitious, as the imaginary monologue is assumed to be. 
This leads Derrida to the grammatological reduction: because it only re-presents 
meaning and does not express it immediately, the indicative sign can be imitated, it 
can be repeated, it represents deferring and differance. And, furthermore, Derrida finds 
re-presentation to be at the heart of 'internal time consciousness', and of pure 
linguistic expression. To repeat, the latter is not supposed to be a matter of expressing 
and of communicating oneself to oneself, but simply the way in which consciousness 
expresses something to itself about an object, "simply stamping an already constituted 
meaning (sinn) with linguistic signification (Bedeutung), but not adding anything to it" 
[Caputo:op.cit:136]. For Husserl, nothing divides the pure medium of consciousness. 
Husserl holds that consciousness is temporal. To contain the effect of time, he 
distinguishes between retention and reproduction. The former is a kind of 'primary' 
memory, a synthetic unity of protentions and retentions, a present, Caputo [ibid:133] 
says, in its 'pregnant' sense, a 'now' enriched with protention and retention. The latter 
is a memory in the ordinary sense, a re-presentation of something which happened in 
the past. The effect of the distinction is to secure the pure undivided consciousness, 
since in the case of retention, 
"...the return of the subject to itself in self-reflection is not threatened 
by the gap, ever so small, between the reflecting moment and the 
moment reflected upon. For the reflecting ego grasps itself in the 
immediately retained now, that is, within the safety net of the present in 
the broader or enriched sense." 
[Caputo:ibid:135] 
For Derrida, this difference between retention and reproduction is not essential; it is 
only a quantitative difference. Retention needs the sign as much as reproduction does. 
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Both are but cases of representation. The 'presence-of-the- present' is derived from 
repetition. There is no private realm in which consciousness constitutes pure meaning 
without the co-operation of the sign. There is no unmediated self-identity which 
precludes the need to inform itself of its own doings. 
"[T]he 're-' in repetition, representation, reproduction does not come 
second, as a re-presenting of a prior presence, but first, as an enabling 
condition of possibility, as a code of iterable, repeatable signs, which 
generates presence (perceptual objects, ideal objects, and indeed every 
possible unity of meaning)." 
[Caputo:ibid:139] 
The consequences of this critique for the notion of linguistic communication and of the 
subject, perhaps, begin to become apparent. Husserl's position presupposes a 
conception of communication whereby what the meaning of communication is has been 
decided beforehand. The indicative sign remains inessential and external to what is 
communicated. What is communicated is reached by absolute abstraction from the 
singular utterance-events and by means of their reduction to the type they have in 
common. Against Husserl, Derrida makes meaning dependent on language, or better, 
on writing. What the phenomenological reduction excludes, according to Derrida, is 
not the materiality of the sign per se, but the element of impurity, of nonessence in that 
materiality. That is, instead of thinking the essence of the sign by referring to the 
idealized model of object perception, Derrida thinks the sign as the trace of difference 
and then proceeds to interpret object perception on this model. As Staten put it, 
'The thing itself is a sign' does not mean 'we can't get outside of 
words'. It means approximately this: 'Let us consider the experience of 
what we call "things themselves" as structured more like the experience 
of signs than like the experience of an idealized 'full presence.'" 
[ Staten:1985:58] 
In short, Derrida exploits the tension between the critical and the metaphysical motifs in 
Husserl, in order to root out the transcendental illusion of phonocentrism, i.e., the 
view that speech and the pure voice are free from the element of writing. Thus he shows 
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that the sign is not unproductive, and language is not transparent. Establishing where 
the Derridian notion of repetition (iterability) stands vis-a-vis Heidegger, especially 
his writings after "Being and Time", is an enormous task to undertake. While the 
'grammatological reduction' draws on the Heideggerian text, the 'debt' is not something 
which can be recounted. In any case, one can never be certain that Derrida's discourse 
is a criticism of Heidegger rather than an amplification or radicalization of what is 
already there [Holland:1985:225; Caputo:op.cit; Sheehan:op.cit; Wood:1987]. Perhaps 
it would be better to return to Caputo's metaphor of the postal system, in the hope that it 
could give us some idea of this difference. The Heideggerian post office, Caputo 
writes, functions according to an eschatological postal principle. An original letter is 
sent out, but is fundamentally lost. Only tracks of it remain until we find the postal 
principle which tells us that metaphysics writes in reverse. The original dispatch is 
retrieved and repeated. Our return mail has reached its destination, even as the original 
message has reached us. It is 'deep hermeneutics' that can read the saving message 
[12]. For Derrida, however, such knowledge does not make thinking any less 
metaphysical. The dispatches are without destination, and there is no metaphysics as a 
unified essence, and, therefore, no guiding logic of reversal. 
One can say that if Heidegger deconstructed the vulgar concept of time - starting from 
the early thesis that time is the meaning of Being - and moved from transcendental 
phenomenology to hermeneutics, Derrida deconstructs the residual elements of 
metaphysics of presence which take the form of logocentrism in Heidegger's text. It 
seems, first, that Derrida (see, for example, Derrida:1987a) presses harder on the 
problematic of contamination in any act of repetition - i.e., the idea of the constitutive 
outside or the nonpresent that inhabits presence. Secondly, Derrida seems to believe that 
there is still a tendency in Heidegger toward a kind of hermeneutic reconstitution and 
repetition of unities of sense - of a certain privileged unity. The Heideggerian 
hermeneutics, while open to a kind of polysemy, still holds on to a certain unity that 
gathers together the multiplicity. Derrida's deconstruction multiplies the questions 
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around the value of this privileged gathering and, as we will see in the subsequent 
sections, makes the move from polysemy to dissemination by making the linguistic turn 
and problematizing it through writing. 
6.3.1 DERRIDA'S CONFRONTATION WITH THE PRAGMATIC 
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 
Derrida finds a special interest in J. Austin's theory of speech acts or 
performatives, and, for reasons which, in part, parallel his interest in Husserl, 
focuses on Austin's notion of illocutionary force. As Staten [1985:112-113] 
observes, both Husserl and Austin separate the problem of the formal structure of 
meaning from that of the metaphysics of entity (reference). But whereas, for Husserl, 
the formal structure of meaning is tied to the form of objects, Austin's analysis of 
utterances as performatives is an attempt to turn away from the category of substance 
to that of force. Thus, for Austin, even declarative statements are performative because 
they tell us what the 'illocutionary force' of a sentence is - i.e., how the sentence is to 
be taken. This is a radical move that Austin makes: statements as performatives - i.e., 
living actions that have a certain power that initially is articulated not in terms of truth 
and falsehood but rather in terms of strength and weakness [cf. Frank:1989:82]. As 
such, they have to be analysed in terms of the full context of utterance. This means 
that one has to take into account all the situational constraints that determine whether the 
speech act has been properly performed or not. As far as truth is concerned, once it is 
made to depend not on a simple referent, but on 'the speech situation as a whole', truth 
demands more than correct representation. 
In chapter 5, I discussed Habermas' reinterpretation and utilization of J. Austin's 
speech act theory, in particular, his distinction between illocution/perlocution, on which 
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he grounds his claim on the priority of communicative over strategic action. I explored 
there the question of the types of linguistic activity such a move seems to imply and 
recognize, and, I hope, I have shown the consequences of this for the model of 
communication that Habermas is thereby putting forward. The Derridian reading of 
Austin, and the model of communication that he 'extracts' from this - a deconstructive 
move, similar to that performed on the Husserlian text - starts not from distinguishing 
but rather from complicating the illucotion/perlocution distinction. 
The move from form to force is the point that both attracted Derrida's attention, and 
directed his critique. For, if the emphasis is on 'force', this allows for a more radical 
conception of communication than the classical one. That is to say, from transferring or 
'transporting' of an 'already constituted meaning', communication can be now defined 
as 'an original movement' which 'produces or transforms a situation'. Austin's analysis 
of speech acts focuses on the model of the promise and the contract. When he says that 
statements are performatives, he means that statements commit us to future behavior. 
The 'commissive dimension', which has an ethical underpinning in Austin's project, 
taken by him as basic to all speech acts, points to the illocutionary force of speech. As 
Austin writes, "accuracy and morality alike are on the side of the plain saying that our 
word is our bond" [cited in Staten:op.cit:114]. In Derrida's reading, however, time 
radical elements in Austin's project, in the end, become normative determinants of a 
theory of speech acts. In the end, it is form, i.e., norm or type, that allows Austin to 
complete his move and to offer a theory of performatives. As Staten remarks, 
"Despite his careful survey of the great variety of types of speech acts, 
his most general concept of a speech act is normed by the category of 
the 'commissive'..." 
[ibid:113; emphasis added] 
Derrida's criticism of Austin is that, despite his radicalism, the presuppositions in his 
theory of 'speech act' tie him to the western metaphysical tradition, and especially to 
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phenomenology. To uncover these presuppositions, Derrida concentrates and reflects 
on possible motives for Austin's banishment of the so-called 'infelicities' from the 
standard or normal performatives. The emphasis on the per-formative, on the up-
taking of the speech act, leads Austin to an investigation of the 'necessary conditions' 
for its successful execution: conditions of the first category specify the conventional 
form that must be satisfied. Conditions of the second category specify that the form 
must be correctly and completely activated. With these two categories of conditions, 
the act has been completed but not yet 'consummated'. For this to happen, a third 
category is required which is of a different kind. It involves the 'implementing' or 
'consummating' of the act, what Staten [ibid:115] calls the 'commitment' conditions; 
that is to say, sincerity where this is called for, and fulfillment of our commitment in out 
subsequent conduct. Without the latter, the satisfying of the former categories give the 
dead shell of a ritual. For Derrida, the system of conditions assumed to be describing 
the 'total context' of the speech-act situation, requires that Austin works with a concept 
of context which is, in principle, exhaustively determinable: 
"...I shall take for granted the fact that Austin's analyses at all times 
require a value of context, and even of a context exhaustively 
determined, in theory or teleologically; the long list of 'infelicities' 
which in their variety may affect the performative event always comes 
back to an element in what Austin calls the total context. One of those 
essential elements - and not one among others - remains, classically, 
consciousness, the conscious presence of the intention of the speaking 
subject in the totality of his speech act." 
[Derrida: 1988: 14] 
The consequence of this, for Derrida, is that the performative communication, once 
more, becomes the communication of an intentional meaning according to the model of 
speaker/hearer fully present to themselves, and the transportation of a message. And 
this 
"implies teleologically that no residue [reste] escapes the present 
totalization. No residue, either in the definition of the requisite 
conventions, or in the internal and linguistic context, or in the 
grammatical form, or in the semantic determination of the words 
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employed; no irreducible polysemy, that is, no 'dissemination' escaping 
the horizon of the unity of meaning." 
[ibid] 
The force of Derrida's argument is in his emphasis on 'teleological determination'. 
Austin's inquiry, he argues, "is always guided by its aim at a normative or ideal 
structure, the ideal form of the successful performative" [Staten:op.cit:116]. To avoid 
'infelicities', he has to make massive exclusions, such as 'parasitic' - i.e., 'non-serious' 
- uses that do not occur in 'ordinary circumstances'. In Derrida's view, this theory-
strategic move to be substantiated would require a precise coincidence of the form of the 
intention and the form of the utterance. The graphematic character of the sign (mark), 
the result of his critique of the Husserlian text, is here put to work in order to show that 
iterability (repetition) problematizes the assumption of the coincidence between 
intention and expression, with implications for the intentional subject. Similarly, 
iterability endangers the code/context distinction to such an extent that every new 
utterance of a type of speech act places in question the norm or convention that has been 
applicable up to that point. 
In an attempted debate between the speech act theorist, J. Searle (see section 5.3), and 
Derrida [13], the points of controversy between the two positions are emphasised. 
First, Derrida himself notes a minimal accord between them which consists in their 
accepting that, for communication to take place, the numerous linguistic occurrences 
must be reducible to a finite number of 'types'. To be understood, signs or types have 
to obey a convention that both speaker and addressee master. Searle describes this 
conventionality of linguistic acts as their 'iterability'. He understands iterability as the 
repetition of the same in the act of signification. For, if signification changes, the rule 
that prescribes language use would change. It would, therefore, be impossible to fix the 
rules in a closed system of speech acts. Thus, for Searle, the success of the act of 
promising (performance) is a matter of convention, and this depends on the application 
of a particular and inviolable rule (code) which controls the context. Moreover, the 
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intention of the speaker, as itself encoded and decoded, does not change in the act of 
communication; hence it can never be the disruptive element in the system of 
significations. For Searle, Frank [op.cit:400-401] argues, "the intention with which a 
phrase is determined as threat or as promise is just as universal and just as conventional 
as the signification of the signs I use". 
Derrida, like Searle, starts from the 'iterability' of linguistic types. But the conclusions 
he draws are fundamentally different. He begins with an examination of the problematic 
of communication and its traditional hierarchical distinction between oral and written 
communication, and observes that (oral) communication is understood as the circulation 
of a representation as an ideal content (meaning). Writing, though with a relative 
specificity, is but a species of general communication. Derrida brings into this the idea 
that the specificity of writing has to do with a certain absence, a break or rupture in 
presence (or death). More specifically, two hypotheses are offered [Derrida:1988:7]: (a) 
since every sign presupposes an absence, this absence in the field of writing must be of 
an original type, if we are to grant any specificity whatsoever to the written sign; (b). if 
(a) is no less appropriate to any species of sign and of communication, writing would 
no longer be one species of communication, and all the other concepts to whose 
generality writing was subordinated would be ill-formed, and destined to insure a 
particular historical discourse. 
Derrida examines the essential predicates in a minimal determination of the concept of 
writing, namely: (i) in order for a 'written communication' to retain its function as 
writing - i.e., its readability - it must remain readable (iterable) despite the absence of 
any receiver determined in general. Such iterability is in the structure of the mark of 
writing. To be what it is, all writing must be capable of functioning in the radical 
absence (death) of any empirically determined receiver. Moreover, what holds for the 
receiver, holds also for the sender. A written mark is a mark that subsists, that does not 
exhaust itself in the moment of its inscription, and which can give rise to an iteration in 
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the absence and beyond the presence of its 'producer'. This is to say that for a writing 
to be a writing, it must continue to 'act' in the absence of intention, of 'saying 
something meaningful'. Thus the situation of the writer, with regard to the written text, 
is that of the reader, and writing as an iterative structure is cut off from 
consciousness as its ultimate authority. 
(ii) A written sign carries with it a force that breaks with its context, i.e., the 
collectivity of presences that organize the moment of its inscription. This is, first, the 
case with what is called 'real' context. The fragment of a text, such as 'I have forgotten 
my umbrella' which Derrida discusses in "Spurs" (1978), can function independently of 
any factual context, and independently of Nietzsche's intention (to want-to-say-what-
he-means) on whose desk the fragment was found. 'I have forgotten my umbrella' is a 
perfectly readable quotation. It is, also, the case with reference to the internal semiotic 
context: a written sign can be detached from the chain in which it is inserted and be 
grafted on to other chains without losing the possibility of 'communicating'. This is not 
an accidental characteristic of a mark, but the very structure of the written sign. 
(iii) Derrida argues that this force of rupture is tied to the spacing that constitutes the 
written sign. Spacing separates the sign from other elements of the internal contextual 
chain, but also from the present reference (of the referent, and of the signified 
meaning). Spacing is not opposed to time; rather, it is an operation, a productive 
movement, the emergence of the mark. 
The important insight that Derrida brings in is that the written mark, structurally 
liberated from any living meaning, is readable, quotable, citable, iterable; his 
endeavour thereby being to work out the logic that ties repetition to alterity, indicated by 
iter (itara, other in Sanskrit). For Derrida, the essential traits of writing mentioned 
above, characterize not only the written sign but all orders of signs, e.g., spoken 
language, all semio-linguistic communication, and the totality of experience, as long as 
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this is inseparable from the units of iterability and of the mark; that is to say, separable 
from their internal and external context and also from themselves. For, iterability that 
constitutes the identity of a sign, does not permit it to be a unity that is identical to itself. 
Put differently, for a mark or sign to function, a certain self-identity of this mark is 
required to permit its repetition and recognition. Paradoxically, this identity is the 
division of itself. That is to say, the unity of the signifying form only constitutes itself 
by its iterability, by the possibility of its being repeated, not only in the absence of the 
referent, but also of a determined signified, and of intention of actual signification. This 
structural possibility of being weaned from the referent or the signified, and, therefore, 
from communication and its context, makes every mark a grapheme in general; that is to 
say, "the non-present remainder [restance] of a differential mark" [Derrida:1988:10]. 
Derrida's most general concept of differance conveys exactly this. Differance is not a 
mere difference, a negative which is opposed to a positive (an identity), but one which 
operates in time, deferring the moment when the positive returns to itself. As such, it 
destroys full identity and any logic of identity. It reminds us that no single moment of 
experience can present itself, except in so far as it refers to what is not. It is a track, a 
pathway whose effect is to undo the opposition presence/absence [14]. 
Differance is the Derridian challenge to any theory of presence. The presence model -
discussed with reference to Husserl in section 6.2.2, but shared with the whole 
metaphysical tradition - poses a domain of objects or acts which repeats identically, and 
to which we are supposed to have direct epistemological access. The Derridian 
argument that denies the possibility of fully present representations can be 
recounted as follows: (a) any significant - i.e., sign-like-items in being arbitrary, 
require interpretation or supplementation. They differ and defer from their significance. 
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(b) Signs are essentially iterable. That is to say, it is some iterable aspect of the semantic 
item that carries the meaning. The real problem for a theory of meaning, therefore, is to 
specify what makes a token (an instance) a repeatable of a given 'type'. In essentialist 
accounts of meaning, the nature of the token is the universal which is its type, and 
theories which rely upon conventions suppose, at some level, real natures about 
linguistic and semantic items which, then, constitute conventions. From Derrida's 
reading of Husserl, in the preceding section, it became apparent that, for Husserl, the 
universal (type) is constructed out of the potentially infinite repetitions of the token past 
and future. The repeatability of representations, their status as tokens of a given type, is 
a feature which cannot be completely present. Consequently, determining that a token 
belongs to a given type is itself a matter of interpretation, and therefore, nothing 
significant can be totally present. This last observation is important for speech act 
theory. Significant items are sign-like in referring to something else and deferring their 
meanings. For Den-ida, the lack of fullness in the meaning that comes in utterance is, in 
principle, unfillable, and thus the whole theory of the speech act collapses. There are no 
unmediated meanings, and no magical links between acts of uterance and these 
meanings. Similarly, the non-standard uses of a token of a type, are not accidental 
deviations but essential, and marginal speech acts cannot be set aside to be dealt with as 
special cases of a more general theory. 
(c). Signs, as signs, defer from what they are signs of. This deferral is never 
consumated. Sign-like representations are never fully present. It is imporant to 
emphasise that the distance between language and what language expresses is not a 
deferral of some presence. As Wheeler III puts it, 
"Language differs from what it is about and defers what it is about, but 
without the structure of two domains which both of these terms 
(`deferral' and 'differing') presuppose." 
[1986:487] 
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I have already referred to Derrida's critique of the metaphysical desire of presence, 
evident in the Husserlian distinction between expression (intention)/indication 
(utterance). In a similar way, Derrida points to the metaphysical drive for presence 
which becomes evident in the requirement of a conscious subject that can control the 
context ('the situation as a whole') of the speech act. It can now be indicated why 
speech act theory is a presence theory, and the requirement of a subject is only one of its 
corollaries. The theory of speech act starts with the axiomatic of analytic philosophy, 
namely with the view that the meaning of an expression is closely connected with its 
possible uses. Semantic conventions are then invoked to create the bond between 
signs and their uses. The conventions (and/or rules) specify both the conditions of 
utterance, and what the utterance counts as. Behind the assumption that there is a core 
of normal uses referred by the convention, is the assumption of a semantic nature. 
Derrida's critique of presence basically challenges this assumption and, consequently, 
the assumption that there is a core of normal uses and other abnormal uses that are 
outside or beside the normal. The very possibility of the so called abnormal, Derrida 
argues, affects how we understand the normal uses; and, against the conventionalist 
view, he emphasises uses of language usually considered marginal and parasitic. In 
other words, the flaw of speech act theory is that it attempts to give an account of the 
meaning of a sign (or of a speech act) in terms of conventions, but this is necessarily 
inadequate because it is based on the exclusion of certain uses of the sign. 
Furthermore, Derrida draws attention to the speech act theorists' non-distinction 
between intention/expression. Derrida poses as irreducible the difference between 
intention/expression. This is not a return to mentalism which has been already 
attacked by Wittgenstein. To recall, Wittgenstein argues that there is no self-identical 
mental reality that blends in unity with 'expressions' of this reality. Our mental 
experiences, in connection with intention, are on the same level as our utterances and 
actions. Speech act theorists, Searle in particular, assert the non-distinction of intention 
and utterance, not in order to do away with the ideality of intention but rather in order to 
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saturate the utterance with the self-identity of this ideality. Derrida's move is to undo 
this absolute subordination of utterance to ideality, in order to read intention itself as 
differing and deferred: 
"...the dehiscence already discussed does not intervene, primarily, 
between an 'intention' and an 'expression', but already, from the start, 
as an effect of iterability within each of these putative instances 
[intention/expression]." 
[Derrida:1988:72] 
In this way, he exposes the (methodologically and theoretically) strategic necessity of 
Searle's insistence on repetition as repetition of the 'same' for his theory of linguistic 
action. For, in order to have a theory of speech acts, Searle must conceive of the 
imprecision between intention and expression as reducible - i.e., to treat intention as 
conventionalized. One can 'idealize' the concepts and free them from 'chance' and 
'impurity' and, therefore, arrive at unproblematic 'ideal speech situations' or 'pragmatic 
universals' (cf. Habermas, chapter 5). Idealization methodologically excludes the 
'parasitic' use of the types, and operates with a rigid model of convention. This model 
can only function if intention 'fills out' expression without any remainder. Derrida, on 
the other hand, is more interested, at this point, to explore what a theory of linguistic 
action would look like if it were to account for the 'infelicities', 'misunderstandings' 
and 'chance'; if, indeed, it were to think the consequences issuing from the fact that a 
possible risk is always possible, a necessary possibility, a law [Derrida: 1988:15]. 
Further below, (section 6.4 & chapter 8) I will attempt to show that this aspect of 
Derrida's work not only uproots the essentialist assumptions of metaphysical 
conceptuality underpinning the logocentric model of communication but creates also the 
possibility for beginning to think of a different notion of communication based on 
writing. For the moment, let it be said that Wittgenstein and Derrida, though they 
follow different routes, are in agreement in that, as Staten [1985:123] observes, "once 
mental reality is stripped of its special ideal character and interpreted as differential, 'the 
difference, inner-outer, does't matter'. 
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It should be emphasised here that the denial of presence that the graphematic character 
of the sign entails (differance) has similar consequences for structuralism. The shift in 
the problematic is similar. Structuralism shifted from previously held positions about 
consciousness and the intention of the author to treating the text as a totality, closed off 
by not referring to either the author's intention or the reader's analytic capacities. The 
text, however, was seen as a quasi-conscious and self-reflexive entity, and all the 
characteristics of the subject were then attributed to the text as subject (cf. Smith,1989). 
Differance has effectively challenged the notion of structure [15], as well as certain 
positions that had already begun to pay attention to what has been called "the moments 
in a text where the argument begins to undermine itself' [Hobson:1982:298]. But it is 
the possibility of intervention in the 'system', analysed thanks to differance, as I will 
argue later, that distinguishes Derrida's project and makes it important for an alternative 
model of communication, and for the discourse on practice. 
To conclude, iterability is an invitation to work out the logic of repetition and alterity. 
This is one of the insights that Derrida draws from his confrontation with the pragmatic 
philosophy of language: 
"[A] certain practice of citation, and also of iteration... is at work, 
constantly altering, at once and without delay... whatever it seems to 
reproduce." 
[1988:40] 
In the section that follows, I would like to make explicit the consequences of iterability 
at the level of structure, and in particular, for the code/context distinction. To draw its 
consequences at the level of the subject, hinted at here by the thesis of the irreducibility 
of the intention/expression distinction, we may have to make a long detour, through 
section 6.4 which develops the implications of Derrida's grammatological 
reduction for the discourse on (linguistic) action, and through the problematic of 
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chapter 7, as announced in the introduction to part II of the thesis, so that the 
problematic of the subject becomes accessible. 
6.3.2 A NOTE ON CONTEXT 
In the preceding section, I remarked that differance and the Derridian critique of 
presence has implications for structuralism, in particular, for the structuralist idea of the 
text. The idea that everything is a text is held by both hermeneutics and structuralism, 
and I would like here to make clear the argument that writing as an iterative structure, 
poses a radical challenge to the text/meaning distinction which is presupposed by both 
of them and by any theory of meaning (e.g., speech act theory). To begin with, as the 
title of his essay "Signature, Event, Context" - which inaugurated the attempted debate 
with speech act theory - indicates, Derrida's notion of text implies the problematic of the 
relationship between code/context. 
Let's recall, first, my argument from Part I, that in the attempt to weaken the notion of 
rule (code), and determination by rule, research projects and theoretical moves employ a 
naive empiricist notion of context. They thus understand context as that which 
surrounds a 'thing', or that which is the circumstance of an event, and argue that 
context determines activity. Moves away from the notion of rule very often resort to an 
idea of practice, and in Appendix A I refer to four different notions of practice which 
claim to rely on Wittgenstein's argument of context specificity. To draw from my 
discussion there, one is associated with conventions and types of activity (No.2), and 
can easily be subsumed under the argument on linguistic conventions Derrida aims to 
undermining with his critique. Another notion of practice (No.1) refers to the actor 
who, through his/her activity, 'situates' the universal. The underdeterminacy of the 
'code' is put to an end by the supposed activity (enactment, realization) of a moral 
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essentialist subject. This entirely modernist solution (see chapter 8), however, in 
assuming that the will is bound up with the problematic of truth and that the latter is 
interconnected with the problem of certainty, commits the error of confusing and 
dissolving the difference between the epistemic and the moral [cf. 
Watson:1989:51,n.3]. A third notion (No.3) assumes that practices are recurring 
activities which are closed by context (as the circumstance of an event). Finally (No.4), 
practices are seen as examples, i.e., disparate descriptions with no essence. 
As I have shown in chapter 4, Dreyfus goes beyond the context-specificity argument by 
invoking the idea of a practical whole as that which provides the general sense and 
makes a decision possible. I have argued that the return of a (conscious or unconcious) 
subject, in Dreyfus' critical position against cognitivism, is the corollary of his not 
taking into account the linguistic turn. Derrida's confrontation with speech act theory is 
located, precisely, at this point, because it unravels the presuppositions of the linguistic 
turn. From the exposition in 6.3.1 it can be inferred that, on the one hand, Derrida 
believes that his critique of speech act theory results in 
"...the disqualification or the limiting of the concept of context, whether 
'real' or 'linguistic', inasmuch as its rigorous theoretical determination 
as well as its empirical saturation is rendered impossible or insufficient 
by writing." 
[1988:9] 
On the other hand, he considers that the notion of context is being treated (for example, 
by speech act theory) in a contradictory way. While it is assumed to be of primary 
importance for the determination of meaning, the research practice treats it as secondary, 
deferring and excluding its consideration. But, as Derrida argues, either the context 
changes everything, i.e., it determines from within, or leaves certain aspects intact. 
The latter implies that these aspects can separate themselves from the 'original' context, 
and can graft themselves in other contexts without losing the possibility of functioning. 
Rather than indicating the necessity of posing an either/or of alternatives, for Derrida, 
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this situation requires the re-elaboration of the value of context "...by means of a new 
logic, of a graphematics of iterability" [ibid:78]. 
Conn-text, as that which comes with the text, presupposes our understanding of text. 
Traditionally, the notion of text has been understood as [Gasche:1986:278-279] (a) a 
transcription of speech that must efface itself before its oral reactivation and the 
meaning it represents; (b) as an intelligible object that corresponds to the signifying 
organization of differentially determined signifiers or signifieds; (c) as a dialectical 
totality of formal or semantic meanings. For Derrida, a text cannot be reduced either to 
the sensible or to the visible presence of the graphic, or to the 'signs' or to a dialectical 
totality. His generalized notion of text is that which exceeds the traditional 
determinations of text as totality. 
"What I call 'text' implies all the structures called 'real', 'economic', 
'historical', socio-institutional, in short: all possible referents. Another 
way of recalling once again that 'there is nothing outside the text'. That 
does not mean that all referents are suspended, denied, or enclosed in a 
book...But it does mean that every referent, all reality has the structure 
of a differential trace, and that one cannot refer to this 'real' except in an 
interpretive experience. The latter neither yields meaning nor assumes it 
except in a movement of differential referring." 
[Derrida: 1988: 148] 
The assumption of the self-identity of the text implies a definite notion of reading 
which, in the last analysis, presupposes the decidability of meaning. 
"What we will thus be concerned with here is the very possibility of 
thematic criticism...at work wherever one tries to determine a meaning 
through a text, to pronounce a decision upon it, to decide that this or 
that is a meaning and that it is meaningful, to say that this meaning is 
posed, posable, or transposable as such: a theme. 
[Derrida:1981: 245] 
The Derridian critique of thematic criticism focuses on the 'theme', traditionally 
assumed to be the constituted unity or substance, the minimal unit of meaning or 
signification. Present outside of its signifier, it exercises a totalizing function with 
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regard to all the signifiers of a work. Gasche [1986:262-270], commenting on the 
Derridian analysis of thematicism, emphasises that while its logic is monological -
i.e., a monothematical reading is by definition anchored to the principal referent of a text 
- a structural semantics does not, in principle, differ from the monothematic position. A 
structural semantics which proclaims polysemy (polythematicism), in fact, puts out its 
multiplicities and variations within a horizon of reading: 
"the horizon of the final parousia of a meaning at least deciphered, 
revealed, made present in the rich collection of its determinations." 
[Derrida:op.cit:350] 
Derrida's point is that all content oriented readings presuppose that writing is simply the 
weaving of several threads into a text in such a way that a reading can unravel all the 
contents and identify the unifying thread - the ultimate theme of the text. The unitary 
retotalization of the meaning of a text, however belated, secures, at the same time, the 
totality of the text itself. 
Two things should be emphasised here. First, Derrida's critique is directed as much 
against criticism which takes the theme - manifest or hidden, full or empty - as its object 
or its 'illustrated truth', as against purely formalist criticism. The latter reduces 
everything to the code, the technical manipulation of a text-object, and overlooks "the 
genetic effects or the ('historical'...) inscription of the text read and of the new text this 
criticism itself writes" [Derrida:198 lb:47]. It thus neutralizes the specificity of the text, 
and raises it to the status of a mere example of a universal essence. 
Secondly, according to Gasche [op.cit:255-270], Derrida's critique of thematism should 
be placed in the context of the phenomenological problematic of thematization and of the 
unthematized. Put very briefly, Husserl conceived of thematization as an articulate 
judgment which objectifies the unthematized of the natural standpoint (see section 
6.2). Phenomenological inquiry must put in parenthesis the natural standpoint in order 
to unearth a fully radical unthematized. This phenomenologically unthematized is, 
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according to Husserl, the phenomenon of the intentionality of consciousness. So, in its 
Husserlian form, phenomenology is an attempt to 'thematize' the unthematized 
transcendental structures of consciousness. Heidegger's early philosophy determines 
the unthematizable as essentially in withdrawal from the 'thematizations' to which it 
lends itself. That is to say, the unthematizable escapes all possible objectification, but 
becomes its very condition of possibility. 
As Gasche explains, Derrida continues the problematic of thematization but with the 
decisive difference that he connects the necessary phenomenologically unthematizable to 
the problematics of the difference between the unthematized and the thematized, and 
thus removes it from the sphere of jurisdiction of truth, in that aletheia unfolds only as 
and in that difference [ibid:265]. This Derridian move, while still connected to late 
Heidegger's problematic of the 'trait' (see chapter 8), through which he continued the 
elaboration of the question of Being, extends and radicalizes this logic with the 
'structure' of re-marking [ibid:292]. 
Re-marking, as one of the quasi-concepts in the chain to which iterability also 
belongs, is connected in Derrida with the problematic of the general text. The latter, 
as was noted earlier, is a network of textual referrals, which endlessly refers to 
something other than itself, yet never to something outside it which would bring its 
referring function to a stop [ibid:289]. The general text is a radically non-
phenomenologizable 'structure' of non-reflective re-marking and retrait [ibid:260]. In 
other words, a text, Derrida argues, is constituted by a mode of linkage that is not 
oriented by oneness and totality. This impossibility of totalization of a text is neither a 
result of its irreducible polysemy and richness of content, nor of the limitations of 
formalization as such, nor of the finitude of its human beholder, but of the structural 
nature of the condition of the 'general text' as a 'system' of referral. 
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This means that a text cannot be totalized either by a theme constituted independently of 
the play of the general text - i.e., the re-marking of the marks - nor can it be a formal 
totality. Both totalizations are limited 'effects' of what Derrida calls the reserve 
(remainder) of textual operations [ibid:290; cf. Llewelyn:1986:93]. This 'reserve' 
accounts both for the illusion of self-reflection and reflexive totalization by a theme or a 
concept, and for the impossibility of any ultimate self-representation or self-presence. 
Derrida thus, by radicalizing the logic of 'trait' in late Heidegger, reveals the general text 
as a radically nonphenomenologizable structure of nonreflexive remarking, which is 
t. 
constituive of phenomena in the Hussrlian sense, and of Being as the phenomenon par 
excellence in its radical difference from beings. 
Contrary to interpretation and structural analysis, both of which are grounded on the 
assumption of a totality decidable in its meaning (i.e., with a decidable referent) and 
finally readable in its form or in its content, the Derridian notion of the text as structures 
of referral, requires a reading of the radically unthematizable, because undecidable 
(without a referent); i.e., the reading of a text's structural incapacity to lead itself to 
unequivocal and unproblematic totalizations [16]. 
The claim that "there is nothing outside of the text", therefore, does not imply that all is 
language, but that there is no referent outside of the system of referral about which we 
could decide independently of that system. "A text is possible", Gasche [1987:xiv] 
writes, "only because it has no self of its own". This is why Derrida can interchange the 
terms of text and context, and declare that "nothing exists outside context" [1988:148]; 
but, also, that the border of the context always entails a clause of nonclosure: "the 
outside penetrates and thus determines the inside" [ibid:152-53]. 
Earlier on, I quoted Derrida as saying that there is a need to re-elaborate the notion of 
context in terms of the graphematics of iterability. To recall from the preceding section, 
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the latter requires the working out of the logic of repetition and alterity which 
characterizes essentially (i.e., structurally) every mark: 
"It is because this iterability is differential, within each individual 
'element' as well as between the 'elements', because it splits each 
element while constituting it, because it marks it with an articulatory 
break, that the remainder, although indispensable, is never that of the 
full presence. It is a differential structure escaping the logic of presence 
or the (simple or dialectical) opposition of presence and absence..." 
[ibid:53] 
This essential characteristic, which makes of every 'sign' the non-present 
remainder of a differential mark, affects the notion of context understood as (i) the 
collectivity of presences organizing the moment of the inscription of the mark - viz., the 
sender (the intention of saying something meaningful, consciousness as the 
ultimate authority), the receiver, the referent, the meaning. Derrida's critique of speech 
act theory, Searle's in particular, is that it adheres to a definition of writing as the 
transcription of speech, and of text as the contents of an oral utterance, which 
presuppose a value of absence understood as a continuous modification of presence. 
This, in turn, requires that the conditions of context be absolutely determined. But, 
Derrida argues, 
"Mr' order for a context to be exhaustively determinable...conscious 
intention would at the very least have to be totally present and 
immediately transparent to itself and to others, since it is a determining 
center of context." 
[ibid:18; 58-60] 
(ii) The structure of the mark affects the internal and linguistic context. This means that 
the mark can be cited and, in so doing, it can break with every given context 
"engendering" and "being inscribed in" new contexts without limit. Derrida does not 
argue here that the mark is valid outside of the context, "but on the contrary that there 
are only contexts without any center or absolute anchoring" [ibid:12,79]. 
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Such an understanding of context and of the mark has the following implications: (a) the 
disruption of the authority of the code as a finite system of rules; and, at the same time, 
the radical destruction of every context as the protocol of a code [Derrida: 1982b:316]. 
The authority of the code is ruptured as a result of its structural possibility of being 
drifted into new contexts; this, however, also means that it becomes independent of the 
power of any specific context to determine its meaning once and for all. 
(b) The essential openness of text that the structure of the mark implies does not entail 
an argument of indeterminacy and free play. There is always a context which is more 
or less stable (and hence destabilizable). This context, first, "is always, and always has 
been, at work within the place, and not only around it" [Denida:1988:60]; but, 
secondly, however complex, stabilized and overdetermined, in it there is a margin of 
play, of difference. This complicates the limits of inside/outside, i.e., the framing of a 
context [ibid:151]. For Derrida, the main problem of the code/context distinction, and of 
framing alike, is the problematic of the inside/outside; but I will defer discussion on this 
until section 6.4. 
(c) The irreducible opening of context requires research strategies that would take into 
account that margin of difference in the framing of the context that allows for research 
operations to, precisely, stabilize the framing of a context. This kind of analysis, which 
Derrida names pragrammatological, I will discuss in the final section of this chapter. 
6.3.3 EXPLICIT/IMPLICIT DICHOTOMY AND THE PROBLEM OF 
THE EXEMPLAR 
As I indicated earlier, the phenomenologically unthematizable in early Heidegger still 
falls within the logic of thematism. The unthematized/unthematizable, the 
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explicit/implicit, the hiding/revealing of truth is still a movement within bounds. 
"This embedding process", Hobson [1982:305] writes, "can be indefinitely prolonged, 
but it is always working within opposing limits" [cf. Derrida:1987:357]. 
This limitation, in early Heidegger, surfaces in Dreyfus' notion of 'tacit background 
practices', and it is worthwhile interrupting at this point the Derridian argument, to refer 
to it briefly. As I have shown in chapter 4, the notion of 'tacit background practices' is 
used as a way of arguing against the posssibility of formalization of knowledge. His 
distinction between formalizable/non-formalizable or implicit/explicit knowledge, which 
organizes his types of activity, rests on the presupposition that, although tacit, 
unthematizable, nonreflective, 'background practices' are still full presences to 
themselves. 
To be sure, in view of the discussion in the preceding section, a critical assessment of 
Dreyfus' position will require the clarification of the following questions/issues: (a) the 
notion of 'practice' presupposed in the 'tacit background practices' argument; (b) the 
force of this argument and its 'analogy' to T. Kuhn's notion of the exemplar as the 
concrete, typical case; and (c) the notion of 'background practices' and exemplar as the 
unthematizable, the theme full in its presence, however delayed, and the 
question of judgment as decidability. 
I intend here to supplement what has already been said in chapter 4, and what will be 
argued further below in the text, and I will do it by referring to the study on "Michel 
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics" which Dreyfus co-authors with P. 
Rabinow. Rather than attempting to do justice to the rich content of this study, which 
would require an extensive reviewing, as well as a detailed reading of the early and late 
work of Foucault which cannot be done here, some observations will suffice. 
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Assessing the work of Foucault, at the time of the "Archaeology of Knowledge", 
Rabinow and Dreyfus write: 
"In his determination to avoid the traditional attempt to trace medical 
lore back to the 'founding act' of the reflectively aware 'thinking, 
knowing, speaking subject', Foucault...passes over the shared 
everyday medical practices passed on by teaching models and picked up 
by apprenticeship below the level of explicit reflective awareness." 
[1982:68] 
In contrast to the early position, 
"where discourse and the abstract systematic structure which regulates it 
were taken to be methodologically privileged, Foucault in his later 
writings sees discourse as part of a larger field of power and practice 
whose relations are articulated in different ways by different 
paradigms." 
[ibid:199] 
Dreyfus and Rabinow read this later move by Foucault as bringing him closer to T. 
Kuhn's position, according to which "what focuses and unifies scientific practices as 
well as scientific discourse into one enterprise is a shared exemplar" [ibid:66]. The 
exemplar as "the concrete piece of successful work" [ibid:60] which all 
practitioners accept as an example of the right way to proceed, "function(s) directly 
through the practices of those who have been trained to see, think and act in terms of 
them" [ibid:76; emphasis added] [17]. 
In other parts of the study, Dreyfus and Rabinow seem to endorse Kuhn's thesis that 
"the determination of shared paradigm [exemplar] is not...the determination of shared 
rules...Rules derive from paradigms, bur paradigms can guide research even in the 
absence of rules" [ibid:60,199; Kuhn:1970:42]. In the same vein, the two authors 
consider, as the most original contribution of Foucault's later work, his conception of 
normalizing technologies. These operate by establishing a common definition of goals 
and procedures which takes the form of agreed upon examples of how a well ordered 
domain of human activity should be organized [op.cit: xxiii,198]. The role of such 
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exemplars is considered to be that of "taking up scattered practices, focusing them, and 
giving a direction to the strategies implicit in them" [ibid:198; emphasis added]. 
As I will argue latter on (chapter 8), the methodological significance of this position -
which Dreyfus and Rabinow explicitly articulate in the study under consideration, with 
reference to Kuhn's exemplars, Foucault's 'disciplinary technologies' and Heidegger's 
'background practices' - should not be underestimated. Moreover, it should be 
emphasised that, regarding Dreyfus in particular, any endeavour to evaluate his work 
couldn't do justice to it were it not referred to the specific context, namely A.I., in 
which he articulates this position. This context is, in fact, the backdrop against which he 
sets up the dichotomy and the opposition between formalizable - conceptual, theoretical 
knowledge- and background practices, exemplars and examples (the unformalizable). 
The primacy of background practices over against rules is an attempt to challenge 
dominant views of rules as foundations. While his argument is persuasive (see section 
3.2), it still implies an essentialism in the way 'practices' are viewed, because it 
employs a common sense notion of 'practices' which are assumed to be direct, 
concrete, unmediated and nonreflective. The rule is replaced by the full-presence of 
the exemplar so that it can guide the practitioner's or the scientist's activity in the 
absence of rules. 
Furthermore, the notion of 'meaningful human activity' [op.cit:78] has to be employed 
in order to direct the hermeneutic quest to understand action. The presupposition on 
which this position rests implies a replacement of the self-same identity of the example 
or 'practices' for the self-same identity of rules. Lacking a perspective on language from 
which to view the oppositions rule-theoretical knowledge/practices-examples-
exemplars, the nature of each one of these terms and their interrelationship remain 
unclarified. Thus, at times, the example/exemplar/practices focuses the rule; at other 
times, it replaces or supplements the rule [ibid:77]. Similarly, rules which can be made 
explicit are juxtaposed to those kinds of norms which are picked up by apprenticeship 
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and the "sort of concrete examples Kuhn calls exemplars or paradigms" which cannot 
[ibid:108,n.1]. In a similar way, Dreyfus defines the notion of skill. Skills are 
acquired by working through exemplary problems which, based upon background 
practices, cannot be de-contextualized [ibid:163]. In short, in his determination to avoid 
the paradigm of reflection, and the subject/object dichotomy, Dreyfus falls into the 
opposite of formalism, and poses the exemplar as an unreflective, full presence. The 
exemplar functions as the ultimate signified, as the theme present outside of its signifier. 
I argued earlier that Dreyfus is interested in the methodological relevance of the issues. 
So, he does differentiate between the Kuhnian exemplar, which can be taken as a 
theme, and can be used hermeneutically "as a way of getting inside the serious 
meanings of the investigators whose behaviour makes sense in terms of the paradigm" 
[ibid:199], and the interpretive analytics. That is to say, a diagnosis which is not 
empirically demonstrable but emerges as an interpretation [ibid:xxii]. Thus, for 
example, for Dreyfus and Rabinow, Kuhn's account of scientific normalcy and 
revolution is a level of research which goes beyond the hermeneutic understanding, 
which through reflection, becomes available to the scientist. 
However, the level of analysis directed towards what has been indicated by the 
existential-pragmatic position of 'tacit background practices' - a position which, 
according to Dreyfus and Rabinow, unites thinkers such as Heidegger, Wittgenstein, 
Kuhn and Searle [18] - is still pursuing an 'element' or 'horizon' which produces and 
governs action and discourse [ibid:77]. The idea of the element as the elementary 
constituted unity betrays a haunted essentialism in Dreyfus's account. It is not 
without significance that Derrida puts in quotation marks the term element when he 
states: 
"No element can function as a sign without referring to another element which 
itself is not simply present. This interweaving results in each 
'element'...being constituted on the base of the trace within it of the other 
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elements of the chain or system. This interweaving, this textile, is the text 
produced only in the transformation of another text." 
[1981:26] 
The neglect of this essential trait of any element makes it impossible for Dreyfus to think 
the unthematizable outside the determinations of a hermeneutical interpretation and 
decidability. In section 6.4, I discuss Derrida's understanding of the unthematizable as 
the undecidable, i.e., as a parasitical production which requires a different notion 
of reading. For the moment, the following should be kept in mind: (a) in contrast to 
Dreyfus' notion of practice as concrete (or even tacit), non-formalizable because non-
representable, unalterable in its repetition, that which totalizes and accounts for the 
closure of the text, Derrida's work on language allows us to link practice with 
performance, and think both of them in terms of the undecidable; (b) the oppositional 
logic of formalized/unformalizable determines the function of the rule (code) and the 
example in Dreyfus' framework. Although the notion of rule as foundation has been 
challenged and its lack has been shown, the example which fills this lack is presented as 
having a self-same identity by which an admittedly weakened totality achieves its 
closure. Similarly, by resorting to a position of 'shared background practices', passed 
on by concrete models or agreed-upon examples, the notion of rationality has not, in 
fact, been challenged. The logic of the example/exemplar, opposed to that of rule, is still 
within the order of the rational: it defines the 'limits' of rationality according to the logic 
of saying/showing. In contrast, Derrida's notion of parasitical production gives us to 
think the rule/example relation according to the logic of the 'supplement', and, 
furthermore, gives us the tools for deconstructing the notion of the exemplar as the 
concrete model (see chapter 8). As will be argued later on, Derrida's discourse produces 
another 'logic' which is beyond the calculable or the dialectic, and which views both the 
rule and the example as 'effects' of iterability. Similarly, the deconstruction of the 
rule/example logic and their correlates of 'know that' and 'know how' or theoretical 
knowledge/skill, brings into prominence the level of judgment which cannot have a 
place within the order of the calculable programme. 
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6.4 FROM PRAGMATICS TO PRAGRAMMATOLOGY 
In the introduction to this chapter, I used the term pragrammatology to indicate a 
level of research that the Derridian inquiry has opened up. In the preceding sections, I 
pointed to some of the texts whose deconstruction and transformation has led to 
pragrammatology. In the first place, his critique of the Husserlian text - among others -
that I discussed in section 6.2.2, results in 'grammatology' as the deconstructed science 
[19] of writing and signification. 'Grammatology' amounts to a critique of the 'sign' 
and its correlates: communication and structure. In the second place, it is Derrida's 
reading of Austin's theory of performatives. The move that the latter makes with regard 
to language from semantics to pragmatics - i.e., from the view of universal meaning to 
language use - subordinates the performative to the constative, and the analysis of 
language in terms of its force to an analysis in terms of form (the stating of the facts). 
Derrida radicalizes this move by rejecting the view that the performative is the repetition 
of the same rules for describing context ('contextual rules' or conventions), and 
asserting that repetition is always repetition and alterity (iterability). The insertion of the 
conclusions of grammatology into the discourse of pragmatics, modifies and reinscribes 
both, producing the space of pragrammatology. Derrida announces this fundamental 
kind of research with the following words: 
"...I propose calling 'pragrammatological' the space of an indispensable 
analysis 'at the intersection of a pragmatics and a grammatology'... 
Grammatology has always been a sort of pragmatics, but the discipline 
which bears this name today involves too many presuppositions 
requiring deconstruction, very much like speech act theory, to be 




I would like to argue that the research practice that Derrida proposes, takes into account, 
rein scribes and transforms the movement concerning language whose trajectory has 
been underlined in this thesis in one way or another: from a notion of language whose 
s . 
essence is to decnbe and refer, to the Wittgensteinian notion of language as a box of 
tools which serves a multiplicity of purposes, to a theory of performatives which 
displaces the distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic action, and ascertains that 
in saying something, we are doing something. Derrida's work does so by inserting the 
notion of iterability - as the condition of codification (idealization) and, at the same time, 
condition for the ability of the sign to break with codification - into this discourse which 
fundamentally transforms the notion of a theory of action. For, on the one hand, 
more forcefully than ever, it returns us to the question of whether it is possible to have a 
general theory of action if such a theory has to break with pure ideality of speech 
situations and treat infelicities, 'chance' and 'misunderstandings' as 'necessary' 
possibilities. On the other hand, in showing that there can be no theoretical 
determination or empirical saturation of any given context, thereby limiting the 
theoretical importance of the argument of context-specificity for the determination of 
action or meaning, it leaves us with the problem of dealing with the following thesis: the 
authority of the code is ruptured as a result of its essential drifting into new contexts; 
similarly, and at the same time, it becomes independent of the power of any specific 
context to determine its meaning once and for all. 
Derrida argues that both univocity, which reduces language to the point where its 
translatable elements are transparent, and polysemy, which resolves equivocity by an 
appeal to the context, are in principle of the order of the decidable. Polysemy can be 
reduced - i.e., it can be clarified and rendered in univocal terms. It is thus assumed that 
it is possible to delimit a finite range of legitimate interpretations, and then to appeal to 
some determinable context to decide which interpretation suits it. In contrast, as I 
argued in the preceding section with reference to Derrida's notion of text, his claim 
about the essential openness of text is neither a thesis of decidable equivocity 
260 
(polysemy), nor a thesis of free play and pure indeterminacy (undecidable equivocity) 
[20]. The latter assumes that, since the context which would render meaning decidable 
cannot be absolutely determined, it is always a question of interpretation. Conflicts of 
meaning are always conflicts of interpretation - e.g., competitions aiming at the 
hegemony of one interpretation. It is, therefore, assumed that each interpretation (or 
theoretical account) "spreads according to a double and yet singular law of the principle 
of reason and of the will to power" [Derrida:1990:72]. 
Without excluding or opposing this kind of undecidable (interpretation), Derrida 
cautions against reading undecidability as equivalent to 'indeterminacy'. Referring to 
some of the ways in which he has emphasised the irreducibility of undecidability, he 
writes: 
"One of them determines in a manner that is still too antidialectical, 
hence too dialectical, that which resists binarity, or even triplicity (see in 
particular Dissemination)." 
[1988:116] 
While the latter is distinguished from the undecidable, which "defines, still within 
the order of the calculable, the limits of decidability, of calculability or of 
formalizable completeness" [ibid], it is not the particular undecidable that the Derridian 
deconstruction operating on a specific text seeks to produce. The Derridian 
undecidable, although including an interpretive moment, is not strictly and rightly 
interpretive. Remaining "heterogeneous both to the dialectic and to the calculable", it 
opens the field of decision: 
"It calls for decision in the order of ethical-political responsibility... A 
decision can only come into being in a space that exceeds the calculable 
program that would destroy all responsibility by transforming it into a 
programmable effect of determinate causes. There can be no moral or 
political responsibility without this trial and this passage by way of the 
undecidable. Even if a decision seems to take only a second and not to 
be preceded by any deliberation, it is structured by this experience and 
experiment of the undecidable." 
[ibid] 
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This undecidable entails, on the one hand, a quasi-transcendental movement. Stricture 
[21], Hobson writes, is the Derridian term which pulls together what metaphysics 
attempts to separate (form/content, sensible/intelligible, etc.), and sets up a pathway 
between what is postulated as separate. It designates, at once, its relation to dialectics 
and a certain 'outside' of it: 
"Stricture seems to be a tension of opposites which instead of being 
opposed, are looped under high tension into a pathway...it is not 
dialectic, it merely creates dialectic effects..." 
[1987:108] 
On the other hand, it includes a double movement of attachment to and detachment from 
the text under deconstruction, which is inseparable from the former one. As Derrida's 
deconstructive practice has shown, this becomes possible because the tools of 
deconstruction such as, for example, trace, differance, supplement, parergon, etc., 
though belonging to the quasi-transcendental chain as stricture, are borrowed 
strategically from the discourse being read. Such terms - borrowed and dropped, used 
and carried to another discourse, taking over from each other, operators of the text 
being written and elements of the text being read - do not permit the development of a 
metalanguage, and show the greatest respect for the text being analysed, without, 
however, stopping there. 
Deconstruction, therefore, as the double movement of a quasi-transcendental operation, 
and a movement of attachment to/detachment from a particular text or discourse, is what 
enables a metaphysical opposition - such as, for example, in our case, the opposition 
theory/empiricism - to be altered, moved on, but not destroyed. It effects what Derrida 
calls reinscription. To be precise, then, deconstruction is neither an analysis - i.e., a 
regression to a simple element - nor a critique which is one of the 'objects' of 
deconstruction. In the context of a correspondence concerning the translation of the term 
'deconstruction', Derrida [1988a:1-5] muliplies the difficulties in any attempt to 
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'define', and, therefore, translate it. Deconstruction, he says, is not a method, 
especially in the technical and procedural sense of the term, since it cannot be reduced to 
some methodological instrumentality; however, one cannot be content either with the 
claim that each deconstructive event remains singular, or with the claim that it is an act, 
an operation or even a practice. Rather, 
"[d]econstruction takes place, it is an event that does not await the 
deliberation, consciousness, or organization of a subject...It 
deconstructs it-self." 
[ibid:4] 
Derrida's own writings demonstrate that deconstruction is 'what happens', what 
allows state-ments to take place without itself having a stable or theorizable place. 
This means that, in contrast to decidable interpretations, deconstructive writing, being 
itself without a place, cannot conform to any ideal of legitimation. There is no logical or 
methodological justification for a gesture of departure which achieves a certain 
exteriority in relation to metaphysical oppositions. In the brief chapter of "Of 
Grammatology" on the "Exorbitant Question of Method", where Derrida explicitly deals 
with the issue, he writes: 
"Within the closure, one can only judge its style in terms of the accepted 
oppositions...The departure is radically empiricist. It proceeds like a 
wandering thought on the possibility of itenerary and of method. It is 
affected by nonknowledge as by its future and it ventures out 
deliberately." 
[1976:162] 
This radical empiricism (the incapability of absolute justification) (i) is connected to a 
certain 'historical necessity', i.e., the deconstruction of metaphysical presuppositions 
and logocentrism [cf. Gasche:1986:170]; (ii) it does not imply a rejection of the 
instruments of traditional analysis and research. 'Guardrails', Derrida maintains, are 
indispensable to the moment of 'doubling commentary' of a text. But "...this 
indispensable guardrail has always only protected, it has never opened, a reading" 
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[Derrida:1976:158]. By 'double commentary', Derrida [1988:144] means a quasi-
paraphrastic interpretation which bases itself upon that which in a text constitutes a very 
solid zone of implicit 'conventions'; that is to say, stratifications that are already 
differential and of a very great stability with regard to the relations of forces and the 
hierarchies or hegemonies they suppose to put into practice. This competent access to 
structures that are relatively stable must, however, be supplemented by an analysis of 
the play or relative indetermination in the text. It is only this 'labour', Derrida says, that 
can open the space for 'another' reading, i.e, the production of the undecidable. The 
latter should be understood, therefore, not as indeterminacy but as a determinate 
oscillation between possibilities - of meaning or of actions - which, indeed, are highly 
determined in strictly defined situations. Moreover, these two readings should not be 
understood as two separate stages but as two different moments in the same process of 
deconstructive reading: 
"...in a reading that is itself interpretive, inventive, or 'productive', 
assuming thereby the form of another writing, in a text in 
transformation in which the posssibilities of differential play are 
increasing and at the same time becoming increasingly determined." 
[Derrida: 1988: 147] 
(iii) This empiricism is only a mask. For, it does not close off that from which it is 
other. Rather, it works through differing/deferring. The putting into doubt of 
hierarchical oppositions, the opening of the question, which cannot be justified by past 
norms, is justified by the strength of the question. This is why Derrida writes that: 
"We must begin wherever we are and the thought of the trace...has 
already taught us that it was impossible to justify a point of departure 
absolutely. Wherever we are: in a text where we already believe 
ourselves to be." 
[Derrida:1976:162] 
(iv) Metaphysics, as a writing, is organized around a privileged point of presence 
(subjectivity, consciousness, temporal presence, intersubjectivity, etc.). If the 
metaphysical presuppositions are not ideas in a subject's (e.g. an author's) head, but 
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rather they are in the structures of a text, at a number of different levels, they betray 
themselves in a founding opposition in which one of the terms of the opposition is 
privileged. This means that there is a problem of metaphysics and language [22]. 
More specifically, the research situation has to negotiate (a) the problem of traditional 
metaphysical oppositions, and the interconnected problem of permutation of ordinary 
language with metaphysical concepts; and (b) the structure of language itself. Derrida 
uses the term strategy to convey the need for such a negotiation. 
With reference to the first problem, I have already said that Derrida claims that an 
immanent critique, i.e., a demonstration of the contradictions of a text, would have an 
effect of confirming metaphysics. Thus one can discern, in his own textual practice, a 
very general strategy, a strategy "without finality" [Bennington:1988:79], which he 
uses in order to distance his own text from metaphysics. Deconstruction as the double 
movement of reversal and reinscription has been practiced by Derrida with 
hierarchical conceptual oppositions - i.e., violent hierarchies where one of the two terms 
governs the other axiologically, logically, etc. - such as presence/sign, speech/writing, 
etc. It amounts to reversing the hierarchical opposition such that the lower term is 
privileged, and then reworking and reinscribing the newly privileged term in such a way 
that it permanently disrupts the hierarchical structure, creating a space which is not of 
the order of phenomenal meaning. This serves 
"...to avoid both simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of 
metaphysics and simply residing within the closed field of these 
oppositions, thereby confirming it." 
[Derrida:198 lb:41] 
Secondly, it is an intervention in the field of forces. To be effective, deconstruction 
has to take into consideration the conflictual and subordinating structure of the 
opposition, and to operate at a given moment. But it is not a question of chronological 
moment: "the necessity of this face is structural; it is the necessity of an interminable 
analysis: The hierarchy of dual oppositions always reestablishes itself" [ibid:198 1 b:42]. 
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Thirdly, to remain in this phase is still to operate from within the deconstructed system. 
But "we must also mark the interval between intervention, which brings low what 
was high, and the irruptive emergence of a new 'concept', a concept that can no longer 
be, and never could be, included in the previous regime" [ibid:42]. The production of 
the undecidables in a parasitical writing is the movement forward. Derrida insists on 
this dissymetric strategy in deconstruction, and contrasts it to an economy of decidable 
polarities characteristic of structural and eidetic reductions, which neutralize the text. 
This neutralization, Denida insists, is far from neutral, and has an ethico-theoretical 
character, namely, the systematic privileging of one of the two series that characterize 
the system of metaphysics: the series concerned with form, quantity, internal 
organization, closure, static analysis, as opposed to that concerned with content, 
quality, history, openness, genetic analysis. Thus when deconstruction operates on this 
series it has an effect of opening which is structural. However, as Gasche [1986:142- 
147] argues, it is as little a structure as it is an opening. It can be understood neither 
from a genetic nor from a structuralist and taxonomic point of view. Hence the double 
and dissymetric movement in deconstruction. Whereas its first gesture plays entirely 
within the closure of metaphysics, the second attempts a breakthrough towards a certain 
outside; that is to say, it is entirely heterogeneous to the first. 
With reference to the second problem, namely the question of language itself, there are 
several considerations which call for strategies, rather than a research programme. 
Above all, the latter implies a subject. The rejection of the subject as the origin of 
meaning, and the emphasis on language as the condition for one's being a subject, 
shifts attention from intention to intentional effects, and the whole idea of a 
'programme' falls down. This means that, first, the 'incision' of deconstruction is not a 
voluntary decision. The analysis is made in the general movement of a field, it is never 
exhausted by the conscious calculation of a 'subject', and it depends on a kind of 
systematic genealogy [cf. Derrida:1981b:82]. 
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Secondly, the concept of 'effect' is itself in the process of its deconstruction. Derrida 
[ibid:66-67] points to this need, and provisionally works the terrain of this still highly 
undecided concept as falling between, and borrowing from the oppositions 
essence/appearance, cause/effect, without being reduced to them. It is this fringe of 
undecidability which calls for intervention. 
The shift from intention to intentional effects displays the need for negotiation when one 
moves from the subject/text pair of opposition to writing. This means that the effects 
of the latter (a) can no longer be accounted for by the traditional notion of a text and of 
its assumed destination, conceived under the model of a sender (a prior constitution of 
a subject), a message (the communication of a content), and a receiver (an assured 
destination). It is this that makes Derrida wonder: 
"[W]lly do we still call strategic an operation that in the last analysis 
refuses to be governed by a teleo-eschatological horizon? Up to what 
point is this refusal possible and how does it negotiate its effects? Why 
must it negotiate these effects, including the effects of this why itself? 
Why does strategy refer to the play of the strategem rather than to the 
hierarchical organization of the means and the ends?" 
[Derridaibid:71] 
(b) These effects cannot be reduced to a limited field, such as, for example, sociology, 
literature, philosophy, etc., but places in question the limits between what is 
inside/outside, and the framing of each one of them. 
At various points in this chapter, I had the opportunity to touch upon both problems that 
are posed here. Derrida himself thematizes them, when in "My Chances/Mes Chances", 
he refers to the fundamental research of pragrammatology with the following words: 
"...pragrammatology should always take the situation of the marks into 
account; in particular that of utterances, the place of senders and 
addressees, of framing and of the sociohistorical circumscription...It 
should therefore take account of the problematics of randomness in all 
fields where it evolves." 
[1984b:27-28] 
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With reference to the problematic of randomness, the indetermination in the destination 
is already imprinted in the essential characteristic of every mark to be re-markable. 
Derrida emphasises that the effects of chance appear to be at once produced, multiplied 
and limited by language (or other systems of marks). "Such competition", he writes, 
"between randomness and code disrupts the very systematicity of the system while it 
also, however, regulates the restless, unstable interplay of the system" [ibid:2]. 
Furthermore, he juxtaposes two types of activity in considering the question of 
determinism and chance. On the one hand, it is the tendency to "interpret the incidents 
or accidents that befall us...by means of the reintroduction of determinism, necessity or 
signification.." [ibid:20] [23]. On the other hand, and in contrast to this, one can count 
on the calculating capacity of language, with its code and game [ibid:4], and 
exercise his/her 'analytical power' and 'calculating power' in 'gamelike 
situations' [ibid:12], i.e., a 'scientific and artistic' treatment of randomness [ibid:28]. 
Secondly - it becomes clear now from the exposition in this section - the justification of 
one's language and one's choice of terms is possible only within a topic, and an 
historical strategy. Thus Bennington writes: 
"It is perfectly reasonable to read Derrida's entire output as working 
between the attachment to and detachment from context or rather, for 
again this is a differential stricture, as exploiting the economy of forces 
of detachment and the forces of attachment, depropriation and 
reappropriation, letters never quite arriving, arguments never quite 
understood." 
[1988:81; emphasis added] 
I have tried to explain, in this section, Derrida's concern with a kind of research which 
would not compromise the stakes of the research situation by turning them into 
programmable effects of determinate causes. In particular, I discussed his notion of the 
undecidable, which is distinguished both from the notion of free play of meaning and 
action, and from the calculable. As against the calculable, Derrida's understanding of 
the undecidable opens the issue of 'critical' judgment in research. Since I will take up 
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and attempt to explore the problematic of judgment in the chapter which follows, and 
return to this problematic in the final chapter, suffice it here to make two points. 
First, in the vocabulary of the problematic of judgement - to be sure, in Kant, and I will 
expand on this later - there is a distinction between the particular, as an instance of the 
universal, as that which needs to be conceived through subsumption, determined and 
known, and the singular, as that which does not fall under the rule or the concept, but 
rather needs to be looked at, appreciated and judged [Schiirmann:1989:6]. Derrida's 
work complicates this distinction in many ways and by different strategies or 
interventions [24]. The most profound one - and the most relevant for the present 
discussion - is related to the idea of iterability and of the mark which upsets the 
distinction between a type and an instance, between the universal as the repetition of 
the same, and the individual or singular event. 
I have already argued that this undecidable has to be negotiated: that is to say, thought in 
a 'now', which is a thinking of and for the present ("en ce moment meme") that 
simultaneously negotiates the past and the future [cf. Bennington:1988:110]. It cannot 
be conceived, therefore, as an instance (a particular) which can be abstracted by an act 
of decontextualization or a theoretical decision; and this upsets the distinction between 
a constative (a statement of fact) and a performative act of writing. This radically 
particular (singular/ or event), for Derrida, as that which exists without an 'internal 
double' and therefore 'without reference', escapes the criterion of iterability with 
identical meaning, and the criterion of the 'ideal objectivity'. 
Secondly, this thinking of and for the (deconstructed) present is related to Derrida's 
concern with the ethical, the political and the question of responsibility in research. It 
should be emphasised that, in contrast to a notion of ethics subordinated to ontology 
determined in terms of presence, Derrida understands ethics in terms of undecidables. 
This explains Derrida's persistent location of 'ethico-theoretical' decisions at the root of 
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supposedly purely theoretical concerns. To understand this, we should recall Austin's 
decisions regarding speech act theory. Despite the strong ethical underpinnings of 
Austin's theory of speech acts regarding the question of truth - his concern with making 
truth dependent not on the simple existence of a referent, but on the whole speech-act 
context - we have seen that his most general concept of speech act is normed by the 
category of the 'commissive'. For Derrida, although "this prescriptive normativeness is 
not overtly moralistic", it reproduces, under the guise of a description of an ideal purity, 
"the given ethical conditions of a given ethics" [1988:122]. That is to say, Derrida 
shows that Austin's and Searle's theory of speech-acts not only sets up value 
oppositions clustered around an ideal limit, it, moreover, subordinates these values to 
each other (normal/abnormal, serious/non-serious etc) [ibid:92-97]. In this way, 
theoreticians of speech acts, 
"...exclude, ignore, relegate to the margins other conditions no less 
essential to ethics in general, whether of this given ethics or of another, 
or of a law that would not answer to Western concepts of ethics, right, 
or politics." 
[ibid:122] 
In other words, for Derrida, it is a question of ethics and politics, to uncover, in 
research, the implicit telos which guides the general theory of speech acts (and, more 
generally, of current research), and to show the implications of an analysis which is 
subject to teleological determinations. For example, despite the recognition that a 
given speech act does not fit neatly into one category (that there are "families of related 
and overlapping speech acts"), the analysis, which activates the theory and determines 
its methodology, guided by a telos (e.g., commitment to explicitness, to theory), has to 
have recourse to a normative or ideal structure: the ideal form of the 'successful 
performative'. Staten describes this very succinctly when he writes: 
"We have the pure generality 'successful performative'. Then we have 
particular events, which can be ranged in a spectrum from the most 
problematic to the clearest. In between, we have generalizations which 
attempt to specify the content of the pure generality. On this 
intermediate level, contamination is inevitable. No flawless formula can 
be given. But we can effect a marriage between the pure generality and 
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particular successful speech events in which the telos seems to be 
actualized. The whole set of illocutionary acts escapes exhaustive 
specification in formulas, but a subset of 'successful' speech acts 
norms the set. The criteria that Austin searches for are those by which 
particular speech events can be identified as something. On one hand, 
Austin finds that the criteria always fail to keep out complicating 
possibilities that render the identification problematic. On the other 
hand, it is always sure as what the identification is supposed to, or fails 
to, identify the cases." 
[1985:177:n.5] 
It becomes clear where deconstruction is pointing to, when Derrida, in the case of 
speech act theory, opens up the problematic of a non-distinction between a statement (a 
constative) and a performative act, the ethics and politics of research, and the problem 
of judgment. General theories, for example, in our case the developmental model of 
skilled performance in Dreyfus, ('action research' typologies in education would be 
another case), set up typologies - i.e., 'the logos of the type' (generalizations, e.g., 
'successful performative') - according to ideal (formal) structures. While Derrida points 
to the compatibility between a certain kind of formalism, its irreducible empiricism and 
the implied intrinsic moralism [1988:97], his work, simultaneously, opens up a 
pragrammatological space which takes the non-actualization of a telos as an 
essential - i.e. structural - possibility, and is sensitive to the 'negligible margin' 
between: a concept and what it leaves out; the intention and expression; the ideal 
structure and the multiple occurrences, and the rule and the transformations of its use. 
For Derrida, these supplementary complications call for 
"other thoughts beyond the concept and another form of 'general 
theory', or rather another discourse, another 'logic' that accounts for 
the impossibility of concluding such a 'general theory'." 
[ibid:117; emphasis added] 
For the sake of systematization, the table below (6.4.1) highlights the points of the 
Derridian intervention in the pragmatic theory of speech acts. 
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A PRAGRAMMATOLOGICAL SPACE OF RESEARCH VIS-A-VIS A 
TYPOLOGY OF PRAGMATICS 
PRAGMATICS PRAGRAMMATOLOGY 
structure of equivocal/ univocal 
meaning (or action) 
undecidable - differential stricture 
determination by calculation of forces Double move: defining the 
determinations at work, and 
showing the margin of play which 
allows these determinations to 
stabilize themselves. 
Context specific Double move: dependent on a given 
context but also independent of the 
power of any specific context to 
determine meaning and action once 
and for all. 
repeatability of the type iterability: repetition-and-alterity 
a calculable decision which reproduces 
the given axiomatic order 
opens the field of decision in the 




CHAPTER 7: CALCULABLE VS CRITICAL JUDGMENT 
"Phronesis...is acquired slowly, by practice, by imitating the moves of 
the prudent man. But suppose the polls is divided among itself, torn 
into competing factions, each of which has its own ideas about the 
prudent man. Suppose the polls is decentered, ruptured, in conflict? 
Suppose it is a mixed polls, populated with Athenian democrats and 
Spartan warriors..., each of whom speaks of loving the gods and the 
city and of doing one's civic duty but each of whom has entirely 
different ideas and practices...Phronesis cannot function if there is a 
conflict about who the prudent man is." 
[Caputo:1987:217] 
"You have not finished, you will never have finished with judgement. 
Your epoch, which is also a crisis...retains something like an enormous 
prejudgment in the form of a paradoxical denial as concerns judgment 
itself...It is because it rests on nothing and cannot be presented, 
certainly not with philosophical guarantees, criteria or reason, but 
judgement is paradoxically ineluctable." 
[Derrida:cited in Carro11:1987:213,n.19] 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
One string in the line of inquiry thus far can be taken up by saying, with Caputo, 
[1987:210] that the work to redescribe what 'reason' means led Husserl to an intuitive 
model. This ended up in a new subjugation of reason to intuition, by demanding, 
according to Heidegger, a transcendental self-justification, and by precluding, according 
to Derrida, the free manipulation of signs which do not require intuitive redemption. It 
can be certainly shown that most of the research projects reviewed have been anticipated 
by Husserl's framework. It should, also, be noted that as we moved from the 
cognitivist to the practical paradigms of research into action, we noticed a shift from 
descriptive research to interpretation to rational reconstruction. In the preceding chapter, 
I attempted to present not an alternative to those fundamental approaches to research but 
rather another discourse - what I called, following Derrida, pragrammatology. The 
neologism is meant to indicate that space of indispensable analysis which deconstructs 
and articulates the discourse of pragmatics and the critique of the sign. 
Redescribed in terms of rationality, we noticed a shift from a notion of rationality as 
rule-following, to a notion of action grounded on (social) practices, about which no 
rational account in the form of formalized rules can be given. It has been argued that, 
among the studies reviewed, the most sophisticated attempt to redescribe rationality by 
recognizing the importance of practice in the determination of action is that of Dreyfus' 
Heideggerian approach. However, his notion of action, as grounded on a non-cognitive 
base and normalized by exemplars, presupposes a notion of judgments as calculable, 
i.e., nonrepresentational but still demonstrable decisions; in other words, a reversal of 
calculation from saying to showing, and from the explicit rule to skill (and example) 
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picked up by imitation - i.e., tacit identity criteria. It was also argued that without a 
move to pragmatics and language, Dreyfus' account cannot present a radical enough 
critique of the notion of rule, neither can it provide a notion of practice which would 
avoid the traditional problems of representation, nor formulate a notion of critical 
judgment. 
The examination of Habermas' communicative action was meant to investigate the 
possibility that his own shift to language and intersubjectivity could provide the present 
thesis with the means to radicalize Dreyfus' model of exemplarity. As I argued in 
Chapter 5, his formal pragmatics approach to language turns the subject-centred reason 
into a 'we' of rational consensus which presupposes a notion of judgment as calculable 
(procedural) decision. The latter, through the (ideal) practice of argumentation, forms 
the collective subject from linguistic competence as the subject of action and decision. 
Both projects were depicted in Part I of the thesis as the most theoretically informed 
examples of the attempt to rethink the issue of rationality and of action which, while 
acknowledging the significance of the pragmatic context for the determination of action, 
would not be content with, say, an empirical pragmatic analysis of action. However, in 
both cases, it was the inadequate rethinking of context vis-a-vis judgment which 
surfaced as problematical. With reference to Dreyfus, I indicated the difficulties by 
demonstrating that, in the end, a psychological mechanism of intuition has to be 
employed in order to save the subject of decision from losing itself into the anonymity 
of either the 'they' or the task. With reference to Habermas, I argued that it is an ethical-
theoretical decision demanded by the telos of reason as emancipation which is 
responsible for his revision of speech act theory in such a way that the latter loses its 
radical potential. This, however, does not lessen the burden of having to deal with the 
problematic of context and judgment. 
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It is well known that the admission of an unbridgeable gap between practice and rules is 
what has turned attention to the issue of context and practical reasoning in the first 
place. Within the hermeneutic tradition, Gadamer, for example, attempted to rethink 
rationality along the lines of Aristotelian phronesis. This involved an understanding of 
reason - both in its scientific and its practical modes - as a flexible faculty of application 
and appropriation of norms wherein judgments are sharpened by making decisions in 
the concrete. R. Bernstein (1983) puts this view to work in order to organize the 
insights of post-empiricist philosophers of science from Kuhn onwards. Being sceptical 
about an uncritical acceptancrof the concept of phronesis, Bernstein objects that this 
notion presupposes a community in which there is a shared acceptance of principles and 
norms in order for phronesis to mediate between a universal (norm) and a concrete 
situation. That is, it presupposes a world already in place. However, his own position 
is to continue to address the issue of critical judgment in terms of more determinate 
criteria and critical standards that would provide the basis for decision making 
[ibid:155,157-58,171-231]. But, as Caputo [1987:210] remarks, it is at the moment of 
instability that "we must confess the play, for what causes phronesis to founder is just 
the unavailability of criteria". For Caputo, 
lilt is only after a free argument has played itself out that we can 
afterward, with a logic which limps along lamely after the fact, 
reconstruct what sorts of moves reason made which won the day. And 
it is only afterward, after the conditions for a new wave of normal 
science have been forged, that phronesis can again have a place - in the 
skilful application and extension of the new paradigm and in the training 
of young initiates.' 
[ibid:310:n10] 
The problem Caputo points to in the above quotation is the problem of 'the moment of 
indecision' (cf. Ferrara:1987/88:246-249) which is usually resolved only by its 
reduction to metaphysical determinations as, for example, in the case of Habermas and 
Austin. By presenting Derrida's confrontation with speech act theory in the preceding 
chapter, and from there on by elaborationg his conception of language, a space has been 
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created and the means are given to rethink the problematic of rationality as judgment, 
justification and legitimation. 
With the deconstruction of speech act theory, it became clear that: (i) because of 
differance, no single moment of experience can present itself, except in so far as it 
refers to what it is not; (ii) differance (the denial of presence) and dissemination 
define language as the non-present remainder of a differential mark; (iii) this marks the 
difference between a decidable, i.e., polysemantic, interpretive, hermeneutic, 
ethnomethodological equivocity which, in principle, allows for a fixed interpretation of 
the meaning of an utterance or an action, and an undecidable equivocity. 
With reference to the undecidable, it should be recalled that, first - as the determinate 
oscillation between possibilities of meanings of utterances or of actions - it cannot be 
understood in terms of a type/token distinction, but rather as a stricture. Secondly, it 
connects with the ethical in that it requires decision and judgment which exceed the 
calculable. Thirdly, it poses it as a problem in the form of the question of "what 
happens when acts or performances (discourse or writing, analysis or description, etc.) 
are part of the objects they designate?" [Derrida:1987:391]. This question opens a space 
for a pragrammatological analysis where "[a] reckoning is no longer possible, nor is an 
account, and the borders of the set are then neither closed nor open" [ibid]. 
I will now continue the argument in greater detail by turning to Lyotard's recent study 
on "The Differend". In addition, I have argued already for the need to look at Lyotard's 
work, for it could serve to endorse the critique advanced earlier with regard to 
Habermas' theory (section 5.3). It will, also, make clear the claim, as will be pointed to 
in a moment, with regard to Lyotard's shift, that the move to language as pragmatics is 
not in itself sufficient to displace the metaphysical determinations, and, in particular, 
those affecting the instance of decision and judgment. For, as has been argued before, 
the 'metaphysics of presence' is not something that can be done away with by making a 
277 
theoretical decision. I would like to demonstrate in this chapter, paying particular 
attention to the problematic of the subject, that metaphysical conceptuality keeps coming 
back, reinscribing presence where it is least expected. 
It is important to mention that "The Differend" is not the only study in which Lyotard 
deals with the problematic of judgment. In the "Postmodern Condition" (1984) a notion 
of judgment is detected which is based on his interpretation of Wittgenstein's 'language 
games', and on speech act theory. With reference to the former, the emphasis is on the 
heterogeneity of the different language games rather than on the questioning of the 
notion of rule itself. I am referring, in particular, to Wittgenstein's own interest in 
questioning the notion of rule itself (see section 3.3) - his tendency to "imagine", as 
Staten [1985:101] puts it, "the liminal moments of rule learning during which it is not 
yet natural to go on in the standard way and something new might be done." 
Similarly, the notion of 'public use', stressed by Wittgenstein in his move from rules to 
language games, hasn't become the focus of Lyotard's attention. Rather, he accepts the 
speech act theorists' interpretation of 'use' as convention, though, his pragmatics 
emphasise more the performative effects of the speech act. Lyotard's 'little narratives' 
have an open and mobile form, and are constituted in terms of their own pragmatics; 
i.e., they focus on the relations which are established within the narratives and 
underplay the content or context. This introduces an important difference between 
speech act theory and Lyotard's pragmatics, for, cut from context, the little narrative is 
cut from the assumed central element of all context, namely, authorial intention 
[Carro11:1987:158-159; ibid:210 n.4]. 
In "Just Gaming" [Lyotard & Thebaud:1985] judgment is presented either as the 
application of rules requiring specification, or the reflexive discovery of rules in the 
light of ideas. Ingram [1987/1988:286-305], in his discussion of this work, emphasises 
the double influence of the Aristotelian notion of 'phronesis' and the Kantian notion of 
'ideas' on Lyotard's account of judgment at this stage. Underlying such an account is a 
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sensitivity regarding the notion of community - that is, in either case, community is 
problematical. For if community in Aristotle becomes a substance, the Kantian 
grounding of (moral) judgment on the ideas requires an ideal community. 
But it is the study and revision of the Kantian notion of judgment of the "Critique of 
Judgment", in "The Differend", that leads to a rethinking of judgment, and a re-
orientation regarding the following aspects of Lyotard's work: (i) the notion of 
community is rephrased in terms of the Kantian 'conflict of the faculties; (ii) the 
emphasis on pragmatics is redirected: from the heterogeneity of the language games to 
the demand that springs from this heterogeneity - that is to say, the 'art' of their 
combination (phrasing). The differend, i.e., a case of conflict between two parties, 
which cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a universal rule of judgment, produces, 
for Lyotard, a critical questioning of and experimentation with rules, with no ultimate 
resolution possible. The differend connotes the subtlety of a difference and the 
antagonism of a dispute [1] and belongs to that chain of quasi-synthetic concepts which 
include, for example, iterability (cf. J. Bernstein:1989:407-425), and connects with the 
claims and aporias of the Kantian aesthetic judgment; iii) as Lyotard himself emphasises 
[1988:No.91:55; No.188:137], it is the anthropocentrism and teleology implied in 
Wittgenstein's language games - i.e. the notion of a subject-player who exists outside or 
prior to the universe of language games - that Lyotard wants to displace with his 'little' 
narratives, and more so with his notion of phrasing. The Kantian theme of judgment 
is, in fact, the posing of this problematic, for it is in the Kantian text that this question 
has been raised in the form of the question of the unification of the autonomous regimes 
of judgment. I might reformulate this issue in the following way: Lyotard's shift from 
Wittgenstein and the pragmatics of speech act theory to phrasing, raises, more 
forcefully than ever, the question of the subject of judgment, for it is the type or 
convention of pragmatics, which supposedly fixes the subject, that this shift attempts to 
undermine. 
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Section 7.2 presents, first, a dominant reading of Kant which gives support to an 
existing dichotomy in the Kantian texts between determinant and reflective judgment, 
and, then, makes some references to readings that attempt to, at least, weaken this 
opposition. Section 7.3 reviews the study on "The different: Phrases in Dispute" and 
other relevant essays by Lyotard. In particular, it focuses on Lyotard's reading and 
revision of the Kantian texts and follows him in his reformulation of judgment as critical 
activity. It also attempts to follow the pathways through which he articulates a pragmatic 
conception of language with a Kantian-inspired notion of language as incommensurable 
with itself. The chapter concludes with a critical note, a kind of interrogation as to 
whether such a reworked conception of language succeeds in distancing itself from the 
metaphysics of presence, and, in particular, anthropocentrism, teleology and 
adequation; in short, whether Lyotard is not trapped in mimetologism. 
7.2 KANT AND THE PROBLEMATIC OF JUDGMENT 
Dominant interpretations read Kant as distinguishing between two cases of judgement: 
either the general is already known, and all that is required is to apply it - that is, to 
determine the individual thing to which it applies (determinant judgement); or the 
general poses a problem and must itself be found (Reflective judgement). For Deleuze, 
[1984:58] both types of judgement imply art and skill; a man of judgement is always a 
man of skill. In determinant judgement the art is, as it were, 'hidden'. The concept is 
given, whether it is a concept of the understanding or law of reason. There is, therefore, 
a legislative faculty which directs or determines the original contribution of the other 
faculties, so that this contribution is difficult to evaluate. Reflective judgement, on the 
other hand, expresses a free and indeterminate accord between all the faculties. 
The art which remained hidden and subordinate in determinant judgement becomes 
manifest and exercises itself freely in reflective judgement [ibid:60]. This is not to say 
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that reflective and determinant judgement are like two species of the same genus. As 
Deleuze puts it, 
"Meflective judgement manifests and liberates a depth which remained 
hidden in the other. But the other was also judgement only by virtue of 
this living depth..[A]ny determinate accord of the faculties under a 
determining and legislative faculty presupposes the existence and the 
possibility of a free indeterminate accord." 
[ibid:60] 
Thus, for Kant, judgement is always irreducible or original. It never consists in one 
faculty alone, but in their accord, whether an accord already determined by one of them 
playing a legislative role, or in a free indeterminate accord [ibid:61]. 
In the three "Critiques", Kant defines the faculties, in one sense, according to the 
relationships of representation in general (knowing, desiring, feeling) and, in a second 
sense, as sources of representations (imagination, understanding, reason). 
[Deleuze:ibid:68-69; passim] When we consider any faculty in the first sense, a second 
faculty is called on to legislate over objects and to distribute their specific tasks to the 
other faculties. Thus: 
THE KANTIAN DEFINITIONS OF FACULTIES 
FACULTIES in the first sense 
of knowledge I 	 of desire 	 I 	 of feeling 
LEGISLATIVE FACULTIES 
Understanding Reason Imagination: it does not 
take on a legislative 
function but frees itself, so 
that all faculties enter into 
free accord. 
Table 7.2.1 
Source: Deleuze: 1984 
In theoretical judgement, in order for the understanding to apply a concept, it needs the 
schema. This is an inventive act of imagination, capable of indicating the condition 
under which individual cases are subsumed under the concept. Similarly, practical 
judgement - in Kant, the domain of moral law - expresses the accord of understanding 
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and reason under the legislation of reason. The understanding provides a type in 
accordance with the law of reason [ibid:59]. 
In Kant's "Critique of Judgment", the doctrine of schematism is substituted by, but 
also linked to, the notion of exemplary validity. The two are linked in the role of 
imagination which is fundamental to both, providing schemata for cognition as well as 
examples for judgement [Beiner:1982:viii]. Further, according to H. Arendt [1982:83-
84], Kant accords to examples the same role in judgements that schemata have for 
experience and cognition. Examples, Arendt says, play a role in both reflective and 
determinant judgements, that is to say, whenever the concern is with particulars. In the 
"Critique of Pure Reason", the example is called the go-cart of judgement. In the 
"Critique of Judgement", it is seen as guiding us, and the judgement thus acquires 
exemplary validity. 
In one of her lectures on Kant, H. Arendt gives the following example to indicate the 
different functions of schema and example. In order to recognize a table as a table, one 
has, before the eyes of one's mind, a schematic or merely formal table shape to which 
every table must conform. Alternatively, one proceeds from the many tables one has 
seen in one's life, strips them of all secondary qualities, thus arriving at the abstract 
table containing the minimum properties common to all tables. One more possibility is 
left, Arendt continues, and 
"this enters into judgments that are no cognitions: one may encounter or 
think of some table that one judges to be the best possible table and 
take this table as the example of how tables actually should be: the 
exemplary tab/e...This exemplar is and remains a particular that in its 
very particularity reveals the generality that otherwise could not be 
defined." 
[1982:76-77] 
Implicit in this description of judgments which are not cognitions is an aesthetics of 
judgment. Arendt characterizes this type of judgment as imaginative, dialogical and 
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communitarian [ibid:66-67] and, in her political theory, posits the rehabilitation of the 
'singular', traced in Kant's "Third Critique", as the very issue for judging. 
Arendt's choice of Kant's aesthetics as a model of political judgment, is rooted in her 
belief that it is there that Kant's political thought also resides. In his positive judgment 
of the French Revolution, Kant detects a "wishful participation that borders closely on 
enthusiasm", a feeling which is described as consisting in "simply the mode of thinking 
of the spectators which reveals itself publicly" [Kant:1963:143]. 
In Arendt's reading of Kant, the criterion of superiority of the standpoint of the 
spectator-judge (aesthetic judgment of feeling) over that of the moral actor (the judgment 
of the moral law of the "Critique of Practical Reason") is publicness. Publicness as the 
criterion of rightness, for Arendt, partially resolves the opposition between the 
practical and the aesthetic standpoint and, with it, "the conflict of politics with morality" 
[Arendt:op.cit: 19]. 
Thus the conflict of the faculties, the conflict between necessity and freedom, is 
resolved in Arendt's Kant by the position of the moral politician who is capable of 
viewing history, not as a mere mechanism of nature but as a theatre of moral purposes 
in which the politician's freedom is tested and affirmed. This is done by the latter's 
being able to adopt the maxim of 'enlarged thought', and reflect upon his judgment 
from a univeral standpoint - i.e., that of an ideal public of spectators - and thus to shift 
the ground to the standpoint of others. The importance of the maxim of 'enlarged 
thought', for Arendt, hinges upon the imagination through which particular appearances 
are elevated to the ranks of exemplary universals. 
It should be noted that the privileging of the standpoint of the spectator over that of the 
(moral) actor is, first, Arendt's move to the model of aesthetics as a model for political 
judgment. This, secondly, is a consequence of her recognition that the emphasis in Kant 
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is not on the question of subsumption/ non-subsumption (the distinction, 
therefore, between types of judgment), but rather on Kant's realization of the 
heterogeneity between the faculties - in this case, between aesthetics and politics, which 
results in a conflict and calls for judgment [2]. 
Many commentators have already argued that Arendt's project leads to an 
'aestheticisation of politics' [3]. More specifically, it has been argued that, as with a 
certain reading of Kant, her position of the spectator-judge presupposes and anticipates 
an ideal public of spectators. However, as Lacoue-Labarthe [1984:26-27] remarks, 
Arendt, in attempting to articulate aesthetics with politics, is not anaware of the 
Heideggerian notion of 'world' and the problem of articulation that this poses. For the 
world opened up by art makes possible "the-sharing-the-world-with-others" (the public 
space), but the latter is not the same thing as the 'world'. "It is inscribed there, and this 
inscription -such is the articulation- is made at the place where art calls upon judgment" 
[ibid:26]. Yet, despite this, as Lacoue-Labarthe goes on to suggest, Arendt's judgment 
is only the judgment of the beautiful. Lyotard [1984:77-79], who makes a similar 
charge to Habermas, emphasises the significance of the distinction between a feeling of 
the beautiful and that of the sublime in Kant [4]. 
It is worth noting that Arendt, by employing a notion of judgment of the beautiful, both 
covers up the Heideggerian problematic of 'world', and gives a subjectivist 
interpretation of Kant. In contrast, let us note, for the moment, that Lyotard emphasises 
the conflict, and takes the Kant of the sublime as his starting point. In Arendt, the 
articulation between politics and aesthetics is understood as the judgment which 
expresses the free and indeterminate accord between the faculties, and is based on what 
is common to them. By remaining within the framework of "The Second Critique", 
Arendt's reading of Kant's aesthetics still juxtaposes knowledge and truth to judgment 
and decision, and fails to challenge the distinction between knowledge/judgmment, or 
subsumption/estimation. Decision is still an action to be taken in a future-present. 
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Schiirmann (1989), in his critical evaluation of Arendt, notes that the fascination with 
the singular, which inspires her project of its rehabilitation, makes her gloss over the 
problematic of subsumption in her distinction between schema/example on which the 
particular/singular opposition is grounded. His claim is that Arendt's reading of Kant 
relies upon that line of argument in the Kantian text, according to which the particular 
needs to be conceived through subsumption, determined by concepts and known, while 
the singular is to be looked at, appreciated and judged. However, Schiirmann claims, in 
this line of argument 
"...aesthetic appreciation puts only conceptual, not paradigmatic, 
subsumption out of function. As the singular appears under the guise of 
one given particular gauged by one exemplary particular, it is not 
entirely set free from comprehensive measurement." 
[1989:8] 
For Schiirmann, what is at stake with the distinction is "enlightenment through 
reclaiming the subjective autonomy that has been lost under the sway of ultimate 
metaphysical representations" [ibid:6]. As he goes on to explain, with regard to science, 
to become autonomous is to prescribe transcendental laws to nature; in matters of 
morals, it is to submit freely under self-given imperatives; and in matters of judgment, it 
is to evaluate things as beautiful or political for their own sake. His argument, therefore, 
is that, contrary to Arendt's claims, in all these attempts at enlightenment, subsumption 
and calculability is indeed operative; however, in matters of judgment, standards are 
taken from experience, and consequently, their claim to universality is a modest one. It 
is modest in scope, since 'exemplars' apply only to selected facts: "as courageous as 
Achilles" applies only to phenomena of courage. It is also modest in depth since it 
entails only comparisons, not groundings. In contrast, the universality of the particular 
is unconditioned, since it aims at securing one standard immune to further evaluation -
one supreme referent. This means that the distinction that Arendt draws between the 
moral action and the spectator-judge, still conditioned by the dichotomy of 
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subsumption/appreciation-judgment, misses this crucial point. That is to say, far from 
being in opposition, the pairs exemplary validity-singular and subsumption-particular 
are united in the Kantian text by the theme of judgmental difference. 
Schiirmann explains the term and distinguishes it from the differend (the term 
borrowed from Lyotard but only as a term). In the first case, two opposing parties, e.g. 
claims, enter a litigation, thereby acknowledging the pertinence of one law (or 
exemplary case) under which they seek to be judged. Their dispute can therefore be 
settled. In contrast, in the case of the differend, there are two conflicting claims, that is 
to say, two claims which cannot be subsumed under the same covering law as they are 
heteronomous - falling under diverse vogot. "In a radical differend, we stand equally 
exposed to laws unifyng the particular and plurifying the singular" [ibid:3]. The 
differend marks the double bind, the particular/singular in one stroke. Schiirmann puts 
it thus: 
" In all our activities investigated by Kant, we put to work the 
ontological differend, or rather that differend puts us to work. In all our 
endeavors it ties us in one stroke and necessarily to consolidation as 
well as to dissolution. The retraction towards chaos...appears as no less 
normative ontologically than the attraction toward order. The most 
enlightened insight is into that double bind." 
[ibid: 16] 
To talk of the differend is to make another reading of Kant, itself articulated in the 
Kantian text as a different line of argument. Very briefly, the problematic of the 
differend, as Schiirmann analyses it, is Kant's dualist ontology of being, which, hinted 
at in the earlier writings, comes to the fore in the "Critique of Judgment" as the question 
of the singular and the very issue for judging. Kant's two answers to the question of 
being taken in their heterogeneity split the subject and make it heterogeneous to itself. 
Tracing the difference in the earlier writings of Kant, Schiirmann argues that the 
question of the differend is posed in the form of the question: "Is 'my existence' the 
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indeterminate content of sensation or the determinate act of consciousness?" [ibid:11]. 
The two answers to the question show the subject to be broken. On the one hand, there 
is the determinative 'I think' that posits itself as a category; on the other hand, is 'my 
existence' which stands in need of determination. The first answer - i.e., 'existence as 
category' - centres being on the spontaneous 'I' and indicates a move towards 
synthesis; the second answer to the being question - i.e. 'existence as presence' -
disperses being among the givens received in sensibility and hints at dispersion. In the 
"Critique of Judgment", the first move is subverted by a systematic need for being as 
giveness, as indeterminate. Primitive self-presence places full presence forever out of 
reach [ibid:13] [5]. 
To conclude this first and brief exposition of the problematic of judgment in Kant, I 
would like to emphasise that the different readings presented here, are supported in the 
Kantian text, and are a consequence of inconsistencies in the latter, related to the role of 
imagination, which result in different conceptions of judgment. In Heidegger's reading 
of Kant, as explicated by W. Richardson [1967:107-160], these different conceptions 
are located in two series of texts in Kant, one of which (the second edition of "The 
Critique of Pure Reason") enumerates the transcendental imagination among the three 
basic powers (faculties), along with the pure intuition and pure concepts of 
apperception; the other insists that there are only two 'stems' of knowledge - i.e., 
sensation (receptivity) and understanding (spontaneity) - and that the imagination is the 
unknown common root of the other two. Though impossible to enter this problematic, it 
is essential that it is stated here before I proceed to present Lyotard's Kant, for, as 
becomes apparent later on, Lyotard is aware of this distinction, though he gives his own 
interpretation of the role of imagination. Let's therefore conclude by citing the different 
conceptions of the 'imagination' in Kant: (a) a process of validating a general rule by 
subsuming a particular under it - i.e., as a function inhabiting the faculties of 
understanding, practical (moral) reason and theoretical reason, providing schemata, 
types and symbols respectively; (b) as a separate faculty in its own right but lacking a 
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specific object or field; and (c) a general 'cognitive' faculty along with understanding 
and reason [Ingram:1987/1988:304,n.25; Lyotard:1988:130-131; 1988a:166]. 
7.3.1 LYOTARD'S KANT 
As Carroll [1984:76] rightly remarks, "The Differend: Phrases in Dispute" (1988) is 
Lyotard's major attempt to literally perform linkage or phrasing. For Lyotard, this 
means that disagreement rather than consensus is the starting point. It also means that 
the disagreement is more over the phrasing of a dispute than over the content or the 
referent of phrases. These two starting points inform Lyotard's strategies in his thinking 
or, rather, phrasing the praxical (ethical or political). 
His strategies are focused by an interlinking of narrative pragmatics and Kant as the 
'critical watchman', which results in a modification or, rather, radicalization of both. 
With respect to the first, while he uncompromisingly holds on to his earlier position -
resting on a genuine respect for heterogeneity - not to mix up the various games, he 
moves away from narratives to the extent that the philosophy of phrases demands 
few assumptions and produce fewer exclusions. Still, narrative pragmatics provides 
him with a notion of situation, which, in his view, allows one to specify the way in 
which the instances of a universe (addressor, addressee, referent, sense) are related. 
That is to say, relations are indicated by the form of a type-sentence. This position, 
accentuated in the philosophy of phrasing, displaces the notion of the subject player of 
pragmatics. The subject becomes a situated instance within the universe of phrases. Yet, 
the respect for heterogeneity that this pragmatic approach to language demands, still 
does not deal with the problem of a simple pluralism. Lyotard's shift to Kant is meant to 
provide a corrective to this problem through the latter's notion of presentation. 
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For Lyotard, the metaphysical illusion and the philoshophy of the subject consists in 
treating a presentation like a situation [1988:61]. Presentation is an occuience and it is 
the "business of the faculty of judgment" to effectuate a presentation. It supposes a 
capacity for judging the example or case which fits an established or unknown rule, and 
for finding it without a rule. By focusing on "the art of combination", presentation 
undermines the assurance of the type (of a narrative or a type phrase) as that which 
determines how the instances of a universe are to be related. The latter - and the 
tradition, Kant included - confuses a presentation with a situation. The confusion 
consists in thinking that a presentation is a simple ostention. But, for example, within 
the regimen of knowledge, presentation requires the conjunction of an ostensive with a 
cognitive - i.e., of two hererogeneous phrases. In a similar fashion, Lyotard brings the 
language of pragmatics into the issue of the Kantian presentation, showing that it is the 
conjunction of two phrases that establishes an object. The assumption of a subject as a 
source of unification of the different faculties - a problem that Kant realizes but covers 
up- is thus undermined, for the subject is situated differently in the two phrases. 
Phrasing escapes from the mastery of a subject. 
Lyotard vividly demonstrates the implications of such an intersection between 
pragmatics and Kant, in his "Kant notice 1" [ibid: 61-65]. There he draws attention to 
the doubling of the phrase constitutive of an object. The Kantian distinction between 
sensation/conception is reinscribed in terms of two heterogeneous phrases. Thus, 
"[t]he immediacy of the given...is not immediate. On the contrary the 
constitution of the given requires an exchange of roles between 
addressor and addressee instances, and thus requires two phrases or 
quasi-phrases: respectively, the one where impression occurs and the 
one where the putting into (spacio-temporal) form occurs. This 
permutation involves two partners who alternate between addressor and 
addressee...The 'first' addressor, however, the one who affects the 
subject through sensation, remains unknown to the latter." 
[ibid:62] 
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It is not only that the 'subject' is situated differently in the two phrases. Lyotrad calls 
attention to the fact that a differend (dispute) is installed between them, for they speak 
different idioms. Though the issue of differend is Lyotard's new focus, there is 
something which remains constant throughout Lyotard's work in his preoccupation 
with the praxical and the social. This is the desire to maintain the social as a question to 
be determined anew, a judgment always to be made again. The social is always a 'case' 
which is brought before a tribunal, and where the nature of the tribunal, which is 
supposed to pronounce judgment, is itself the object of the dispute. 
For Lyotard, the absence of a homogeneous language is marked in the Kantian text in 
the event of obligation. Watson [1988:35] describes it as the problematic of "tracing the 
event of obligation within the play of theoretical difference, the underdetermination 
of the moral and the antinomies of transcendental dialectic..." - i.e., that problematic in 
Kant which gives licence to an extension that grants 'primacy' to the practical. 
Kant realizes that, at the foundation of morality, there would always be an abyss and an 
inextricable dispute concerning its possibility. In Lyotard's reading of Kant, the dispute 
also concerns its character and its domain. Injustice involves an event, always 
underdetermined, and thus always denied within a particular 'universe' of phrases. 
Every description remains inadequate before this abyss and opens up a differend. 
In "Kant Notice 2" [op.cit:118-127] Lyotard describes the impossible question faced by 
Kant of how to 'deduce' the prescriptive without making it lose its specificity, which 
leads him to transfer the question into the situation of obligation. Kant notes the 
difference between theoretical reason, where there is an isomorphism between the 
object-language of science and the critical language of deduction, permitting the 
extraction of the principle of causality, and practical reason where there is heterogeneity 
between the prescriptive of the supposed object-language and the descriptive language 
of critical deduction. In the failure of the deduction, which is supposed to legitimate 
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prescriptives, Kant concludes that what can be deduced in the absence of the law is 
freedom. The law itself is a quasi-fact of reason because it cannot be established as a 
true and simple fact by means of a procedure under the model of theoretical reason. The 
moral 'experience' relates to an idea and it cannot be established as an experience 
(cognition). 
If the abyss found between the theoretical and practical reason is impassible, for Kant, 
the morals remain an abstraction. He attempts to find a mode of passage which is not 
simply an extension of legitimation from one realm to another but "the establishment of 
a differential for the respective legitimations. The 'as if is the generic name of this 
differential" [ibid:123]. The analogy ('as if) is that of the natural law which serves only 
as a type of a law of freedom. The passage is made by the form of the law: ethical 
judgment borrows this form from the theoretical in order to guide itself when a case 
needs to be established. In the realm of ethics, causality is only an idea signalled by a 
feeling of respect and constitutes the situation of obligation. 
Different readings of Kant give different interpretations of the situation of obligation. 
Centred on the interpretation of the analogy of 'as if, they can be read as the difference 
between the categorical and the moral imperative. The former, belonging wholly to 
modernism [Watson:op.cit:48], gives an algorithm for strict univocal adjudication of the 
ethical. For Lyotard, following Levinas [Lyotard:op.cit:110-115], it is the inadequation 
of the imagination to the event, whose inextricable underdetermination cannot overcome 
the conflict of interpretation, that makes it undecidable with reference to the 
theoretical, thus giving rise to the situation of obligation (moral imperative). For 
Lyotard, as for Levinas, it is a matter of an idea which could never be free from the 
question as to whether it has taken place. Its transcendence would always remain empty 
[Lyotard:ibid:No.172:115]. 
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Lyotard [ibid:122-123] explains in his own idiom: as a specific regimen of phrases, 
obligation is by itself the proof of a causality. Either the 'if...then' is a performative, 
i.e., a moral obligation, or the 'if...then' supposes a linkage of implication ( a 
series of consequences) - that is to say, a categorical imperative. This is of particular 
significance for Lyotard. For, if ethics is read as an implication, it establishes a 'world' 
in the Kantian sense (as a chain of causes and effects) - i.e., a substantive ethical 
community - which excludes obligation and, therefore, judgment [ibid:127]. He 
elaborates the problem as the threat of transcendentalism which is introduced with the 
analogy of the form of legality, thus: 
"If the maxim of your will ought to be able to be set up as 'a universal 
law of nature', to constitute 'a universal legislation'..., it is apparently 
because the dissymetry beteen I and you ought to be disregarded for the 
benefit of some universal, 'humanity', the we of exchangeable I's and 
you's...They are thus exchangeable not only upon the instance of the 
obligated one, the you of the you ought to, in order to form a 
community of hostages, but also upon the instance of the legislator, the 
I of the I am able to, in order to form a community of constituents." 
[ibid:125] 
The abyss is filled and the differend between the regimen of phrases of obligation and 
that of cognition is treated as a simple litigation. By imposing onto the former the rules 
of the latter ( rules of exchangeability and consensus) ethical legitimation is reduced to 
cognitive legitimation. The law is known and the ethical is no longer in question but 
presented as a fact. 
In "Kant Notice 3" [ibid:130-135] Lyotard turns to Kant's "Critique of Judgment" and 
some of his later texts on the historico-political, which provide him with a critical 
strategy for phrasing the political. In the process, as Carroll [op.cit:79] remarks, "the 
aesthetic will be politicised as it indicates a critical way into the political and the political 
'aestheticised' as it is forced to bear the critical test of aesthetic judgment." 
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In Lyotard's reading of those texts, Kant not only recognizes the heterogeneity and 
dispersion of the various genres of discourse, but also poses it as the problem of 
finding passages between them. The faculty of judgment, in the earlier writings 
assigned the role of intervening in order to validate a case or to present an object 
permitting its validation, appears here as a force of passages between the faculties. 
Contrary to the name it bears - i.e., as a faculty, the latter understood as the capacity of 
cognition in a broad sense and the capacity for having an object - the faculty of 
judgment has no object but it is "the determination of the mode of presenting the object 
that suits each respective genre" [op.cit:130]. Its interventionist force consists in both 
ensuring the passages between genres and enabling each of them to be delimited, thus 
establishing their authority. 
Tracing the operation of several passages at work, as they are first identified by Kant, 
for example, between the dialectical argumentative and the cognitive (theoretical reason 
and understanding respectively), or between the beautiful and the morally good, 
Lyotard elaborates the notion of a passage by means of analogy, clarifying the 
sense in which he believes that it is respect for heterogeneity and the differend that 
makes an activity critical. As he explains, there is a difference between sensible 
illustrations - i.e., an operation of sensibility in harmony with the laws of 
understanding, for example, an analogy between a living body and a political regime -
and the analogy at work that Kant draws attention to in his explorations of the judgment 
of taste, but also in other passages. In the latter, the analogy and symbolization do not 
occur through a substitution of objects but rather through permutations of instances 
(referent, sense, addressor, addressee) in the respective phrase universes, and without 
recourse to a direct presentation. It should be recalled that this is what has been 
identified in my earlier presentation as being the case with reference to the ethical 
phrase. In there, it is not the object but the law (practical reason), not the referent but the 
sense, which affects the addressee. This permutation of the instances is shown now to 
occur for the aesthetic and the political. 
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This discovery is crucial. For the critical watchman's task is described as that of finding 
modes of passages which, as was mentioned earlier, are not simply the extension of the 
legitimation from one genre to another, but the establishment of a differential (`as if' 
analogy). This means - and with reference to the immediately preceding paragraph - that 
what allows the judge to say 'this is the case' in the judgments of taste - the latter taken 
as a model of critical judgment- is not necessarily empirical facts, but also rules of 
formation (phrase families) and of linkage (genres of discourse), and where the rule is 
itself an 'as-if rule or critical analogy which permutes the instances. 
Mapping out the pathways that Kant follows in his explorations of the passages, 
Lyotard reinscribes the dichotomy between reflective/determinant judgment in terms of 
the differend. If there is an 'arrangement' and compromise between the teleological 
thesis of an autonomous reflective judgment (the thesis of nature in the Kantian sense) 
and the mechanical antithesis of heteronomous determinant judgment, this compromise 
should be understood in terms of a 'guiding thread'. The critical judge effects the 
compromise without a rule which would authorize him to do so, and only by means of 
an 'as if analogy. In his searching for singularities to find an order, he judges as if 
there were one. This cannot be presented as an object, for it is a mere idea. 
In his critical reading of the Kantian notion of the 'sign of history', Lyotard, following 
Kant [ibid:169], advances far into heterogeneity: the necessity to judge in the absence of 
determinable laws, when one is called to judge, but the authorization to judge is the 
problem. The 'sign of history' ("Kant Notice 4"), as read by Lyotard, demonstrates this 
further degree of complexity regarding the passages which are needed to phrase the 
historical-political. Kant introduces this difficulty, in his exploration of the differend 
between a cognitive phrase about history - legitimated through the presentation of 
examples and counterexamples and carried out in a pragmatic politics - and a phrase 
within the strange family of phrases of judgment which would ascertain that 'there is 
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progress'. In the latter case, the phrasing is not according to the rules of direct 
presentation proper to cognitives, but according to the free analogical presentation in 
which a certain phenomenon does not have the value of examples or schemata but it can 
only be a guiding thread. What is sought, therefore, is not an intuitive given, but an 
event - i.e., an occurrence which can indicate and not prove. That is to say, this event 
ought not to be, itself, the cause of progress but only its index - "a sign that recalls, 
shows and anticipates. The sought-for Begebenheit [event] would have the task of 
'presenting' free causality according to the three temporal directions of past, present, 
and future" [ibid:164]. Moreover, this occurrence is not just a deed which, appropriated 
by different phrases (e.g., the descriptive-cognitive, the dialectical, etc.), would be an 
equivocal phenomenon allowing for different readings. For there can be no direct 
presentation of the object of a phrase when it bears on the future. The occurrence of the 
cause remains undetermined, a price which is paid for the possibility of its intervention 
in the past and future, too [Lyotard:1987:169]. If the event is not given by experience 
(as a phenomenon) it is given in experience - i.e., delivered as a sign 
[Lyotard:1988:165]. 
The event that Kant responds to as a sign of progress is the French Revolution, 
mentioned earlier with reference to H. Arendt's reading of Kant. The event is not the 
Revolution itself, but 
"...simply the mode of thinking of the spectators which reveals itself 
publicly in this game of great revolutions, and manifests such a 
universal yet disinterested sympathy for the players on one side against 
those on the other, even at the risk that this partiality could become very 
disadvantageous for them if discovered..." 
[Kant:1963:143] 
This "wishful participation that borders closely on enthusiasm" [ibid] is an aesthetic 
analogon of a pure republican fervor. It is a modality of the feeling of the sublime. 
Instead of experiencing a feeling for the object, we experience on the occasion of that 
object a feeling for the idea of humanity. 
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What is aesthetic in the historical is that which cannot be determined as cognitive and 
must be judged by the same means as the aesthetic per se. However, in contrast to 
Arendt, Lyotard's reading is not content with affirming the position of the passive, 
enthusiastic spectator capable of reading the signs of history. The step to the 
'politicisation' of the aesthetic [Carro11:1984:83] is ensured in Lyotard's linking of the 
feeling of enthusiasm with the sublime feeling (pain and joy): the imagination does not 
succeed in presenting an object that might validate an idea; it feels its impotence but, at 
the same time, is filled with joy for the discovery. What it discovers is not only the 
incommensurability of ideas to all presentation but, also, "the destination of the subject, 
'our' destination, which is to supply a presentation for the unpresentable..." 
[Lyotard:1988:166;emphasis added]. The destination of the spectator, therefore, is not a 
simple passive contemplation, but a demand is raised, and he is called to do what cannot 
be done - viz., to strive continually towards a justice that can never be guaranteed. The 
presentation is a paradoxical one, namely, 'the impasse as passage'. The sublime is a 
formless given and, as such, it falls under the sway of the critical judge; it is an event 
which "ought to make a sign of history", the phrasing ought to indicating that the pure 
aesthetic feeling of enthusiasm requires a common sense and calls upon a consensus 
which is nothing more than a sensus - i.e., underdetermined. It is an idea and an 
appeal to community for which no proof, that is, no direct presentation, can ever be 
found, and only an indirect presentation is presented. 
One can only see how this reading of Kant authorizes Lyotard to claim [1988a:304-
307], against Habermas' rational consensus and Rorty's pragmatic relation of 
interlocution [6], that "the notion of interlocution, as a passage or circulation of speech 
in the first person - from I to you, and from you to I - does not guarantee that the I 
and you must make a we..." [ibid:305]; and, furthermore, it raises the question of 
whether such a pragmatic relation is constitutive of our relation with language. This 
point needs further elaboration: 
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According to Kant's "parathetical solution to an antinomy", two apparently 
contradictory propositions can be maintained alongside each other, even if the 
explanation of the possibility of their concept surpasses our faculty of knowing 
[Lyotard:1987:174]. Involved in this, Lyotard argues, are the senders and addressees of 
the various families of phrases. In particular, the situation of the addressor and 
addressee is regulated - i.e., subject to determination according to the way the referent is 
presented by a phrase. With reference to the situation of obligation, it has been said 
earlier that only the situation of addressee is regulated, while the sender of the moral law 
remains indeterminable. The ethical community is mediated by a concept of reason (the 
idea of freedom), and, therefore, the community required is not a substantive 
community - since it is not subject to the rules of direct presentation. Being obliged is a 
relation with the law which does not focus on the 'I', but only on the 'you', and where 
others are not implicated by conversational address. In the phrase of the beautiful, what 
is regulated is the fact that there is no rule, since there is no determinable presentation of 
the referent. Yet, this rule of no regulation appeals to a possible agreement between 
sender and addressee, as the latter are affected or immediatetely situated in 
feeling; that is, by the 'referent' not of the cognitive, but of the strange phrase of 
judgment (ethical phrase, ethical value of the sign). Therefore, the community of 
adressors and addressees, called forth without the mediation of any concept, is judged 
to be there, but not as rational consensus. The communicability of the judgment cannot 
be obtained empirically, much less by means of conversation. Since it does not proceed 
through concepts, it cannot be validated by argumentative consensus [1988a:306]. 
In a similar way, through an appeal to Kant's 'sign of history', Lyotard proposes to 
reconsider the question of reality, rephrasing the rationality of the historico-political 
'real' as follows: "That everything real is rational, yes, that can be said, if rational 
signifies: in conformity with the procedure for establishing the reality of a referent" 
[1988:No.131:79]. His outstanding example is the proper name of Auschwitz, 
presented as an abyss in which the dialectical genre is invalidated (the presupposition 
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that "all real is rational and that all rational is real"). At least this crime, which is real, is 
not rational. The reality of the 'wrong' (injustice) suffered in Auschwitz remains to be 
established, because it is in the nature of a wrong not to be established by consensus. 
The inability of the dialectics to conceptualize Auschwitz and generate a 'result' from 
this 'experience' raises a general problem of knowledge. Lyotard interprets the silence 
imposed by Auschwitz to be a 'sign'. 
"Signs...are not referents to which are attached significations 
validatable under the cognitive regimen, they indicate that something 
which should be able to be put into phrases cannot be phrased in the 
accepted idioms. That, in a phrase universe, the referent be situated as a 
sign has as a corollary that in this same universe the addressee is 
situated like someone who is affected, and that the sense is situated like 
an unresolved problem, an enigma perhaps, a mystery, or a paradox.-
This feeling does not arise from an experience felt by a subject. It can, 
moreover, not be felt...The silence that surrounds the phrase, 
Auschwitz was the extermination camp is not a state of the mind, it is 
the sign that something remains to be phrased which is not, something 
which is not determined. This sign affects a linking of phrases." 
[Lyotard:1988:No.93:56-57; the second emphasis added.] 
Thus (a) the name of 'Auschwitz' marks the limit where the cognitive narrative 
(historical knowledge) sees its competence challenged. Narratives fail before the 
occurrence and drive the event back to the borders. But differends are born from this 
occurrence [1988:No.218:151]. The feeling aroused by the negative presentation of the 
indeterminate, calls upon unknown phrases to link onto the name of Auschwitz. This 
sign therefore - as with all 'signs of history' - becomes a matter of judgement. As 
Carroll [1987:173] observes at this point, the philosophy of phrases which started off 
as constituting something like an analytic of the historical-political, ultimately leads to a 
critique of the analytical and conceptual, and to what could be called a receptiveness, not 
only to the facts but also to the signs of history. The latter is not a psychological state 
but rather an anticipation of enunciations or acts that must follow. 
(b) This 'example' of a proper name - Lyotard offers other examples or rather signs, 
such as 'Budapest '56', 'May 1968' [1987:162] - shows the complexity of the 
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passages that have to be made in order to link into the phrase "Auschwitz was the 
extermination camp". In his own discourse, this name becomes a sign of an event. This 
Begebenheit marks what has been called post-modernity, a feeling produced by the 
fission of the great narratives (in this case dialectics) which produces a new type of 
sublime. In this, we feel not only the irremediable gap between an idea and what 
presents itself, but also the gap between the various families of phrases and their 
respective legitimate presentations [1987:178]. In the event announced by a feeling, the 
critical judge (Lyotard) judges 'as-if history has moved one step in its progress: 
"This step would consist in the fact that it is not only the Idea of a single 
purpose which would be pointed to in our feeling, but already the Idea 
that this purpose consists in the formation and free exploration of Ideas 
in the plural, the Idea that this end is the beginning of the infinity of 
heterogeneous finalities." 
[ibid:179] 
(c) The 'as-if presentation (analogy) is the most fragile and risky form of 
argumentation, for there is a very fine line between a 'good' and a 'bad' analogy. 
Carroll comments on Lyotard's use of analogy with these words: 
"Given that there cannot be any predetermined rules to distinguish one 
form of analogy from the other, each analogy must be judged in each 
instance to decide if, on the one hand, it maintains the differences 
between the terms while linking them, or, on the other, it collapses 
them into each other. Each analogy, if critical, will result in the 
introduction into each field of a perspective that is, at least in part, that 
of the other field. In this way, each field remains open, always to be 
determined...The Kant of critical judgement is, for Lyotard, therefore, 
the Kant of critical analogies, of an 'as if which never becomes a 
simple 'as'." 
[Carroll :1987 :175] 
In Carroll's assessment, there are two widely divergent and even conflictual tendencies 
in Lyotard's critical strategy. The analytic-pragmatic side is locked in a struggle with the 
non-cognitive, the latter seen as an undeniable element not only of the aesthetic but also 
of the political-historical. Moreover, Lyotard makes no attempt to resolve the conflict, 
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he even exacerbates it, moving from one extreme to the other to increase the tension 
between them; the term differend, itself, being a kind of limit case. 
It should be noted that Lyotard's acceptance of the distinction between direct/indirect 
presentation, and consequently, the example/analoga distinction serves, precisely, such 
a strategic purpose. Lyotard starts off by accepting Kant's insight of the need to expose 
the 'transcendental illusion', namely the confusion of what is presentable as an object 
for a cognitive phrase (schemata/examples) with what is presentable as an object for a 
dialectical and/or ethical phrase (analoga). The acceptance of the example as falling 
within the cognitive realm, however, is only a strategy which prepares his subsequent 
move: the problematization of the notion of analogy as indirect presentation. This is 
achieved by exposing the transcendental illusion in Kant himself, namely, nature as an 
as-if subject, thus recasting the 'Idea in the Kantian sense' in terms of the differend [7]. 
Put differently, Lyotard argues that the modelling of indirect presentation according to 
direct presentation, puts obstacles to the task of promoting differends. By removing the 
obstacle of the 'as if subject of nature, Lyotard opens the question of the differend as a 
question of language rather than anthropology. Language, Lyotard would say, is 
differends: 
" At the limit... language does not communicate with itself: it is capable 
of producing phrases which are not translatable into other phrases." 
[1986/87:213] 
A translation presupposes that the sense presented by a phrase in the language of 
departure can be recovered by a phrase in the language of arrival. It is on the occasion 
of a linking, which attempts to bring an end to differals integral to language by 
transforming a conflict into a litigation (translation), that a differend can manifest itself 
by the mode of feeling - the mode of a phrase that awaits its expression. For Lyotard, 
therefore, it is the (traditionally) negligible differends rooted in the heterogeneity of 
language that call for judgment. 
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(d) The fission produced attacks both the subject and rationality. In contrast to Kant, the 
critical judge of the postmodern cannot judge according to the philosophy of the subject 
and according to the Idea of Man, for this is a transcendental illusion. Rather, he is 
called to judge according to the passages between heterogeneous phrases while 
respecting their heterogeneity. Similarly, and in contrast to Kant, the task of this critical 
judge is not to transform disputes into litigations by substituting the law court for the 
battle field, but rather to emphasise disputes, and to give a language to what cannot be 
expressed in the language even of the critical judge (much less in the language of 
rational consensus). This is what the sign of the postmodern obliges us to do. 
To conclude this section, I want now to assess provisionally the importance of 
Lyotard's work for the thesis. In the introduction to the chapter, I emphasised that the 
move to pragmatics is not sufficient to deal with context specificity without reducing it 
either to a form of relativism - i.e., relative to a subject fully conscious to itself and/or a 
substantive community - or to a form of objectivism by positing a free (ideal) 
community; more generally, that the shift to language as pragmatics cannot, in itself, 
displace the metaphysical determinations of a concept, a 'theme' or a field of discourse. 
Through his reading of Kant, Lyotard presents us with a notion of judgment which is 
far removed from an understanding of it in terms of an empirical- psychological subject 
(a state of mind) or, ideal, the transcendental or phenomenological subject. Judgment, 
in Lyotard, is a critical activity (an interventionist force), a way of determining the mode 
of presenting (establishing) the reality of the referent rather than a re-presentation where 
something (e.g. a subject) presents something to itself. As such, it is intrinsically 
connected with language. To judge is to open an abyss between phrases by analysing 
their differend; it is to maintain and find ways of phrasing the differend, and thus keep 
the critical task unresolved. It has to do less with knowledge (therefore rules and 
categories) than with limitations of knowledge; though, what is not determinable in all 
its aspects by knowledge and is, therefore, undecidable, is still regulated by the 
question of justice. In this account, the subject itself is neither passive nor active, but 
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only an instance of a phrase universe. It is the judgmental instance, itself, that is obliged 
by phrasing to demand justice. Therewith the disunity of the subject and the disunity of 
all experience is posed in its most acute form. 
Such an understanding of judgment presupposes a rethinking of the necessity/freedom 
problematic (determinant/reflective judgment and particular/singular, direct/indirect 
presentation and example/analoga), and, consequently, the problematic of 
(pre)constituted/constituting subject. This problematic poses either a preconstituted 
subject following rules, or the free subject which makes and obeys the law (e.g. the 
maxim of 'enlarged mentality' referred to above in discussing Arendt's position). In 
terms of language and communication, it presupposes the transportation of a fully 
present to itself meaning. The shift by Lyotard and Derrida to a different conception of 
language, recasts this problematic in terms of necessity/chance. Derrida uses, instead of 
the latter, the term ava ►m and gives it the status of those terms he calls undecidables. 
To assess whether Lyotard's notion of undecidable - as that which is to be judged 
through critical analogies (passages) - takes fully into consideration the problematic of 
language in terms of necessity and chance, I will proceed, in the section which follows, 
to submit his conception of language to a critical examination. 
7.3.2 A CRITICAL NOTE ON LANGUAGE 
At the beginning of this chapter (section 7.1), I justified the focus on Lyotard's most 
recent work. However, it is imposssible, for reasons that will become apparent in what 
follows - the important change from language games to phrasing and its significance 
notwithstanding - to distinguish his work into stages, let alone to comprehend it in 
parts. What unifies his whole enterprise, if there is such a thing as a unity of a position, 
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is his concern with the post-modern western society, the question of knowledge and 
legitimation, and the question of language. These concerns are present as much in "The 
Postmodern Condition" (1984) as they are in "Just Gaming" (1985) and in "The 
Differend" (1988) [8]. In what follows Lacoue-Labarthe's (1984) incisive critique of 
Lyotard's work will be, almost exclusively, employed. This, precisely because it goes 
to the heart of that which is at issue in his writings, addresses his work as 'a whole'. 
In my concluding remarks on Habermas (section 5.3) I noted that if, for Habermas, the 
collapse of transcendentalism still leaves hope for reconstructive science which would 
base research, for Lyotard, what remains is a proliferation and multiplication of 
narratives ('heterogeneous finalities'), a permanent invention of rules. One can 
speculate that, to an objection (for example, Redding,1986) that his preservation of the 
notion of rule results from a misappropriation of Wittgenstein's conception of language, 
Lyotard would reply that his use of rules serves only a strategic purpose. However, the 
question still remains as to whether he has fully embraced the claim of 'our' time that, in 
Lacoue-Labarthe's [ibid:29] words, when "the 'totalizing' discourse collapses, it is 
totality, itself, that decomposes", with no hope of recomposition. I take this remark to 
be targeted, in particular, against any residue of the collapsed metaphysics of presence. 
At one level, it is correct to say that Lyotard's position, by separating the great 
narratives of emancipation and speculation associated with metaphysics (the 
'legitimating narrative') from the 'little' narratives, already preserves something, 
namely, the discourse of pragmatics, the notion and value of critique, judgment and 
decision. On the other hand, he complicates things by insisting that, although a form of 
legalism, his theory preserves only the idea of playful rules. The latter, it is argued, 
saves the postmodern game of multiple moves, in the multiple mechanism of language 
and the permanent invention of rules. In effect, it is the conception of language 
presupposed in the claim to 'neutrality' (as a pure play) of language games and/or 
phrases, and the associated concept of legitimation resulting from the collapse of 
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transcendental authority - be it reason, history, system or subject - which will allow us 
to assess his resulting notion of judgment and decision. Moreover, any understanding 
of judgment, in Lyotard, has to pass through an assessment of his contribution to 
practical discourse, namely the fact that Lyotard is opening up the question, ignored by 
Habermas and practical discourse in general, of the event of obligation. For, in fact, it is 
obligation which forces theoretical discourse to turn practical. But this, as I will argue 
in a moment, is inseparable from the question of language. 
In his dealings with the issue of 'justice', Lyotard makes an explicit recourse to 
transcendence, and, following Levinas, he relates the prescriptive with the 'being-
obliged'. That is to say, the obligation comes from the unjustified demand of the 
absolutely Other, an obligation that is treated as a structural element. This is to say 
that the prescriptive which has the status of a norm [Lyotard:1984:31] presupposes the 
'withdrawal of the sender' - i.e., it is a game without an author. The post of authority 
remains vacant, its rules bearing upon the listening. Two immediate implications follow 
from this position. First, in Lyotard's discourse, it is not only a question of 
heterogeneity between different language games, or different regimens of phrases. The 
notion of 'empty transcendence' introduces a 'vertical' incommensurability between the 
role or positions of the addressor and those of the addressee, and this is described as the 
situation of obligation. Secondly, if this point is pressed further, it is, precisely, a 
question of listening, of address and of destination. I have already discussed this 
point of address and destination with reference to Derrida's argument that "in the 
destination there is...a principle of indetermination", chance, luck, no assured 
destination [9]. Lacoue-Labarthe emphasises this point as it is the question of language, 
of speech addressed, of the question of 'failing' built into it. In short, it is this that 
opens up the praxical to the redefinition of the subject as no longer limited to the active 
or passive positions, and, more specifically, the ethical to radical alterity. 
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Furthermore, it is by pressing the question of Lyotard's supposedly 'innocent' 
distinction and opposition between the cognitive and the narrative, that his conception of 
language comes forth. In the "Postmodern Condition" [op.cit:28-29] Lyotard argues 
that the new language game of science posed the problem of its own legitimation at the 
very beginning - i.e., with Plato. There, the question of knowledge legitimation is 
linked with the question of socio-political authority, and it is provided in the form of 
narrative. Here, Lacoue-Labarthe's intervention is of utmost significance. For he 
reveals what is at issue with the narrative form, namely, the general question of the 
distinction between logos/mythos and the exclusion of mimesis. For Plato, it is not just 
the narrative form but a division and a hierarchization of modes of narratives based on 
the types of their enunciation. The most dangerous mode of narrative, the dramatic, was 
dangerous because the 'mimos' (actor), strictly capable of playing all roles, is nothing 
of its own. That is, the 'I' of the dramatic narrative is not present to the 'I' of the 
enunciating subject. There is no necessary coincidence between the speaking subject 
and the linguistic 'I'. By contrast, logos, in opposition to mythos, demands the 
coincidence of both 'I's'. 
Here we have, in Plato, the serious/play distinction and from Plato onwards (for 
example, in Austin and Habermas) the fear of play: mimesis, as opposed to the serious 
logos. In this fear of the myth, there is the fear that the mimetic power is all the 
stronger, the more anonymous and authorless the narrative is. That is to say, it is the 
fear of the loss of identity, of the impossibility of identification and, consequently, the 
fear of social destabilization. 
With these distinctions in mind, Lyotard's analytical position can now be located. He 
calls for a generalized mimesis, that is, a reversal of Platonism in that the imperative of 
having to 'recite' narratives, of inventing new rules, of expressing the differend is the 
Platonic mimesis, and the call for dissensus is the call for the destabilization of the 
social. The decomposition of the great narratives creates the mimetic space where what 
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remains and proliferates is the 'free play' of the practices of language, the 'recitative' 
and the obligation to respond and to prescribe. In all this, the ethical and the praxical 
demand appears to emerge by simply valorizing what Plato condemned. 
Two immediate effects result from the conception of language according to a 'narrative-
mimetic' model: (i) despite - or because - of Lyotard's precautions and his awareness 
regarding the problematic of the decentred subject, the latter is presented as occupying 
the place of the 'mimos'. The permanent invention of rules presupposes an 
uncontrollable exchange of 'roles', with no possibility of identification, i.e., 
constitution. That is to say, in Lyotard's case, there is the requirement that judgment be 
referred back to the will to power - i.e., to some subject; though, as Ingram 
[1987/88:291] remarks, if a will to power can be said to exist at all, it nonetheless 
remains embedded in a play of authorless interpretations. But, on the other hand, the 
ethical obligation stresses the passivity of the receiver of the prescription. 
(ii) Despite his emphasis on an empty transcendence as an 'originary mimesis' without 
models or rules, and his insistence on the anonymity of obligation, judgment is 
conceived according to an unchallenged narrative-mimetic model. This is the reason 
why Lyotard has to rely upon a certain reading of Kant, and to resort to the aesthetic 
judgment of the "Critique of Judgment" that leads him to think of justice and of criteria, 
which, finally, refer back to the propriety of phrases - i.e, a model of representation 
as inadequation, a residue of metaphysics of presence; his very notion of the 
sublime is the concept of inadequacy and incommensurability itself [Lacoue-
Labarthe:op.cit:35]. One cannot escape from representation that easily, just via the 
notion of a generalized mimesis. 
The move to pragmatics, in Lyotard's case an articulation based on a pragmatic model, 
is the slip between language as nothing other than pragmatics and language as itself 
resisting this reduction. There is a function of language that is pragmatic, and, for 
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Lyotard, the 'proper' language is to be pragmatics. But the question is to what extent 
can one appropriate language, up to what point can one treat language as nothing other 
than pragmatics? And here is the importance of Derrida's pragrammatology which puts 
pragmatics to grammatology: he links it to a movement of appropriation/ 
disappropriation - i.e., differance. 
The difference between Lyotard's phrasing and linguistic pragmatics, on the one hand, 
and pragrammatology, on the other, can now be provisionally stated - and as a 
preparation for the final chapter of the thesis- in terms of the following. 
For Lacoue- Labarthe, as for Derrida, it is a question of how to work out a model of 
mimesis as a constitutive undecidability between language/reality - an original 
supplementarity between the model and that which imitates. And this, first and 
foremost, is, as Lacoue-Labarthe [ibid:35] remarks, the recognition of the double bind 
and the mimetic paradox: "...there is no inventio without imitatio". From this 
point, I will move to undecidability and the desistance of the subject. This move is 
necessary because Lyotard's position has not freed itself from some kind of articulation 
as a 'bridge'. Thus, despite the insistence on heterogeneity, his position does not arrive 
at the undecidable but oscillates between a polysemy (an undecidable equivocity -
i.e., pure play) and the positing of a still formal criterion of what is a proper 
phrasing - i.e., inadequation is still a model of the (im)proper. The occurrence of new 
events calls for new sets of conventions, but the questions which this view poses are 
not addressed, notably that the new event presupposes the illegality of the old set of 
conventions, and that the new event, as a just event, obliges a violent reinscription of 
the old conventions through the performative structure itself [10]. 
Once it is realized that Lyotard's insistence on heterogeneity depends on a vertical 
heterogeneity and that this is the situation of obligation to the Other, two problems 
arise: (a) the question of the subject presents the problem of a subject which is purely 
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passive, asymmetric to the other; or (b) the subject is active, for Lyotard, in that the 
subject is a mimos which actively imitates - i.e., invents. In other words, vertical 
heterogeneity leads to the question of the subject, but, in contrast to Lyotard, Derrida 
and Lacoue-Labarthe also realize that in this shift to active/passive one may still keep the 
incommensurability of the ethical as pure. For Lacoue Labarthe and Derrida, an 
element of transgression contaminates transcendental legislation at its very heart, and the 
legislative subject (either the active one as the legislator or the one who takes the law) is 
traversed by "the a priori of a counter-law". As Derrida rhetorically puts it: 
"What if there were, lodged within the heart of law itself, a law of 
impurity or a principle of contamination? What if the condition for the 
possibility of law were the a priori of a counter-law, an axiom of 
impossibility, maddening its sense, order and reason?" 
[quoted in Schiirmann:1984:361] 
In other words, they realize that the active/passive distinction is implicated in the 
transcendental/empirical distinction, and that the ethical and the subject in desistance 
(see chapter 8) breaks, on the one hand, with a quasi-transcendental obligation and, on 
the other, with the empirical, that is, specific language games. 
I would like, then, to argue that, in Lyotard, connected to the Other is the idea of the 
Other which is still under the Kantian regulative idea. Lyotard's differend moves 
between evidence and idea and demands a different mode of linking. In contrast, the 
undecidability of differance undercuts the play of evidence and idea [Watson:op.cit:50- 
51], and the ought of obligation is submitted to the trace of differance. The ethical 
obligation is an implication of undecidability. This means that the elaboration of the 
undecidable ultimately depends on the way in which "the idea in the Kantian sense" is 
deconstructed in the two projects, namely, Lyotard's and Derrida's. I would, therefore, 
conclude this reading of Lyotard with the question: is not the analogon (the non-
cognitive, in Lyotard) a strategy to keep reason pure from its contamination? 
308 
CHAPTER 8 : EXEMPLARITY AND COMMUNICATION: ENDINGS 
The thesis has been concerned with what I termed professional discourse. I have 
used this term to call attention to the following: with professional, I have indicated 
the move to a new area of educational analysis and research which focuses on the 
teacher, or any other practitioner, as a professional; by that I mean the 'practical' 
practitioner as opposed to the 'theoretical' practitioner. In general, the area of 
professional/teacher represents a move to practical activities - i.e., performance; but, 
above all, a tacit or explicit resistance to theory, or the subordination of theory to 
practical activities. As a consequence of this, it is suggested that the way forward, for 
the professional development of practitioners/teachers, is through 'practical 
involvement', 'reflection on practice' and 'dialogue'. 
With discourse [1], I have argued that in order that the as yet limited debate on 
professional activity be opened up, it has to be linked to the opposition between practice 
and theory. This means that the professional discourse has been examined with 
reference to whether it has come to or has failed to come to terms with the general 
question of the theory/practice opposition at the analytical level. When the 
theory/practice opposition has not been directly engaged, then an implicit practical 
vocabulary has been identified in the thesis. Terms such as reflection, repetition, 
judgment, decision, skill, example, etc., which are found to rely upon oppositions such 
as explicit/implicit, competence/performace, theoretical/practical knowledge, 
saying/doing or showing, have served as a link between the professional and the 
practical. I am not claiming that this is an exhaustive list, but only that, within the space 
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of the 'professional', these terms constitute and are constituted by, the theory/practice 
opposition. 
What the thesis has been concerned with is by no means a genealogical reading of the 
theory/practice relation, which, for one thing, would presuppose that we do know how 
to write this history. But, the preceding paragraph justifies my choice to address, 
explicitly, the question of the theory/practice relation in its various formulations in the 
work of H. Dreyfus, Habermas, Lyotard and Derrida. For if, as I have shown, 
Dreyfus' notion of exemplarity, in addressing this question, makes the link possible 
between the professional and the practical, it is only with Habermas, Lyotard and 
Derrida that the professional/practical discourse takes its linguistic turn. The task I was 
presented with, then, was the assessment of the implications of the linguistic turn for 
the theory/practice opposition. I have judged this task to be particularly urgent under the 
present contingencies in which, on the one hand, we are witnessing the most interesting 
challenges to the theory/practice opposition in its linguistic formulations and 
manifestations, but, on the other, within the professional discourse itself, the linguistic 
turn has hardly been recognized. This means that concepts such as dialogue, 
communication, intersubjectivity and community are thought of as having 'meaning' 
beyond and outside language. That is, the professional discourse is still replicating a 
non-linguistic model, which is part of the cognitive paradigm of subject/object, and the 
model of the philosophy of consciousness, as I have argued in Part I of the thesis. 
Alternatively, there is a postponement in facing the problematic opened up by the 
linguistic turn through an appeal, for example, to Habermas' work, though in such an 
empiricist way that it shows no respect for the recent, rich debate over language. 
What has been attempted, in the preceding chapters, has been directed by what can be 
said to constitute a basic claim of this thesis, namely, that it is only through an 
examination of the metaphysical presuppositions of the practice/theory opposition, 
in its linguistic turn in particular, that the claim of professional discourse to be free from 
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the determinations of theory can be assessed. I must now justify and make explicit the 
ground of such a claim. To put it simply, the thesis turns on a distinction between 
practical knowledge as a strategic decision and its metaphysical presuppositions. But, if 
the Derridian deconstruction states anything at all, it is that any strategic - i.e., 
methodological - aspect of whatever discourse, always involves a decision, be it 
implicit or explicit, which concerns metaphysics. Derrida's words that 
"[t]he more confident, implicit, buried the metaphysical decision is, the 
more its order, and calm, reigns over methodological technicity [,]" 
[1988:93; emphasis added] 
accurately describe the case of professional/practical discourse. Metaphysics, in its most 
traditional form, reigns over practical knowledge. The following points can support this 
argument: 
(i) the metaphysics of presence and the present is, above all, intrinsic to theory, as the 
repetition of the same. Heidegger describes it thus: 
"What characterizes metaphysical thinking which grounds the 
ground for beings is the fact that metaphysical thinking departs 
from what is present in its presence, and thus represents it in 
terms of its ground as something grounded." 
[Heidegger quoted in Wood:1989:409,n.10] 
But, as I will argue shortly, the shift to the practical alone cannot do away with 
metaphysics. An indication of this is provided by the various 'theories', or even 
positions that explicitly repudiate theory, which, at some level, pose a domain of objects 
or acts to which one is alleged to have direct epistemological and, therefore, semantic 
access. This is the case, for example, with arguments about 'lived experience'; with 
empiricist theories that use sense content as 'present' to intuition; with assumptions that 
the content of certain acts is present to unmediated inspection, or that we know how we 
meant something on a given occasion. 
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(ii) An opposition of metaphysical concepts such as the theory/practice opposition "is 
never the confrontation of two terms, but a hierarchy and the order of subordination" 
[Derrida:1988:21]. The simple reversal of a hierarchy cannot displace a conceptual order 
or the non-conceptual order with which it is articulated. It is for this reason, and for this 
reason alone, that I said earlier that any project, any methodological operation, involves 
a decision concerning metaphysics. The research methodologies of professional/ 
practical discourse have not made a decision concerning metaphysics, and thus they are 
reduced to methodological technicity. The implications which bear witness to this are, 
indeed, many and varied. Derrida has made abundantly clear, for example, as I have 
shown in chapter 6, the hierarchical axiology at work in speech act theory. Distinctions 
such as serious/non-serious, normal/abnormal not only set up value-oppositions, but 
also subordinate those values to each other. Likewise, methodological procedures, 
supposedly simple and innocent - starting, for example, with a decision for the priority 
of one term of a distinction over the other (e.g., serious/play) in order, then, to examine 
the complications and derivations - result in a series of exclusions beginning with the 
subordinated term. Such priorities have the power of sanctioning, evaluating, selecting 
and excluding. Habermas' choice of communicative action, as the 'original' and 
'originary' mode of language use, is a case in point. For it does not simply serve to 
characterize strategic action and instrumental rationality as derivative and secondary, 
but, at the same time, it sets aside a series of linguistic activities (e.g. 'literary' use of 
language) as irrelevant and/or 'parasitic'. But, this decision, which permits a focus on 
the 'normal' and the pure, is not just a 'theoretical' choice. 
"...[T]he exclusion of the parasite (of divergences, contaminations, 
impurities, etc.) cannot be justified by purely theoretical-methodological 
reasons[.] How can one ignore that this practice of exclusion, or this 
will to purify, to reappropriate in a manner that would be essential, 
internal, and ideal in respect to the subject or to its objects, translates 
necessarily into a politics?" 
[Derida:1988:135] 
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Strategic decisions, always and necessarily touching on the political and the ethical, are 
often the sites which hide a deep, metaphysical decision, with the result that the practical 
never breaks with theory or always regresses behind theory to an empiricism. 
(iii) The metaphysics of presence and the present implies a structure or a system of 
metaphysical conceptuality. In effect, any attempt to break out of metaphysics is 
threatened by reappropriation. Put differently, there is the problem that when one goes 
beyond the existing categories of understanding, it is hard to see what terms one ought 
to use. Certainly, "[n]o concept is by itself, and consequently in and of itself, 
metaphysical, outside all the textual work in which it is inscribed" [Derrida:1981b:57]; 
and, in any case, "[t]here is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in 
order to shake metaphysics" [Derrida:1978a:280]. In the case we are dealing with - that 
is, the theory/practice distinction - the notion of theory goes with a teleological structure 
which implies that the concept of the future is subjected to metaphysical ends. Theory 
essentially has to repeat itself in time and space. The traditional relation between theory 
and practice is positioned in time and as a programme for the future. The logocentric 
concept of future is "to project the value of presence on what is not present, to reduce 
the unknown to the known, the other to the same" [Wood:1989:368]. One move of 
critique, as we have seen, is to open up the space between theory and its applications by 
using arguments such as those that Wittgenstein and Dreyfus use in order to 
problematize the idea of 'rule following'. This is a legitimate move, but it might still be 
under the metaphysical determinants of temporality. 
Here, then, is the problem. On the one hand, the concept of 'the future' is 
indispensable. No account of any present - even of 'lived experience' - is complete or 
even intelligible without an account of the future. Understanding is never a mere 
grasping of the present. On the other hand, there is a critique of this concept which is 
continuous with the critique of the value of presence. This critique, or caution against 
references to the future [Wood:op;cit:361-383], puts in question the effectiveness of any 
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attempt (a) to simply weaken the concept of theory, such as, for example, the Kantian 
regulative idea, which would project the future as a promise - i.e., as a supplement for 
the deficiences of the actual present; or (b) at undermining logocentrism by a radical 
pluralism, where there would be no enveloping unity by which the multiplicity can be 
sustained, and no theoretical place for such a unity. Still there is the problem that, in the 
latter case, such a plurality might leave linear temporality untouched, while, if future is 
another way of referring to what is other, the former case might be just an attempt to 
reappropriate the other. To restate the problem, therefore, if terms such as 'present' and 
'future' are understood to refer to frameworks of discourse, rather than to events in 
chronological time, any difficulty of thinking outside of those frameworks puts an 
immediate limitation on the thinking of the other (the future). 
I have pointed to a general argument about the metaphysical presuppositions governing 
the theory/practice opposition - viz., the value of presence, the privileging of an 
hierarchical axiology, and the teleological structure accompanying it, and I indicated the 
threat of reappropriation besetting any attempt to shift beyond metaphysics. For these 
reasons, I believe, as I have also argued in chapter 6, deconstruction is a necessity. 
For its strategies presuppose that any reference to a beyond (beyond metaphysics, the 
future, the other) is an undecidable, and operates a double movement of a reversal of 
the hierarchical oppositions and a displacement - i.e., reinscription and thus 
transformation - of the terms it criticizes. It is on this condition that deconstruction 
provides the means of intervening in the field of oppositions. 
To make explicit the metaphysical presuppositions in their specificity, deconstruction 
discerns a long chain and a narrow sequence (cf. Derrida:1981a). The former consists 
of motifs belonging to a powerful tradition which go back to Plato and Aristotle; folded 
in the latter, those motifs are displaced. Their sense and function change. Once inserted 
in another network, the 'same' motif is no longer the same, and, in any case, it never 
had an identity external to its functioning. To deal with this, deconstruction adopts two 
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styles, although it most often grafts one on to the other. One, formal and ahistorical, 
demonstrates logico-formal paradoxes; the other proceeds through readings of texts, 
interpretations and genealogies. 
The general effects of the deconstructive process on the concept and the field of theory 
will be pointed to as I now proceed to take up what I said at the beginning of this 
chapter concerning theory; namely, that one of the characteristics of the 
professional/practical is that it represents a tacit or explicit resistance to theory. 
First, I am going to present some observations regarding the studies, the positions and 
projects that have been considered in this thesis - and the thinking that they have given 
rise to; then, I will put forward a first specific claim about theory; finally, I will explain 
the sense in which deconstruction is a 'resistance to theory', albeit in a different sense. 
The following problems and/or observations helped shape the first claim of this thesis 
which concerns theory: 
(i) at the most general level, I had to face the question of the conditions of possibility 
and impossibility of a theoretical statement on practical knowledge. If this 
question is not faced, there is the danger of empiricism, and often a concomitant 
rhetorical invocation of the ethical and political as, for instance, in an unanalysed 
concept of pluralism and community. This is evident in the argument that, for example, 
decisions are, and are to be made, in the concrete, or that it is impossible to specify 
criteria of good practice. But, on the other hand, Habermas, for example, is aware of 
both the problem and its implications of moral essentialism, or of a slippage into 
nihilism. This explains his concern with keeping the line division between the cognitive, 
the practical and the aesthetic, and his methodological decision on reconstruction. 
(ii) Working with the theory/practice relation, I became more and more aware - indeed, 
it came as a surprise to me - that practice resists its own 'theorization'. I can exemplify 
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this by recalling Dreyfus' case. Although he not only addresses explicitly the 
theory/practice relation, but, also, examines analytically both the concept of theory and 
that of practice, he fails to think of the professional/practical discourse as such. By this 
I mean that his explicit critique of the pole of theory, in the theory/practice opposition, 
tacitly inhibits the theorization of the 'move as such' to the practical. Put differently, 
Dreyfus has not reflected upon discourse, and, by implication, upon his own 
discourse. This, I believe, is a consequence of his failure to take into account the 
theory/practice opposition (or the practical discourse) in its linguistic turn. What I am 
trying to argue here is that, as I said earlier, what makes the link between the 
professional and the practical is the theory/practice opposition, but the link between the 
professional discourse and the practical discourse is only made by 'discourse' - i.e., by 
theorizing the 'linguistic' relation of these oppositional terms when, with the linguistic 
turn, the notion of 'relation' has been problematized. 
(iii) I became particularly interested in the specific problems that practice raises for 
theory, and the strategies that are needed to push the question of practice beyond itself, 
and its theoretical representation. It became clearer to me, as I was working on Derrida, 
that at stake are, precisely, the boundaries separating and linking practice and theory, 
and the relations that exist within and across these boundaries. Rather than rejecting 
theory, this position suggests work at or on the borders of theory in order to bend or 
exceed its limitations. 
(iv) To be able to assess the effects of 'critical work' on the theory/practice relation, 
surfaced as important. In particular, (a) on the one hand, I had to confront the 
assumptions underlying the 'theoretical practitioner'; but, on the other, I had to assess 
the specific effects of the, perhaps, more sophisticated, but still reductive, shifts to 
practice in the attempt to show the limitations of theory. I had, therefore, to remain 
suspicious of the move, and be aware of the risk of mystifying the powers of the 
practical as, ultimately, Dreyfus and Lyotard do. This is an important point, and should 
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be highlighted - namely, the risk of over-inflating the powers of the practical when the 
latter is brought in to do battle with the theoretical in order to 'save us' from the 
dogmatism of theory; (b) if a general process of re-evaluation and experimentation 
concerning the theory/practice relation is underway at the present time (Lyotard, 
Den-ida), there is an opposite move to reimpose forms of already challenged 
orthodoxies in order to cut short debate and experimentation, and re-establish what is 
sometimes claimed to be more solid foundations for inquiry. I am referring, for 
example, to Habermas' project which, ultimately, reinstates the assurance of an 
egological intersubjectivity at this moment in history (I mean that of ours) in which the 
field of theory - i.e., the conditions of the possibility of objectivity - has been 
questioned and destabilized. This also means the destabilization of 
"...the relationship to the object, everything that constitutes and 
institutes the assurance of subjectivity in the indubitable presence of the 
cogito, the certainty of self-consciousness, the original project, the 
relation to the other determined as egological intersubjetcivity, the 
principle of reason and the system of representation associated with it, 
and hence everything that supports a modern concept of theory as 
objectivity." 
[Derrida:1990:86] 
Let me, now, formulate the claim that was implicit all along. The shift from the 
cognitive to the practical/professional, in putting forward arguments against the 
dominance and/or necessity of theory - i.e., in resisting theory - makes theory the tacit 
other. More specifically, there is a general logic in operation. If the concept of theory is 
formalized in terms of objective, identity, repetition of the same, determination by laws, 
representation, abstraction or the 'dead letters', then the practical discourse, whenever it 
rejects theory - in the name of, for example, lived experience, enactment over 
description, etc. - can be shown to re-instate and re-inscribe it. This resistance to and 
neglect of theory is also the case in those instances which explicitly address the general 
problematic. By the latter, I mean not only the explicit address of the relation between 
theory and practice, but, mainly, the identification of the theoretical problematic - that is, 
that the decisive element in theory is identity and repeatability - and, also, of factors 
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such as the move from a philosophy of a metaphysical subject of human consciousness, 
and cognitive representation, as, for example, in Dreyfus, Habermas and Lyotard. The 
thesis has attempted to show that, even in the latter case, theory 'returns' as the 
repressed or tacit other. 
I just referred to a very general effect of deconstruction, namely, a general 
destabilization of the theoretical whose consequence has been to put theory in quotation 
marks. I will only pick out one of the points that Derrida makes regarding 'theory' (in 
quotation marks). This is the reversal of the distinction between proper (what is proper 
theory, and proper to theory) and nonproper. 'Theory' conveys a distrust towards a 
concept which is pure from any contamination - i.e., which would elude iterability - as 
the notion of proper indicates. But, Derrida writes, 
"...in this discrete graphic mark of reversal, it is possible to take the 
measure of a displacement which is by definition measureless, if not 
without rules." 
[1990:77; emphasis added] 
This displaced notion of 'theory' is neither the scientific in the classical sense, nor the 
philosophical concept of theory, but, rather, 
"...the opening of a space, the emergence of an element in which a 
certain number of phenomena...will call for trans-, inter-, and above all 
ultra- disciplinary approaches, which, up to now, met nowhere, in no 
department..." 
[ibid:82] 
Such are the implications of deconstruction which, as an element of the series, i.e., of 
the epistemological discourse and its methodologies, and of the axiomatics of 
knowledge - in other words, of the series marxism, linguistics, structuralism, 
phychoanalysis, feminism, etc. - no longer simply belongs to the series but introduces 
into it "a principle of dislocation" [ibid:84]. One example will have to suffice here. The 
way deconstruction deals with the plurality and multiplicity that the notion of 'theory' 
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signifies, is to take it as a law of the field, a clause of non-closure. What, then, blocks 
the development of a metalanguage is the fact that the deconstructive 'elements' are both 
elements in the text which is analysed, and operators. They, therefore, describe a 
movement and a form of energy which closes neither the text nor the deconstructive 
discourse [Hobson:1982:302-303]. As a consequence, deconstruction has no stable or 
theorizable place. 
This form of 'resistance to theory' does not consist in reactively opposing theorization; 
it destabilizes the conditions of objectivity, shows the impossibility of closure, and 
deconstructs the metaphysical assumptions of existing theories, and of theories implicit 
in discourses which denigrate theory. This 'resistance to theory' distinguishes, at the 
same time, deconstruction from deconstructionism (deconstructionist discourse). In 
contrast to the destabilizing force of the former, the latter, though indissociable, tends to 
stabilize, state and produce statements (theses). Hence the paradox: although a 
'resistance to theory', deconstruction produces theories and theory - i.e., theoretical 
movements which attempt to institute, formalize, and stabilize the structure of 
deconstruction. 
A second and related claim I would like to make, with reference to the practical, is that 
the latter, in its shift from theory, rejects the cognitive subject - often seen as 
determined or positioned by theory - and moves to the freedom of the moral subject 
who has will and is necessarily practical, and/or the aesthetic subject who merely plays 
without interest. Advocates of practical discourse, in their determination to escape from 
the determined subject - for example, the teacher determined by theory - fall into either 
an aestheticism or a political aestheticism. And that is only to state the arguments of 
Habermas. At this point, his claims have some limited efficacy, but the problem is how 
to think 'between' the cognitive and the aesthetic, and I will return to it. 
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Earlier on, I pointed to the metaphysical presuppositions hidden in Habermas' decision 
concerning the theory/practice opposition, namely, in his distinction between 
communicative and strategic action types, and in his emphasis on communicative action 
and reconstruction. A third point I would like to make relates to Habermas, and 
concerns action. We have seen that Habermas shifts from a labour paradigm to 
communicative interaction in order to escape from a technical or an instrumentalization 
of praxis. And this enables him, as I have shown, to ground his typology of action. I 
have indicated two major problems with this shift, which I would like to underline here: 
first, the concept of action, in the sense of intervention, is abandoned in as much as 
intervention is defined as instrumental - i.e., a relation of a subject to a 'object'. So 
action becomes intersubjective legitimation and discursive justification; this, however, 
poses the question of whether, at the level of justification, communicative action is not 
in itself instrumental. Secondly, to move away from the subject/object dichotomy and 
into inter-subjectivity, Habermas makes use of the performative. But he turns it into a 
formal pragmatics, and this gives him his typology of action for the critique of the 
instrumental strategic. However, the inter-, in intersubjectivity, is the bridge between 
two subjectivities - i.e., two full presences or persons. This is a consequence of the 
non-problematization of the notion of the relation to the other, in his critique of the 
instrumental-strategic as a technicized relation with nature, which by no means leaves 
the notion of inter-subjectivity unaffected. 
I would like to argue that both problems are indications of Habermas' failed attempt to 
think language outside the logocentric paradigm. The move to intersubjectivity, 
linguistic dialogue and communication maintains the metaphysical subject(s)' presence, 
and truth as adequation. Its model is the theory (and the rules) of speech acts which -
though it represents a move from the speaking (phonocentric) to the linguistic 'I' - has 
not thought of the effects of the performative. 
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We have seen that the effect of the constative/performative is to release the 'I' from the 
speaking (intentional, external, empirical) subject. But the problem is that, with the 
move to convention, the 'I' loses its foundation and its absolute presence. But the 
model that Habermas employs, by not problematizing the distinction between the 
constative form of a proposition as an instance of a code, and the dialogue - i.e., the 
performative - preserves the truth of the statement. From the 'I' of the speech act, we 
are back to the 'I' which is outside the text. The seriousness and truth of the speech act, 
although legitimized by reasons adequate to the rules, is ultimately guaranteed through 
the phonocentric (metaphysical) subject. In other words, in this shift from the 
speaking to the linguistic 'I', the analytic question of the difference between the two has 
been effaced. My claim is that this differance is the presupposition for inter-
subjectivity and co-constitution. To 'lift' the problematic of intersubjective 
communication to strategic intervention as an inter-subjective relation with/ 
to the other (reinscription) is to open up the space of judgment or decision which 
would exceed the calculable. I will argue this point, in some detail, with my fifth and 
final claim. Before that, the fourth claim concerns the critique of the logocentric 
paradigm. 
Within the discourse on practice, the most recent and significant move has been the 
linguistic turn, and within this, I have argued, the crucial move has been that of seeing 
language as performative utterance. Thus, a linguistic analysis which would enable 
us to deal with the theory/practice opposition makes a shift away from an implicit or 
explicit assumption about language - namely, truth as adequation; that is to say, that the 
primary or sole function of language is to make propositional statements about an 
objective world of facts. "Stating is performing an act", Austin [1975:139,145] argues. 
The general picture offered by speech act theory is that speech is the primary form of 
communication, that such communication consists of speech acts, and that linguistic 
acts are ways of doing things or producing certain effects. 
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With the critique of the constative/performative, the cognitive/practical opposition is 
implicated in a reinterpretation of mimesis. With the latter, I am referring to one of the 
most significant effects of the deconstructive process, to which the 
constative/performative distinction has been submitted by Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe. 
With reference to the former's work, the discussion, in chapter 6, of the analysis and 
deconstruction of the Austinian speech act theory, and of the shift to pragrammatology, 
allows us to think of two important implications: (i) Derrida problematizes that which 
has been ignored by Habermas, namely, that every constative utterance itself relies, at 
least implicitly, on a performative structure. We have seen that the latter assigns a 
special place to 'the cognitive use of language'. As McCarthy writes, for Habermas, 
"[i]n constative speech acts we explicitly thematize the propositional 
content of utterances while the interpersonal relations established 
through them remain in the background. (Thus the usual form of an 
assertion is p and not the more explicit, 'I assert to you that p.')" 
[1978:299] 
The problem is, Derrida argues, that the whole distinction breaks down once the 
assertoric form becomes explicit, 'I assert to you that p'. For in order to say that this is 
the normal form of asserting (a serious performative), rather than mere play, one has to 
rely upon normative criteria. For Derrida, a constative always responds to the demands 
of theoretical rationality - i.e., it is always calculable; but as a performative, it always 
maintains, within itself, some irruptive violence. This is because, on the one hand, it is 
subject to iteration, and, on the other, it cannot be a decision except by founding itself 
on conventions, and so, on other anterior performances. It is thus a question of 
negotiating - which is to say, calculating by re-inventing the rule - the relation between 
the calculable and the incalculable; i.e., it is always a question of undecidability. 
(ii) The deconstructive process destabilizes the opposition between serious and non-
serious (play) speech act, and the entire system of associated values. Once the strategic 
and methodological significance of this distinction becomes apparent - namely, that in 
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order for the theory of speech act to be, precisely, a theory, its concepts have to be 
idealized and freed from all chance and 'impurity' - the exclusion of the 'parasitic' use 
of a type of speech act is shown to be without a ground. One of the effects of the 
linguistic turn, therefore, is to show that, on the one hand, it is a question of iterability -
i.e., of a general quotability - that leaves no general, context-free criterion for 
distinguishing between serious and non-serious, use and mention and proper and 
improper use; and on the other, it is, indeed, a question of language, of speech 
addressed - a question, therefore, of infelicities, misunderstandings, chance and risk -
in other words, of failure as the necessary possibility of every speech act. These two 
Derridian 'remarks' establish that no praxical can pass over this kind of problematic, 
or the more general problematic to which it is connected, namely, the metaphysical 
opposition between logos and mythos. The latter, dated since Plato's clear opposition 
between two uses of speech, or two modes of discourse, brings forth the problematic of 
mimesis. 
The latter notion has been provisionally introduced in the preceding chapter by 
referring to Lacoue-Labarthe's critical remarks on Lyotard's work. To recall, Lyotard 
sets up an opposition between cognitive and narrative, and argues that the Platonic 
discourse which inaugurates science is not scientific. It is narrative, he writes, that is 
used to legitimize science, and this, despite the fact that narrative is the most dangerous 
in the eyes of Plato. In effect, Lyotard reverses Platonism by valorizing what Plato 
condemned - i.e., narrative or mythos - thus resulting in a generalized mimesis. For 
Lyotard, the 'subject' is an effect of the pragmatics of narrative; therefore, it is nothing 
of its own, it has no 'proper' being. However, what has not been challenged in this 
reversal, Lacoue-Labarthe argues, is a fixed interpretation of mimesis which is not only 
the Platonic interpretation, but which, since Plato, is the philosophical interpretation. 
This interpretation results from and rests upon a distinction between propriety and 
impropriety. Thus, in Lacoue-Labarthe's reading of the tradition, what frightens 
practically all philosophy, Plato in particular, is not the mythical per se, but rather that 
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something of the mimetic (i.e. the properless) might affect the purity of the logos 
(science, theory, cognitive paradigm). It is this fear that governs, in advance, the 
condemnation of the mythical. 
Although it is impossible to do justice to the work of Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe on 
the problematic of mimesis - because this would involve a close reading of their texts 
and the specific texts that they deconstruct - I will attempt what can only be a sketch of 
the problematic. It should be mentioned, in advance, that there are specificities in the 
way the two thinkers tackle the issue, which, mainly, depend on the texts that they are 
dealing with; but I believe that it is sufficient here to make clear the general logic at 
work. 
Lacaou-Labarthe often talks about the 'paradox' of mimesis, a paradoxicality that may 
account for the returning of an active notion of mimesis, even in those cases in which 
there is awareness of the problematic, and a conscious attempt to overcome subjectivity 
based on an active/passive model of the subject. For Plato, mimesis, as imitation or 
reproduction, is by definition a 'bad' thing, because it leads to non-existence, passivity 
- i.e., a passive subject. Imitation is that passive mode, Plato says, by which one comes 
to oneself, by submitting to the model of the other. As Lacoue-Labarthe puts it, in 
Plato, 
"...being-itself...is constituted in the same way that a figure is 
impressed upon a malleable material when it is struck by a typos or 
'typed'." 
[1990a:220] 
According to Lacoue-Labarthe's analysis (1990a), from within the perspective of the 
reversal of platonism, yet conforming to the tradition, Nietzsche at first thinks of 
mimesis as passivity. But under this notion, he is not thinking of art, but of the 
aesthetics of the theatre - i.e., Germans as spectators. For Nietzsche, as long as German 
art does not exist there can be no German people. Imitation prevents Germany from all 
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access to itself - i.e., to its 'proper' being. On the other hand, Nietzsche does not ignore 
that art, since Plato and the Aristotelian determination of techne, is imitation, mimesis. 
But he believes that the imitation at work in art is in no way a passive imitation. At this 
point, he opposes Plato and follows Aristotle, in that properly artistic mimesis - i.e., 
productive or producing mimesis - is the highest degree of activity. What is important in 
Nietzsche is that he sees passive imitation as a 'bad' relation to history, and it is this 
relation that must be transformed into a creative relation. 
This latter notion of active mimesis has been elaborated by Lacoue-Labarthe in his 
essay on "Diderot: Paradox and Mimesis" (1989a). He, there, indicates three important 
traits of active mimesis as the paradoxicality of the mimetic logic: (a) the function of 
mimesis is to assume auto-formation, or auto-organization. The authentic actor, who 
does not submit to the model, but consciously elaborates upon it, provides the 
exemplar. The paradox, though, is that "the more I imitate, actively, deliberately, 
constructively...the more it is myself, by myself, that I construct" [1990a:222]; (b) this 
explains why active mimesis is, above all, a means of identification - i.e., an 
appropriation of a model. The more extreme the de-propriation, the more authentic 
the appropriation, in that the subject is actively constructing its model and itself; (c) 
active mimesis involves a different relation to history - that is, a non- historicist relation, 
in that it does not admit any constituted model, but it constitutes its models. The 
Nietzschean, for example, schema of historicity, also employed by early Heidegger, is 
that which calls for a mimesis without models, and a re-establishment, ultimately, of 
history. 
I said earlier that with Austin's constative/performative problematic, the linguistic turn 
connects with the Platonic metaphysical opposition between logos and mythos, which 
is a subordination of the latter to the former. Derrida (1981) returns to this Platonic 
stage and, as part of his discussion of the general problematic of mimesis, turns to the 
question of mythos/ literature as the other of philosophy/logos: 
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"The double session...about which I don't quite have the gall to say 
plumb straight out that it is reserved for the question what is literature, 
this question being henceforth properly considered a quotation 
already...this double session, about which I will never have the militant 
innocence to announce that it is concerned with the question what is 
literature, will find its corner BETWEEN... literature and truth, 
between literature and that by which the question what is? wants 
answering." 
[Derrida:1981:177] 
At stake is the question of truth. Logos, as the cognitive representational structure 
presupposing a cognitive subject, an identity of the represented, truth as adequation and 
rationality, is opposed to mythos, the aeste'tic, the narrative, literature, fiction, play and 
non-truth. To know what literature is, and to use this knowledge against philosophy 
and its knowledge, is to pit one truth against another. By situating his investigation 
between the two, in terms of a relation in which neither term is determined as such, 
Derrida attempts to undermine the authority of 'what is'. 
Already in Plato, Derrida argues, it is impossible to assign a single place to the techne 
mimetike. The project of Plato is to separate good mimesis - i.e., that which 
reproduces faithfully and truly - from bad mimesis - i.e., harmful play - so much so 
that one can decide, in each instance, what serves and what does not serve the truth. 
Like Lacoue-Labarthe, Derrida describes the paradoxical 'logic of mimesis' - a 
paradoxicality intrinsic to mimesis - which destabilizes any attempt to ground the 
distinction between good and bad mimesis. 
Carroll [1987:202,n.20] summarizes the Derridian description of the 'logic of mimesis' 
in Plato in the following points: (i) mimesis produces a thing's double. From this, it 
follows that the imitator is worth nothing in itself: the imitator is good when the model 
is good, and the reverse. Moreover, if mimesis is worth nothing in itself, then it is 
nothing in value and being. Therefore, to imitate is bad in itself; (ii) this non-being, the 
imitator, does 'exist' in some way. In adding to the model, it comes as a supplement, 
and therefore, ceases to be a non-value. In adding to the model, the imitator is not the 
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same thing. The resemblance is never absolute, consequently, never absolutely true. As 
a supplement that can take the model's place, but never be its equal, the imitator is, in 
essence, inferior to the model. 
Derrida focuses on these Platonic contradictions, though he is in no hurry to resolve 
them; on the contrary, he intensifies them by analysing their effects vis-a-vis the work 
of MaHarm& Derrida treats the latter's texts - at least those that he analyses - as 
exemplary, in that the reference to truth, in the name of which mimesis is judged, is 
absolutely displaced in the workings of a certain syntax. At the same time, however, the 
notion of exemplarity is, itself, put into question. Derrida shows that Mallarmes 
attempt to move beyond mimetic truth takes the form not of anti-mimesis but of a 
generalization of mimesis: a mime without referent or model; a mime on stage 
without text to follow. The mime performs something that exists only in and with his 
(pure) performance. And yet, Derrida objects, if the mime imitates nothing, and the 
performance is without any predetermined link to any outside, then the performance 
constitutes its own truth; this is defined in terms of unveiling, production, presentation, 
rather than expression, reproduction, representation: 
"The mime produces, that is to say makes appear in praesentia, 
manifests the very meaning of what he is presently writing: of what he 
performs. He enables the thing to be perceived in person, in its true 
face. If one followed the thread of this objection, one would go back, 
beyond imitation, toward a more 'originary' sense of aletheia and of 
mimeisthai. One would thus come up with one of the most typical and 
tempting metaphysical reappropriations of writing, one that can always 
crop up in the most divergent contexts." 
[Derrida:1981:206] 
As the above quotation clearly indicates, at stake is the question of truth and presence, 
the problematic of a subject constituting itself in pure performance, and the question of 
mimesis (representation) and metaphysical presuppositions. I have just attempted to 
indicate that both Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida want to make clear that breaking with 
one form of mimesis - i.e., the naive form of mimesis and representation as adequation 
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- very often results in the reinstitution of mimesis in another form. The pure literature, 
myth, performance, rather than being an undermining and complication of truth and the 
mimetic tradition supporting it, is just a reversal - i.e., a generalization of mimesis. This 
is not to say that Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe reject mimesis, or oppose its 
generalization. They only want to say that generalization, as such, cannot displace the 
ontology of subjectivity (of the active or passive subject). I will come back to this. 
But let's, first, pursue the question of mimesis and presentation a little bit further. 
For, what is at stake is both the active/passive subject dichotomy and the 
theory/exemplar dichotomy. Both of these dichotomies turn around Darstellung. No 
one has studied this problematic with more rigour than Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe - often 
in collaboration with Jean-Luc Nancy (Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy:1988). His highly 
intricate discussion of (re)presentation, and its associated chain of Gestalt, Gestell, 
Stellen, etc. in the writings of Heidegger, which I intend to summarize here, concludes 
with the general argument that though Heidegger revealed the reversal of Platonism as 
the onto-type, he was ultimately unwilling to address its implication, which is the 
thinking of subjectivity. 
I draw on this discussion, because I want to argue that the general opposition 
theory/practice, when it is analysed as the theory/example opposition, as in Dreyfus (see 
chapters 4 and 6.3.3), moves into such an onto-type and, at the same time, falls into the 
dichotomy of the active or passive subject. This means that the concept of exemplar 
involves the determinations of Darstellung. That is to say, an exemplar refers to the 
sensibilization through a figure as opposed to a theoretical concept, it is a type or model 
or image, and it is an example which "speaks to the eye rather than the ear" [ibid:viii] in 
the form of a sensible presentation (Darstellung) presented for imitation. 
Taking into account the Derridian 'critique' of Heidegger [2], Lacoue-Labarthe traces 
Heidegger's attempt to rethink the discourse on aesthetics and to speak of art in a 
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language which is different from that of aesthetics. What is at stake with Heidegger's 
"The Origin of the Work of Art" (1975), Lacoue-Labarthe [1990:55-56] writes, is the 
re-orientation in the interpretation of truth and re-presentation. Art is conceived as 
harbouring within it the capacity of opening up a possibility of historical Dasein. The 
work of art is defined as a mode of unconcealing of aletheia. Gestalt (figure) is 
"truth's being fixed in place in the figure" [Heidegger:1975:64]. Heidegger 
subsequently shifts from art to techne (and technology) which he defines as the 
mode of unconcealing. That is to say, what he saw as true with reference to the work of 
art, Heidegger subsequently uses to characterize modern technology as Ge-stell. 
What Heidegger, in effect, realizes is that the concept of Gestalt, or the advent of the 
figure, is the proper site for the unfolding of the most modern metaphysics, and 
presupposes the Platonic determination of Being as eidos or idea. As Lacoue-Labarthe 
explains, although 'Gestalt' came to be opposed to the 'simple idea' in the modern 
sense of 'perceptio', or representation by a subject, it still retains within itself - and is 
overdetermined by - the element of the 'optical', 'eidetic' or 'theoretical' in as much as 
the 'figure' is accessible only in a seeing. In other words, Heidegger reveals that the 
metaphysics of the 'Gestalt' is unthinkable in any form other than that of onto-ideo-
logy, and denounces the reversal of Platonism as an onto-typology. 
According to Lacoue-Labarthe, this important accomplishment of Heidegger is 
accompanied by his refusal to consider the relation that might also exist between the 
metaphysics of the 'Gestalt' (the representation of Being as figure) and Darstellung -
i.e., (re)presentation or 'literary presentation'. To be more precise, Heidegger 
moves from the aesthetic determinations of Darstellung (from art) to techne. But, 
Lacoue-Labarthe argues, techne is fundamentaly language, especially if one takes into 
account that mythos is the most archaic of the Greek 'technai'. One might even say, 
Lacoue-Labarthe claims, that this is exactly what orients Heidegger's thinking on the 
essence of the modern technology, and, ultimately, on language in his latest writings. 
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Yet, Heidegger obstinately refuses to address the question of the relation between 
mythos and mimesis. In effect, he refuses to see that the mimetic is always linked to 
the mythic. For, 
"...nothing less is involved, under the heading of the 'question of art' 
(or of poiesis, than the question of the status...of Mimesis, and 
thereby, inextricably linked to and entangled with this question, the 
status of philosophical Darstellung itself." 
[1989:73] 
To hint only at a very important metaphysical problematic, (a) it is initially in "The 
Origin of the Work of Art" that Heidegger refers to the word Ge-stell (produce, present, 
institute, constitute) which is subsequently used to characterize modern technology: 
"What is here called figure, Gestalt, is always to be thought in terms of 
the particular placing (stellen) and framing or framework (Ge-stell) as 
which the work occurs when it sets up and sets itself forth." 
[Heidegger:1975:64] 
But, (b) as Lacoue-Labarthe's [1989:43-95;1990:85-86] studies bring out, in this still 
early work, the semantic chain of stellen comes into competition with the chain of 
reissen (Riss means trait), and with it, the outline of techne, of difference on the basis 
of the trait, which Derrida, as we have seen, takes up. In Heidegger, though, it is only 
in the later writings that the term 'Riss' returns, when he had already denounced onto-
typology; (c) what is lost here between two or three texts of Heidegger, Lacoue-
Labarthe claims, is the word Darstellung which "...is not simply the disappearance of 
a word. It is at least that of a concept, if not that of a whole motif..." [1989:73]. Linked 
with it, is Heidegger's fundamental mistrust towards any problematization of 
subjectivity. 
What has to be rethought, therefore, in the shift from the aesthetic to the mythical, and 
under the determinations of Darstellung/exemplar, is the connection between 
language as mythos, mimesis and the identity of the 'subject'. The claim is that mimesis 
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requires the rethinking of representation as a general de-stabilization. That is to say: (i) 
prior to the classical 'theoretical' representation, to the dualism of the present and the 
represented, a thought of representation is required in which the re- of repetition would 
govern any presentational value; (ii) this structure of representation implies the 
uncontrollable proliferation of doubles. Mimesis is the danger of an originary absence 
of subjective 'property' or 'propriety'; and (iii) the lack of being-proper and lack of 
identity - i.e., undifferentiation - necessarily presupposed by the mimetic act, 
reintroduces the question of aletheia within that of language (of enunciation) in so far 
as, what is at play there, is the question of the subject in its relation to language. 
As with the Derridian deconstruction of mimesis, briefly referred to earlier, Lacoue-
Labarthe exposes that which is the most threatening aspect of mimesis for the entire 
metaphysical tradition: the pluralization and fragmentation of the 'subject' which is 
provoked by its linguistic (de)constitution. The metaphysical tradition, fraught 
with fear in the recognition that "the mimetic life is made up of scenes from the life of 
one who is suited for nothing" [ibid:129], offers two solutions to overcome this fear: 
either the - Platonic above all - urgent need for a serious purification of language and a 
rectification of fiction - that is, an anchoring on logos or phone (speech) - or, once all 
prior determinations assumed by an abstract, universal, rational subject (the 
subject/object dichotomy, and cognitive representation), had become ineffective, the 
function of the onto-type is to stop, to put a 'limit' to, the undifferentiation provoked by 
the mimetic act. 
As I've argued earlier, it is Lacoue-Labarthe's analysis of myth that brings forth the 
problematic of mimesis vis-a-vis the question of the 'subject'. I will elaborate with the 
following three points. 
(i) Lacoue-Labarthe argues that if Plato only admits those forms of discourse which are 
faithful to truth, it is not because myth is a 'lie', but, rather, because myth is a fiction - 
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in the strong active sense of the word - as 'fashioning'. Its role is to propose, if not to 
impose, models or types. In the imitation of the model, an individual or a people grasp 
themselves and identify themselves. 
(ii) Myth, therefore, is in no way mythological. It is a formative power defined as an 
identificatory mechanism. Its power consists in the gathering together of the 
fundamental forces and orientations of an individual or people. As Lacoue-Labarthe 
[1990:93ff] and Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy (1990) well demonstrate, nowhere else has 
the relationship between myth and the question of identification been elaborated better 
than in the German tradition, where, for historical reasons, at stake is the question of 
identity of the German people. It is beyond the scope of the present thesis to discuss the 
issue that immediately connects with the most recent history of what Lacoue-Labarthe 
[1990:58] has called 'national aestheticism' of Nazi Germany; however, it is important 
that the general problematic be stated. 
Once the inconsistency of the abstract universals of reason (passive, determined subject) 
was revealed, in German tradition there has always been a quest for identity in 
language, which provoked an awakening of the power of myth. Myth, Lacoue-Labarthe 
writes, is 
"...the power of a deep, concrete, embodied identity...the projection of 
an image with which one identifies through a total and immediate 
commitment. Such an image...is the figuration of a type conceived both 
as a model of identity, and as that identity formed and realized." 
[1990:94] 
The type is the realization of the singular, concrete identity. It is both the model of 
identity which types you as a difference - produces different identities - and its present, 
effective and formed realization. The type is the Gestalt (figure/and literary figure) in 
its most recent sequence [3]. Gestalt, therefore, in its essence, is to have a form, to 
differentiate itself. It puts a 'limit' to undifferentiation, by detaching a figure from a 
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background, by distinguishing a type [Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy:1990:306]. The 
metaphysics of Gestalt (onto-typology) is the ontology of subjectivity in the form of the 
subject of absolute creation (active, mimetic subject). As such, it transcends all the 
determinations of the modern subject, brings them together, and concretizes them, thus 
constituting the subject in absolute terms. Its logic is that of the realization of 
abstractions and their becoming concrete. 
(iii) The (onto-)type, then, is an aesthetico-political construct, and the idea of the 
myth is the idea of an aesthetic model of subject constitution. It covers all the meanings 
of the exemplar to which I referred earlier. Its specific function is that of exemplarity. 
But, exemplarity is the critical problem par excellence. For it opens up the question of 
mimetism insofar as only mimetism is able to ensure an identity. Plato's exclusion of 
myth amounts to a redress of mimetism in favour of rational conduct. In the Platonic 
poetics of genres - in fact, the mimetic instrument par excellence - either the poet speaks 
in his own name - i.e., in a simple narrative (haple diegesis) - or the poet hides 
behind the one he (re)presents. By exposing himself as other than he is, he 
depropriates himself. Mimesis, as Darstellung - in other words the instability of the 
subject of enunciation - opens the space for substitution, for 'subjective' exchange: 
the entire space of mimetism [Lacoue-Labarthe:1989:132-133]. I will come back to this 
in a moment. 
But first, let's repeat the argument - after this rather long detour - which establishes my 
fourth point. With the Austinian shift to the performative utterance, the 
cognitive/practical opposition takes its linguistic turn and connects with the metaphysical 
opposition of logos/mythos, logos/mimesis, representation/presentation. At stake is the 
question of the subject - the 'I' - which, as an effect of the constative/performative, has 
been released from the speaking, empirical subject. Plato's insistence on the full 
presence of the cognitive subject gives the speaking phonocentric subject. The linguistic 
statement is a representation grounded on a cognitive subject, and the subject/object 
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relation is grounded on the 'I' - i.e., the full presence of the speaking subject who can 
make present the representation, the 'proper'. In contrast, Austin starts with the 
performatives and the linguistic 'I'. To get away from 'pure' performatives, therefore 
the 'I' of mythos (narrative, play), he accepts only the serious speech acts by bringing 
the 'serious' under the authority of the logocentric 'I'. Habermas, too, makes an anti-
mimetic move which maintains the metaphysical subjects' presence and truth as 
adequation. 
At stake, in early Heidegger, is the mode of the 'ready-to-hand'. The relation between 
the 'subject' and practical holism becomes the crucial question in Dreyfus' shift from 
cognitive representation, and from the subject/object relation, to presentation and 
exemplarity. Dreyfus, however, fails to address this question properly, let alone to 
respond to it. This explains his ambiguous position; that is to say, on the one hand, a 
regression to a cognitive intuitive subject; but, on the other, with the shift to the 
practical, the mimetic comes into play. The exemplar, then, like the onto-type, is that 
which, as a 'theoretical' decision, comes to stop the interminable generalized mimesis 
(dispersion). It gathers together and focuses implicit practices. This solves the question 
of how to stop the infinite play of mimesis if the opposition theory/practice is reversed, 
but not displaced. But it opens up another question which is registered in the 
problematic of identification. When the novice moves from the determinations of the 
logos (rules) to the practical (performance), the exemplar becomes the model to be 
imitated (e.g., the expert by the novice). In the mimetic identification with the model, 
the subject grasps itself (aesthetico-political solution). Here, there are two positions for 
identification which fall into the dichotomy of the active/passive subject [4]. 
Lyotard, on the other hand, as we have seen in chapter 7, starts with Kant. In the latter, 
the opposition between determinant/reflective judgment is the typology of the cognitive, 
and Kant's move to the aesthetic-reflective judgment is in opposition to the cognitive. 
Thus, the opposition being unchallenged, it is the cognitive-determinant paradigm 
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which still grounds the Kantian framework. Working from within such a framework, 
Lyotard moves from the meta-narrative to the narrative [5]. In the shift from the 
speaking subject, external to language, to the linguistic 'I', a mimetological subject 
emerges as an effect of the performative utterance. But, according to the determinations 
of the onto-type, such a 'subject' is by definition subjectless. For it cannot enter into 
the process of self-fictioning and, therefore, cannot constitute a being-proper. This 
explains why, on the one hand, by rejecting the onto-type, Lyotard is still under its 
metaphysical determination of proper/improper, and, on the other hand, he is obliged to 
accept a 'pure' ethical subject (an act of will). The latter assumes a 'pure' ethical order, 
an order without myths, that obligates and provokes respect for the law. In other 
words, by not thinking language (mythos/logos) and truth, by not challenging the 
oppositional logic of adequation/inadequation, he restores the 'proper' - the pure ethical, 
passive subject, asymmetric to the other. It is clear that the decision, with reference to 
logos/mythos, has always been a reversal of Platonism. Mimetology reverses the 
opposition and goes for the pure [6]. The instability introduced by the mimetic act is 
then stopped by an a priori (calculable) decision of either an onto-type or a pure-ethical 
order - the uncontaminated pure transcendental. 
It was intimated earlier that, for Heidegger, the onto-type is technology, and in the 
preceding discussion, two instances of methodological technicity were mentioned which 
take the argument beyond the critique of technicism implied in the subject/object 
ontology, as this has been advanced by Dreyfus' questioning of calculative rationality 
and Habermas' attempt to move away from instrumental reason. That is to say, first, the 
onto-type carries all the determinations of onto-ideo-logy, that is, of the theoretical (e.g. 
the optical). Secondly, both the onto-type and the position which simply rejects it, turn 
on an a priori decision as to how to stop the interminable generalized mimesis. This 
raises the question of what happens when a metaphysical limit is not posed. The final 
analytical question to be dealt with here of 'subject' constitution, Co-constitution and 
the other, is the response to this problematic of the irreducible undecidability of the 
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limits of logos/mythos, constative/performative, theory/practice. To start thinking of 
this problematic requires the displacement of the logocentric/cognitive paradigm, and, 
with it, any onto-typological solution to the problems of the practical. The displacement 
of metaphysics has repercussions for the traditional model of communication in which 
the concepts of subject constitution, co-constitution, intersubjectivity and the other are 
embedded, as we have seen in the case of Habermas' concept of communicative action. 
In all cases, as I argued in chapter 6 - whether structuralism, hermeneutics and/or 
humanism, determination by rules or context, etc - the dominant model of 
communication is understood as the transmission of meaning or sense from a sender to 
a receiver, in a specific context, whose expectations enable the receiver to delimit the 
ambiguity, and identify the intended meaning of the message. The source of all meaning 
is the intention of a subject-sender (the phonocentric subject) whose message is 
assumed to be carried to the receiver without failure. Furthermore, writing is assumed 
to be a substitute or representation of presence: of the voice (saying), and of the gesture 
(showing). Reading is comprehension, interpretation and capturing of the image. 
Derrida challenges this model by developing the notion of writing. This deconstructs 
the logic of identity which underpins the traditional interpretation of mimesis, 
destabilizing, in effect, the distinction between constative/performative, and displacing 
the traditional opposition of the active/passive subject. As has been shown, both 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida conceive of mimetism - be it techne/physis, 
language/reality, model/subject, rule/example, life/death - according to the stucture of 
'writing' - i.e., as an original supplementarity - which destabilizes the oppositions, 
contaminating them, and making them undecidable. On the 'subject', in particular, 
Lacoue-Labarthe writes: 
"...traversed from the very beginning by a multiple and anonymous 
discourse (by the discourse of the others and not necessarily by that of 
an Other), is not so much (de)constituted in a cleavage or a simple 
spaltung - that is, in a spaltung articulated simply in terms of the 
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opposition between the negative and presence (between absence and 
position, or even between death and identity) - as it is splintered or 
dispersed according to the disquieting instability of the improper." 
[1989:128] 
The question is how to think of this mimetism whose law is imprortiety. The term, 
(de)constitution, points to "a kind of 'originary' and 'constitutive' loss (of 'self)" 
[Lacoue Labarthe, quoted in Derrida:1989:16:n.9], which is prior to any self-
possession, and follows another logic than that of dispossession. The (de)constitution 
has to be thought of as lack, or insufficiency, a differance inherent in the 'subject' 
which forever prevents it from being a subject. Derrida suggests the term desistance 
which marks, in a better way, the middle voice [7]: "the subject is desisted without 
being passive" [1989:5]. He understands it as the condition (of (im)possibility) for any 
relation either to oneself (self-consciousness) or to an other (sociality). It is this deferral 
or 'delay' [Lacoue-Labarthe:1989:138] which, in preventing the 'subject' or the 
'community' from identifying itself (with itself or with the other) - i.e., from being 
identical - is the condition of (im)possibility of identification. 
Desistance marks the move away from a logocentric determination of communication 
and intersubjectivity. As I've argued earlier, Habermas' concept of communicative 
action is logocentric and expells radical alterity, in that it rests on phonocentric subjects 
with full presence, communicating with one another. This makes dialogue an extension 
of the process of reflection, and reduces the otherness of the other to being the object of 
a self-expansive appropriation. The other is treated as an alter-ego. I rely on Wood 
(1990) here (as Derrida's "Alterites" has not been translated into English) to refer to 
Derrida's distinction between two types of relation to the other - namely, mediation 
and interruption. The logic of the former is that of the restitution of identity, and that, 
I would claim, is Habermas' logic of intersubjectivity. Regarding the latter, Derrida 
writes: 
"To enter into a relation with the other, interruption must be possible: 
The relation (rapport) must be a relation of interruption. And 
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interruption here does not interrupt the relation to the other, it opens the 
relation to the other." 
[quoted in Wood:1990:126] 
It is clear that this is a development of desistance. I can better explicate 'opening the 
relation to the other' by following Nancy's concept of communication - which is close 
to Derrida's interruption - to enable clarification of intersubjective communication as 
interruption, and extend communication to community. What is important here is that 
communication and community is neither an abstract relationship, nor a common 
substance, nor a common being: 
"it is to be in common, or to be with each other, or to be together. And 
'together' means something that is neither inside nor outside one's 
being." 
[1990:159] 
In Nancy's formulation, this being-together is related to iterability in that he argues that, 
"...for an 'I' to have its own meaning, it, like any other signification, 
must be capable of being repeated outside of the presence of the thing 
signified. This can only happen either by means of the 'I' of another 
individual, or by means of the 'you' with which the person addresses 
me. In each case, 'I' am not before this commutation and 
communication of the 'I'." 
[ibid:159] 
This means that the constitution of the subject - the 'I' and the subject 'we' - can never 
attain full identification, and its work is infinite. Politics is interminable and can never 
become substantive. 
At this point, I must close off the discussion of the relationship between the political and 
the practical. I think I have said enough to indicate that, at the moment, practical 
discourse can slip too easily into an essentialism or substantialism (consensus, 
pluralism, liberalism) of the subject(s), or an aesthetic solution to the political, because 
of active mimetism, and thus totalitarianism or fascism. Such are the implications of 
technicism, that is, of the research methodologies' refusal to make a decision 
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concerning metaphysics. I think any textual labour has to follow through Heidegger's 
meditations of techne/physis, 'Work of art', work, technology, and, above all, his path 
through onto-typology to Riss. 
Commutation and communication/interruption could signify perpetual deferring without 
decision, political or otherwise. It is necessary to repeat here, in conclusion, as I have 
argued, that in order to displace the metaphysical presuppositions - as this is the ever-
open trap into which practical discourse may fall - it is necessary to be clear about 
decidability/undecidability; as well as to rethink its connection with desistance and 
stabilization/destabilization of subjects within society, as a field of forces. 
I am articulating inter-ruption and opening the relation to the other, with reinscription 
and strategic intervention, because interruption refers to, and takes into account the 
destiny of the 'mark' - namely, the possibility that chance intervenes, interrupts and 
diverts its destination (Derrida:1984b). Intersubjectivity, as mediation, assumes the 
other, and presupposes that the 'call' of the other is picked up necessarily. The 
dialogue is based on the ideal of openness and of vision, which involves commitment 
to presence. The dialogue becomes the bridge between two subjectivities. It is a drive 
for consensus which presupposes the representability of all views, and reduces the 
other to her/his capacity to represent herself/himeself (or to be represented). It is an 
appeal to a third party which suspends the singularity of the other. In contrast, 
intersubjectivity, as interruption, has the structure of writing: it is typographical. It 
implies no necessary link between the message and the receiver. The 'I' of the 
transmitter is dispersed in a narrative voice rather than in an identifiable narrator. The 
address (performative writing) is an interlacing of voices and sendings: "...addresses 
without message and without destination, without sender or decidable addressee..." 
[Derrida:1984a:34]. The uptake of the performative, of the 'call', is the point of 
reinscription of the 'subject'. It is a negotiation and a strategic intervention, the point of 
decision, and the point of judgment. One relates to another in the inter-, the 
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between; it is co-constitution. That is why interruption is an ethical moment. For, 
Denida writes, in the interruption of the cognitive, which marks the limits of 
knowledge, there is a "respect for the singularity or for the call...of the other" [quoted 
in Eisenstein:1989:283]. This ethical relation exceeds the limits of ethics. 
I must close yet again this avenue. The concept of listening to the language addressed, 
and hearing voices, could be 'co-constitutive' both of self-presence, and of the other. 
Beyond all experience, beyond the cognitive, decision in research comes about at this 
'moment' where the 'you' is situated - and consumed there - by dint of being 
addressed. The 'call' is the site of the mark of the necessity of decision within the 
undecidable. This is a new relation of the signer to the text, a second signature, 
different from that of an empirical signatory [8]: 
"...the signature becomes effective - performed and performing - not at 
the moment it apparently takes place, but only later, when ears will have 
managed to receive the message. In some way the signature will take 
place on the addressee's side..." 
[Derrida:1988b:50] 
I take the above quotation as a reminder that death/life is a shifting relationship. Its line 
is incalculable. If the 'I' dies at the moment that one starts 'writing', what is 'proper' to 
the 'self only comes from an other. This position leads from narcissism, mirrors, 
reflection, to images to echo to rhythm (cfLacoue-Labarthe:1989b), and, in so doing, it 




"The instance of krinein or of krisis (decision, choice, judgment, 
discernment) is itself, as is all the apparatus of transcendental critique, 
one of the essential 'themes' or 'objects' of deconstruction." 
[Derrida:1988a:3[ 
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As a result of my thesis, I would argue that it is now necessary and possible to initiate 
research on the relationship between Metaphysics and teaching, through the specific 
problematic of the theory/practice relationship. That is, having opened up questions of a 
theoretical generality, it should be possible to study 'pedagogical practices' and their 
administration: what the forms and norms of these practices are, what effects are aimed 
at and what effects are obtained? possible research in this area would be, for example, 
communication, dialogue, the master-pupil relationship; the model of the 'book', the 
lesson, the presentation, the thesis, the essay; procedures for verification and the real, 
repetition, the use of example; saying/showing, listening and the pedagogic obligation; 
the forces that empower and limit the teaching system, its legislation, its juridical and 
traditional code; forms and norms of evaluation, criteria and bureaucratic structures; the 
calculation of effects, no longer bound to the order of calculation between two poles of 
opposition, but to the incalculable call of the other - that is to say, decision, as the moral 
and political responsibility - and history and experience. 
Following the notion of strategies and reinscription, it would be necessary to research -
moving from the production/reproduction problematic - how the pedagogical structure is 
(re)inscribed within the so-called historical, political, social and economical fields; but -
none of these last words being reliable enough to be used easily - theorized as fields of 
forces, and in particular the perlocutions - that is, their effects: how does the 
pedagogical structure inscribe itself, how does it operate and represent to itself its 
inscription, how is it inscribed in its very representation, and how does it connect with a 
moral and political system that forms, at once, both the object and the actualized 
structure of pedagogy? 
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Above all, the theory/practice relationship is profoundly implicated within pragmatics as 
a linguistic field. My treatment of pragmatics shows that it is effecting a general 
redistribution and transformation of the field and the axiomatics of disciplines and 
educational research. These entail an essential co-implication of disciplines, and open up 
a space in which a certain number of phenomena, a multiplicity of problematics, will 
call for trans-, inter- and ultra-disciplinary approaches and explorations of discourses, 
which, up to now, have met nowhere, in no department, in no area of any discipline. 
Whether they concern speech acts, the speaking (empirical) or the linguistic subject, the 
relation between speech/writing and the effects on the so-called passive subject -
questions which must be made more specific with specific research programmes - they 
should still engage with the problematic of the 'performative' dimension. For, as Paul 
de Man's inquiry obliges us to conclude, 
"...constative language is in fact...performative, but...the possibility 
for language to perform is just as fictional as the possibility for 
language to assert...What seems to lead to an established priority... of 
language as action over language as truth, never quite reaches its mark. 
The episteme has hardly been restored intact to its former glory, but it 
has not been definitively eliminated either. The differentiation between 
performative and constative language...is undecidable; the 
deconstruction leading from the one model to the other is irreversible 
but it always remains suspended, regardless of how often it is 
repeated." 
[quoted in Derrida:1989a:134] 
The thesis has made it clear that, for Derrida, such an undecidability is the condition of 
all deconstruction: 
"in the sense of codition of possibility, indeed, efficacy, and at the same 
time in the sense of situation or destiny. Deconstruction is, on this 
condition and in this condition. There is in this a power (a possibility) 
and a limit. But this limit, this finitude, empowers and makes one write; 
in a way it obliges deconstruction to write, to trace its path by linking its 
'act', always an act of memory, to the promised future of a text to be 
signed. The very oscillation of undecidability goes back and forth and 




I will limit myself to what, I believe, are two unavoidable instances of 'basic' research 
that deconstruction, penetrated by a form of questioning and writing, poses, as an 
implication of the present thesis, as a (political and ethical) responsibility, at this stage 
of inquiry into cognitivism and the attempt to displace it. First, if it is indispensable 
especially to free the original possibility of ideal objects from historicist empiricism, and 
attempt to account for the historical specificity of a theory, a science and of any project 
of true discourse - that is to say, to pay attention to the original historicity of culture, 
language, theory, and of the institutions that theories are - then the question which 
deconstruction sets into motion is that of the relation between institutions, performatives 
which institute the institutions, and 'subjects'. 
Secondly, if the notion of the subject-in-desistance, brought up with the problematic of 
the logos/mythos distinction, resists the logic of identity-of-subject and indicates (a) that 
'sociality' is neither a positive choice, a reciprocal esteem of subjects, nor a coercion of 
pure force; and (b). that this 'splitting' does not take place in a subject but in the space 
of a dispersal and dissociation; and furthermore, if it can be offered as a working 
hypothesis - as this thesis has been led to accept - that the problem of identification, 
elided in practical discourse, is "the essential problem of the political" [Lacoue-
Labarthe:1989c:300], then, what is opened up is the thinking of the problem of 
'sociality' beyond, or, more accurately, between the only existing models - i.e., the 
free choice or coercion - and of the ontologico-political stakes of its 'identity'. For "we 
can no longer speak of the identification of someone with someone else. Neither of, nor 
with, nor by" [Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy:1989:203]. Thus we have to work on the 
difficulties of this 'sociality', and effect a gradual alteration of the traditional model of 
identification along the lines of mimesis; not as an imitation which implies a model of a 
subject and of an identity, or a figure set forth before an imitator, but, rather, as "the 




Notes to general introduction to the thesis 
1. A determination of the theory/practice distinction by a hierarchical model of the five 
senses, from Plato to Kant to Hegel, requires detailed investigation. 
Notes to chapter 1 
1. For reasons that will become apparent later on in this chapter, and more generally, in 
Part I of the thesis (esp. in chapter 4) I follow Dreyfus's reading, as referenced in the 
text, of both Husserl and Heidegger. When I refer to other sources, it is for purposes of 
clarification, and I do so only when I think that they do not offer a radically different 
reading of Heidegger. 
2. I should note here that Okrent ("Heidegger's pragmatism", Cornell University Press, 
London, 1988, p.10), in giving an account of what is at stake in transcendental 
arguments, wants to emphasise the structural analogies (cognitive/practical) between 
Husserl and early Heidegger. It is important to keep this in mind, because Dreyfus's 
account - which basically gives the direction of the present chapter - overemphasises 
differences and the break with the tradition in Heidegger's early work. But, as I will 
argue in this thesis, Dreyfus's account glosses over important questions, with serious 
consequences for any attempt to utilize, without submitting it to further scrutiny, the 
notion of practical activity found in this early Heideggerian framework. 
3. Perhaps it is interesting to note how often attempts to shake cognitivism are 
interpreted as a return to behaviourism. On this, see J. Coulter, "Rethinking Cognitive 
Theory", the Macmillan Press, 1983, p.2 and p.4, n.8 
4. See his "Intentionality", Cambridge University Press, 1983. See also the treatment of 
speech act theory in chptrs 5 & 6. 
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5. There is no need to go into the argument in detail here and raise objections, but see 
M. Okrent's "Hermeneutics, Transcendental Philosophy and Social Science", in 
"Inquiry", 27, 1984 
6. For a full account, see H. Dreyfus, "Holism and Hermeneutics" in "Review of 
Metaphysics", 34, 1980; Ch. Taylor, "Understanding in Human Science", ibid; R. 
Rorty, "A Reply to Dreyfus and Taylor", ibid; Rorty, Taylor and Dreyfus, "A 
Discussion", ibid; also, H. Dreyfus, " Why current studies of human capacities can 
never be scientific", Cognitive Science Program, Institute of Human Learning, 
University of California, Berkeley, Oct. 1983; R. Rorty, "Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature", Princeton University Press, 1979, chapter 7; M. Okrent, ref. n.5, above. 
7. I will have the opportunity to discuss aspects of this issue later on in section 6.3.3, 
but notice that this reading attempts to draw parallels between Heidegger and M. 
Foucault. This aim is explicitly formulated in Dreyfus', "Beyond Hermeneutics: 
Interpretation in Late Heidegger and Recent Foucault" (in "Hermeneutics: Questions and 
prospects", (ed). Gary Shapiro and Alan Sica, The University of Massachusetts, 
1984a). The article discusses, also, the Heideggerian hermeneutic interpretation as 
Dreyfus understands and develops it. See, also, H. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow, "Michel 
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics", The Harvester Press, 1982. 
Notes to chapter 2 
1. Report of panel 6, National Conference on studies in Teaching, Washington, DC, 
National Institute of Education, 1975, cited by C. Clark & P. Peterson, "Teachers' 
Thought Processes" in "Handbook of Research on Teaching", Ed. M.C. Wittrock, 
Collier, Macmillan, London, 1986, p.256. 
2. The debate started off as a response to official government policy on the 
improvement of teaching quality. The policy - outlined in the White Paper "Teaching 
Quality" (D.E.S., cmnd 8836, HMSO, London, 1983), reiterated and developed in 
"Better Schools" (D.E.S., cmnd 9469, HMSO, London, 1985) and in the "Initial 
Teacher Training: Approval of Courses", Circular 3/84 ( D.E.S., HMSO, London, 
1984) - was a consequence of the government's diagnosis of undesirable personal 
qualities among teachers, their low level of pedagogical skills, and weakness in subject 
expertise. The proposed remedies were training, screening and matching (see A. 
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Hargreaves, "Teaching Quality: A Sociological analysis", in "Journal of Curriculum 
Studies", 1988, vol. 20, No.3, pp.211-231), initiatives which have been interpreted as 
attempts at greater bureaucratic control over education (NUT: "Teaching Quality", 
London, 1984). Educationalists voiced their concerns by raising a series of questions 
concerning the nature of professional skill, of professional development, the systematic 
formal assessment requirement and standardization of competency as a quality control 
mechanism vs professional development, etc. See, for example, "The Quality 
Controllers: A critique of the White Paper 'Teaching Quality' (ed. F. Slater, Bedford 
Way Papers, no.22, Heinemann, 1985); E. Hoyle, "The Professionalization of 
Teachers: A paradox" (in "Is Teaching a Profession", Bedford Way Papers, No.15, 
London, 1985); C. Hunter, J. Elliott, D. Marland & E. Wormald, "Teacher Education 
and Teaching Quality" (in "British Journal of Sociology of Education", vol.6, No.1, 
1985); G. Grace, "Judging Teachers: The Social and Political Contexts of Teacher 
Evaluation" (in "British Journal of Sociology of Education", vol.6, No.1, 1985). 
3. G. Fenstermacher ("The place of Science and Epistemology in Schon's conception of 
reflective practice?", in P.P. Grimmett & G.L. Erickson (eds), "Reflection in Teacher 
Education", Vancouver Pacific Press & New York Teachers College Press, 1988) 
expresses his surprise about Schon's quite loose use of the notion of epistemology. 
Perhaps what is more important is Schon's general framework - i.e., his attempt to 
ground action and knowledge on reflection - as will become apparent in the text. 
4. "Schon's work [is]...an instance of a radical departure from conventional wisdom in 
Education and Educational scholarship" and "...has become an important source of 
stimulation and insight to educators everywhere." (L. Schulman, "The dangers of 
dichotomous thinking in Education" in P.P. Grimmett & G.L. Erickson (eds), 
"Reflection in Teacher Education", Vancouver Pacific Press & New York Teachers 
College Press, 1988, pp.36-37). Also, "[t]his provides the occasion for summarizing 
current studies that build on Schon's framework, and allows us to press the argument 
that although his work is not fully developed, many of the questions that require 
attention are empirical ones" (H. Munby and T. Russell, "Educating the reflective 
teacher: An essay review of two books by Donald Schon" in " Journal of Curriculum 
Studies", 1989, 21, p.71; my emphasis). Having been accepted as inspiring and 
stimulating, Schon's theoretical framework has been submitted to the 'test' of empirical 
investigations, in the U.S and Canada in particular. See, for example, H. Munby, 
"Reflection-in-Action and Reflection-on-Action" (paper presented at the annual meeting 
of the Americal Educational Research Association, San Francisco, March,1989); H. 
Munby & T. Russell, "Metaphor in the Study of Teachers' Professional Knowledge" 
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(paper presented at the annual meeting of the Americal Educational Research 
Association, San Francisco, March, 1989a); T. Russell, "Re-framing the theory-
practice relationship in in-service teacher education" (in L.J. Newton, M.Fullan & J.W. 
MacDonald (eds), "Rethinking Teacher Education: Exploring the link between research, 
practice and policy", Toronto, Joint Council on Education, University of 
Toronto/OISE, 1987); L. Turner-Muecke, T. Russell & J. Bowyer, "Reflection-in-
Action: Case Study of a Clinical Supervisor" (in "Journal of Curriculum and 
Supervision", Fall 1986, vol.2, No.1, pp.40-49). 
5. "In the original sense of the word metaphor - from the Greek metapherein, to carry 
across - they were engaged in a process of metaphor, carrying a familiar experience 
over to a new context, transforming in that process both the experience and the new 
situation." (D. Schtin, "Coaching reflective teaching" in P.P. Grimmett & G.L. 
Erickson, "Reflection in Teacher Education", Vancouver Pacific Educational Press & 
New York Teachers College Press, 1988, p.25) 
6. It is interesting to note that neither Schee himself has made any reference whatsoever 
to Kant's problematic, nor have any of the many commentators on his work 
acknowledged SchOn's employment of an aesthetic model. Whenever this has 
happened, it is in remarks such as the following: "...Scholl chooses to employ a curious 
logic. He suggests that the best practitioners are in some sense 'artistic'. Therefore, if 
one is to have artistic practitioners, one should consider emulating the training of artists. 
This reasoning does not seem to follow, since it implies that all graduates of design and 
music schools are artistic in the sense of being successful, competent performers, 
whereas they may only be artistic in the sense that they are engaged in artistic types of 
activities." ( G. Gilliss, "Schon's Reflective Practitioner: A model for teachers?" in P.P. 
Grimmett & G.L. Erickson, see ref. n.5, above). M. Selman ("Schon's Gate is Square: 
But is it Art?" (P.P. Grimmett & G.L. Erickson, op.cit. pp.177-192), in the same 
spirit, refers to the meanings of the word 'art' given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 
viz., (i) "skill, especially human skill as opposed to nature", and (ii) "imitative or 
imaginative skill applied to design, as in paintings, architecture, etc", in order to suggest 
that: "We cannot conclude that educational strategies which have been found to be 
effective in bringing about competent aesthetic performances should be similarly 
effective in developing artistry in enterprises which are less obviously aesthetic" 
(p.182). Further, distinguishing between situations in which aesthetic standards are 
central to judging the quality of practice and situations which require other value 
standards and where concepts, rules, procedures, theories and strategies play a more 
central role, he reaffirms a traditional dichotomy between skilful and scientific practice 
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and aesthetic judgment. This dichotomy, and more generally, the active 
indetermination of the concepts of judgment and skill in the current educational 
discourse in its most broad sense, and in professional education in particular, indicates, 
I believe, that we should make room for a systematic analysis of these terms. 
7. I am referring to J. Hills & C. Gibson's essay ("Reflections on Schon's The 
Reflective Practitioner" in P.P. Grimmett & G.L. Erickson, see ref.n.5, above) and I 
am saying 'unintendedly' because there is no problematic of the 'subject' in their 
account. They write: " From the evidence presented in the several case studies, one 
might conclude that Schon's practitioners have developed reasonable levels of analytic 
competence. They are reasonably fluent in the use of their own specialized linguistic 
systems. But one might also conclude that rather than having mastered those languages, 
they are bound by them. Nowhere in the material presented do we find any suggestion 
of reflexive processes or the attendent ability to shift at will from one 'notation system' 
to another." (p. 174). 
8. J. Lave's ( "Cognition in Practice", Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp.34-44) 
critique of what she calls 'the culture of transfer experiments' is a case in point. 
Laboratory experiments, she argues, present problems as if they were objective and 
factual; they are constructed 'off-stage' by experimenters for problem-solvers; the 
problems are bounded and once solved have no other consequences beyond success or 
failure. She notes: "in this genre, 'problems' are small-scale demands for an acquiescent 
problem-solver to operate on the information given by a problem-giver using algorithms 
or formal inferential reasoning to match a correct or ideal answer" (p. 35). Furthermore, 
they foster a static, objectified conceptualization of the powers of reasoning, and the 
subjects' performances are evaluated according to a predetermined ideal view of correct 
problem solutions. 
Notes to chapter 3 
1. As the following passage well demonstrates, M. Polanyi has a mentalistic 
conception of skilful performance and tacit knowledge: "He [the trainee] must try to 
combine mentally the movements which the performer combines practically, and he 
must combine them in a pattern similar to the performer's pattern of movements. Two 
kinds of indwelling meet here. The performer co-ordinates his moves by dwelling in 
them as parts of his body, while the watcher tries to correlate these moves by seeking to 
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dwell in them from outside. He dwells in these moves by interiorizing them. By such 
exploratory indwelling, the pupil gets the feel of a master's skill and may learn to rival 
him." ("The Tacit Dimension", Doubleday & Company, INC, New York, 1966) 
2. Wittgenstein himself has stated ("Philosophical Investigations", trans. G.E.M. 
Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford,1968, §23) that the "Tractatus" was one of the 
most traditional theories of language. To be sure, in the "Tractatus" Wittgenstein started 
from the presuppositions that the structure of language is revealed by logic, and the 
essential function of language is to describe the world. The ontological conclusions of 
this work can be summed up : in the first place, objects make up the substance of the 
world. Everything which is 'the world' is an empirical reality which is limited by the 
totality of objects. What is primary is the fact, i.e., objects related to other objects in a 
certain form. Language pictures the world in the sense that the relation among 
linguistic samples reproduces the system of relations among various objects. The fact 
that the elements of the picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents 
the fact that things are related to one another in the same way. If language can only be 
an example of complex propositions, ultimately based on elementary propositions 
which state a certain atomic fact, and if this is the only thing that language can do, the 
logical analysis shows the point language can reach and the point beyond which 
language cannot go. In the "Philosophical Investigations" Wittgenstein questions not 
only the assumptions of the "Tractatus" but also the considerations which led to that 
assumptions, that is: (a) the assertion that every proposition 	 has a perfectly 
determinate sense ; (b) that the process of analysis makes the sense of a proposition 
explicit and clear; and finally, (c) the assertion/assumption that the distinction between 
the simple and the complex is an absolute one. On aspects of these see H.F.Pitkin, 
"Wittgenstein and Justice" (University of California Press, 1972), chptr. IV; D. Pears, 
"Wittgenstein" (Fontana Press, London, 1971), pp.45-91; S. Kripke, "Wittgenstein on 
Rules and Private Language" (in Irving Block, "Persepectives on the Philosophy of 
Wittgenstein", Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1981), pp.273-276 & n.43, p.305. 
3. This is, for example, P. Winch's ("The Idea of the Social Science and its Relation to 
Philosophy", London, Routledge, 1958) interpretation of Wittgenstein's discussion of 
rules, which he, then, uses to argue about the type of understanding he believes should 
be sought by social sciences. T. Schatzki ("The Prescription is Description: 
Wittgenstein's view of the Human Sciences", in "The Need for Interpretation: 
Contemporary conceptions of the Philosopher's Task", (eds) S. Mitchell & M. Rosen, 
The Athlone Press, London, 1983, n.7, p.175) puts it in the following way. Winch 
claims to follow Wittgenstein when he argues that it is the actors' implicit understanding 
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of the rules governing their behavior that enables them to act in ways intelligible to each 
other. But this type of rule lies somewhere between two kinds of rules: it is like the 
rules, an expression of which is involved in action; that is to say, it is supposed to be 
the actor's cognizance of a rule that determines that he acts in a way that counts as an 
application of it; and it is like the rules which describe regularities, in that there is no 
conscious cognizance of them. Put in the context of the discussion of section 3.2, the 
rule that Winch attributes to Wittgenstein lies somewhere between the rule of the 
psychologist and that of the formalist. 
4. 'life' and 'lifeworld', basic concepts in the metaphysical tradition, as I will have the 
opportunity to indicate in subsequent chapters, are in need of scrutiny and systematic 
analysis. 
5. "Here he compares the verbal expression of the hope to a sigh, the instinctive 
expression of his state of mind, not a report on it. The AuBerung [manifestation] 
literally presents the state of mind; it doesn't represent it" (Edwards, "Ethics without 
Philosophy, Wittgenstein and the Moral Life", University Presses of Florida, Tampa, 
1982, p.197). 
6. On these uses of the term and the confusion that the term 'paradigm' caused see, 
esp., T. Kuhn, "Second Thoughts on Paradigms" (in his "The essential tension", The 
university of Chicago Press, 1977; see, also, M. Masterman, "The Nature of a 
Paradigm" (in Lakatos & Musgrave, "Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge", 
Cambridge University Press, 1970) esp. pp. 61-66. 
7. Less positivistic answers to the question have been suggested by M. Hesse ("The 
Structure of Scientific Inference", Macmillan, 1974, esp. pp.24-77, and pp.54-66), 
who develops a 'network model of science'. She writes from a post-empiricist point of 
view and stresses the hermeneutical features of science, though she still wants to hold 
on to some notion of 'correspondence' and coherence conditions in determining 
estimates of truth and correctness of applications. B. Barnes ("T.S. Kuhn and Social 
science", the Macmillan Press, 1982), also, developed the' notion of a 'conceptual 
fabric' in order to argue that scientific concepts are learned and used in two ways; viz., 
by ostension that displays instances of concepts and connects concepts to nature, and as 
components in laws and generalizations that convey what we can expect of those 
instances, connect concepts to each other, and make each one part of a system of verbal 
culture. 
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8. The incommensurability thesis asserts that there aren't any neutral criteria for 
translating the activities of two groups of scientists which have different models of 
scientific explanation (exemplars), or which do not share the same diciplinary matrix. 
9. 'Subjectism', in Heidegger, as distinct from 'subjectivity', is a syndrome of the 
modern age. 'Subjectism' is seen as resident in any philosophical position which takes 
the human phenomenon as its ultimate reference point: man becomes a creating being, 
the ground of the world that he himself forms and projects. On this, see R.L. 
Palmer "Hermeneutics" (Northwestern University Press), 1969, p.144 & p.144, n.6. 
10. For the ethnomethodological critique of the 'judgmental dope' of traditional 
sociology see my Appendix A, "Rationality as Practical Reasoning: The 
Ethnomethodological Case". 
Notes to chapter 4 
1. R. Hamm ("Clinical Intuition and Clinical Analysis: Expertise and the Cognitive 
Continuum" in "Professional Judgment", (eds) J. Dowie & A. Elstein, Cambridge 
U.P., Cambridge, 1988, p.97) argues that, in starting with the task, cognitive 
continuum theory is taking into account the effects of social and institutional settings 
upon the structuring of the task. The Dreyfus and Drefus model, in contrast, in starting 
with expertise, is ignoring such factors. But the whole point in the latter is that expertise 
is an effect of socialization into a practical whole, as it will become clear further 
below in the text. 
2. This is the way P. Benner ("From Novice to Expert: Excellence and Power in clinical 
Nursing Practice", Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, California, 1984) reads and 
uses the Dreyfus & Dreyfus model of skill acquisition to uncover and describe the 
knowledge embedded in clinical nursing practice. And H. Dreyfus ("Misrepresenting 
Human Intelligence", in Rainer Born (ed), "Artificial Intelligence: The case against", 
Groom Helm, London, 1987b, p.48) writes that, indeed, their model fits the data of 
this study, though they were collected independently. The methodological techniques 
for data collection included the 'critical incident' technique, interviews with pairs of 
beginning and experienced nurses on the same patient care situations, and interviews 
and/or participant observation of experienced nurse clinicians, newly graduated and 
senior nursing students. The approach was based on situation rather than on task 
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analysis, and the description, evaluation, and classification into the five-stage model of 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus concerned clinical situations, and avoided the classification of 
nurses into competency levels which would imply that they are supposed to possess 
traits or talents indicative of expertise. Qualitative interpretations of the data resulted in 
31 competencies which were classified into seven domains on the basis of similarity of 
function, and were presented in the form of 'exemplars' which depicted one or more of 
the competencies identified. 
3. On the paradigmatic example of the craftsman in Heidegger's writings, see Farwell, 
"Can Heidegger's Craftsman Be Authentic", in "International Philosophical Quarterly, 
vol.XXIX, No.1, issue No.113 (March), 1989, pp.77-90. 
Notes to chapter 5 
1. "The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society", 
vol.1 (trans. T. McCarthy, Heinemann, London), 1984; "The Theory of 
Communicative Action: The Critique of Functionalist Reason", vol.2 (trans. T. 
McCarthy, Polity Press), 1987. They will be referred to in the text according to the date 
of publication of the English translation. 
2. Although elaborated at length for the first time in "The Theory of Communicative 
Action", the topic of the 'lifeworld' is not entirely new in Habermas's vocabulary. In 
"A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests" (in "Knowledge and Human 
Interests", trans. J.J.Shapiro, Heinemann, London, second ed., 1978, p.369) reference 
is made to a diffuse 'life-praxis' seen as a backdrop to the 'praxis of inquiry' in which 
validity claims are scrutinized. In "Legitimation Crisis" (trans. T. McCarthy, 
Heinemann, London, 1976, pp.1-8) the notion of the 'lifeworld' is introduced to 
counterbalance the category of 'systemic' imperatives, that is, imperatives geared to the 
instrumental-rational efficiency of social systems. 
3. See, for example, Habermas' "Modernity- An Incomplete Project" in "Postmodern 
Culture", ed. Hal Foster (Pluto Press, London), 1985, pp.3-15; see, also, the collection 
of essays edited by R. Bernstein, "Habermas and Modernity" (Polity Press), 1985. 
4. See, for example, A. Giddens' "Labour and Interaction" in "Critical Debates", eds. 
J.B. Thompson and D. Held (The Macmillan Press, London), 1982 pp.149-161. 
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5. It is important to bear in mind this enlarged framework of grounding a notion of 
rationality as emancipation, in order to grasp the full significance of Habermas' move to 
language. But the tension in his work between the paradigm shift from the philosophy 
of consciousness to the philosophy of language and its commitment to modernity, is 
what is basically at stake. The move to language, of course, is not something unheard 
of within the marxist tradition. Gramsci's and Althusser's emphasis on language is well 
known. Neither of them, however, represents a complete break with the 
Base/Superstructure model, nor does either of them offer a radical critique of the labour 
paradigm of human activity. This is not to say, of course, that Habermas' 
communicative action is the only possible way out of this model. E. Laclau & C. 
Mouffe's "Ideolgy and Socialist Strategy" (trans. W. Moore & P. Cammack, 
Verso,1985) formulated a new conception of politics based on 'articulation' and 
'discourse', through a radical critique and deconstruction of marxist essential 
categories, Gramsci's in particular. 
6. In "What is Universal Pragmatics" (in Habermas, "Communication and the Evolution 
of Society", trans. T.McCarthy, Beacon Press, 1979, p.1) Habermas defines the task 
of universal pragmatics as that of identifying and reconstructing universal conditions of 
possible understanding. The task here, then, is to reconstruct the general 
presuppositions of communicative action, taking as fundamental the type of action 
which aims at reaching understanding. In note 1, p.208 he replaces 'formal' for 
'universal' pragmatics. 
7. The question of decision has been addressed at various levels by commentators of 
Habermas. T. McCarthy ("Reflections on rationalization in the theory of communicative 
action" in "Praxis international", vol.4, no.2, 1984, p.184) remarks that, as opposed to 
Weber who thought that questions of value were ultimately undecidable in any rationally 
binding sense, Habermas thinks them to be rationally decidable. S. Benhabib (in 
"Critique, Norm and Utopia", Columbia University Press, 1986, chapter 8) shows the 
problems that this position creates for Habermas' theory of communicative ethics. For, 
as Benhabib remarks, Habermas identifies the capacity to engage in arguments with an 
ethical commitment. Ferrara ("On phronesis" in "Praxis International", vol.7, nos.3/4, 
Winter 1987/8, pp.246-249) also makes the empirical observation that Habermas's 
theory cannot avoid the moment of indecision. More specifically, he remarks that this 
moment enters the discourse of critical theory (a) in so far as the ideal speech situation 
calls for a hierarchical and apriori ranking of its requirements if it is to serve as the 
yardstick for evaluating the rationality of consensus; and (b) insofar as Habermas' view 
of rationality, differentiated into the three domains which have different standards of 
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rationality, calls for the ability to determine the kind of rationality standard to be applied 
in a given situation. 
8. The return of some notion of 'active' subject, paradoxically, must now be seen as the 
return to the phonocentric subject but without an essentialism of the voice. That is to 
say, the problem now is voice, but it is the problem of a split voice, the multiplication of 
the voices, and no easy decision between cacophone and justice. Thus the new problem 
of voice and hearing and listening marks an interruption with the problematic of seeing, 
the clarity of vision and distinctness of the cognitive representation (see chapter 8). 
Notes to chapter 6 
1. On the analysis of the kind of reading that this thesis would like to point to, see 
sections 6.3.2, 6.4, and chptr 8. Suffice it here to point to Gasche's " Reading 
Chiasms: An Introduction" in A. Warminski's "Readings in Interpretation: Holderlin, 
Hegel, Heidegger" (Theory and History of Literature Vol.26, Minneapolis:University 
of Minnesota Press, 1987, p.xv), which clearly distinguishes between interpretation 
and reading: while interpretation requires an operation of decision making in a totalizing 
perspective, reading is the reading of the text's unreadability, i.e., its structural 
incapacity to lead itself to unequivocal and unproblematic totalizations. 
2. On 'schematism', see Derrida, "Limited inc" (Northwestern University Press, 
Evanston 1L,1988), p.147 and p.159 n.13; see also H. Rapaport, "Heidegger and 
Derrida: Reflections on time and language" (university of Nebraska Press, Lincoln & 
London, 1989), chapter 5, and the references to Derrida's work given there. 
3. This is how Schiirmann, in "Heidegger on Being and Acting:From Principles to 
Anarchy" (Indiana Univ. Press, 1987), proposes to read Heidegger's writings, namely 
to retain the three moments mentioned in the text, while renouncing the opposition 
between Heidegger I and Heidegger II. See esp. pp.17-18, 283, 285, 300, 314 n.46. 
J.D. Caputo in "Radical Hermeneutics", (Indiana Univ. Press,1987, p.308,n.13) 
expresses a similar view. Derrida, too, in "The Ends of Man" (in "Margins of 
Philosophy", trans. Alan Bass, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982, p.124) 
questions the validity of the distinction between an 'earlier' and a 'later' Heidegger. 
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4. The main direction and organization of this subsection is based on Gasche's study 
"The tain of the mirror" (Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press,1986). 
5. M. Taylor ( "Foiling Reflection" in Diacritics/spring 1988, note p. 58) explains that 
the term 'reflection' is used to refer to the paradigm of reflection, while 'reflexion' 
refers to Hegel's speculative philosophy. 
6. See Husserl's "Experience and Judgment" (trans. J.S. Churchill & K. Americs, 
Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973). 
7. The quotation is from M. Heidegger "The Question of Being" (trans. W. Kluback & 
J.T. Wilde, New York, Twayne, 1958), p.103. 
8. See M. Heidegger's "The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays" 
(trans. W. Lovitt, New York, Harper & Row, 1977a), pp.155-182. 
9. See, for example, D. Wood: "The deconstruction of Time" (Humanities Press 
International, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1989), pp. 297-309; also, his "Heidegger after 
Derrida", "Research in Phenomenology", vol.17, 1987; H. Rapaport:"Heidegger and 
Derrida: Reflections on Time and Language" ( University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln & 
London, 1989), esp. pp.257-264; Gasche: "Joining the Text: From Heidegger to 
Derrida", in J.Arac, W. Godzich, W. Martin (eds), "The Yale Critics: Deconstruction in 
America", University of Minnesota, 1983, pp.156-175; G. Bennington: 
"Deconstruction and the philosophers", "The Oxford Literature Review", vol.10,1988, 
p. 128 n.68; N. Holland, " Heidegger and Derrida Redux: A Close Reading" in 
"Hermeneutics & Deconstruction", (eds). Hugh J. Silverman and Don Ihde (State 
University of New York Press), 1985, pp.219-226. 
10. M. Frank links Derrida with "an unbroken irrationalist tradition since the Third 
Reich" (quoted in "Responses: On Paul de Man's wartime journalism", (ed) W. 
Hamacher et.al., University of Nebraska Press, 1988, p.20). See, also, M. Frank's 
("What is Neostructuralism", trans. S. Wilke & R. Gray, University of Minnesota 
Press, 1989, pp.215-221, 239) views on the similarities and differences between 
Tugendhat and 'Neostructuralism' (his term for 'Poststructuralism'), Derrida in 
particular. 
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11. See, also, Derrida's "Introduction to 'The origin of Geometry" (in J. Derrida, "E. 
Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction", trans. with a preface and afterword by 
J.P. Leavey,Jr, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln & London, 1978, 1989 
12. This metaphor, perhaps, will become more comprehensible if it is connected to 
Heidegger's problematic as this emerges in his writings after "Being and Time", and 
signalled in "The Origin of the work of Art" (in "Poetry, Language, Thought", trans. 
Albert Hofstadter, Harper Colophon edition, 1975). In his attempt to re-think the 
constitution of the modern, Heidegger addresses and confronts the discourse on 
aesthetics, the question of truth and representation, and the question of the formation of 
an historical subject - the question of the political/ethical. Lacaue-Labarthe ("Heidegger, 
Art and Politics", trans. Chris Turner, Basil Blackwell, 1990, pp.57-58) succinctly 
sketches the three strategies of the modern from which Heidegger distances himself. 
Two strategies, namely the dialectical and that of the 'rebirth', call on antiquity as a 
model (Greece) though they attempt to discover an authentic, deeper than the one that 
served as a model in Renaissance and classicism. The third strategy wants to liberate 
itself from the ancient as a condition for self-creation. For Heidegger, no modern can be 
constituted without inventing its relation to the ancient. The 'Greece' that he 'invents' 
has never seen the light of day, and repetition, for Heidegger, is repetition of what has 
not occurred. The importance of the move for the political is ably demonstrated by 
Lacoue-Labarthe, and some of its consequences inform my thinking in what I attempt to 
put forward in the final chapter of the thesis. 
13. "Limited inc", referenced in the text as Derrida 1988 (Northwestern university 
Press, trans. S. Weber), is a collection of three essays by Derrida - "Signature, Event, 
Context", "Limited inc abc...", and "Afterword: Toward An Ethic of Discussion" - that 
reconstruct the dispute between J. Derrida and J.R. Searle on issues related to speech 
act theory. The volume includes, also, an editorial note which is a brief summary of the 
main points of J.Searle's response to Derrida's first essay entitled "Reiterating the 
Differences: A Reply to Derrida" published by "Glyph", 1977. Unless otherwise cited, 
the references related to the debate are to the volume of "Limited inc". 
14. J. Derrida discusses "Differance" in his "Margins of Philosophy" (trans. Alan Bass, 
The Harvester Press, 1982) pp.1-27. 
15. On the consequences of the disruption of presence for the concept of 'structure' see 
J. Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" in J. 
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Derrida "Writing and Difference" ( trans. by Alan Bass, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London, 1978a). 
16. The dream or desire for totalization is evident, for example, within the analytical 
tradition in the post-Fregean philosophy which, as J. Llewelyn ("Derrida on the 
threshold of sense", MacMillan, 1986, p.112) writes, "[Waving being persuaded that 
the name has meaning only in the context of a sentence, it has gone on to teach that it 
has meaning only in the context of an entire form of life." E. Laclau ("Politics and the 
Limits of Modernity" in T. Mastnak & R. Riha (eds), "The Subject in Democracy", 
Institut Za marksisticne studije, Yugoslavia, 1988) describes this move in terms of the 
developments and transformations of the 'linguistic model', and locates it in the second 
stage in the history of structuralism. This phase is characterized by a loss of the 
specificity of the linguisic object'; speech and actions appear as differential positions 
with no way of distinguishing between those systems of differential positions proper to 
speech and the 'extra-linguistic' or 'extra-discursive' actions to which they are linked. 
As he goes on to explain, it is in the third stage of structuralism (post-structuralism) that 
the linguistic model is difficult to hold to the closed character of the system: " while the 
signified was ever less closed within itself and could only be defined in relation to a 
specific context, the limits of that context were increasingly less defined. In effect, the 
very logic of limit was increasingly more difficult to define" [ibid:26]. 
17. In contrast, B. Brown & M. Cousins ("The linguistic fault: The case of Foucault's 
archaeology" in "Economy and Society", vol.9, N.3, August 1980, pp 251-278) 
identify as the most serious problem in Foucault's "Archaeology of Knowledge" the 
lack of a theoretical account of the 'sign' on which his notion of the 'statement' 
depends. As they point out, the unwanted return of the 'sign' which places the text in an 
embarrassment necessitates that Derrida's arguments on the characteristic traits of the 
sign should be dealt with rather than dismissed. See esp. notes 11 & 12, pp 277-78. 
18. In note 1, p.77 of the study under consideration, Dreyfus & Rabinow warn that the 
situation is not quite so simple regarding the sharing of views among these thinkers. 
19. In an interview with Julia Kristeva on "Semiology and Grammatology" (Derrida, 
"Positions", trans. Alan Bass, The university of Chicago Press, 1981, pp.15-36), 
Derrida answers the question of whether grammatology is a 'science' with the following 
words (pp.35-36): "Grammatology must deconstruct everything that ties the concept 
and norms of scientificity to ontotheology, logocentrism, phonologism...This supposes 
a kind of double register in grammatological practice: It must simultaneously go beyond 
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metaphysical positivism and scientism, and accentuate whatever in the effective work of 
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science connbutes to freeing it of the metaphysical bonds that have borne on its 
definition and its movement since its beginnings." In this sense 'grammatology' marks 
and at the same time loosens the limit which closes classical scientificity. 
20. On Derrida's critique of the ideals of univocity and equivocity, and for an analysis 
of decidable and undecidable equivocity, see A. Cutrofello's "Derrida's deconstruction 
of the ideal of legitimation" (in "Man and World", 1990, vol.23, pp.157-173). 
21. Gasche ("The Tain of the Mirror', Harvard University press, London, 1986, 
pp.177-251) uses the general term 'infrastructure'. The latter term has been used by 
Derrida, though not very often (e.g. "Of Grammatology", 1976, p.164). Bennington 
("Deconstruction and the Philosophers", in OLR, vol.10, 1988, pp.80-81), also, refers 
to the tension or stricture of the univocal and the equivocal that Derrida's texts 
produce: "being able to understand this question of differential stricture...and its 
relationship with a thought of structure seems to us one of the more promising ways of 
going about reading Derrida." See also Bennington, ibid, pp.88-93 & p.142, n.41; and 
J.D.Caputo's "Den-ida as a kind of philosopher: A discussion of recent literature" (in 
"Research in Phenomenology", vol. xvii, 1987a, pp.245-259). 
22. See D. Wood, "The Deconstruction of Time" (Humanities Press, Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ., 1989), Part Four, chpt.3, and the "Postscript to the Question of 
Strategy", pp.293-318. 
23. Derrida, for example, asks in "My chances/ Mes Chances" (in J.H. Smith and W. 
Kerrigan (eds), "Taking Chances: Den-ida, Phychoanalysis and Literature", 1984b), 
p.20: " What is the difference between superstition or paranoia on the one hand, and 
science on the other, if they all mark a compulsive tendency to interpret random signs in 
order to reconstitute a meaning, a necessity, or a destination?" 
24. See, for example, J.Derrida, "The Truth in Painting" (trans. G. Bennington & I. 
McLeod, The university of Chicago Press, London, 1987b); I. Harvey, "Den-ida, Kant, 
and the Performance of Parergonality" (in "Derrida and Deconstruction", (ed). Hugh J. 
Silverman, Routledge, London,1989); Bennington's discussion on "the idea in the 
Kantian sense" in his "Deconstruction and the Philosophers" (in OLR, vol.10,1988), 
passim, and esp. p.110, and p. 129, n.73. 
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Notes to chapter 7 
1. This is how Cecile Lindsay, who translates Lyotard's essay "Judiciousness in 
Dispute, or Kant after Marx" (in "The Lyotard reader", (ed) Andrew Benjamin, Basil 
Blackwell, 1989, n.3, p.357), puts it. 
2. This is not the place to elaborate on Arendt's political judgment. I have only tried to 
indicate the problematic which shifts from the false problem of types of judgment 
(determinant vs reflective) to the question of judgment in the absence of rules - that is, 
as posed in "The Third Critique". This will become clear further below in the text. 
3. R. Beiner ("Interpretative Essay" in "H. Arendt: lectures on Kant's political 
Philosophy", (ed) R. Beiner, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1982, p.139) gives 
the following picture of the tension in Arendt's work, which, in Beiner's view, was 
resolved by her opting for a conception of aesthetic judgment : "on the one hand, she 
is tempted to integrate judgment into the vita activa, seeing it as a function of the 
representative thinking and enlarged mentality of political actors, exchanging opinions 
in public while engaged in common deliberation. On the other hand, she wants to 
emphasise the contemplative and disinterested dimension of judgment, which operates 
retrospectively, like aesthetic judgment." In Beiner's assessment, Arendt's later and 
most systematic reflection on the nature of judging resulted in a much narrower and 
perhaps less rich concept of judgment. Since Beiner himself is more concerned with 
finding a bridge between action and judgment, it is not surprising that the core ambition 
of his own "Political Judgment" ( University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983) is an 
attempt to combine Kant with Aristotle's notion of phronesis. But as F. Dallmayr 
remarks in his critical review of this book ("Between Kant and Aristotle: Beiner's 
Political Judgment" in "New Vico Studies", 1988) the fact that he does not accomplish 
the goal, reflects less on Beiner's ability than on the formidable character of the task. 
4. At stake in this move from the beautiful to the sublime is not only practical judgment 
but also the concept of communication, dialogue and community. The general thesis to 
which I'll return in my last chapter, is that the latter concepts have, as a determination, 
the aesthetics of the beautiful and with it that of egological intersubjectivity. 
5. According to M. Frank's ("What is Neostructuralism", trans. S. Wilke and R. Gray, 
Univ. of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1989, p.374) analysis of Deleuze's work, the 
latter seems to interpret Kant in a way similar to that of Schiirmann. For Deleuze, "the 
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self of the I think carries, within its essence, a receptivity of intuition in relation to 
which, already, 'I' is an other". That is to say, Deleuze's view is that in Kant's texts, 
difference successfully prevails over the identifying operation of representation or of 
reflection. 
6. R. Rorty formulates this position of a pragmatic relation of interlocution in his 
"Contingency, Irony and Solidarity", Cambridge University Press,1989. 
7. Comp. Derrida's ("Economimesis" in "Diacritics", vol.11, N.2 (summer), 1981a, 
pp.1-25) treatment of the Kantian analogy and his deconstruction of the 'Idea in the 
Kantian sense' as the disguised principle of differance. 
8. These studies were originally published in French in 1979, 1979, and 1983 
respectively. 
9. The question of listening is now becoming a complex topic of inquiry as the acoustic 
model begins to take over from the optical, specular, speculative model of 
representation. See my earlier note 8, in chptr. 5. 
10. There is a structure here between the performative and violence. The performative 
necessarily involves violence, in that the performative, qua undecidable, must 
necessarily break violently with old prior conventions in as much as these conventions 
are decidable. I touch here upon the relationship between metaphysics, pedagogy and 
violence as deserving detailed investigation to counter the naive presupposition that 
violence is either an accident or something that can be eliminated from the pedagogical 
scene. On the question of performatives and violence see, for example, Derrida's 
"Declarations of Independence" (trans. T. Keenan & T. Pepper, in "New Political 
Science", 1986, No.15"), and his "The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, in 
Admiration" in J. Derrida & M. Tlili (Eds), "For Nelson Mandela" (Seaver Books, 
New York, 1987d). 
Notes to chapter 8 
1. I am using the term without attempting to give it an analytical treatment. 
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2. Derrida lays out this problematic very clearly in "Sending: On Representation" 
("Social Research", 49 (2), 1982c) where, on the one hand, he acknowledges the 
importance of Heidegger, in that the latter addresses the problematic of the destination 
of representation - i.e., of the relationship between the epoch of representation and the 
great Greek epoch; but, on the other, he presses the issue further by posing the question 
of whether this relationship is not still interpreted in a representative mode - that is, 
whether it does not still presume the unity of a history of metaphysics. 
3. In "The Nazi Myth" (trans. Brian Holmes, in 'Critical Inquiry', Winter, 1990, vol. 
16, No.2) Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy argue that the onto-type of Nazism, in fact, 
breaks with the German romantic tradition in one important respect. While the latter 
focuses on 'mythos' - original language - as opposed to 'logos', the former links myth 
with nature (blood and soil), thus accentuating the elements of singularity, concreteness 
and embodiment, already present in the onto-type. 
4. In sociology, this is the problem, par excellence, in the debate between hermeneutics 
and structuralism. Theoretical research, in its move to the practical, moves to the active 
interpretive subject and to hermeneutics, the unseen determinants of active/passive, and 
the full presence of meaning and experience. But it is only when this assumption 
surfaces that the problem of micro-/macro-sociology can be addressed. 
5. Narrative autobiography and biography, which surfaces within practical discourse, is 
a similar move. Feminism, for example, rejects a male (cognitive) rationality, and 
attempts to find strategies of presentation. To what extent these strategies disengage 
themselves from a cognitive subject, a cognitive representation, and phonocentrism, on 
the one hand, and the pitfall of a pure ethical subject, is the crucial question. This makes 
the recent concern with developing sophisticated ways for the study of autobiography, 
especially interesting. 
6. There is no claim here that this logic is repeated in every specific text of analysis or 
research. This can only be decided on a specific reading. But the thesis is presenting 
evidence that the general logic, which is being described in the text, is in operation. 
7. On the 'middle voice', see J. Llewelyn, "Derrida on the threshold of sense" 
(Macmillan), 1986, pp.90-94. 
8. Perhaps it has become apparent that Derrida's "Signature, Event, Context", on which 
chapter 6 has drawn, is the essay which poses the problematic I have been discussing in 
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my final point in the text. The three notions of the title have been developed more fully 
in Derrida's subsequent work, for example, in 'Glas'. On this, see G.L.Ulmer, 
"Sounding the Unconscious", in "Glassary" (J.P.Leavey,Jr (ed), University of 
Nebraska Press, Lincoln & London), 1986. 
363 
APPENDIX A : RATIONALITY AS PRACTICAL REASONING: THE 
CASE OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 
In contrast to traditional cognitive approaches to social action, Garfinkel begins with an 
emphasis on the cognitive basis of action which goes well beyond routine references to 
the actor's definition of the situation. The `knowledgeability" thesis in Garfinkel's 
theory of action has two major underpinnings: first, the observation that the actors treat 
their own and one another's actions as the intelligible products of knowledgeable 
subjects. Secondly, the observation that the actors believe themselves to be, and treat 
one another as, confronted by real choices in conduct for which the chooser will be held 
accountable as the agent of his/her actions. Moreover, while the cognitive approach is 
based on hierarchies of preordained cognitive schemata, Garfinkel's analysis treats 
actions as reciprocally organized within a setting in which the actors' cognitive 
frameworks are instantiated as patterned interaction. As Heritage puts it: 
"Actions-as-constitutive-of-their-settings and settings-as-constitutive-
of-their-actions are two halves of a simultaneous equation which the 
actors are continually solving through a mass of methodic procedures. 
It is through these methods, brought to bear on a temporal succession 
of actions, that actors are continually able to establish the 'state of play' 
between them, to grasp the nature of the circumstances in which they 
are currently placed and, not least, to assess the moral character, 
dispositions and identities of those with whom they are dealing." 
[ibid:1984:308] 
For Garfinkel, what is lost in the treatment of actors as 'judgmental dopes' is the 
principled approach to the practical reasoning of ordinary actors in situations of 
action [Heritage:1987:240-248]. That is to say, Garfinkel emphasises the cognitive 
availability and moral accountability of norms - i.e., their constitutive rather than 
determining or regulative character; the constitutive role of time in the organization of 
activity - i.e., the interpretative role of retrospective and prospective temporal sequences 
which, for Garfinkel, are central to understanding the socially and temporally organized 
character of activities; and the mutual elaboration of 'action' and 'context' - i.e., the 
conceiving of a situation as the presupposition, project and product of its own 
constituent actions, and the analysis of each constituent action as the establishment, 
adjustment, restoration, alteration or breach of a given context. The latter, it is argued, 
displaces the problematic of the relationship between general norms and the diverse set 
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of unique action situations. Thus the gap that exists within cognitivism between norms 
and the domains to which given norms apply, and norms and their concrete application 
is not a problem for ethnomethodologists. For, on the one hand, the situation of action 
is said to be uniquely and indefinitely describable, but, on the other hand, the concern is 
with asking about the very possibility of being able to see in, say, a scientist's activities 
how science is actually, really, normally, properly done. While this involves a direct 
examination of what relevant people are doing, the interest in the case is not in terms of 
its potential for generalization: 
"The methodological question, what is the relationship between this 
instance, on the one hand, and such things in general, on the other? 
gives way to how do the activities going on here connect into, organize 
themselves into, the business of science?, and this is plainly an 
organizational problem." 
[Sharrock & Anderson:1986:90] 
Thus the subject matter of ethnomethodology is the localized - rather than local -
character of work. That is to say, it is concerned with the ways in which competent 
practice of scientific investigation, artistic creation, mathematical reasoning, etc., is 
procedurally achieved, and requires more than the mastery of general principles by the 
mathematician, scientist or artist. In short, its subject matter is the phenomenon itself, 
i.e., the practitioners' inquiries which are as much worked-up-as-they-go-along as they 
are done according to rigid and laid down formulae [Sharrock & Anderson:1986:91]. 
The reflexive character of these activities - i.e., the fact that descriptions are part and 
parcel of the activity to be described - places the ethnomethodologist's descriptions and 
the accounts of the actor on the same level, for what matters is not the truth of the 
description but the way in which descriptions are related organizationally to the activities 
they describe. The target, therefore, is not the study of the practitioners' accounts but of 
accounting practices, and reflexivity points to the problem of specifying the ways in 
which every aspect of a situation of action, its participants, their rationalities, and their 
motives can be known through the reflexive accountability of its constituent deeds. 
In what follows, I would like to limit myself to raising the question of whether 
ethnomethodology has thought through its move from the cognitive paradigm to 
practical reasoning, and to indicating a possible path for investigating this question. It 
should be remarked that, as opposed to the main positions discussed in the text (chapter 
3) which move from a rejection of theory and of language as a rule-governed system to 
the practical realm, through the notion of exemplar/example, ethnomethodology does 
not altogether abandon the notion of theory. Moreover, in contrast to traditional 
sociology which seeks to develop explanatory theories, the aim of ethnomethodology is 
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to identify and describe phenomena. It thus puts forward a limited notion of theory (as 
investigative maxims), a notion of reflexivity of activities, instead of the view of a 
subject reflecting upon an object, and a notion of rules as a set of instructions, rather 
than as determinants of action. 
I believe that the immediate problem that ethnomethodology has to face in this move is 
the problem of displacing the dichotomy between totalization/empiricism. Furthermore, 
a tentative set of questions for investigating this problematic should include an account 
of language underlying ethnomethodology. Table A.1 describes the main features of 
empiricism and its linguistic version (cf. Hobson, 1982). 
VERSIONS OF EMPIRICISM 
EMPIRICISM (1) LINGUISTIC EMPIRICISM (2) 
Any system of knowledge is 
provisional and incomplete 
(a)  
Knowledge is limited. 
The limitation is attributed to the 
human mind relative to the richness 
of the world. 
Language is essentially incomplete. 
The limitation is attributed to language 
(discourse) relative to the irreducibility 
of an infinite world. 
(b)  
Inadequacy of the cognitive human subject. 
The moral subject is invoked to justify 
his/her actions in specific contexts 
Meaning is infinite (polysemantic) but 
the text itself is closed, i.e, hermeneutic. 
(c)  
Reference to the finitude of experience Reference to the indeterminacy of 
meaning 
(d)  
Invoking a moral-practical subject. An active subject is invoked to interpret 
(totalize) the hermeneutic text. 
(e)  
Table A.1 
In an earlier debate on ethnomethodology, Phillips (1978) focuses on Garfinkel's 
notion of indexicality, and attempts to show that this notion depends on an account of 
meaning which holds that meaning is deeply connected to 'experience'. Phillips 
suggests that this empiricist account of language, which holds that knowledge gained in 
experience accounts for how members understand language, renders the meaning of 
terms indefinitely problematic through scepticism about that knowledge. To a certain 
extent, his argument relies upon demonstrating that Garfinkel's conception of language 
is not consistent with Wittgenstein's, a fact which becomes apparent upon an 
examination of the differect notions of 'practice' employed by the two thinkers. 
In his response to Phillips, Heritage (1978) claims that there is an important 
convergence between Garfinkel and Wittgenstein. He locates this convergence on the 
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common assumption of the indefiniteness of descriptive resources which is opposed 
to a finite, rule-based theory of meaning. Thus Heritage's argument is that rather than 
deriving from sceptical considerations about the nature of human, linguistic or 
conceptual resources, the approach to decriptive accounts developed by Garfinkel's 
studies has to do with the indefiniteness of language itself. 
If Heritage's point is accepted, Garfinkel's ethnomethodology shares assumptions 
coming from both versions of empiricism, as table A.2 indicates. The assumption of 
indexicality, I would argue, plays the role of 'saving' the theory in the face of 
inconsistences stemming from the two versions of empiricism; for example, between a 
moral practical subject and an active hermeneutic subject. 
THE LINGUISTIC EMPIRICISM OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 
Language is a limited set of instructions 	 (la) 
Language is essentially incomplete. 
The limitation is attributed to language (discourse) 
relative to the irreducibility of an infinite world 	 (2b) 
Inadequacy of the cognitive human subject. 
The moral subject is invoked to justify his/her actions 
in specific contexts 	 (lc) 
Alternatively, meaning is infinite. 
	 (2c) 
Reference to the indeterminacy of meaning 	 (2d) 
Empiricism (moral-practical subject) 	 (le) 
or, 




Following the notion of indexicality, it has been argued that it expresses Garfinkel's 
attempt to break with a notion of language as a system of representation and the 
associated mentalistic overtones of subjectivity. It substitutes a stress on meaning-
in-context, and the order or rationality of an event is placed in the attempted 
replacement of 'indexical' with 'objective' expressions. Phillips [op.cit.:57-58] 
emphasises two diversions in Garfinkel's use of this notion: (a) Garfinkel extends it and 
asserts that all uses of language are indexical, as opposed to the 'normal' use of 
indexicality to denote terms which do not have a definite reference (this, him, here, etc.) 
and which are contrasted either to terms that specify some referent uniquely or to 
general terms that are good for whole classes of referents; (b) contrary to the traditional 
problematic which considers individual expressions as a nuisance that requires 'repair' 
in order to formulate a theory of language use, Garfinkel understands indexicality as the 
general task of any inquiry (of the lay member and of the ethnomethodologist alike). 
Thus, social order, rationality and normality rest on the successful demonstration of 
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'fit' between a rule and a present situation. This must always be problematic, and a 
member's achievement - not in any final sense, but 'for all practical purposes'. 
However, I would like to suggest that the two notions of indexicality co-existent in 
Garfinkel's ethnomethodology (table A.3) make obvious the oscillation between a 
moral-practical and an active subject. 
1NDEXICALITY 
refers to an incomplete rule the use of which 
	
is generalized. 
(its 'repair') must be justified in the specific 	 Meaning or sense is always indexed 
context through the practices of the (moral) 	 as is necessarily in need of 
subject. 	 (No 1) 	 interpretation 	 (No 2) 
Table A.3 
Furthermore, in the case of indexicality No.1, we have to understand the situation as 
unique (thus the requirement of an incomplete rule). The ethnomethodologists' rejection 
of the uniqueness of the situation (for example, Coulter, quoted in Phillips:ibid:73,n.7; 
Heritage,1978], and their claim that the force of indexicality lies solely in its stress on 
the contextness of meaning (indexicality No.2), makes the equally problematic assertion 
that meaning is inseparable from context (see section 6.3.2 in the text). 
Finally, the inconsistencies in the notion of indexicality are reflected in the different 
notions of practice employed in ethnomethodology. Phillips correctly points to the 
gulf between two meanings of practice, viz., one theoretically specified by Garfinkel, 
the other, much broader, and demonstrated in empirical studies. In his view, the second 
is more in accord with Wittgenstein's notion of practices as recurring situations of doing 
things - including particular linguistic usages - based on the assumption that the rules of 
language are necessarily embedded in practical contexts. As opposed to the theoretical 
specification of practices as a member's methods for the 'repair' of indexicality, which 
presupposes the existence of a problem and work for its solution, Phillips remarks, in 
Wittgenstein's notion of practice there is no problem and no work. For it is essential to 
the latter's position that individuals or groups find certain usages 'natural' and 
'obvious', and to question the knowledge involved makes no sense to them. I have 
already discussed Wittgenstein's critique of rules [1], but what is significant here is that 
some empirical ethnomethodological approaches, claiming to adopt an approach to 
language similar to that of Wittgenstein, have, in fact, replaced a calculus with a notion 
of typified practices. For reasons of clarity, table A.4 below includes two further 
conceptions of practice which result from different readings of Wittgenstein (see 
sections 3.3 and 3.4 in the text). 
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CONCEPTIONS OF PRACTICES 
Practices are the methods and resources of the actor in the situated accomplishment of 
'objectivity'. 
(No 1) 
They refer to the way in which particular linguistic usages are necessarily embedded 
in devices involving rule-bound relations to types of practical activity. 
(No 2) 
They are recurring activities which cannot become an object of representation and are 
determined by context (or a form of life). 
(No 3) 




Notes to Appentix A 
1. I have already mentioned that, prior to "Philosophical Investigations" and after the 
"Tractatus", there is a Wittgensteinian position which holds on to the notion of a rule. 
The later Wittgenstein obviously rejects this view. 
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